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Abstract 
This thesis aims to expand knowledge regarding the socio-economic and political aspects of 
the western Indian Ocean (WIO) tuna fisheries at different levels - local, national, regional. 
The thesis was written at a time when ocean-based activities are high on the agenda of 
governments and other stakeholders in a wave of interests for the blue economy, including in 
Africa and in the Indian Ocean. With increasing signs of collapse of some tuna stocks in the 
WIO, the thesis unveils the complexities of managing fishing activities of a highly valuable 
and mobile marine species such as tuna. To this end, the research answers the question: How 
do socio-economic and political processes shape the management of tuna fisheries in the 
Western Indian Ocean? To respond to this question, I will look at three aspects: narratives 
around the state of tuna resources, access politics and regionalism. 
A political ecology approach is used for the research. Political ecology as a field of study 
pays particular attention to politics in its attempt to understand human-environment 
interactions. The study focuses on three countries in the WIO: Madagascar, Mauritius and the 
Seychelles. These countries were used to build a regional perspective. The thesis is based on 
empirical data collection and analysis, notably of documents regarding the fisheries, semi-
structured interviews, and observations of fishing activities, landing at ports and decision-
making during regional meetings.  
The thesis makes three main arguments. Regarding the state of tuna resources, the thesis 
demonstrates that local fishers have developed strong discursive claims that they use to 
contest exploitation by industrial actors. Industrial actors, on the other hand, perceive 
themselves as unjustly accused of being the main responsible for overfishing in the region. In 
the case of tuna fisheries in the WIO, discursive power is not only exercised by usual 
powerful actors; small-scale fishers have built over the years a powerful narrative of tuna 
being overfished, with the support of actors such as NGOs and the media.  
As for access politics, the thesis highlights that while rights-based mechanisms set the 
foundations for the possibility of equal access to the fish through various legal arrangements, 
structural mechanisms present a clear picture of unbalanced and unequal access between the 
various actors of the fishery. These power relations and conflicts are aggravated by the 
materiality of the tuna resources and the western Indian Ocean. The thesis also argues that 
local and national stakeholders in the fishery are at different times and spaces both winners 
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and losers; the foreign industrial actors are consistent winners; and the fish - or its 
sustainability - a consistent loser.  
With respect to regionalism, the thesis unravels the importance of both local socio-economic 
contexts, geopolitical interactions and their role in advancing or not regional cooperation and 
identity. It also shows that capitalist exploitation of the resources involving geopolitical 
actors strongly influences regional management and use of the resources. For regionalism to 
truly exist in the WIO, building stronger links between countries, the WIO people and 
through tuna fisheries is essential.  
For the WIO countries to continue to benefit from tuna fisheries, three action points are 
needed: take management measures that prioritise the long-term sustainability of tuna instead 
of political and economic interests; assess the impact of various types of tuna fisheries on 
livelihoods, food security and the state of resources; and promote regional initiatives that 
highlight the shared socio-economic and cultural values of tuna in the WIO region. 
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Résumé 
Cette thèse vise à élargir les connaissances sur les aspects socio-économiques et politiques de 
la pêche au thon dans l'Océan Indien Occidental (OIO) au niveau local, national, et régional. 
La redaction de la thèse s’est faite durant une période où les activités basées sur l’utilisation 
de nos océans figurent comme priorités dans l'agenda des gouvernements et des autres parties 
prenantes dans une vague d'intérêts pour l'économie bleue, notamment en Afrique et dans 
l'océan Indien. Considérant les nombreaux signes d'effondrement des stocks de thons dans 
l'OIO, la thèse décortique les complexités de la gestion d'une espèce marine mobile et de 
haute valeur économique telle que le thon. La question de recherche est la suivante: 
Comment les processus socio-économiques et politiques façonnent-ils la gestion de la pêche 
au thon dans l’Océan Indien occidental? Pour répondre à cette question, trois aspects seront 
analysés: les récits sur l’état des stocks de thons, les politiques d’accès et le régionalisme. 
Une approche Political Ecology est utilisée pour cette recherche. En tant que domaine 
d'étude, la Political Ecology accorde une attention particulière aux aspects politiques des 
interactions entre l’Humain et l'environnement. L'étude se concentre sur trois pays de l’OIO : 
Madagascar, Maurice et les Seychelles, qui ont été choisis afin de développer une perspective 
régionale. La thèse est basée sur la collecte et l'analyse de données empiriques, incluant des 
documents concernant les pêcheries, des entretiens semi-structurés, et des observations.  
La thèse avance trois arguments principaux. Premièrement, en ce qui concerne les récits atour 
de l’état des stocks de thons, la thèse démontre que les pêcheurs locaux de l'OIO ont 
développé de fortes revendications discursives qu'ils utilisent à différents niveaux pour 
contester l'exploitation thonière par les acteurs industriels. En revanche, les acteurs 
industriels se considèrent comme injustement accusés d'être les principaux responsables de la 
surpêche dans la région. Dans le cas de la pêche au thon dans l'OIO, le pouvoir discursif n'est 
pas seulement exercé par les acteurs puissants habituels; les petits pêcheurs ont construit au 
fil des années un puissant récit de la surpêche au thon, avec le soutien d'acteurs tels que les 
ONG et les médias.  
Deuxièmement, en ce qui concerne les politiques d'accès, elle souligne que si les mécanismes 
basés sur les droits posent les jalons d'un accès égal aux ressources par le biais 
d’arrangements juridiques divers, certains mécanismes structurels reproduisent un accès 
déséquilibré et inégal entre les différents acteurs impliqués. Ces relations de pouvoir et ces 
conflits sont aggravés par la matérialité des ressources thonières et de l'OIO.  
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Troisièmement, concernant le régionalisme, la thèse démontre que l'exploitation capitaliste 
des ressources impliquant des acteurs géopolitiques influence fortement la gestion et 
l'utilisation des ressources au niveau régional. Pour que le régionalisme existe réellement 
dans l'OIO, il est essentiel de renforcer les liens entre les pays et les populations de l’OIO; 
notamment par le biais de la pêche au thon.  
Pour que les pays de l'OIO continuent à bénéficier de la pêche au thon, trois points d'action 
sont nécessaires : prendre des mesures de gestion qui privilégient la durabilité à long terme 
du thon plutôt que les intérêts politiques et économiques; évaluer l'impact des différents types 
de pêche au thon sur les moyens de subsistance, la sécurité alimentaire et l'état des 
ressources; et enfin, promouvoir des initiatives régionales qui mettent en évidence les valeurs 
socio-économiques et culturelles communes concernant le thon dans la région. 
  
  ix  
Acknowledgements 
A thesis always necessitates a tremendous amount of help and advice. In the end, many 
people are behind the production of one. My thesis could have not been completed without 
the assistance, support and ideas of the following people.  
First, I would like to express my profound gratefulness to Professor Christian Kull. He hired 
me as a graduate assistant and gave me the opportunity to do this PhD, in a topic of my 
interest that he accepted to explore. He has been an outstanding supervisor, boss and human 
being. With his unshakeable good mood, he always responded promptly to my endless 
requests of advice, reviews and meetings. He also let me investigate different ideas while 
never missed to send interesting literature, calls for papers and conferences – many of which 
resulted in publications. And not least, he has been a great foundation for my arrival and still 
navigating of how ‘to be’ in Switzerland.  
My gratitude also goes to the many great minds that advised me all the way, including my 
committee advisors and jury members, Prof. Valérie Boisvert, Prof. Liam Campling and Prof. 
Christina Hicks. I am also thankful for the editors, co-authors and anonymous reviewers that 
helped improve the quality of my papers and the ideas in the thesis in general.  
The results of the thesis were obtained through interesting discussions with 200+ people that 
I met in different countries. They have given their time and ideas. I hope that the thesis gives 
justice to their views.  
Working in three countries would have not been possible without my research assistants 
Pamima Leste, Patsy Theresine and Safina Echa. They have made my fieldwork enjoyable, 
efficient and especially they were so much invested in the research, always asking for a few 
more minutes or a last question to our interviewees.  
Doing a PhD is often described as an endeavour done in a precarious environment. It was not 
the case for me thanks to the Institut de Géographie et Durabilité (IGD), my ‘lab’. The IGD 
provided a comfortable office, excellent equipment and funding for the research and 
conferences. I thank the directors and commissions that approved my various funding 
requests. My appreciation also goes to Marcia, Carole and Manon who always gave me their 
best in terms of admin, equipment, documentation and so much more. I also thank my many 
colleagues that made days at the office very agreeable with lunch breaks full of interesting 
(academic and non-academic) talks. My special thanks go to my office mates, Hélène, 
Jérémie, Laura and Florence. They supported me and picked me up on the low days, while 
  x  
inspiring me to work hard - as they did. I also need to mention Jérémie and Daniel with 
whom I built a great friendship in and outside the office. They taught me the key to the PhD 
journey: working hard and also/especially keeping a social life. 
I am also very thankful for my family. I have been blessed by meeting my life partner, Dan, 
at the start of the PhD. He has been a co-passenger on the roller-coaster journey and at many 
times his “you gotta just sit and write”, pushed me to move forward. I also thank my family 
in Madagascar and my in-laws in the UK who encouraged me all the way. In the fourth year 
of my PhD, I got Isabelle Miangaly, the sweetest baby. She slept the night very early on to let 
me rest and always let me work when I needed to.   
There are also distant people that have engineered this PhD from the referees that helped me 
to get the job to those that helped me attend meetings in various countries. Amongst others, 
those are Prof. Nigel Leader-Williams, Alasdair Harris, John Burton, Martin Purves and 
Frederic Le Manach. I am also especially indebted to Dan, Daniel Baehler, Daniel Owen, 
Laura Neville, Ross Shackleton, Florence Betrisey, David Amuzu and Jérémie Sanchez for 
the very insightful proofreading of this thesis, which they agreed over a very short notice.  
Finally, many parts of my thesis were the very result of unexpected encounters and 
favourable events that I believe were put on my way by the universe. I would like to express 
my deep gratitude to the one that created all things, whoever you may name Him/Her/It.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  xi  
Table of Contents 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... v 
Résumé .................................................................................................................................... vii 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... ix 
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................... xi 
List of Figures .......................................................................................................................... xv 
List of Illustrations ................................................................................................................... xv 
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................... xvi 
List of Acronyms .................................................................................................................. xvii 
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Gap in society and stake of the research ......................................................................... 2 
1.2. Aim of the research and research questions .................................................................... 4 
1.3. Personal motivation ......................................................................................................... 6 
1.4. Structure of the thesis ...................................................................................................... 6 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND POLITICAL ECOLOGY AS A 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................................... 11 
2.1. EARLY ‘MARINE’ POLITICAL ECOLOGY ........................................................ 13 
2.1.1. Challenging the narrative of ‘the tragedy of the commons’ ................................................................13 
2.1.2. Debating the making of science and knowledge .................................................................................15 
2.1.3. Acknowledging the role of non-humans .............................................................................................17 
2.2. RECENT TRENDS IN ‘MARINE’ POLITICAL ECOLOGY .............................. 18 
2.2.1. Blue economy and blue (de)growth ....................................................................................................18 
2.2.2. Refocussing on the sea and its people .................................................................................................20 
2.3. TUNA FISHERIES AS ADDRESSED BY POLITICAL ECOLOGY AND 
OTHER DISCIPLINES ..................................................................................................... 24 
2.4. BUILDING A POLITICAL ECOLOGY FRAMEWORK FOR THE WIO TUNA 
FISHERIES......................................................................................................................... 31 
2.4.1. Analysing claims about the state of nature and claims about these claims .........................................31 
2.4.2. Tracking winners and losers ................................................................................................................32 
2.4.3. Exploring human and non-human dialectics .......................................................................................34 
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................ 36 
3.1. FIELDWORK.............................................................................................................. 36 
3.2. METHODS .................................................................................................................. 39 
3.2.1. Interviews ............................................................................................................................................39 
3.2.2. Observations ........................................................................................................................................41 
  xii  
3.2.3. Document analysis ..............................................................................................................................44 
3.3. DATA ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................... 45 
3.4. CHALLENGES IN DOING THE RESEARCH ...................................................... 47 
3.4.1. Unaddressed subjects ..........................................................................................................................47 
3.4.2. Investigating sensitive subjects, ‘at home’ ..........................................................................................48 
CHAPTER 4. TUNA FISHERIES IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN .................... 52 
4.1. THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION ......................................................... 54 
4.1.1. Geography of the western Indian Ocean (WIO) .................................................................................54 
4.1.2. The tuna of the WIO ............................................................................................................................55 
4.2. MADAGASCAR: A SEA OF FISHERS BUT A LIMITED TUNA FISHERY .... 60 
4.2.1 Key players ...........................................................................................................................................61 
4.2.2. The segments of the tuna fishery .........................................................................................................66 
4.3. MAURITIUS: FACILITATED INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS 
FOR TUNA EXPLOITATION ......................................................................................... 70 
4.3.1. Key players ..........................................................................................................................................71 
4.3.2. The segments of the tuna fishery .........................................................................................................75 
4.4. SEYCHELLES: THE WIO CENTRE FOR TUNA EXPLOITATION ................ 78 
4.4.1. Key players ..........................................................................................................................................79 
4.4.2. The segments of the tuna fishery .........................................................................................................82 
4.5. DISTANT ACTORS ................................................................................................... 86 
4.5.1. Distant Water Fishing Nations, their fishing firms and fishing associations ......................................86 
4.5.2. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), NGOs and research centres ......................................................89 
4.5.3. International forums ............................................................................................................................90 
CHAPTER 5.  THE STATE OF TUNA RESOURCES IN THE WIO AS PERCEIVED 
BY DIFFERENT ACTORS .................................................................................................. 96 
5.1. BUILDING A FRAMEWORK EXPLORING NARRATIVES AROUND THE 
STATE OF TUNA RESOURCES .................................................................................... 97 
5.1.1. Discourses and narratives in political ecology ....................................................................................97 
5.1.2. The analysis of discourses and narratives in this thesis ....................................................................100 
5.2. TUNAS AS OVERFISHED IN THE WIO ............................................................. 102 
5.2.1. Elements of the discourse: local perceptions and written assessments .............................................102 
5.2.2. Actors (re)producing the overfishing discourse ................................................................................106 
5.2.3. The narrative of the WIO local fishers: “they take all our tuna” ......................................................107 
5.2.4. The narrative of IOTC’s scientific committee: “the yellowfin tuna stock is determined to be 
overfished and subject to overfishing” ........................................................................................................110 
5.2.5. The narrative of European industrial operators: “we are unfairly blamed for overfishing” .............113 
5.2.6. The narrative of NGOs at the IOTC level: “yellowfin tuna catches need cuts to prevent collapse” 117 
5.2.7. Co-producing the discourse of tuna being overfished .......................................................................120 
5.3. TUNA STOCKS AS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS – A PARALLEL VIEW ........... 121 
  xiii  
5.3.1. Elements of the discourse: limited national and regional data and scientific uncertainties ..............121 
5.3.2. Actors (re)producing the unpredictability discourse .........................................................................124 
5.3.3. The narrative of governments at national levels: “we cannot know the national stock of tuna” ......124 
5.3.4. The uncertainty narrative at IOTC: “it is difficult to predict the trajectory of the stock” .................127 
5.3.5. The parallel narrative of industrial operators: “there is a lack of data from other segments”...........129 
5.3.6. Co-producing the discourse of unpredictability of tuna stock ..........................................................131 
5.4. INTERACTION BETWEEN NARRATIVES........................................................ 132 
5.5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION ................................................................................ 134 
CHAPTER 6. ACCESS POLITICS AND THE WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE 
WIO TUNA FISHERIES .................................................................................................... 137 
6.1. THE THEORY OF ACCESS AS A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS ................ 138 
6.1.1. The concept of access ........................................................................................................................138 
6.1.2. Ribot and Peluso’s ‘theory of access’ ...............................................................................................140 
6.1.3. Rationale for an enhanced theory ......................................................................................................142 
6.2. MECHANISMS OF ACCESS TO TUNA RESOURCES IN THE WIO ............ 144 
6.2.1. Rights-based access to tuna resources ...............................................................................................144 
6.2.2. Relational and structural means of access to tuna resources .............................................................154 
6.3. CONSIDERING MATERIALITY AND THE ROLE OF NON-HUMANS IN 
ACCESS POLITICS ........................................................................................................ 184 
6.3.1. The concept of materiality and its influence in resource management .............................................184 
6.3.2. Integrating materiality and the role of non-humans into Ribot & Peluso’s framework ....................189 
6.4. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION ................................................................................ 195 
6.4.1. Patterns of situated winners and losers..............................................................................................195 
6.4.2. The contributions and limits of using the theory of access in tuna fisheries.....................................200 
6.4.3. The contributions and limits of using materiality and the role of non-humans in studying tuna 
fisheries .......................................................................................................................................................203 
CHAPTER 7. POTENTIALITIES AND CHALLENGES TO REGIONALISM 
THROUGH TUNA FISHERIES ........................................................................................ 205 
7.1. USING GEOPOLITICAL ECOLOGY TO EXPLORE REGIONALISM ......... 206 
7.1.2. The concepts of region, regionalism and the making of regional identity in political ecology ........207 
7.2.3. Contributing to a geopolitical ecology of tuna fisheries ...................................................................209 
7.2. PAST AND CURRENT REGIONALISM THROUGH TUNA FISHERIES IN 
THE SWIO........................................................................................................................ 210 
7.2.1. The ‘Indianoceania’ identity and the Indian Ocean Commission .....................................................210 
7.2.2. Attempts to establish a regional industrial tuna fleet ........................................................................214 
7.2.3. Involving small-scale fishers in regional tuna fisheries management ...............................................217 
7.2.4. Success stories with grey areas .........................................................................................................221 
7.3. CHALLENGES TO REGIONALISM IN TUNA FISHERIES ............................ 225 
7.3.1. Geopolitics as a persistent obstacle to regionalism ...........................................................................225 
  xiv  
7.3.2. Competition for landings as an economic factor against regionalism ..............................................235 
7.3.3. The absence of a regional identity at the local level .........................................................................236 
7.4. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION ................................................................................ 237 
7.4.1. Pathways towards making tuna fisheries a catalyst of regionalism ..................................................238 
7.4.2. Reflecting on the study of regionalism through actors’ practices and geopolitics ............................246 
CHAPTER 8. CONTRIBUTING TO AN IMPROVED KNOWLEDGE OF THE WIO 
TUNA FISHERIES .............................................................................................................. 248 
8.1. MEETING THE MULTI-SCALAR NEEDS OF THE WIO COUNTRIES ....... 248 
8.1.1. Lessons learnt from exploring overfishing narratives, access politics and regionalism ...................248 
8.1.2. Improved knowledge on Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles’s tuna fisheries ......................250 
8.2. ‘SPEAKING’ TUNA ................................................................................................. 253 
8.3. ENRICHING THE FIELD OF ‘MARINE’ POLITICAL ECOLOGY BY 
STUDYING TUNA FISHERIES .................................................................................... 256 
8.3.1. Discussion of blue degrowth .............................................................................................................257 
8.3.2. An empirical contribution to discussions of spatial scale .................................................................258 
8.3.3. Reiterating the importance of non-humans .......................................................................................258 
8.4. FUTURE RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES .............................................................. 259 
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 262 
Appendix ............................................................................................................................... 283 
 
Appendix 1. List of interviews............................................................................................... 283 
Appendix 2. Guiding questions during interviews ................................................................ 291 
Appendix 3: Sample of codes and main trends derived from the Atlas ti. analysis .............. 295 
Appendix 4: Description of gears catching tuna in the WIO ................................................. 296 
  
  xv  
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Map of villages and towns during fieldwork............................................................ 38 
Figure 2: Map of the WIO region with countries considered part of the region...................... 55 
Figure 3: Production route of tuna from the WIO ................................................................... 59 
Figure 4: Timeline of involvement of DWFNs in the WIO..................................................... 87 
Figure 5: Results of interviews regarding perceived causes of decrease in tuna resources ... 109 
Figure 6: Evolution of yellowfin catch as presented in the SC reports of 2012 to 2018 ....... 112 
Figure 7: Spatialisation of the ocean and tuna fishing by the Law of the Sea ....................... 145 
Figure 8: EEZs of the countries of the WIO region ............................................................... 146 
Figure 9: Mapping of access to tuna using R+P’s classic theory of access ........................... 183 
Figure 10: R+P’s mapping of access, enhanced by materiality and the role of non-humans 189 
Figure 11: A theory of access to tuna infused with materiality and the role of non-humans 194 
Figure 12: Contextualized winners and losers within the arena of power relations .............. 200 
 
List of Illustrations 
Illustration 1: Landing in the three segments of the fisheries .................................................. 42 
Illustration 2: Intermediaries (second type) in Sainte Luce ..................................................... 63 
Illustration 3: Sample of PFOI products .................................................................................. 65 
Illustration 4: An intermediary and fisher’s spouse in Tombeau Bay ..................................... 72 
Illustration 5: An example of the sea’s bounty – fishing and curing for sea cucumber........... 99 
Illustration 6: Presentation of yellowfin as overfished in a 2017 WWF report ..................... 105 
Illustration 7: Reply form a representative of purse seiners on the yellowfin situation ........ 114 
Illustration 8: Artisanal boat used for tuna fishing in Ramena, north of Madagascar ........... 161 
Illustration 9: Semi-industrial tuna boat in Victoria, Seychelles ........................................... 162 
Illustration 10: Head of a Spanish purse seiner landing in the Seychelles ............................ 163 
Illustration 11: Sample of tracking device for FADs on a Spanish purse seiner ................... 163 
Illustration 12: Sample of bycatch caught on purse seiners. .................................................. 165 
Illustration 13: One boat owner’s nets and a boat under construction in the background ..... 166 
Illustration 14: Sale of yellowfin between a fisher and an intermediary in Rivière Noire .... 172 
Illustration 15: Control of tuna landing at the local processing company in Victoria ........... 173 
Illustration 16: Landing of catch from an artisanal boat in the north of Madagascar ............ 176 
Illustration 17: Promotion of the ‘Indianoceania’ by the IOC on its facebook page ............. 212 
Illustration 18: Role of each IOC member under the regional tuna project ........................... 216 
Illustration 19: Coverage of the PRSP program .................................................................... 223 
  xvi  
Illustration 20: Inaugural sign for the extension of fisheries centre in Mauritius .................. 226 
Illustration 21: Newly built processing factory in the Seychelles, co-funded with the EU ... 227 
Illustration 22: News report in the Seychelles after the 2017 IOTC commission meeting ... 240 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Examples of themes and approaches used in political ecology ................................. 12 
Table 2: Studies in marine and coastal management addressing political ecology themes ..... 22 
Table 3: List of actors interviewed in each country and remotely ........................................... 40 
Table 4: Categories of questions asked during semi-structured interviews ............................. 40 
Table 5: Summary of data extracted and analysed in the grey literature ................................. 45 
Table 6: Key figures on tuna fisheries for Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles ........... 52 
Table 7: Description of main tuna species found in the WIO .................................................. 56 
Table 8: List of fishing access agreements concluded  by Madagascar in 2016 ..................... 70 
Table 9: List of fishing access agreements concluded by Mauritius in 2014 .......................... 78 
Table 10: List of fishing access agreements concluded by the Seychelles in 2015 ................. 86 
Table 11: European producers associations, active in the WIO, as of 2015. ........................... 88 
Table 12: Main organisations active in the WIO region on tuna fisheries. ............................. 89 
Table 13: IOTC structure linked to the management of tuna resources. ................................. 92 
Table 14: The large array of intervention of the IOC .............................................................. 94 
Table 15: Flow of work on narrative analysis ....................................................................... 101 
Table 16: Discourses and narratives regarding the state of tuna resources in the WIO ........ 102 
Table 17: Perceptions about quantity of catch during tuna season now and ten years ago ... 103 
Table 18: Diversity of claims and discourses regarding tuna resources in the WIO ............. 135 
Table 19: Access mechanisms in R+P’s access theory applied to tuna fisheries .................. 141 
Table 20: Summary of SFPAs between the EU and the three countries as of 2018. ............. 147 
Table 21: Different types of permits to access the fishery and sell the catch ........................ 150 
Table 22: Types of subsidies available to fishers in Mauritius and the Seychelles ............... 151 
Table 23: Types of knowledge, context of knowledge production and sample of quotes ..... 156 
Table 24: History of EU funds available for EU fleets covering technology ........................ 164 
Table 25: Sample of tuna-related projects under the SMARTFISH program of the IOC. .... 213 
 
 
 
  xvii  
List of Acronyms 
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states 
CSP Centre de Surveillance des Pêches Madagascar 
DWFNs Distant Water Fishing Nations 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
ETP Eastern Tropical Pacific 
EU European Union 
FADs Fish Aggregating Devices 
FPAOI 
Fédération des Pêcheurs Artisans de l'Océan 
Indien 
G16 A group of ‘like-minded’ coastal states at IOTC 
IO Indian Ocean 
IOC Indian Ocean Commission 
IOTC Indian Ocean Tuna Commission 
IRD Institut de Recherche pour le Développement 
IUU Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing 
MSC Marine Stewardship Council 
MTCs Minimum Terms and Conditions 
NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations 
PRSP Programme Régional de Surveillance des Pêches 
R+P Ribot and Peluso 
RFMO Regional Fisheries Management Organisation  
SC Scientific Committee (of the IOTC) 
SFA Seychelles Fishing Authority 
SFPAs Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements  
SIDS Small Island Developing States 
SWIO Southwest Indian Ocean 
SWIOFC Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
USTA Unité Statistique Thonière d'Antsiranana 
WCPO Western and Central Pacific Ocean 
WIO Western Indian Ocean 
WWF World Wildlife Fund for Nature 
 
  xviii  
  
  xix  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Few wild-caught food products are as ubiquitous as tuna. Annual 
catches for some species of tuna are in the billions of pounds! Yet, like 
most animal products, tuna arrives in our kitchens with little visible 
evidence of its natural history or the human labour that got it from sea 
to table. What does a tuna even look like? How and where are they 
caught? And by whom? 
(Robbins 2014: 225) 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Tuna products are omnipresent in our daily lives, from tuna cans in our cupboards, tuna in 
our sandwiches and sushi or tuna steaks at supermarkets and restaurants. Tuna also generates 
an array of by-products that, probably without knowing, we are also indirectly consuming, 
such as fish oil in nutrition supplements or fishmeal that is used in aquaculture, currently 
providing most shrimp and salmon sold in supermarkets. Tuna fisheries are one of the most 
valuable fisheries in the world. In 2014, tuna contribution to the global economy was 
estimated at more than US$42 billion (PEW 2016). The Indian Ocean generates US$2 billion 
from its tuna, of which up to 80% comes from the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) (Obura et al. 
2017). Tuna fisheries are therefore providing important revenues, jobs and food security for 
various actors in coastal countries.  
In the WIO, tuna is seen as blue gold and tuna fisheries are considered a key component for 
the emergent blue economies1 of the region. In Madagascar, tuna fisheries have long been 
considered a strategic fishery, due to their high value in export, and the development of a 
national fishery is considered as a priority (MRHP 2015). In Mauritius, tuna fisheries fit 
within ‘traditional ocean sectors’ that have been productive for many decades and are 
especially praised for their contribution to employment in the country through the cannery 
(Cervigni and Scandizzo 2017). In the Seychelles, tuna fisheries are considered a ‘mature’ 
activity providing ‘high levels of value addition and employment’ (Commonwealth 
Secretariat 2015).  
The tuna fisheries of the WIO have three components: small-scale, semi-industrial and 
industrial. Small-scale fisheries provide livelihoods and food for coastal communities at an 
often underestimated value of US$200 million (Obura et al. 2017). The semi-industrial 
segment is developing in the WIO, with the lead taken by the Seychelles and its increasing 
number of semi-industrial vessels, followed by Mauritius and to a very limited extent 
Madagascar which only has a handful of vessels. Industrial fisheries, mainly undertaken by 
Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs), are the third income provider in the WIO blue 
economy (after coastal and marine tourism and carbon sequestration) (ibid). Tuna 
exploitation in the WIO, and more largely in the Indian Ocean has been considered generally 
stable, yet two episodes of collapse of yellowfin tuna biomass have been noted (in 2010 and 
 
1 the concept of blue economy, in the context of marine resource use in coastal countries, comprises “the 
range of economic and related policies that together determine whether the use of the oceanic resources is 
sustainable” (World bank 2017, p. 6) 
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2015) (IOTC 2015). The management of tuna fisheries in the WIO depends on interactions 
between various stakeholders at different scales, from local fishing villages and ports, to 
national governments, to the regional Indian Ocean level. This management is complicated 
by the fact that tuna is a multi-species resource that moves between territorial waters, 
exclusive economic zones and high seas. This leads to intricate relations between actors but 
also between actors and the moving tuna.  
Tuna fisheries of the WIO represent a conundrum for the various actors involved: it is a 
commodity sought by distant countries but also an object of conflict, debate and management 
in coastal countries. The following anecdote illustrates the issue. On a visit to family in the 
UK a couple of years ago, I noticed my mother-in-law’s routine of feeding the cats a can of 
tuna every day as a snack. I asked her once if she preferred the tuna she bought for the cats, 
she responded that it could be any brand and it cost around 0.80 GBP. I further asked her if 
she knew where the tuna came from. She jokingly responded, “I have no idea, you know until 
I knew you did your research on tuna, I did not really question those things”. Interestingly, 
the label showed that it was manufactured in Mauritius. This mundane conversation, to me, 
prompts the question: how can tuna be a cheap product considering the amount of effort and 
labour and especially the complex processes behind its production? The consumer is often 
unaware that behind tuna products are not only the fishing companies that fish the resources 
but also countries that debate the management of the resource, negotiations of access to 
fishing grounds and especially local fishers denouncing the reduction of tuna resources in 
their waters. Studying tuna fisheries aims to shed light on these processes behind tuna caught 
in the WIO.  
1.1. Gap in society and stake of the research 
Tuna fisheries have been studied in different oceans. Disciplines such as biology, fisheries 
economics, political economy, political sciences, international relations or geography have 
studied tuna fisheries from different angles. There is, however, room to expand the study of 
the WIO tuna fisheries within social sciences, especially in human geography. The thesis 
therefore aims to explore the relations between people behind the fishing, the canneries and 
the management decisions. It also looks at tuna resources and the sea from a natural 
resource’s management perspective and investigates the human-nature relations. The thesis 
explores how humans and non-humans influence each other either in their practices, in the 
making of the fisheries and its management and in the making of tuna and the WIO.   
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There are three reasons that make studying tuna fisheries timely. First, the current state of 
tuna resources in the WIO and in the Indian ocean is alarming. Despite yellowfin tuna being 
assessed as “overfished” since 2015, fisheries managers have not yet managed to reverse the 
trend of overfishing. Also, the ubiquitous character of tuna in our daily lives makes it difficult 
to imagine that we are in an overfishing situation. The consumer, in developed countries 
particularly, can still find tuna everywhere, even endangered species such as bluefin tuna. 
Yet, fishers and coastal population in developing coastal countries like those of the WIO are 
seeing a decrease in the availability of tuna and other marine resources, and find it more and 
more difficult to sustain their livelihoods based on fishing and their food security. This 
divergence of views between two types of consumers makes it important to explore where 
tuna comes from and what processes are behind the tuna can, the sushi or steak; and 
especially what are the impacts of the fisheries on local coastal population and their 
livelihoods. The story of this thesis aims to fill this gap and unravel the complex processes 
behind tuna fisheries. The thesis will also discuss the issue of competition between the 
industrial and non-industrial segments of the fishery, considering the diversity between the 
different types of fisheries and their related actors. 
Second, because tuna fishing takes place out of sight, the actors involved are equally out of 
sight. Fishers are at sea for long periods and management decisions are sometimes taken by 
actors disconnected from the fisheries or the fishers. The fisher in the remote coastal village 
of Sainte Luce in Madagascar often does not comprehend the management measures taken by 
the Malagasy government at an IOTC meeting in Bangkok. Similarly, crew members of purse 
seiners such as captains do not always understand why some management measures are taken 
or by whom. The management of tuna is often disconnected from the direct users of the 
resources and driven by economic and political processes. It can therefore be useful to 
understand who makes the decision, how and why, in order to understand the current 
challenges of management in the WIO tuna fisheries. The thesis therefore aims at looking at 
the different actors in the fishery and their interactions with each other.   
Third, this thesis has been developed at a time when blue economy and blue growth are 
buzzwords used by various stakeholders at the global and national levels. Ocean-based 
activities are seen as providing a tremendous potential for economic growth that can also 
achieve sustainability (Silver et al. 2015). Tuna fisheries have been part of the blue 
economies of the WIO region for more than 30 years. Yet, it has not achieved the 
sustainability goals governments have aimed at nor strongly developed local fisheries. Tuna 
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fisheries therefore present an interesting case as a mature blue economy activity. It provides a 
reality check for stakeholders currently enthusiastic about the opportunities offered by the 
blue economy and blue growth. As innovative activities such as seabed mining and 
bioprospection will require involvement of external actors just like the involvement of 
DWFNs in the WIO tuna fisheries, the thesis shows that such interactions can be both 
beneficial and detrimental to the marine resources, as seen in the WIO.  
1.2. Aim of the research and research questions  
This thesis undertakes a political ecology study of tuna fisheries in the WIO. It aims to 
expand the knowledge regarding the socio-economic and political aspects of the WIO tuna 
fisheries at different levels (local, national, regional) and better understand management 
decisions in tuna fisheries. This knowledge is relevant to help fisheries managers understand 
the obstacles to sustaining the tuna resources but also to tell the stories of the people and 
processes behind the different types of tuna fishing in the WIO, especially in Madagascar, 
Mauritius and the Seychelles. The three countries have been chosen because they are at the 
centre of the WIO tuna fishery – each having active fishing ports and canneries – but also for 
their diversity, as the three countries have distinctive socio-economic contexts and different 
levels of exploitation of tuna resources. The research uses political ecology as a theoretical 
anchoring mainly for two reasons – that will also be developed later in Chapter 2: it gives 
attention to the political and socio-economic drivers behind environmental change, but 
especially it allows the exploration of natural resources management with a multi-scalar 
approach. To achieve the above-mentioned goal, the research aims to answer the following 
research question: How do socio-economic and political processes shape the management 
of tuna fisheries in the Western Indian Ocean? To respond to this question, I will look at 
three aspects: narratives around the state of tuna resources, access politics and 
regionalism.  The focus on these themes stems from three reasons. First, exploring the state 
of tuna resources is relevant as it is an essential element driving decision-making in fisheries 
management. The state of the resources is, however, viewed and established differently by 
actors which in turn has an impact on how and what management measures are adopted and 
implemented. Second, analysing access with a political ecology approach provides a multi-
scalar view of who benefits or not from the fisheries. Within regional fisheries management 
organisations, access systems are discussed and debated. They are also determinant in how 
management is implemented at the national and local levels. Finally, I look at regionalism as 
tuna fisheries are inseparable from regional cooperation and management due to their 
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mobility. As tuna travels within the Indian Ocean, regionalism plays a key role in how 
management of fishing activities is decided and also how countries interact in the WIO 
region.  
The thesis will then present the study of these aspects in three parts : 
An analysis of the narratives surrounding the state of tuna resources:  
• How do different actors perceive the state of tuna resources in the WIO? 
• How do actors at different scales (locally, nationally, and regionally) build their 
knowledge on the state of tuna resources?  
• What narratives are used by different actors to defend their story about the state of the 
resources and how do they mobilise these stories?  
These questions will be answered in Chapter 5 with the hypothesis that local fishers maintain 
a narrative of overfished tuna based on struggles for livelihood and food security while other 
actors (governments, industrial actors) convey a narrative of stable exploitation to perpetuate 
the fishing of tuna in the WIO region.  
An investigation of the politics of access and management of the fisheries:  
• What are the socio-economic and geopolitical drivers behind access to and management 
of tuna fisheries at national and regional levels?  
• Who benefits from access to tuna resources and who loses?  
• What is the role of tuna and the WIO as actants in the making of tuna fisheries? 
These questions will be answered in Chapter 6 with the hypothesis that access to tuna 
resources has been dominated by foreign operators who have improved their access 
mechanisms including through technology, capital, markets, labour, knowledge, authority, 
and social relations, to the detriment of local fishers. 
An exploration of perceptions of regionalism among actors in the WIO: 
• From this individual, yet common fishing activity, do countries see themselves as sharing 
a regional identity?  
• Is there a regional perception regarding the resources or do fishers and individual 
countries only consider themselves as isolated islands?  
• What influences management decisions at the regional IOTC level? 
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Those questions will be answered in chapter 7 with two hypotheses. Firstly, the WIO regional 
identity is limited to project-related initiatives and written narratives and are not adhered by 
individual countries and their fishers in regards to the management of tuna fisheries. 
Secondly, at the IOTC level governments in the WIO are influenced by strong foreign 
operators in agenda setting and, in the adoption or not of management measures, preventing 
coastal countries including the three studied from negotiating as a group within the IOTC. 
1.3. Personal motivation 
My motivation for the thesis came from an observation I made during fieldwork in the former 
organisation I worked for with coastal communities in Madagascar. While attending local 
meetings, fishers would complain that big boats came to take their fish. They were told by the 
government that those boats had licences and were legally operating in our waters. As I 
noticed recurrent complaints from fishers, I wondered why the government would allow such 
exploitation of the resources. While working with other colleagues on fishing access 
agreements, I came to discover that big boats are either shrimp trawlers or tuna vessels. Since 
tuna vessels only land in Antsiranana, the rest of the country knows very little about the tuna 
exploitation in our waters. It is from this limited availability of knowledge that the idea of 
unravelling tuna fisheries emerged. The choice of Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles 
was made because of the movement of tuna between the EEZs of the three countries but also 
from my personal interest in exploring relations and connections between the three islands 
that are relatively close in distance and yet the people know very little about each other. 
Finally, the choice of political ecology came from an insightful lecture by Dr. Ivan Scales 
during my Master’s degree. The idea of exploring socio-political and economic drivers to 
environmental change appealed to me as key for the case of environmental management in 
countries like Madagascar where the political system and interventions from external actors 
such as donor countries have shaped various processes. The possibility of giving voices to 
local actors was also an important feature of political ecology that I wanted to explore and 
hope that I have given justice to in this thesis.   
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is written in a monograph format and is divided into an introduction chapter, two 
chapters referring to the approach of the research, a context chapter, three result chapters and 
a conclusion chapter.  
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Chapter 2 presents political ecology as the theoretical framework of the thesis. It starts by 
exploring the engagement of political ecology with ocean and marine issues and the limited 
studies of tuna fisheries. Then, it discusses contributions of other social science disciplines in 
the field of tuna fisheries including those from key authors in the study of tuna fisheries in the 
WIO. Finally, it presents the themes and concepts in political ecology that I use throughout 
the thesis. 
Chapter 3 summarises the methodology used for the thesis, from describing the fieldwork and 
methods used to the collection and analysis of data. It also presents the gaps that the thesis 
has not been able to cover and the challenges that were faced while doing the research in the 
WIO region as a scientist from Madagascar.  
Chapter 4 introduces the WIO and its tuna fisheries. Starting from the regional WIO level, it 
presents the geography of the WIO, the tuna species present, the catches and the supply chain 
for tuna from the WIO. It then proceeds with describing individually the three case studies: 
Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles. After a brief presentation of each country, the 
actors involved in the fishery are highlighted as well as the different segments of the fishery. 
The chapter ends with a presentation of what I call distant actors who are the DWFNs, civil 
society organisations and international platforms where tuna management is discussed.  
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are the empirical results chapters. Each chapter includes a short 
theoretical framework describing the concepts used, the results and also a reflection on the 
contribution and limits of the concepts used. Chapter 5 investigates the different discourses 
and related narratives that are present in the WIO surrounding the state of tuna resources. It 
starts by presenting two discourses and dissects the narratives under each discourse. The first 
discourse, presenting tuna as overfished, is sustained by local fishers and NGOs. Then, it 
discusses the second discourses, presenting tuna stocks as difficult to assess. This is produced 
by government and industrial actors involved in producing technical reports and complex 
stock assessments. Finally, it explores the different elements that co-produce these discourses 
and associated narratives. The chapter ends by a reflection on the study of narratives.  
Chapter 6 discusses the application of the theory of access of Ribot and Peluso (2003) to the 
study of the WIO tuna fisheries by presenting the rights-based mechanisms but also the 
relational and structural ones that apply in the fishery. It then brings the innovation of adding 
materiality as a contextual element key to the politics of tuna access. Using the theory of 
access allows us to see a broader way of accessing resources and to highlight the diversity of 
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benefits actors get from the resources. The chapter ends by identifying patterns of winners 
and losers as well as a reflection on the use of the theory of access and materiality on 
studying the WIO tuna fisheries.  
Chapter 7 explores regionalism in the WIO region and especially between the three countries 
studied – gathered under the sub-WIO region labelled as the Southwest WIO. It first looks at 
the various manifestations of regionalism through tuna fisheries in the region. It then exposes 
the challenges of regionalism through geopolitical struggles, disconnected people but also 
presumed success stories of regionalism. It ends with a consideration of potential pathways of 
collaborations that consider the current socio-political context in the region. The chapter 
concludes by presenting the lessons learned from using political ecology as a lens to 
understand the WIO regionalism.  
Chapter 8 reveals the conclusion of the research. Split into three parts, it starts by showing 
what the coastal countries and their people can learn from this thesis on the management of 
tuna fisheries in the WIO and a path forward for the region’s tuna fishery’s management. It 
continues with a section discussing the conservation of tuna species and how we can advance 
in adopting measures that might help the recovery of tuna species in the region. It finally 
makes claims about the contribution of the thesis to the field of political ecology and sets a 
future research agenda for the study of tuna fisheries in the WIO.  
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While this thesis is presented in monographic form, some parts have been published in 
articles and a book chapter as follows:  
- The social relations part of Chapter 6 was published in April 2020 within the book 
Sustaining the Sea edited by Prof. Elspeth Probyin, Dr Kate Johnston and Dr Nancy Lee. 
The chapter was co-authored with Prof. C. Kull and my three research assistants in the 
field, Patsy Theresine, Safina Echa and Pamima Leste. The chapter calls for a better 
consideration of local livelihoods in tuna fisheries, a change of paradigm in the industrial 
sector and the need for a ‘care’ for tuna resources. 
- Elements of Chapter 5 were published in an article in Sustainability Science Journal in 
December 2019, co-authored with colleagues met at IOTC in 2018, Dr. Megan Bailey 
and Hussain Sinan, and Prof. Christian Kull. The article presents the empirical case of 
tuna fisheries as a paradox that governments are encountering in the WIO region where 
sustainability is claimed to be achievable while the realities of exploitation are practices 
of accumulation.  
- A shorter version of Chapter 6 was published in the Journal of Political Ecology in 
September 2019, co-authored with Prof. C. Kull. The article is an empirical and 
conceptual paper discussing the theory of access and materiality through the case of tuna 
fisheries.  
- A condensed version of Chapter 7 was published in the Journal of Indian Ocean Region 
in January 2019, co-authored with Prof. C. Kull and Dr. Liam Campling. The article 
discusses the challenges to regionalism that countries of the Southwest Indian ocean are 
facing, using tuna fisheries as an illustration.  
All these publications and especially the comments from the reviewers and the discussion 
with co-authors have greatly improved the content of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND POLITICAL ECOLOGY 
AS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, I will expand on my use of political ecology as a theoretical anchoring. I will 
first briefly introduce the field, then I will review the current literature in political ecology 
that addresses marine and coastal issues. I will also discuss how other fields have explored 
tuna fisheries as a topic of enquiry. I will finish by expanding on the specific themes that I 
will use in this thesis to assess tuna fisheries within the WIO.  
Political ecology has been a fast-growing field in human geography and other disciplines 
such as anthropology and environmental science (Batterbury 2015). From the seminal work 
of Blaikie and Brookfield on land degradation in 1987, studying the socio-economic and 
political drivers behind land degradation, political ecology now appeals to researchers 
interested in the relationship between nature and society or those that aim to cross disciplines 
to explain environmental change. One of the foundational ideas of the field was to combine 
“the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy” (Blaikie & Brookfield 
1987:  17), an endeavour entails the use of different approaches and methods. As explained 
by (Gautier and Benjaminsen 2012), work in political ecology involves interdisciplinarity, 
working at different scales, extensive fieldwork and an analysis of discourse confronted with 
facts.  
Political ecology has been associated with different approaches and goals. It uses an array of 
concepts that have been developed within fields such as peasant studies, science studies or 
new materialism (Table 1). While some authors have been key to the development of some 
approaches, concepts or tools, most of them also use a mix. This diversity has prompted 
Robbins (2012) to suggest political ecology should be seen as a ‘community of practice’ and 
a specific type of text, rather than a field. The field has expanded in different directions and 
addresses a diversity of topics such as environmental conditions, conservation and 
development, access, identities or political objects and subjects (Robbins 2012). The 
approach of this thesis aligns most with that of (Watts 2000), which sees political ecology as 
a way “to understand the complex relations between nature and society through a careful 
analysis of what one might call the forms of access and control over resources and their 
implications for environmental health and sustainable livelihoods” (p. 257). According to 
Robbins (2012), texts in political ecology “track winners and losers to understand the 
persistent structures of winning and losing; are narrated using human–non-human dialectics; 
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start from, or end in, a contradiction; and simultaneously make claims about the state of 
nature and claims about claims about the state of nature” (p. 87). 
Table 1: Examples of themes and approaches used in political ecology 
Concepts Related field Tools and theories 
Moral economy, Marginalisation, 
Division of labour 
Hegemony, Everyday resistance 
Political economy  
Cultural ecology 
Peasant studies 
Historical materialism 
Chain of explanation 
Capital accumulation 
Elite capture 
Commons, Collective action, 
Community-based management, 
Access, Property 
Environmental management  
Development studies 
 
Common property  
Theory of access 
Social movements, gender, race Feminist political ecology 
Postcolonial studies 
Environmental conflict 
Environmental justice 
Knowledge, Power  
Governmentality, Environmentality 
Environmental history 
Critical science 
Urban political ecology 
 
Discourse analysis 
Deconstruction 
Non-humans, More-than-humans, 
hybridity, Networks, Actors and 
objects 
New materialism 
Posthumanism  
Actor-network theory 
Materiality 
Source: Benjaminsen and Svarstad 2009; Forsyth 2008; Robbins 2012 
Its diversity has been one of my main motivations in choosing political ecology as a 
framework. Also, from my practitioner’s background, I saw it as a lens to keep kept me 
grounded to the field, helped me to be immersed in theoretical concepts and also allowed for 
contributions to policy. The idea of being part of a ‘community of practice’ that involves not 
only researchers but also other actors was one of my aspirations along with the fact that the 
constituency of political ecology “operates in the borderlands between analysis and action, 
and between social practice and environmental impacts, resources, or changes” (Robbins 
2012:  85). In sum, my choice of political ecology has been strongly influenced by it being 
both ‘a hatchet and a seed’ (Robbins 2012). A hatchet as “it seeks to expose flaws in 
dominant approaches to the environment favoured by corporate, state, and international 
authorities, working to demonstrate the undesirable impacts of policies and market 
conditions, especially from the point of view of local people, marginal groups, and vulnerable 
populations” (ibid: 99), and a seed as “it involves the detailed analysis of agrarian practices, 
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social systems for resource distribution, and techniques for cataloguing and harvesting non-
human nature [….] with the aim of preserving and developing specific, manageable, and 
appropriate ways to make a living.” (ibid). Through this notion of a ‘hatchet and seed’, the 
aim of my research is then to unpack the complexities surrounding tuna fisheries in the WIO 
while attempting to provide pathways for a better management of the fishery.  
The research also follows the strand of political ecology scholars that is engaged in 
development studies and more specifically in investigating development projects and 
improving development practises (Blaikie 2012; Blaikie and Muldavin 2015; Rocheleau 
2008). In her analysis of development practises, Rocheleau (2008) emphasised that it was 
important to “recognise the limitations and dangers of sustainable development as promoted 
and ‘delivered’ by national and multi-national technocracies, powerful conservation NGOs 
and private interests” (p. 723). This brings to question the way development initiatives are 
practised and the socio-political drivers behind them. This approach is relevant as tuna 
fisheries, especially in their industrial segment, are portrayed as bringing economic 
development to host countries. The research therefore explores tuna fisheries as a 
development project within coastal countries and ultimately aims to provide policy 
recommendations on how to improve such practices.  
As the above broadly presents political ecology in its general scope, in the following sections 
I will discuss in depth what I call ‘marine’ political ecology or the political ecology of marine 
resources and the sea. It also situates the study of tuna fisheries in the existing literature.  
2.1. EARLY ‘MARINE’ POLITICAL ECOLOGY  
Engagement of the political ecology field with the marine environment and its resources 
started in the 2000s, touching on classic themes including; discussions around property and 
access (Mansfield 2001), environmental discourses (Campbell 2007), the use of knowledge 
and science (St Martin 2007), and materiality (Bear and Eden 2008).  
2.1.1. Challenging the narrative of ‘the tragedy of the commons’ 
Much of the marine political ecology literature has questioned mainstream narratives 
surrounding property. One of most dominant discourse in fisheries’ management portrays the 
ocean as a market failure due to the issue of property (Hawkshaw et al. 2012). This discourse 
finds either that there is a lack of ownership in fisheries or that it is a problematic common 
property regime. Consequently, there is a race to fish and a foundation for “a tragedy of the 
commons”, in which economic actors will extract common resources until their 
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overexploitation (Hardin 1968). This situation leads to an economic inefficiency in which 
every actor, based on economic rationality, is competing over the resources without any 
limitation and with the only aim of maximising catches (Gordon 1954). The solution most 
endorsed to solve these problems is the setup of economic rents to access fisheries, to which 
actors will comply leading to the sustainability of production (ibid). The theory of the need 
for rent has dominated fisheries research and policy and has been promoted to combat 
overexploitation.  
Mansfield (2001) challenged the static explanation of the fisheries problem as caused by 
property regimes and individual rationality. Moving beyond the tragedy of the commons or 
the tragedy of open access as an explanation to the depletion of resources, she contended that 
the focus should be on how specific resource use situations are shaped by specific cultural, 
political, and economic practices (Mansfield 2001:  388). In her study of fishing in the 
Pacific, while acknowledging the role of fishers, she also explained the role of national 
policies, territorial state control and social relations in growing the fishery, leading to an 
overutilisation of resources. She pursued her analysis by tracing the 50 year history of 
neoliberalism in the ocean, emphasising how focussing on property as at the centre of the 
fisheries problem has led to the enclosure of the ocean (Mansfield 2004). From a look at 
international policy and academic positions that put “property, rights-based management, 
individual behaviour, and economic rationality as the cause of and solutions to fisheries 
problems” (Mansfield 2004: 320), she tracked the emergence of privatisation as the solution 
to overfishing and overcapacity. In addition to questioning mainstream narratives – here the 
role of economic rationality in the fisheries crisis, this first insight of marine political ecology 
also points out the importance of giving more attention to practices and social relations with 
regards to marine resources use.       
The concept of property has also been studied in the context of marine conservation. 
Campbell (2007) analysed the implementation of conservation at different socio-political 
scales. She unveiled the diversity of property regimes that can be assigned to marine turtles, 
often overlooked or ignored by conservation experts. She explained how local rights to use 
the resources are shaped by national and international policy. She also discussed how 
conservation of migratory species (mobile resources), such as marine turtles, involves 
questions of scale and space. The contribution of Campbell to the materiality of resources 
will be further discussed in Chapter 6. Later, Campbell went further with her argument on 
considering scale by discussing the use of genetics by conservation experts to claim sea 
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turtles as part of the commons (Campbell and Godfrey 2010). She explained how these 
claims of ownership have shaped international conservation policy and been used by some 
states to claim sovereignty of their territory through the existence of sea turtles in their water. 
This second input of marine political ecology shows the engagement of political ecologist in 
studying practices at different scales and explore the possibility of multiple property or access 
regimes for marine resources.  
In line with others suggesting the possibility of diverse property regimes, St Martin is also 
one of the early political ecologists questioning dominant discourses regarding property, such 
as the tragedy of the commons or individual economic rationality. In his study of community-
based management of fisheries in New England, he revealed that bioeconomic solutions to 
overfishing, based on reducing fishing effort mainly through privatisation, largely ignored 
environmental and social heterogeneity (St. Martin 2001). One of his findings was that 
fishers prefer area-based management rather than numeric management based on reducing 
effort. This preference favours fishers’ cooperation and sharing of information rather than 
individual prosperity. By raising factors that are important to fishers in their management of 
the fishery, he highlighted “the ways subjectivity, space, environment, and economy are 
mutually constitutive” (St. Martin 2001:139). This focus on the perspectives of local users is 
an important component of political ecology studies and as shown by St Martin, provides 
alternative paths to solving fisheries problems.   
2.1.2. Debating the making of science and knowledge 
Another topic that aroused interest in early marine political ecology was science and 
knowledge. St Martin (2007) highlighted that local ecological knowledge had the potential to 
play a key role in the field of fisheries science, for example when it comes to cartography. 
Often reliant on scientific knowledge mainly based on individual economic behaviour, 
fisheries management has pushed aside the role of institutions and mechanisms within which 
fishing communities evolve and manage resources. He called for “the need for a parallel and 
complementary shift in our social science understandings of fishing towards context and 
interrelationships amongst and between fishermen and fishing communities; a sensitivity to 
locations and how they are inhabited by communities, socio-economic processes and fish 
harvesting practices across multiple scales” (ibid: 223). While not specifically mentioning 
political ecology as a framework, his promotion of local knowledge and giving attention to 
situated practices are common tools of political ecology. He then called for fisheries science 
to not rely solely on fisheries economics, which has dominated the management of fisheries, 
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but also to integrate and document processes within fisheries communities that have been 
neglected.  
Contributing to the above discussion, Bear and Eden (2008) used an Actor Network Theory 
(ANT) approach to analyse the use of cartographies to produce knowledge in the process of 
Marine Stewardship Council certification. The study highlighted that the process of 
establishing boundaries through cartography was a result of social networks and 
relationships. They argued that, in contrast to the point of St Martin above, social and cultural 
aspects can be exposed in fisheries science, through the use of frameworks such as ANT. 
However, they pointed out that the production of knowledge through cartography can ignore 
biophysical features of marine resources as well the fluidity of the marine environment. As 
they put it, “[…] basing management strategies on the identification of a particular set of 
attributes ignores the ways in which the animals live their lives and is a poor basis for 
management” (ibid: 490). Ultimately, the creation of boundaries within the MSC2 process 
results not only from the science of cartography but also from the actions of the marine 
resources. This consideration of non-humans is developed in the next section and represents 
an important component of political ecology studies.  
Mansfield and Haas (2006), in their investigation of management decisions around the 
conservation of the Steller sea lion, explored the use of scientific uncertainty and scale 
framing by different actors. By analysing the actions of the State, the fishing industry and 
environmental groups, they were able to show how different actors use scale to frame the 
problem of the decline of sea lions and use uncertainty to support their narratives (Mansfield 
and Haas 2006). While fisheries services focused on localised issues, industry and 
environmental groups advocated for a broader scale to be investigated, both linked to 
different interests (respectively climate change for the industry and ecosystems impacts for 
the environmental groups). As they put it “different groups create scale frames that interpret 
and use uncertainty strategically to advance their views and interests” (ibid: 91). Therefore, 
examining the production of scientific knowledge, highlights the political interactions and 
power dynamics that can take place within the making of knowledge and how it can be used 
by different actors to promote their views.  
 
2 The MSC certification consists of an assessment of a fishery by an accredited third-party certification body 
based on three principles of the MSC environmental standard: the status of the target fish stock, the impact of 
the fishery on the ecosystem and the performance of the fishery management system (Ponte 2012) 
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2.1.3. Acknowledging the role of non-humans 
Paying attention to the role of non-humans in resource management has also been a central 
theme for political ecologists. This thesis will develop the question of materiality in Chapter 
6. The current section summarises early engagements with the materiality of the ocean and its 
resources in political ecology.  
Mansfield (2003) explored the subject by looking at the debate around the label ‘organic’ for 
shellfish and wild-caught fish in the United States (Mansfield 2003). She highlighted the 
social construction of nature and especially how actors make distinctions about the world. In 
her study, proponents of ‘organic’ (the industry) considered the natural processes surrounding 
shellfish and wild fish as being the closest to nature and deserving the label of ‘organic’. 
Those against such labelling (those in the organic movement) contended that the organic 
label required a lack of control of fishers over the wild marine environment. Here the debate 
about labelling a product organic or not is associated with the social practice of controlling 
the environment where the marine resources are. This early look at materiality emphasises 
the role of social practices in co-producing nature. 
Bear and Eden (2008) highlighted the role of fishes’ actions in the management of fisheries 
as well as within an MSC certification process. In calling for the fish and the ocean to “not be 
forgotten”, Bear and Eden (2008:  488), highlighted how the movement of the fish across 
established boundaries impacts fisheries management (more details provided in Chapter 6). 
Bear (2012) confirmed his argument in a later study of scallop fisheries. Using assemblage as 
a framework, he showed how the fluidity of the ocean and the actions of both scallops and 
dolphins render fisheries management complex and co-constituted. Debates around the 
management of a particular fishery “are co-produced by a heterogeneity of actants and forces, 
including scallops, water, wind, dolphins, fishermen, fishing technologies, regional, national 
and international fishing regulations and scientific investigations” (ibid, 2p. 35). The study 
clearly shows the role of the sea and its resources in contributing to or obstructing 
management actions.  
Peters (2010) also raised the need to increase the engagement of geographers with studying 
the ocean. By tracing the different geographical works on the ocean, she highlighted the need 
to consider subjects such as materiality and human-nature relationships. Her call to make 
visible the out of sight seas also stresses the increasing prominence of the sea in our everyday 
life, whether through seafood or through the ship transport underlying many of our consumer 
goods.  
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2.2. RECENT TRENDS IN ‘MARINE’ POLITICAL ECOLOGY 
The previous sections presented early marine political ecology studies, the following section 
will present more current topics explored in the field, including; themes of blue economy, a 
revival of studies of the sea and an increasing number of studies on classic political ecology 
themes.  
2.2.1. Blue economy and blue (de)growth 
During my five years of doctoral work, I have sought to interact with researchers working on 
marine issues and using political ecology as a framework. This was done through the 
attendance of two conferences, ENTITLE (in 2016) and the biannual political ecology 
network conference POLLEN (in 2018). During both events, while subjects linked to the 
marine worlds were assigned to different panels not necessarily on the ocean, the main 
academic circle of those using political ecology was centred around the theme of blue 
economy. Defined by the World Bank as “a range of economic and related policies that 
together determine whether the use of the oceanic resources is sustainable”, the blue 
economy “seeks to promote economic growth, social inclusion, and the preservation or 
improvement of livelihoods while at the same time ensuring environmental sustainability of 
the oceans and coastal areas” (World Bank 2017: 6). The concept mirrors the green economy 
concept and emerged at the Rio+20 conference. It has been widely adopted in public 
discourses of governments, NGOs and various industries of ocean-based activities. In 
response to this fast-moving trend, political ecologists have brought contributions on 
different fronts. 
First, political ecology has contributed to the analysis of the concept of the blue economy 
itself. Silver et al. (2015) traced the origin of the concept by attending different international 
events and conferences during which the concept emerged and gained traction. They 
uncovered how the term blue economy was used without distinction by various actors that 
often perceive environmental problems differently and also propose solutions that could be 
contradictory. The blue economy discourse is used by various perspectives of the ocean 
problems such as the lack of protection of natural capital, the need for good business 
practices, the issue of equity for Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) and the importance 
of preserving small-scale fishing livelihoods. This diversity of views shows how various 
actors can appropriate a mainstream concept to support their cause. A Silver et al. (2015), 
discuss “as discourses shape policies and governance practices, the reverse is also true; 
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specific economic sectors, development initiatives, or conservation programs may need the 
support that a popular term or discourse can offer” (ibid:153). 
 In the same endeavour of tracing the genealogy of the concept, Winder and Le Heron (2015), 
investigated what they called ‘the blue economy moment’ at which different actors 
assembled networks and knowledge to enact the blue economy according to their own 
interpretations. In addition to warning about the potential perpetuation of extractivism and 
existing power relations, they also emphasised the importance of considering the existing 
bioeconomic relationships. Finally, Voyer (2018) explored how actors conceived and enacted 
the blue economy, mainly following the categories of ocean problems developed by Silver et 
al. (2015). She established the different areas within which actors are in conflict or agreement 
regarding the blue economy. Conflicts arise mainly regarding who can be included as an 
actor under the blue economy umbrella (mainly questioning the role of carbon-intensive 
industries) and how the assets of the ocean are to be evaluated and commodified. Areas of 
commonalities included the need for marine spatial planning and the need for securitisation 
of the ocean (Voyer et al. 2018). Those sample studies show the current engagement of 
political ecology type studies on the topic of blue economy, examining and tracing the origin 
and current use of a mainstream concept. 
Additionally, the political ecology literature on the blue economy investigates its current 
manifestations. In July 2019, John Child and Christina Hicks coordinated and published a 
special issue on the political ecologies of the blue economy in Africa. The editorial (Childs 
and Hicks 2019) and the six articles of the special issue (one of which is a modified version 
of Chapter 6 of this manuscript) explored how the blue economy discourse is constructed, 
enacted and contested in African countries. By conceptualising and placing the practices of 
blue economy in different parts of Africa, the various authors in the special issue highlighted 
current counter narratives to the blue economy that emerge in Africa (Bond 2019; Kalina et 
al. 2019), the role of non-humans as political actors shaping the politics of blue economy 
activities (Andriamahefazafy and Kull 2019; Carver 2019b), and the different influences that 
are at play to construct the current narrative (Schutter and Hicks 2019). In the conclusion of 
the introductory article, it is argued that the blue economy concept is “far from the stable 
development concept that it promises to be” (Childs and Hicks 2019): 336). These studies 
through a political ecology lens offer a first strong debate about a currently mainstream 
narrative of blue economy. Here the hatchet side of political ecology is used to raise 
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awareness of different actors in order to have better consideration of potential unforeseen 
issues linked to a blind adoption a blue economy discourse. 
Another idea currently explored in political ecology relates to blue degrowth. The concept 
takes its root from the idea of degrowth, or “the equitable downscaling of production and 
consumption that increases human well-being and enhances ecological conditions […] 
(within which) material accumulation will no longer hold a central position in the cultural 
imaginary” (Kallis 2017: 10). Political ecologists working on marine issues are therefore 
interested in questioning the idea of infinite growth and its socio-ecological consequences 
within the context of blue economy or blue growth. Hadjimichael (2018) has started this 
reflection and challenged the blue growth strategy of the EU. Through an analysis of the 
policies for a ‘sustainable use of marine resources’ and an evaluation of sectors promoted by 
the EU's Blue Growth strategy, she unveiled that despite the presence of the word 
‘sustainability’ in all policies of the EU, economic growth is still the principal driver of its 
activities. In a call for a blue degrowth, she reminded us that economic growth remains at the 
foundation of the ecological and social problems linked to the ocean and therefore requires a 
radical change for an “ecologically viable and socially just use of the oceans” (ibid: 163). In 
the same line, another call within the blue economy is the need for social justice and 
inclusion. Emphasising the need to include different perspectives, Bennett (2018) suggested 
an inclusive decision-making process as well as paying attention to the social implications 
and cost and benefits of policies within the blue economy. Some political ecology studies of 
fisheries and aquaculture have previously mentioned the need for social justice, highlighting 
the disproportionate impacts of some fishing practices and aquaculture on small-scale actors 
(Hadjimichael et al. 2014; Loring 2017). The adoption of blue degrowth as a concept as well 
as ensuring social justice and inclusion within blue economies can be interpreted as the ‘seed’ 
component of political ecology, suggesting alternative pathways. In this thesis, similar ideas 
will emerge regarding the implications of tuna fisheries for different actors. Considering the 
complex ramifications of tuna fisheries in the WIO countries, these ideas will be linked to 
broader socio-economic and geopolitical aspects.  
2.2.2. Refocussing on the sea and its people 
In the past five years, the attraction of studying the sea has largely increased (Bennett 2019). 
Novel approaches for ocean research are also being realised. Steinberg and Peters (2015) for 
example, addressed the materiality of the sea to question and integrate ideas of depth, time 
and volume to what they consider as having become a flat ontology of the ocean. Introducing 
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the idea of hydrosphere, they evoked the 3-dimensional reach of oceans as well as the 
interacting forces and relations that constantly occur. Considering the sea as a space of 
volume where sources of conflict might be in constant movement, struggles and contestations 
can become deep and are evolving. The authors assert that considering time and matter brings 
an assemblage of territory that can include various actors, human and non-human. This 
consideration also requires particular attention to how this materiality is used discursively. 
Advocating for a ‘wet ontology’ of the ocean, they suggested to broaden the material 
perspective on the ocean to include diverse fluidities with place and power always in 
movement within space (ibid). Following this renewed discussion on materiality, Acton et al. 
(2019), using the idea of wet ontologies, discussed, for example, the making of the 
boundaries of the Sargasso Sea. Through a mapping process’, the materiality of the Sargasso 
Sea has been obscured to ignore its volume, depths and dynamic ecosystem. The adoption of 
a map with simplified boundaries, while more legible to policy-makers, obscured the 
complexities of social and material realities of the ocean. In line with Steinberg and Peters, 
Acton et al. advocated that “the production of ocean spaces that more closely represent 
particular oceanic materialities, or acknowledging the ‘unacknowledged’, will support 
policymakers in creating more adaptable governance institutions” (ibid: 98). This perspective 
of wet ontology calls for the consideration of more elements when analysing practices and 
imaginaries around the sea and its resources. 
Given this increased interest of studying the sea, a review of the engagement of political 
ecology in marine and coastal management was published by Bennett (2019). Through a 
literature review on web of science, he highlighted the increased number of publications on 
what he calls ‘maritime political ecology’ in the past five years. His review presented existing 
questions linked to political ecology within marine and coastal management. The themes 
(Table 2) encompass various classical topics studied in political ecology, such as questioning 
the role of powerful actors in various processes like shipping, MSP or environmental policy; 
analysing the production and mobilisation of narratives and knowledge in policy and action; 
investigating the social and political construction of scale in marine policy; exploring the role 
of historical trajectory in current management practices and decision-making processing; and 
emphasising the importance of equity and justice (ibid). 
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Table 2: Studies in marine and coastal management addressing political ecology themes 
 
 Authors Political ecology input 
P
o
w
e
r 
a
n
d
 p
o
li
ti
cs
 
Tan-Mullins 2007 
Influence of unequal power relations between different groups of fishers and 
government officials on control over and access to resources in Thailand 
Chambers et al. 
2017 
Role of powerful fishing groups in consolidating ownership over fisheries and 
ITQs in Iceland 
Donkersloot and 
Menzies 2015 
Powerful state actors reshaping available options to coastal fishers in Ireland 
under the EU Common Fisheries Policy 
Carse and Lewis 
2017 
Role of powerful networks within shipping in shaping infrastructure standards 
dependent on destructive practices 
Flannery et al. 2018 
The politics of exclusion and preferential treatment to on some activities or 
actors in MSP processes in Northern US 
Stonich and Bailey 
2000 
Overcoming powerlessness of small organisation and communities by joining 
global coalitions 
Wrathall et al. 2014 
Role of dominant institutional structures and climate stresses in coastal 
migration in Honduras 
Nayak et al. 2016 
Power of social relations in environmental change and people’s ability to adapt 
to change 
Vasquez 2017 Politics of coastal adaptation initiatives ignoring local perspectives and realities 
N
a
rr
a
ti
v
e
 a
n
d
 k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 
Finkbeiner et al. 
2017 
Domination of Malthusian overfishing narrative in the scientific literature on 
overfishing 
Idrobo et al. 2016 
Contradictory discourses between environmental legislation and tourism 
materials regarding Caicara coastal people in Brazil  
Boucquey 2017 
Strategic deployment of certain narratives to increase access or re-territorialize 
the ocean in favour of certain groups/communities in North Carolina 
Osmundsen and 
Olsen 2017 
Production of contradictory storylines by two coalitions of actors about 
aquaculture development in Norway  
Lehman 2016, 2018 
Influence of technology on interactions of scientists with the ocean and its role 
in the production of science, often hiding geopolitical and social context  
Thornton and 
Hebert 2015 
Change from an indigenous communal management system to a neoliberal 
regime with quota system due to a reductionist framing of solutions to fisheries 
crisis in Alaska 
Breslow 2014 
Use and rejection of western science to advance specific agendas by indigenous 
tribes and local commercial farmers  
S
ca
le
 a
n
d
 h
is
to
ry
 
Gray et al. 2014 
Use of distinct global and local scalar narratives to rationalise different types of 
MPAs in the high seas and at the local level.   
Gruby and Basurto 
2013 
Mobilisation of ecological rationales by external organisations to justify high-
level governance and gain influence over local decision-making.  
Gruby and Campbell 
2013 
Re-scaling of local imaginaries by small island developing states delegate to a 
global one to reformulate governance processes  
Armitage and 
Johnson 2006 
Impacts of macro-scale changes on local property rights, institutions and 
resilience in coastal communities in India and Indonesia  
Bush 2004 
Scalar re-alignment of fisheries from a local product to a regionally exported 
resource and local impacts due to a change of national law  
Hanson 2016 
Work, urban development and conservation analysed through trajectories of 
individuals as gendered in coastal communities in Mexico 
Thomas 2016 
Consideration of the impacts of historical realities on structures and policy as a 
key to the success of blue carbon initiatives in Malaysia.  
Hardy et al. 2017 
Influence of racialised histories of coastal community and landscape formation in 
the southern US on present land politics, employment opportunities, and 
decision-making 
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l 
ju
st
ic
e
 a
n
d
 e
q
u
it
y
 
Stonich 1998 
Negative health impact of tourism development on marine resources and local 
impoverished residents 
Stonich et al. 1997 
Expansion of shrimp mariculture industry leading to the destruction of marine 
resources and marginalisation of small producers 
Page 2007 
Disproportionate exposure to risks from salmon farming on indigenous groups, 
more affected by environmental toxins and waste 
Frey 2015 
Adverse environmental and social consequences of waste and hazard shipped to 
other countries, affecting local workers and communities 
Christie 2004 
Social failure of MPAs established in Southeast Asia despite being considered a 
biological success.  
Walker and 
Robinson 2009 
Gendered impact of MPAs in French Polynesia 
Bennett and 
Dearden 2014  
Exclusionary decision-making and negative social impacts of MPAs undermining 
support for conservation in Thailand 
Kamat 2014 
Negative consequences of marginalisation, and dispossession of local people 
from MPAs in Tanzania 
Loring 2017 
Social equity impacts on small-scale commercial fishers of fisheries management 
decisions based on ecological rationales and favouring political and economic 
agendas.  
Cormier-Salem 2017 
Marginalisation of women in decision-making regarding mangrove reforestation 
in Africa and Madagascar and leading to lack of access to benefits from 
mangroves 
Adusah-Karikari 
2015 
Marginalisation and increase of vulnerability of women and their livelihoods due 
to oil-related development within the ‘blue economy’ in Ghana 
Hadjimichael et al. 
2014 
Lack of consideration of social impacts on local fishers and community of 
aquaculture in Cypress 
Veuthey and Gerber 
2012 
Shrimp farm building resulting in privatisation and dispossession of customary 
community mangroves in Ecuador 
Murray et al. 2010 
Blue grabbing through enclosure of marine space through conservation, 
management, development activities or planning processes that cause 
displacement of resource users 
Zalik 2009 Displacement of local communities due to offshore oil development 
Nichols 1999 
Integrated coastal management as opening to aggressive state and global 
investment 
Foley et al. 2015 
Certain policies based on enclosure and commodification can empower 
community-based groups 
Fairbanks et al. 2018 
MSP as providing opportunities to communities to provide different solutions 
beneficial to both the environment and people in the US 
Source: Summary of the survey undertaken by Bennett (2019). Authors mentioned in my own review 
were not repeated in the table 
The review from Bennet shows the diversity of existing research applying political ecology 
approaches. Despite this increase of interest in marine or maritime political ecology, Bennett 
showed that publications in the subfield still represents less than 10% of general political 
ecology work (Bennett 2019). This leaves room for situated studies - such as the one 
presented in this thesis. My own survey of the literature combined with this review of Bennet 
shows that there have not been many direct works relating to tuna fisheries in the political 
ecology field. The following section will explore political ecology questions that have been 
addressed in tuna fisheries studies.   
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2.3. TUNA FISHERIES AS ADDRESSED BY POLITICAL ECOLOGY AND 
OTHER DISCIPLINES 
Very few established political ecologists have specifically worked on tuna and tuna fisheries 
as a subject of study. However, Robbins addresses the issue in a general way within a chapter 
of the book Environment and Society (a text book that introduces contemporary 
environmental challenges through foundational theoretical ideas illustrated with everyday 
examples), through looking at various questions related to tuna, its management and 
conservation. He describes the causes of overfishing of two species: bluefin tuna and 
yellowfin in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP). With a political economy lens, he 
highlighted the role of consumer tastes and technology in driving the demand of tuna and 
capitalist exploitation that ultimately led to overfishing (Robbins 2014). He also looked at the 
role of regulations and geopolitics in the fate of the tuna. He particularly raised issues around 
the impact of certification, such as the Marine Stewardship Council, in creating more 
imbalance in terms of governance and accountability as only large-scale fisheries are able to 
afford the certification process (ibid). Furthermore, he questioned the conservation status of 
tuna. By tracing the emergence of the ‘dolphin-free’ tuna label through ecological ethics and 
animal rights, he highlighted how imaginaries of the public have portrayed dolphins as a 
species requiring protection while tunas are just represented as a commodity (ibid). Robbins 
rightly described tuna as a puzzle. As he put it, “the demand for tuna seems to have no 
ceiling, yet wild stocks of tuna are an undeniably finite resource” and “its ubiquity (for 
example, on store shelves) masks the declines of wild populations” (ibid: 230). Indeed, tuna 
is sold in all supermarket shelves and sushi shops. This prevents the consumer from knowing 
the overexploitation and geopolitical story that is behind each can or piece of tuna. A political 
ecology approach, as described by Robbins above, and as it is attempted in this thesis, tries to 
fill this gap and provide a fuller story for tuna resources in the WIO. 
Socio-economic and political questions surrounding tuna fisheries have been studied within 
different disciplines that address political ecological questions and themes, without 
necessarily associating with the field. Political economy, as well as being a root discipline of 
political ecology, has also on its own been widely used to explain tuna fisheries in different 
oceans. Key authors that have mobilised this approach include Liam Campling, Elisabeth 
Havice, and Stefano B. Longo. Key themes such as commodity chains, exploration of firms’ 
strategies, techniques and relations of production, labour or questions of access, property and 
resource sovereignty have been covered. The work of Campling and Havice have been 
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essential to the development of this thesis as Campling has extensively worked on tuna in the 
WIO and Havice looks at various questions in the geography of tuna. Their insights have 
constituted the foundation of many arguments that are made in the result chapters.  
Canpling et al. (2012), for example, explored the complexity of firms and commodity chains 
in tuna fisheries with different levels of control, ownership, model of production, industrial 
organisation and competition (horizontally with other boats and vertically with processors 
and traders). They also presented the intricate link between techniques of production and 
environmental conditions with the latter often ignored by the industry and impacting on the 
exploitation. They explained how external factors such as global market dynamics, consumer 
tastes, competition or interactions with foreign fishing fleets can influence development 
policy and the management decision of coastal states regarding tuna (ibid). Campling and 
Havice (2014) also looked at the question of property in industrial fisheries and used the case 
of tuna. In line with the literature criticising the tragedy of the commons narrative in 
fisheries, they explained the historical trajectory of property rights in industrial tuna fisheries 
and the importance of the establishment of EEZs` in setting the coastal states as key players 
in the management of the fisheries and becoming landlords of tuna resources. They 
contended that for the case of industrial tuna fisheries, “property relations have emerged out 
of multilateral negotiations, geopolitical contestations and struggles over the influence of 
global production dynamics and the distribution of socio-economic benefits.” (ibid: 724). 
Contrary to the mainstream narrative picturing the states as passive actors contributing to the 
fisheries crisis, they presented state actors as highly influenced by socio-economic and 
political struggles in their decision-making and actively attempting to create and distribute 
surplus value from the fisheries while mediating foreign and domestic interests.   
Campling has especially looked at tuna fisheries in the WIO. Through tracing the arrival of 
European fleets into the WIO and looking at fishing firms’ strategies, he showed that tuna 
represented a ‘commodity frontier’ for European fishers (Campling 2012b). He also looked at 
the link between capital and environmental conditions of production and presented how the 
intensification of exploitation of the EU fleet ultimately led to the degradation of 
environmental conditions key to their fishing activities (ibid). Furthermore, he exposed the 
horizontal relations between fishing firms within the EU fleet and their corporate strategy in 
order to maximise their production. Those included the use of flags of convenience, industry 
associations, corporate concentration and industrial organisation such as integration with 
canned tuna manufacturing (ibid). Through his thesis, Campling (2012b), studied the 
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commodity chain for canned tuna in the Seychelles (Campling 2012a). Using global 
commodity chain as a framework, he described the historical trajectory of the EU fleet from 
the production of raw material at fishing to the manufacturing and retail of canned tuna. By 
detailing the firms’ strategies, he highlighted the importance of environmental conditions of 
extraction in shaping the commodity chain and the role of actors such as supermarkets and 
canned tuna branded firms in influencing the chain governance. He also explored the 
regulatory mechanisms surrounding the production of tuna, presented the political relations 
between states as well as states and firms, and showed how they define the economic 
geography of the EU exploitation. Finally, he analysed the strategies of the Seychelles in 
improving its production process through both policy interventions and internal politics. 
Going beyond the WIO, recent work of Campling in the field included looking at tariff 
regimes and their impact on tuna fishing activities (Campling 2016), investigating the 
influence of state-based regulatory regime in shaping the seafood system (Campling and 
Havice 2018) or highlighting the role of capitalism in territorialising the sea (Campling and 
Colás 2017).   
With a similar political economy approach, Havice, looked at tuna fisheries in the western 
and central Pacific. Through an investigation of interactions of governments with DWFNs, 
she emphasised the importance of historical and political-economic factors in shaping 
institutions’ performance in fisheries’ management (Havice and Campling 2010). First, 
countering the idea that establishing institutions such as property rights leads to rational 
management decisions and overrides social dilemmas, she showed that such institutions are 
actually “a site of social struggle in which interests use political and economic power to 
influence outcomes in their favour.” (ibid: 109). She explained how DWFNs use competitive 
strategies as well as economic and political power to influence Pacific states in the 
formulation of property rights. Additionally, she showed how the internationalisation of 
fisheries management, through the integration of DWFNs in management decisions, has 
negatively impacted the Pacific states’ cooperative efforts, often agreeing to DWFNs’ 
management proposals and leading to the erosion of resource sovereignty (ibid.). She 
particularly studied the issue of state sovereignty over pelagic marine resources and 
especially tuna. For the case of Papua New Guinea, she showed that the state’s strategy of 
obligatory embeddedness, offering long-term licences to firms investing in the local 
processing industries, does not provide the expected full control over the entire tuna fishery 
in country (Havice and Reed 2012). The state, while maintaining control over the resources, 
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is also subject to global and local dynamics, influencing the material conditions of 
exploitation and the state’s policy for tuna processing. Using the theory of access as one of 
her lenses of analysis, she also highlighted that state sovereignty over tuna resources is only 
one component of the complex webs of power and social relations involved in tuna 
exploitation (ibid).  
Moreover, she looked at the role of mobility in shaping state practises on sovereignty in tuna 
fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean - WCPO (Havice 2018). In her analysis, 
three mobilities – the movement of tuna, the vessels and global capital – emerged in tuna 
fisheries as creating various state interactions and practices. As an example, tuna mobility has 
brought small island states to collaborate in order to strengthen their sovereignty over tuna 
resources. Mobility of capital allows vessels to move further in search for fishing sites as well 
as allow fishing companies to use arrangements such as flag states to have a better access to 
tuna resources. Havice made a key contribution through this work by showing that when it 
comes to mobile resources and especially tuna, sovereignty is “constantly renegotiated 
through multistate, public and private relationships and enacted through the mobilities of the 
“things” being sought, governed, or controlled—in this case, the fish and the mobile capital 
embodied in fishing vessels” (ibid:14). It shows how tuna generates “spatially and temporally 
dynamic configurations” (ibid:15) that allow coastal states to have political possibilities to 
influence geopolitical relations and negotiate with DWFNs. These mobilities also create what 
she called ‘more than-territorial institutional innovations’ that challenge territorial boundaries 
and allow state power to be enacted beyond national territory.  
Other relevant contributions of Havice in the study of tuna fisheries include her various 
works on the commodity chain for tuna. In a study on tuna production upgrading (which is a 
process within which states try to gain more benefits from their resources through moving up 
the commodity chain by increasing involvement of lead firms in the chain), Havice and 
Campling (2013) showed that island states face many challenges – financial, political and 
labour related – issues. On contrary to the mainstream narrative that says that island states are 
struggling with the process of upgrading, they demonstrated that island states also succeeded 
in taking advantage of environmental conditions to attract investment in the country for tuna 
production along with setting sustainability goals for the fisheries (Havice and Campling 
2013). Another of her recent publications discusses interfirm strategies in the canned tuna 
global value chain. With Campling, she showed the intricate link between chain governance 
and environmental governance in canned tuna production. They presented how firms use 
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strategies such as concentration or centralisation along with environmental standards and 
association to gain control over other firms and improve competitiveness (Havice and 
Campling 2017). Through this work and their other contributions, Havice and Campling 
demonstrate that environmental conditions are central to tuna exploitation. While 
environmental conditions are used by states and firms to gain access to more resources, they 
also shape interactions between actors as well as create various economic and socio-political 
configurations within the tuna exploitation.  
The third author who has worked on tuna commodity chains is Stefano B. Longo, with a 
focus on bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean. Looking at the collapse of bluefin tuna resources 
in the Sicilian coast, he explained how local practices of tuna fishing have been overtaken by 
intensive industrial fishing, ultimately leading to a ‘metabolic rift’ (Longo 2010). His study 
demonstrated that the industrialisation of tuna fishing led to a degradation of environmental 
conditions along with negative impacts on social relations. Comparing a traditional mode of 
fishing ‘tonnara’ with the industrial fishing that followed, Longo showed that under a strong 
capitalist exploitation, human labour relations with the environment become highly utilitarian 
and the vast local knowledge on the resources and the ecology of the region fade in the face 
of capital and intensive technology (ibid). His focus on the change between traditional tuna 
fishing and intensive industrial fishing narrates how industrialised fishing reorganised the 
production and destabilised the ecological system of tuna resources (Longo and Clark 2012). 
Also arguing against a tragedy of the commons explanation for the collapse of Bluefin tuna in 
the Mediterranean, Longo and Clark contextualised and traced the history of the 
commodification of bluefin tuna. The switch to a capitalist exploitation led to the collapse of 
the resources and degradation of local livelihoods of fishing communities (ibid). Longo also 
brought up the idea of ‘the tragedy of the commodity’ which he developed in his 2015 book 
with Rebecca Clausen and Brett Clark, The Tragedy of The Commodity: Oceans, Fisheries 
and Aquaculture. The book presents tuna fisheries in the Mediterranean as one of the case 
studies and explains the deep contradictions between capitalism and nature with an 
environmental sociology lens. It also explains how capitalist economies attempt to correct 
ecological crises with technofixes - often not achieving the expected sustainability they 
claim. These contributions of Longo regarding the transformation of tuna fisheries in the 
Mediterranean show the drastic impacts of a capitalist mode of production on tuna resources 
and on local fishing systems. His approach, looking at fishing ecosystems and communities 
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in a capitalist exploitation, provides a key contribution that brings local tuna fishers more in 
the light. 
Other branches of the social sciences have also looked at tuna fisheries, especially in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). A selection of those working on topics similar 
to ones in this thesis will be presented. Kate Barclay did an extensive analysis of the impact 
of tuna fisheries on coastal communities in the Pacific. Looking at both the benefits and 
problems brought by the tuna industry to the communities, she showed that communities 
mainly profited from the tuna fisheries through employment and business opportunities with 
canneries and tuna fleets (Barclay 2010). According to her interviewees, communities, also 
experienced negative social impacts linked to mixing with migrants in canneries and on fleet 
or with higher availability of cash to spend on detrimental activities such as alcohol 
consumption. This look at the perceptions of local communities also highlighted the strong 
conviction of communities that the tuna industry has caused environmental damages 
including the depletion of tuna stock or pollution of the ocean (ibid). An interesting feature of 
this research is the specificity of Pacific Islander coastal community responses to the tuna 
industry.  Communities remained within their non-capitalist socio-economies while engaging 
with the tuna industry. They also had the predisposition to disproportionately blame the 
industry for social and environmental problems within coastal communities (ibid). This is 
rather similar to the views of coastal communities in the WIO that will be discussed in this 
thesis.  
In a publication with Ian Cartright, Kate Barclay also looked at island nations in the Pacific 
as case studies to evaluate the wealth gained from tuna fisheries (Barclay and Cartright 
2007). Their conclusion highlighted that some islands have managed to increase the benefits 
from tuna fisheries by requiring domestic involvement and onshore investment. The islands 
that struggled to improve the benefits from the fisheries were those with challenging socio-
economic context or those that could not move beyond fishing access agreements. The study 
also showed that islanders have the common view of wanting to capture more wealth from 
the fisheries in a sustainable manner while they had very diverse and sometimes diverging 
strategy to achieve such vision (ibid). This perspective is also similar to the islands studied in 
the WIO, as I will show in Chapter 7. Other recent studies by Barclay analysed the place of 
gender norms and how gender relations shape tuna fisheries especially in post-harvest 
activities (Barclay et al. 2017) or investigating the international governance of tuna fisheries 
through practices within RFMOs and fishing companies (Barclay 2015).  
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Another author who has worked on tuna is Sandra Tarte. Using a political and diplomacy 
approach, she mainly studied the role of Japanese aid in tuna fisheries in the Pacific (Tarte 
1995). She showed that Japan’s aid policy in the Pacific was strongly linked to diplomatic 
and political considerations needed for negotiating access to tuna grounds in the Pacific. The 
Pacific islands in turn used collective diplomacy, regionalisation and the Law of the sea to 
challenge the economic dominance of Japan (ibid). She also explored the making of 
regionalism within Pacific Islands through the management of tuna fisheries in the region 
(Tarte 2002, 2014). By looking at the different regional institutions that Pacific islands 
created to manage tuna fisheries, she highlighted the shift in power and regional order that 
put Pacific islands as active participants in questions of ocean governance, away from post-
colonialism and former metropolitan powers (Tarte 2014). Increased regionalism has allowed 
Pacific islands to gain more control over problems and solutions regarding the ocean and 
especially regarding the tuna resources and their exploitation (ibid). I conduct similar 
analyses in Chapter 7.  
Transform Aqorau also uses the diplomacy lens to study tuna. He analysed the relationships 
between Pacific islands and their partners regarding access arrangements to tuna. While 
acknowledging the important development of regional collaboration in the Pacific, he also 
highlighted that the complexity of fisheries dynamics and relationships between different 
actors can challenge this collaboration. He demonstrated how the emergence of subgroups 
can drive the decision process or how consensus is difficult to find when one country in the 
region is not interested in management measures (Aqorau 2015). Such studies of tuna 
fisheries in the Pacific through the angle of diplomacy are relevant for the case of WIO in the 
way that external partners in the Pacific such as the EU or Japan are also present in the 
exploitation of tuna in the WIO. The geographical configuration of EEZs in the WCPO and 
the WIO islands is, however, very different (as will be explained in Chapter 6 and 7), thus 
comparing tuna fisheries in the two oceans requires caution.  
Other authors have also brought interesting contributions to the study of tuna fisheries with 
diverse approaches. Bell et al. (2015), for example, looked at the contribution of tuna 
fisheries to food security and health in the Pacific. They argued for the need to increase 
access to tuna for local populations by developing local tuna fisheries and by improving 
distribution of tuna and bycatch from industrial fishing. They contended that an increased 
access to tuna would strongly contribute to sustaining the health of local populations in the 
Pacific. Elspeth Probyn  in her book Eating The Ocean (2016), explores the various 
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entanglements between humans and tuna. This included looking at the history of bluefin tuna 
and how it became a highly valued commodity in Japan and worldwide and the global 
response of NGOs, fishing companies and governments when bluefin came to be overfished 
and endangered. She also looked at practices of tuna fishing, tuna ranching and aquaculture 
in Australia. Her study provided an interesting view, not only of economies, but also the tales 
of the people involved and their relations with the fish and the fishery. These included, for 
example, a detailed tale of bluefin tuna ranching3 and related social practices. She also shed 
light on the actors behind the current fishing of bluefin tuna and raised the importance of 
understanding the processes that take place for bluefin tuna to arrive on consumers’ plate. 
Another interesting concept that Probyn developed was the idea of care for the more-than-
humans and how human relations with resources, including through consumption, develop 
our ‘habitus’ to care (Probyn 2014). These contributions by Probyn resonate to a relative 
extent with what this thesis aims to do, which is, to provide voices to ‘less seen’ actors in the 
tuna fisheries in the WIO and unpack the socio-political complexity of the fishery.  
2.4. BUILDING A POLITICAL ECOLOGY FRAMEWORK FOR THE WIO 
TUNA FISHERIES 
Discussed above are existing works on tuna fisheries in political ecology and other fields. In 
the following section, I will present my appropriation of the field of political ecology and the 
themes that I work on for this thesis. The thesis aims to explore how access politics, 
narratives around the state of tuna resources, and regionalism shape the management of the 
WIO tuna fisheries, therefore, I will address it by undertaking classical political ecology 
tasks, as presented by Robbins (2012). Such tasks include tracking winners and losers, 
exploring human and non-human dialectics and analysing claims about the state of nature. 
The three themes will be used throughout the thesis and will guide the different concepts used 
in each of result chapters.  
2.4.1. Analysing claims about the state of nature and claims about these claims 
The idea of making claims about the state of nature and questioning the same claims has been 
one of the specificities of political ecology. Not limiting itself to describing the 
characteristics of an ecosystem or the state of natural resources, it also questions the 
production of the ideas around the natural system. It has demonstrated how the ideas and 
 
3 The process of ranching comprises the steps of capturing 2-3 years old tuna at sea with purse seiner, 
transfering them into towing pontoons and transporting them to ranching sites where they are fed until 
harvested again.  
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explanations upon which resource management policies are based are influenced by different 
epistemologies or ideologies. Typically, political ecological studies of particular 
environmental ideas and discourses take seriously the genealogy and contextualised 
production and translation of those ideas. This task, sometimes labelled as ‘deconstruction’, 
investigates “the conditions in which ideas about the environment are formed, about the 
discursive rmeans that make certain assumptions about the environment more possible or 
likely, and about the way political power, social habits, and cultural norms may set human 
beliefs about the way the world both is, and ought to be.” (Robbins 2012: 97). This approach 
is not commonly applied in the study of tuna fisheries. The main discourse regarding the state 
of tuna resources in the WIO and in the oceans globally is one of overfishing. Questioning 
claims of overfishing at the current time of resource crises appears rhetorical. However, my 
interest was to investigate the conditions and ways within which this claim is made by 
various actors involved in fisheries as well as their legitimacy. To explore these views, I use 
the concept of co-production, developed originally in science and technology studies by 
Jasanoff (2006) and also discussed by Robbins (2012). Co-production is way of analysing a 
subject by considering natural and social orders but also the diversity of human experiences, 
interactions and cultures. The idea of using co-production is to explore the context and 
political work between actors in constructing their views about tuna including on its 
overfishing. This task involves taking a more constructivist stance when looking at tuna 
fisheries since the construction and making of ideas are examined within their socio-political 
environment.   
In conclusion, as this chapter has shown, there is relevance of applying political ecology to 
study tuna fisheries for this thesis. The field offers the opportunity to assemble a diversity of 
lenses that address both the humans and non-humans. It also situates the perspective of the 
local manager in its broader socio-political and economic context. Finally, it allows me to 
generate a localised account of the WIO tuna fisheries. 
2.4.2. Tracking winners and losers 
In the task of tracking winners and losers, political ecologists have attempted to understand 
the often uneven causes and consequences of environmental transformation between groups 
or communities. To do so, “political ecology narratives typically track the historical 
processes, legal and institutional infrastructures, and socially implicated assumptions and 
discourses that typically make unjust outcomes the rule, rather than the exception” (Robbins 
2012:  87). One of the aims of this thesis is to investigate the impacts of tuna fisheries within 
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the WIO and establish who wins or loses with regard to resource use. Two contradictory 
narratives are present within the WIO. One is from the industrial segment, including from 
DWFNs, that asserts industrial fishing brings long-standing economic development to host 
countries. On the other hand, local fishers claim that they see limited benefits from industrial 
fishing while their livelihoods are put at risk with the depletion of tuna stocks due to the 
industrial exploitation. This highlights that tuna fisheries are a domain of contestations and 
claims between actors, making political ecology a useful analytical tool.  
To explore the validity of these claims, I use the theory of access (Ribot and Peluso 2003) as 
a framework. As I will develop in Chapter 6, the theory of access provides a way of looking 
at access to natural resources not only through property but also through the various 
structural and relational mechanisms that are available to actors involved. It also considers 
the different bundles of power that are created through the interactions between actors while 
accessing the resources. By using the theory of access to study the WIO tuna fisheries, I will 
investigate winners and losers through three steps. First is a mapping of the benefits that tuna 
fisheries provide to the host countries and their fishers, from economic benefits to socio-
political ones. The mapping will explore who gets what benefit from fisheries. Second is an 
exploration of the different mechanisms of access to tuna. It will establish who accesses the 
tuna, with what means and how. Finally, I will look at the power relations between actors in 
this process of access to the fish. This will establish if there is a structure of outcomes that 
produces losers at the expense of winners in tuna fisheries. I use the theory of access with a 
structuralist stance exploring the institutional infrastructures surrounding tuna fisheries while 
being anchored in the history of the fishery. I also use inputs from political economy since 
looking at access to tuna fisheries requires exploring questions of capital, markets and 
dynamics of production.  
Another area where winners and losers will be examined is the regional interactions of 
countries through tuna fisheries in the WIO. As I will develop in Chapter 6, the region and 
especially the three islands studied are fully enrolled in what is promoted as an Indianoceania 
vision for the region to work together including on tuna fisheries. With a closer look at the 
practices surrounding regionalism in tuna fisheries, I will establish that while the idea of an 
Indianoceania is supposed to benefit the countries of the region, when it comes to tuna 
fisheries there is competition between countries, external actors that exercise geopolitical 
pressure thus generating winners and losers. While the countries of the WIO regions are 
portrayed as benefiting from regionalism, tuna fisheries defy this assumption and allow 
  34 
DWFNs to become dominant actors and winners in the region. This exploration requires a 
deconstruction of the idea of regionalism in tuna fisheries by looking at practices, while 
keeping political economy elements in the forefront to contextualise the difficulty of 
achieving regionalism in the fishery.  
2.4.3. Exploring human and non-human dialectics 
One characteristic of political ecology that has been important within this thesis is the 
attention to non-humans. While other disciplines do consider natural resources and their 
impacts on social practices, political ecology gives objects or animals an active role in the 
making of social processes and vice versa. This dialectic provides “a more processual and 
complex picture of the nature of things” (Robbins 2012: 94). As explained by Robbins (ibid), 
in political ecology, “non-human objects (elk, icemakers, fungi), as well as human beings 
themselves, contain and are constituted by their relations to other things”. This co-
constitution and relation between humans and non-humans are highly relevant for the study 
of tuna fisheries considering the movement of the species across the region and its 
management implications. In this thesis, I give particular attention to the tuna and the WIO 
by exploring how their materiality affects tuna fisheries and vice versa – i.e. on how social 
practices influence the tuna resources and the WIO. I will expand on the concept of 
materiality in various chapters to explore how it shapes perspectives regarding degradation of 
the resources (Chapter 5), to see how it influences and co-produces access (Chapter 6) and to 
investigate its role in initiatives towards regionalism (Chapter 7). In this human-non-human 
dialectic, it is also important to take into consideration the various socio-economic and 
historical contexts that surround the relations between humans and non-humans. This 
enriches the “chain of explanation” regarding the use of tuna resources in the WIO. Chains of 
explanation allow political ecologists to “trace the contextual forces that constrain and direct 
more immediate outcomes, and write an explanation of these outcomes that is also, 
simultaneously, a map for the way value flows out the landscape, through local communities, 
and towards sites of accumulation far away” (Robbins 2012: 88). The thesis therefore aims to 
trace the use of resources at different levels by paying attention to the local, regional and 
global variables that impact the fisheries along with the materiality of the tuna and the WIO. 
This consideration of non-humans requires exploring ideas of “new materialism”, a field in 
which political ecology has led work in the science and technologies studies. These include 
investigating the co-fabrication of the socio-material world by both humans and non-humans 
or exploring the materialities through which web of connections and ecologies are always ‘in-
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the-making’ (Bennett 2010; Whatmore 2006). From this literature, I will mobilise two ideas: 
materiality and the role of non-humans. In the study of tuna fisheries, I see the two as 
complementary in understanding the making of processes linked to access, overfishing and 
regionalism. Considering materiality can help to better understand the processes around the 
fishery. As Bennett puts it, materiality “draws human attention sideways, away from an 
ontologically ranked great chain of being and toward a greater appreciation of the complex 
entanglements of humans and non-humans” (Bennett 2010: 112). I will then show in this 
thesis that the materiality of the fish and the ocean brings specificities to the fishery. As for 
the role of non-humans, I also see the tuna and the WIO as active parts of the fishery’s 
assemblage. They are ‘actants’ which can be sources of action that impact the social fabric 
(Latour 1996). The thesis will highlight that the fish and the ocean can cooperate in or 
impede the fishery and its management. Through the use of materiality and non-humans’ 
agency, I will tell the story of tunas and the WIO as actants in tuna fisheries and as shaping 
management.  
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, I present my strategy in undertaking the research for this thesis. I start by 
presenting my fieldwork and the methods. I continue with explaining how the data gathered 
were analysed. The chapter concludes by describing some gaps in the research and the 
challenges I faced in the field.  
The research is based on an empirical approach with fieldwork in the three island nations of 
Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles. They were used as case studies to build a regional 
WIO story. The three countries were not compared against each other as they are highly 
distinctive in terms of tuna fisheries, productivity of fishing grounds and socio-economic 
contexts. To answer the research question and address the themes studied, I conducted semi-
structured interviews during which questions of access, perceptions of overfishing and 
practices of regionalism where asked. To understand and contextualise actors’ views, I 
observed actors’ activities related to the fishery: tuna landings and international discussions 
of management. To complement information gathered from the field, grey literature was also 
used including consultancy, NGO and government reports. Storylines in the thesis were 
generated according to data gathered in the field. The research has adopted a deductive 
approach. Starting from three research subthemes and by mobilising a theory or a concept for 
each theme, data and observations were gathered to establish conclusions and patterns in the 
different topics addressed.  
3.1. FIELDWORK 
The thesis is based on fieldwork undertaken in the three island countries during 2017 (5 
months) and 2018 (3 weeks) (Figure 1). The fieldwork had three main strategies: meeting 
fishers in their fishing villages, observing landings at ports and fishing villages and meeting 
with officials and NGO representatives at their offices. Fishing villages were chosen from an 
initial discussion with key actors in fisheries departments and statistic units who pointed out 
to well-known villages with tuna fishers in the three countries. In addition to those, two 
international meetings were also attended, in Antananarivo (Mars 2017) and Bangkok (May 
2018).  
For Madagascar, the two-month fieldwork in 2017 consisted of observing landings at the 
main tuna port (Antsiranana), meeting government officials and NGOs representatives in 
three administrative towns (Antananarivo, Antsiranana and Mahajanga), and meeting fishers 
in three fishing villages (Amborovy, Antsahabingo and Ramena). In 2018, one other fishing 
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village (Sainte Luce), one port (Toamasina) and two administrative towns (Tolagnaro and 
Toamasina) were visited to meet with fishers, government officials and NGO representatives. 
The village of Ramena was visited again for follow-up with fishers as it is a well-known tuna 
fishing village in this country.  
In Mauritius, the month and a half fieldwork consisted of observing landings and meeting 
governmental officials in the capital city of Port Louis, meeting fishers and observing 
landings in eight fishing villages (Bain des dames, Grand Baie, Le Morne, Rivière Noire, 
Pointe aux Sables, Tamarin, Tombeau Bay and Trou aux Biches).  
In Seychelles, the month and a half fieldwork included meeting government officials in the 
capital city of Victoria, observing landings and meeting fishers at Victoria and Providence 
ports as well as in four fishing villages (Anse à la Mouche, Anse aux Pins, Beau Vallon and 
Bel Ombre). Fieldwork in the two islands (Mauritius and the Seychelles), took place in 2017 
only, due to smaller geographical extent of the country. Within the combined three months 
fieldwork in 2017 in the two islands, best known tuna fishers and boat owners were 
interviewed as well as government officials and NGO representatives.  
One research assistant accompanied me in each country. Each of them being a local from the 
region or country and familiar with the field, they were able to identify well-known villages 
to go to. They also helped with the translation (into northern dialect for Madagascar and into 
Creole for Mauritius and the Seychelles). They also assisted with note taking. When 
interviewees were able to speak mainstream Malagasy, French or English, I conducted the 
interview and the assistant took notes. When they preferred to speak the local dialect or 
Creole, the assistant conducted the interview, translated to me and I took notes.   
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Figure 1:Map of villages and towns during fieldwork 
 
 
 
Madagascar 
 
 
Mauritius 
 
 
Seychelles 
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3.2. METHODS 
3.2.1. Interviews 
The first method was semi-structured interviews with key actors in the three islands. For the 
thesis, interviews represented a key method to gather facts and perspectives of actors 
regarding the three themes of the research but also to understand the socio-economic and 
political context within which actors express their views and ideas. Two strategies were used 
to contact interviewees: the snowball technique, where my first contacts provided their own 
contacts, and onsite recruitment within villages and fishing ports. For government officials 
and NGO representatives, they were identified by contacts from other researchers in the field 
or by approaching the offices in countries and requesting appointments. For fishers and 
intermediaries, repeated visits in the fishing villages and ports were undertaken during which 
actors were approached to request a meeting, to have an interview or just an open discussion 
at the time of encounter. Nine interviews were also done via Skype, these were interviewees 
that were based in Europe or who were not available during the fieldwork. Six interviews 
also took place during attendance of international meetings. Each interview lasted between 20 
minutes to an hour approximately. Here, the role of my research assistants for interviewing 
actors in each country was crucial. They were a key factor in the success of interviews 
including in the depth of discussions and the number of people we could interview. The 
assistant in each country was strongly invested in exploring the different topics and also 
assisted in my understanding of the interviewee’s responses as well as the different local 
contexts of the interviews. 
Interviews were coded according to where they took place, namely Madagascar (interviews 
coded as MD), Mauritius (coded as MU), Seychelles (coded as SE), Bangkok (coded BK) 
and online by Skype (coded as SK) (Appendix 1). Before each interview, the research was 
explained and the interviewee was asked if he/she was willing to discuss the state of the 
resources, access and regionalism. It was also explained that notes from the discussion will 
be used for the research. Interviewees consented verbally to discuss all or some of the topics. 
Some interviewees refused to discuss from the start. This only happened a few times amongst 
fishers, especially in Madagascar. Most interviewees wanted to remain anonymous, so 
anonymity was adopted in the writing of the thesis, by mentioning only the interview codes 
(BK, MD, MU, SE, SK) or the categories of actors. A total of 223 interviews were completed 
(Table 3).  
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Table 3: List of actors interviewed in each country and remotely 
 Madagascar Mauritius Seychelles Bangkok/Skype 
Fishers – Small scale 47 24 20  
Fishers – Industrial 7 0 4 5 
Fishers – Semi Industrial 0 0 14 2 
Fishers – Recreational 2 2 1  
Intermediaries – Individuals 6 2 0  
Intermediaries – Companies 1 0 2  
Cannery staff member 1 3 3  
Government officials 26 8 10 4 
NGO staff members 10 0 9 4 
Research Institute 0 0 5  
Local retailers 2 2 5  
Total by country 102 41 68 15 
Interviews took two forms: semi-structured ones and open discussions. The semi-structured 
interviews were guided by a pre-established questionnaire addressing the three research 
questions of the thesis. The questionnaire (in Appendix 2) was divided into four parts: the 
personal data about the interviewee – such as years as a fisher or in current official position, 
questions about access, perceptions about the state of the resources and questions about 
regionalism (Table 4). Open discussions were interviews during which only a few guiding 
questions were asked then the interviewee was left to provide broad views on the subject. 
These happened mainly with officials in fisheries departments and high-level executives of 
fishing companies or fishing associations. Three guiding questions were usually asked 
including the interviewee’s view on the state of the resources, the management of access and 
the potential for regionalism.   
Table 4: Categories of questions asked during semi-structured interviews  
Actor  Access Regionalism State of the 
resources 
Small-scale fishers • Types of rights-based 
mechanisms of access to 
tuna 
• Structural access 
mechanisms: 
- Knowledge production 
- Technology availability 
- Capital availability 
- Types of market 
accessed 
- Labour opportunities 
- Other social relations 
needed 
Interaction with other 
fishers and knowledge 
about other fishers in the 
SWIO region 
• Perception 
on the state 
of the 
resources in 
the past five 
years 
• Justification 
of 
perspective 
given 
• Perceived 
drivers 
behind the 
state of 
resources 
Industrial tuna boat 
crew 
Knowledge about other 
crew and fishers working 
in the SWIO and location 
of fishing activity and 
landing ports 
Government officials Stakes regarding tuna 
fisheries and interests 
and obstacles to a 
regional collaboration in 
tuna fisheries 
Processing company 
staff 
• Structural access 
mechanisms: 
- Types of market 
Knowledge about and 
interaction with other 
cannery staff from the 
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3.2.2. Observations 
The second method used to collect data was observation of tuna landings and international 
meetings. For tuna landings, observation was important for the research to show the diversity 
of actors involved in each segment but also to investigate the potential interactions between 
the segments of the fishery. Landings took place in coastal villages and at ports (Illustration 
1). In coastal villages, the process of landing and the handling of the fish was observed and 
recorded. This included observing the type of tuna that was landed, the quantity, where the 
fish was going and how it was transported. The aim of this observation was to describe local 
practices of tuna fishing and also observe the technological means of access as well as the 
market route taken by the fish. Observation lasted between a couple of hours to a full day, 
observing landings at different times of the day. 
At ports, observation of landings was possible in Antsiranana port, Madagascar and in 
Victoria and Providence, Seychelles. These were done by accompanying teams of surveyors 
from fisheries departments which undertook the monitoring of catch on purse-seiners. This 
was not possible in Mauritius as the surveyors were not undertaking monitoring during the 
time of the fieldwork. Observation consisted of recording the practices of handling the fish 
including the separation of tuna from bycatch, looking at the interactions between stevedores 
and crew members, and the interactions between crew members and other external actors 
such as surveyors or research institute members. For the case of the Seychelles, where there 
is a growing semi-industrial sector, the observation of landing was undertaken at the local 
ports of Victoria and Providence. They allowed for an understanding of the supply chain for 
sashimi tuna from the Seychelles, the practices of longline by a mixed Seychellois-Sri 
Lankan crew and the handling and processing. Each observation lasted between a couple of 
hours to half a day.  
Other sites were also visited for a couple of hours each during the fieldwork including the 
local fish markets in the three countries and the canneries in Madagascar and Mauritius. 
These observations were important in my approach of humanising the fishery and also to 
accessed 
- Labour opportunities 
SWIO region 
NGO representatives • Structural access 
mechanisms: 
- Knowledge production 
- Types of market 
accessed 
Drivers and obstacles to 
regional collaboration in 
tuna fisheries in the SWIO 
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describe the practices but especially the diversity of actors involved in the fishery. Fieldnotes 
were written and transcribed to record these practices and interactions.  
Illustration 1: Landing in the three segments of the fisheries 
 
 
 
From left to right, landing by small-scale fishers (Mauritius), semi-industrial boats (Seychelles) and 
purse-seiners (in Madagascar). Photos by the author 
Two regional meetings were attended and observed. First, the 8th Session of the South West 
Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission (SWIOFC) took place in Antananarivo, Madagascar, 28-
31 March 2017, then the 22nd Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) took 
place on 21-25 May 2018 in Bangkok, Thailand. SWIOFC meetings are held biannually for 
the commission members (12 countries of the region4) to discuss common issues regarding 
the management of fisheries in the SWIO region. During such meetings, subcommittees 
present their work and regional matters are also discussed. While the commission has a 
working party on collaboration and cooperation in tuna fisheries, another important topic 
discussed was the guidelines for Minimum Terms and Conditions (MTCs) for fishing access 
agreements. Meetings of the IOTC commission, on the other hand, take place every year for 
two main reasons. First, it is used as a reporting mechanism, during which the work of 
different subcommittees is presented to the members. It is also a decision-making mechanism 
where various conservation and management proposals are tabled, debated and adopted as a 
binding resolution for all its members. During the meetings, I was part of NGO delegations5: 
Blue Ventures during the SWIOFC meeting and the International Pole and Line Foundation 
(IPNLF) during the IOTC meeting. In those meetings, NGOs are admitted as observers. 
While observers do not take part in the decision-making process, they are allowed to make 
 
4 Members as of 2019: Comoros, France, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, 
Somalia, South Africa, United Rep. of Tanzania, Yemen. 
5 I was able to join the NGOs’ delegations by request and as having an advisory role on a voluntary basis for 
both NGOs.  
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short statements (for the case of IOTC but not for SWIOFC) to supply information. NGOs 
also often attend these meetings in advisory positions for countries or causes they defend. 
Blue Ventures attended the SWIOFC meeting to show their presence as representing the 
views of small-scale fishers. For the case of IPNLF, they have been engaged in building the 
capacity of coastal countries of the IO through support of the G16 group, a group of like-
minded coastal states hosting the tuna resources. The group does not include countries like 
France or the UK which despite their overseas territories are not considered as ‘like-minded’. 
To observe the meetings, I used techniques from event ethnography which, through careful 
observation of things such as speeches, settings and debates, aim at capturing ‘underlying 
forces’ and the politics of environmental governance at international meetings (Corson et al. 
2014). Three elements were thoroughly recorded. First, speeches and position statements 
from key actors – here the delegates from the three countries studied and from DWFNs – 
were carefully recorded and double-checked with the meeting minutes. Second, reactions of 
actors during debates on management measures were also recorded, including responses to 
statements or spontaneous interventions during topical discussions. Third, the general setting 
of the meeting was observed and recorded – including the setting and timing of different 
agenda items, the time spent on each agenda item or any switch of agenda items and the turns 
of speakers. The objective of this observation was to document the interactions between 
members, notably between the delegates of the three countries studied and the DWFNs. This 
helped to picture the geopolitical interactions regarding tuna fisheries. Another aim was to 
understand how members present and promote their position, and what narratives convince 
parties to come to a decision or not. Detailed note taking was done using each meeting’s 
agenda as a structure for the field notes. They were then double-checked with the content of 
the minutes.  
A last type of observation was a virtual one. I followed online news regarding tuna in the 
WIO, notably on Twitter and on the “undercurrent news”6 website. Twitter accounts that 
were followed include those of the Indian Ocean Commission, of OPAGAC, of the 
Europêche and of the EU ambassador in the WIO region. News from the undercurrent 
website were collected when they concerned the management of tuna in the Indian Ocean. 
Tweets and news articles were saved and were used to complement views or positions by the 
actors studied in this thesis.  
 
6 The undercurrent website (https://www.undercurrentnews.com/) provides news on supply, trade, policy 
regarding various fisheries including tuna 
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3.2.3. Document analysis  
Field data were complemented by an analysis of grey literature regarding tuna fisheries in the 
WIO. A diversity of documents was analysed to provide data and narratives surrounding the 
three research questions (Table 5).  
The first set of documents was fisheries reports from Fisheries departments in the three 
islands. They were collected on the departments’ website (in the case of Seychelles), or 
copied from the libraries of each department. When available, reports between 2012 and 2017 
were consulted to provide data regarding the different mechanisms of access to the resources. 
Catch data was also used to establish the numbers through which governments would assert 
their perspective on the state of resources. Finally, reports also covered the various regional 
initiatives in which governments were taking part regarding the management of tuna 
resources, which were useful to trace the trajectory of regionalism between the three islands 
but also to corroborate governments’ positions regarding regionalism.  
The second set of documents was a compilation of IOTC reports extracted from the IOTC 
website. These consisted of the reports of the commission and the scientific committees 
between 2012 and 2018. Another set of IOTC documents used was the annual national 
reports submitted by countries and a database of catches between 1950 and 2017. These were 
used to triangulate the data from national reports above. They were also used to trace the 
evolution of tuna stocks and especially yellowfin tuna for Chapter 5. The commission reports 
were used to document country positions on the management of tuna resources. They helped 
to establish the different ways island countries and DWFNs interact, through an analysis of 
submitted proposals and resolutions actually adopted. This was a key information to be able 
to analyse the state of regionalism at the IOTC level between the three islands.  
A third set of documents analysed was produced by the Indian Ocean Commission relating to 
tuna fisheries in the past five years. These consisted of project reports, annual reports and 
meetings’ reports from the IOC and press releases concerning different projects linked to tuna 
fisheries. They were important to present the initiatives of regionalism in the WIO region and 
more specifically the Southwest Indian Ocean. The reports also helped to illustrate how 
countries build a narrative of effective regionalism and how it is implemented in the field of 
tuna fisheries. 
Another set of documents was linked to the EU, which has the advantage of having various 
online documents available for consultation and analysis. The EU-related documents were 
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central to explore access to the resources by DWFNs and also to frame the position of the EU 
in the WIO region regarding regionalism. The documents included fishing access agreements 
between the EU and the three islands, leaflets of the EU regarding access agreements and 
tuna fisheries in general. They also included consultancy reports evaluating these access 
agreements. The latter were particularly useful as they present information regarding the 
economic aspects of the fishery including the value added of tuna fisheries to coastal states’ 
economies, even if they were written from an EU perspective.  
A last set of documents was from NGOs such as the IPNLF, PEW and WWF. They included 
press releases on subjects related to the state of tuna resources in the Indian Ocean or 
regionalism at the IOTC level. They also included reports on issues such as FADs. 
Information from those reports were used to present the views of NGOs on the three themes 
of the thesis but also to explore how such actors shape the fishery and its management.  
Table 5: Summary of data extracted and analysed in the grey literature  
 Data collected Modality of analysis 
Governmental 
reports 
• Catch data 
• Access mechanisms 
• Comparison between years 
• Extraction of information, 
positions and narratives 
• Tracing the evolution of 
positions and narratives 
IOC reports and 
press releases 
• Regional initiatives  
• Economic investments 
• Positions of actors on regionalism 
IOTC commission 
reports 
• Resolutions on tuna management 
• Positions of parties 
IOTC scientific 
committee reports 
• Evolution of catch  
• Management advice 
IOTC national 
reports 
• Catch data 
• Evolution of national fisheries 
EU Fishing access 
agreements 
• Financial contribution 
• Management measures 
EU leaflets • Narrative about Fishing access 
agreements 
• EU procedures on tuna 
Ex-post and ex-ante 
evaluation of 
fishing access 
agreements  
• Catch data 
• Economic contribution to the WIO 
• Benefits gained by the EU fleet 
NGO reports and 
press releases 
• Position of NGOs 
• External view of State interactions 
3.3. DATA ANALYSIS 
From the variety of methods used for the research, a diversity of data emerged. Perspectives 
and related narratives emerged from the interviews. These were triangulated with results from 
observation and analysis of various grey literatures and online content. Perceptions on the 
state of tuna resources were checked against written reports by the same actors or grey 
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literature to which actors contributed. Access mechanisms and benefits discussed with actors 
were verified with observations of landings and analysis of fisheries reports. Views about 
access politics were also verified in actors’ negotiation practises during access discussions at 
the IOTC level. Perspectives about regionalism were triangulated with written reports of the 
IOC and also actors’ practices of regionalism during the IOTC and SWIOFC negotiations.  
Data from the interviews were analysed via content analysis by using the software Atlas.ti. 
After interviews were transcribed, they were imported into Atlas.ti. Within the software, a 
system of coding was put in place addressing the research questions of the thesis. Three main 
code branches were created: access, state of resources and regionalism. Each branch then had 
a series of codes that were created according to the most repeated responses received from 
the interviews (Appendix 3). Ninety-nine codes were generated to cover the different 
information from the interviews. Another category was also created to highlight the metadata 
about interviewees including, when provided, their age, professional status and how long they 
have been involved in their profession.  
Coding research outputs with Atlas.ti was useful for three reasons. First, it allowed an easy 
location of the data on any question related to the research. For example, it was easy to look 
at all responses regarding the various means of access to the resources as they were entered 
as different codes. It also showed which mechanisms actors provided the most information 
on. Second, it allowed the identification of major trends in the three topics. For the study of 
narratives regarding the state of resources for example, the coding system showed repetitions 
under different views. It was then possible to see the main trends and who was behind each 
trend. Third, it allowed the easy retrieval of key quotes on the different questions of the 
research.  
For data from observations, field notes were not imported to Atlas.ti and were analysed 
manually by first coding the different contents to the three research questions of the 
manuscript (access, state of resources and regionalism). Specific contents were then used to 
support the arguments generated from the interviews. As presented in the previous section on 
document analysis, data from the reports and documents were also analysed by comparing 
numerical data and by extracting views and positions of actors including those interviewed. 
Contents from documents were also used to depict facts or to support the positions of 
different actors as factual background. 
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3.4. CHALLENGES IN DOING THE RESEARCH 
The study has been subject to common challenges that are often faced by researchers, such as 
the lack of time, never enough data, the difficulty to navigate power games with officials, 
understanding other languages or discussing sensitive topics (Lunn 2014). Some of these 
challenges will be presented here as they had an impact on how the research was undertaken 
and led to experience-based adaptation in the field and in the collection of data.  
3.4.1. Unaddressed subjects 
The research covered a significant number of actors and sites. However, the large extent of 
tuna fisheries in the WIO still generated some gaps. First, while the research has covered 
three key countries for tuna fisheries in the WIO, it did not cover other countries of the WIO. 
Those include for example South Africa which has increasingly taken a leadership role within 
coastal countries at the IOTC or Kenya which has a fairly important tuna port – Mombasa – 
and a local tuna fishery supported by national actors. The lack of time and resources to have 
an extended fieldwork was the reason for not covering other countries.   
Second, the research has not looked at industrial fisheries undertaken by Asian fleets. At least 
three well-known Asian DWFNs – Japan, China and South Korea – fish in the national 
waters of the WIO countries. However, there is a lack of transparency regarding their 
operation. Their fishing access agreements are not public and they do not land in Madagascar 
and only some do land in Mauritius and the Seychelles. At the time of the fieldwork, there 
was no possibility to board landing Asian tuna boats nor interview fishing crew. At the 2018 
IOTC meeting that was attended, two representatives of the Korean fleet were in the 
Malagasy delegation and were approached to ask for an interview. While one of them 
accepted to be interviewed, the discussion was only general without any details provided on 
their exploitation in the WIO. For this reason, the thesis is only based on data from the 
national small-scale and the semi-industrial segments and from the EU industrial fisheries.  
Third, a topic that was not the subject of a deep analysis was the extent of “Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated” (IUU) fishing in the WIO region. While the manuscript 
analyses illegal fishing as an illegal mechanism to access the resources, it does not discuss 
the extent and impacts of this illegal fishing nor those of unreported and unregulated fishing. 
The rationale for this is the limited data available at the local and national level of such 
fishing and also the aggregation of data at the IOTC level which brings all data as for the IO 
rather than the region or the countries. Therefore, while interviews and reports confirmed that 
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there is IUU fishing in the WIO, an analysis of the extent of such IUU fishing at the WIO 
region or at the country level was not possible. 
Another task that the research could not achieve was to measure the contribution of tuna 
fisheries to the food security of coastal communities. As the thesis aims to provide a better 
understanding of the local implications of tuna fisheries, food security represents an 
important component. However, such measuring requires a long-standing research in one or 
more villages that could not be achieved considering the time of the research. During the time 
of the fieldwork, not enough time was spent in villages to analyse and observe the impact of 
the fishery on food consumption and food security. Similar kinds of research have been 
undertaken in Madagascar regarding the impact of wildlife consumption on food security 
(Golden et al. 2011) or at the global level assessing the contribution of global fisheries to 
micronutrients intake in developing countries (Hicks et al. 2019). Such results are based on 
research for several years to collect the data. 
As these topics have been challenging to investigate, I chose to focus my effort on deepening 
knowledge on tuna fisheries in the three countries by exploring the national and EU segments 
of the fishery, and the interactions of the countries and its people at different levels.  
3.4.2. Investigating sensitive subjects, ‘at home’ 
Discussing tuna fisheries with actors at different levels presented some difficulties at times. 
At the local level, fishers rarely wanted to be identified, including those with very strong 
narratives. For those who agreed to be named, some did not want their views to be shared 
with the government. In this instance, fishers were assured that they would be anonymised 
(as seen in Appendix 1). The issue of anonymity also applied to governmental officials to 
some extent, as some were critical of DWFNs that are also considered as partners of the 
coastal countries. To ensure that those officials were not compromised, they have been 
anonymised in the text of the thesis and in the list of interviewees. Finally, some critical 
views about coastal countries were also expressed by representatives of DWFNs and their 
fleets. To avoid pointing fingers, those views were also anonymised in the text. As I come 
from the region and worked for a marine conservation NGO before doing the PhD, I often 
faced the issue of acknowledging my position regarding the fisheries. It was at times difficult 
to dissociate from the home country and the struggles of local fishers or the cause of coastal 
countries. Interviews with representatives of DWFNs required objectivity and a full 
consideration of the views expressed without taking sides.  
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Other challenges also presented themselves and had an impact on how the research was 
undertaken. The first challenge is common to ‘researching at home’. There is a wide 
literature on doing research in one’s own country. Difficulties of such research include 
dealing with prejudices linked to one’s identity or social position, managing subjectivity or 
navigating local power relations with interviewees (Godbole 2014; Sultana 2007). For my 
case, being a researcher studying abroad but also originally from the capital city of 
Antananarivo was at times a burden to carry to the coastal communities. A historicised 
mistrust of people from the capital tainted my arrival in coastal villages. Despite having a 
local as a research assistant, it took at least a couple of days for anyone to talk to us. Also, 
fishers sometimes assumed that we were from the state, policing their fishing activities. It 
was only after repeated visits to local authorities and known fishers explaining the aim of the 
research that fishers felt comfortable talking to us. On the other hand, some government 
officials also required some introduction before they accepted to be interviewed. From a fair 
assumption that researchers will only come, take what they want and publish it – as it often 
happened in the past according to them – a few directors visited asked for either authorisation 
to undertake the research or what I would do with the conversation we were having. A 
comprehensive explanation was provided and especially providing a clear positionality that I 
wanted to increase knowledge on tuna fisheries in Madagascar, share local stories and 
provide information that could contribute to the improvement of the fisheries. With clarity 
provided, government officials were in the end cooperative, as proven by the authorisation I 
got to board landing purse seiners with surveyors from the statistic unit in Antsiranana. As 
expressed by other researchers doing research in their home countries (for example Godbole 
2014), one’s position as a scholar from abroad sometimes was seen as carrying the same 
weight as a foreigner doing the research. However, reflecting on the process, interviewees did 
want to express their views on the subject which helped the entire process. Encouraging 
words came from some discussions where senior officials or fishers acclaimed the research 
and showed pride in contributing to a research undertaken by a researcher from the country.  
The second difficulty was the challenge of data accuracy with data provided by fishers. This 
was due to different factors: first it was the simple fact that in the three countries the 
languages were different and sometimes the system of measure, too (in Mauritius fishers use 
pound when they discuss weight). Also, fishers do not always measure catch or revenues in a 
fixed way. They would navigate between catch per day, catch per fishing trip without 
mentioning how many times a day they would go fishing. Each time we attempted to have a 
  50 
consistent way of measuring effort, the fishers would feel uncomfortable and would not know 
what to respond so we reverted back to what he was more comfortable sharing with us. The 
catch data presented in the thesis is therefore more illustrative than representative. Again, 
more time spent in each village would have been needed to build a consistent set of catch 
effort.  
Another challenge was an unexpected one linked to being a Malagasy researcher, studying in 
Europe and doing research within the WIO and especially in the two neighbouring islands. I 
have always considered myself as part of the region. Having friends in Mauritius, I consider 
other islanders of the region as distant ‘cousins’ and was delighted to be able to do my 
research there. Doing research and especially on fisheries did not always open doors easily in 
the two islands. This was mainly due to the perception that people in the two islands have of 
Malagasy people, which is one of low-skilled workers in the textile industry (in Mauritius) 
and in the tuna cannery (in the Seychelles). An illustration of such perception from the locals 
was a comment I received from a boy in a café in the Seychelles asking “if you are from 
Madagascar, why are you not poor?”. Explaining the diversity of people from Madagascar 
was not always easy or comprehended. To those are added other social misconceptions. At 
the time of the fieldwork, drug smuggling and prostitution from Madagascar were hitting 
Mauritius, local newspapers depicted Malagasy women as increasing local prostitution in 
Mauritius and men as drug smugglers.In the Seychelles, Malagasy women are well known to 
migrate for marriages. Travelling as a solo woman researcher, I was lengthily questioned at 
the airport of both countries about the aim of my visit. To board the plane to Mauritius, two 
airline representatives requested that I provided extra documents to prove my status as a 
researcher. Entering the Seychelles, which is normally an easy process for any foreigner, was 
rather difficult and proof was again required by immigration officials that I was a researcher. 
Those different factors and the confluence of events at the time of the fieldwork did not 
facilitate the research at the very local level with fishers and intermediaries. During 
interviews, I was repeatedly asked first if I worked at the tuna cannery in the Seychelles or 
which factory I was working in Mauritius. Introductions during interviews became rather 
long and explaining my status as a researcher studying tuna took quite a while to be fully 
acknowledged. The situation was more challenging with fishers in the Seychelles as they 
would not understand why I was studying tuna and not solutions to poverty in Madagascar. 
To those were added subtle jokes from fishers that they had Malagasy girlfriends in the past 
or that Malagasy wives were more caring than Seychellois ones. A fine balance was needed 
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between taking the joke, not taking offence, asserting my status and yet trying to build trust 
to have a productive interview. In the end, the discussions with fishers were productive and I 
am hoping that encountering another type of Malagasy woman would have broadened a bit 
more the perception on Malagasy people in the two neighbouring islands.  
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CHAPTER 4. TUNA FISHERIES IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN 
The western Indian Ocean (WIO) represents less than 5% of the global ocean, yet it produces 
around 10% of the global tuna catch and generates more than US$1,6 billion in revenue from 
that catch (Coulter et al. 2020; Obura et al. 2017). While small-scale and artisanal fishers 
have caught tuna as part of their fishing activities for at least three generations, industrial 
fishing only started in the 1950s. The WIO is considered to be the last frontier for industrial 
tuna fleets, after resources started to get scarce in the other oceans (Campling 2012b). In this 
chapter, I will present the tuna fisheries in the WIO both as a region and in the form of three 
case studies. Providing this background context is key as it allows an understanding of the 
importance of tuna and how each country has developed its tuna fisheries and related 
activities. Moreover, it sets the scene for the intricate interactions that take place between the 
large array of actors.  
I focus in particular on three countries, Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles, which are 
at the centre of the WIO tuna fishery, each having active fishing ports where tuna is landed or 
transhipped, processing companies and all hosting industrial fishing by DWFNs. As Table 6 
shows, the three countries also have different socio-economic and historical contexts and 
different levels of tuna exploitation7.  
Table 6: Key figures on tuna fisheries for Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles  
 Madagascar Mauritius Seychelles 
Population 25,000,000 1,200,000 97,000 
EEZ 1,200,330 km2 1,272,765 km2 1,331,964 km2 
National GDP  $USD 11,5 billion $USD 14,2 billion $USD 1,5 billion 
Tuna fishery’s contribution to GDP <1% 2% 20% 
Proportion in volume of national exports  53% 20% 90% 
Annual Catch from tuna fishing: 
- Small-scale and artisanal  
- Semi-industrial 
- Industrial within the EEZ 
 
~100 tons  
~400 tons 
~10,000 tons 
 
250 tons 
250 tons 
4,300 tons 
 
100 tons 
1000 tons 
76,200 tons 
Number of fishers: 
- Small-scale/artisanal (all species) 
- Semi-industrial (tuna and other 
pelagics)  
- Industrial EU vessels - annually (tuna)   
 
85,000  
42 
13 
 
1,620 
78 
0 
 
2,000 
180 
40 
Employment in tuna processing 1,600 750 2,500 
Source: Compilation from Breuil and Grima 2014a, 2014b; Caillart et al. 2018; COFREPECHE et al. 
2015; IOC 2018b; IOTC 2018a; Marsac et al. 2014; Rakotosoa 2017; SFA 2016; Sea Around Us 
database; Sweenarain 2012; USTA 2017; World Bank 2017 
 
7 For the catch data, figures in Madagascar refer to annual catch whereas in Mauritius and the Seychelles they 
relate to 2016 and 2017 respectively. 
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A note on figures used regarding the WIO and the three case studies. 
There is a multitude of grey literature that discusses numbers about the tuna 
fisheries, especially regarding the catch of different segments of the fishery in 
the WIO in general and in the three case study countries in particular. At times 
these data proved confusing and difficult to interpret. However, they were 
needed to describe the different segments of tuna fisheries in each country.  
Regarding the WIO as a region, various reports present figures on the fisheries. 
However, they do not always refer to a stated year. Numbers that are used to 
value the fishery or to depict the catch can therefore be misleading. For clarity, I 
use the year of 2016 as a reference and 2014 when data was not available for 
2016. This choice was made as data was available (albeit to varying extents) in 
different reports and on the IOTC website for these two years, which allowed 
triangulation.  
Regarding the three case study countries, catch data was the most challenging as 
various reports present different figures and reference years. For that reason, I 
again chose 2016 as a reference year; and I also used the five-year period of 
2012 to 2016. For the catch of national fleets, when I started the research, I first 
referred to reports of fisheries departments as they distinguished the different 
segments of the fishery. Those were triangulated with national reports submitted 
to the IOTC and reports evaluating fishing access agreements, often providing 
more details on the semi-industrial and industrial segments. In February 2019, 
the IOTC released a database on historical catch between 1950 and 2017 that 
gathers data by gear, contracting parties, and EEZ. I used that database to 
estimate the catch of DWFNs in each EEZ. During the final year of writing this 
thesis, I also referred to the IOTC database when cross-checking information in 
national reports that were vague (for example lacking a reference year or not 
specifying the fishery segment or gears).  
 
The chapter will proceed as follows. Section 4.1 briefly presents the geographic configuration 
of the WIO and the catch from the region. Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 go into detail on the three 
countries studied. This will include a description of key actors in tuna fisheries in each 
country, including a detailed presentation of each segment – small-scale, semi-industrial and 
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industrial – of the fishery. This will highlight how different the fisheries are in the three 
countries but also how the same external actors have been involved in all three countries. The 
chapter ends with Section 4.5 which presents what I categorise as distant actors. These 
include industrial fishing companies, civil society organisations and research centres that are 
active in the WIO and also intergovernmental organisations regional forums where the 
management of tuna is debated and decided. The section will show that tuna fisheries very 
much involve distant actors that are not directly involved in the fisheries and that interactions 
of these actors within the intergovernmental organisations regional platforms shape the 
management of the fishery and access to the resources.  
4.1. THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION 
4.1.1. Geography of the western Indian Ocean (WIO) 
The western Indian Ocean region is typically considered to include the territorial waters and 
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of around ten coastal countries as well as a large area of 
high seas. The determination of which countries belong to the WIO region varies according 
to the different entities that describe it (Figure 2). For the UNEP and WWF, for example, the 
WIO region includes ten countries – Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
the Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, and the French overseas territories (Obura 
et al. 2017; Paula 2016). Others, such as the FAO or practitioners or researchers, extend this 
list to include countries like the British Indian Ocean Territory (or the contested territory of 
Chagos), Djibouti, India, Iran, Maldives, Oman, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) and Yemen (FAO 2017; POSEIDON 2014; Walker et al. 2017). The WIO 
also hosts contested territories assembled under the Scattered Islands in the Indian Ocean or 
Îles Éparses (including the islands of Bassa da India, Europa, Glorioso, Juan de Nova and 
Tromelin).  
To ensure availability of data on tuna fisheries, my use of the WIO countries in this thesis 
aligns with the wide definition of the WIO (purple limit in Figure 2) covering 19 countries 
which are Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, the Seychelles, Somalia, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Djibouti, India, Iran, Maldives, Oman, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Yemen, 
the French and British Overseas Territories and the contested islands.  
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Figure 2: Map of the WIO region with countries considered part of the region8 
 
In orange as used by the UNEP and WWF, in green by the FAO and consultants of POSEIDON, in 
purple by some researchers. Source: adapted from d-maps.com 
4.1.2. The tuna of the WIO  
The region hosts eight main tuna species, of which four are considered key commercial 
species: albacore, bigeye tuna, skipjack tuna, and yellowfin tuna. The other four main 
species, namely bullet tuna, frigate tuna, kawakawa and longtail tuna, are considered coastal 
(or ‘neritic’) tuna and are mainly caught by small-scale fishing. Each species has its own 
ecological niche, migration behaviour and feeding patterns (Table 7).  Tuna species are 
diverse and are present at different depths, distances from the coast and at different times of 
the year (Dagorn 1994; Nikolic and Bourjea 2013). Due to upwelling along coastal areas and 
energetic eddy processes, the WIO is an area of biological productivity, favourable for tuna 
species (Dagorn 1994). 
 
8 Coloured borders are indicative of coastal countries included, not specific spatial areas 
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Table 7: Description of main tuna species found in the WIO 
Common and 
scientific name 
Maximum 
length, weight 
and age 
Water 
Depth 
Water 
temperature 
Prey 
Albacore 
(Thunnus 
alalunga) 
1,40m 
60,3kg 
13 years 
0-600m 
 
10°C-25°C 
fishes, crustaceans and squids 
Bigeye tuna 
(Thunnus obesus) 
2,50m 
210kg 
16 years 
0-250m 
13°C-29°C 
 
fishes, cephalopods and crustaceans  
Bullet tuna 
(Auxis rochei) 
0,50m 
1,6kg 
5 years 
10m and 
deeper 
21°C-30°C 
 
small fishes - particularly anchovies, 
crustaceans - especially crab and 
stomatopod larvae, and squids 
Frigate tuna 
(Auxis thazard) 
0,65m 
1,7kg 
5 years 
50m and 
deeper  
27°C - 28°C 
small fish, squids, planktonic crustaceans 
(megalops), and stomatopod larvae 
Kawakawa  
(Euthynnus 
affinis) 
1,00m 
13,6kg 
6 years 
0 - 200m 
 
18°C - 29°C 
small fishes, especially on clupeoids and 
atherinids; also on squids, crustaceans and 
zooplankton 
Longtail tuna 
(Thunus tonggol) 
1,45m 
35,9kg 
18 years 
10m and 
deeper  
27°C - 28°C 
variety of fishes, cephalopods, and 
crustaceans, particularly stomatopod 
larvae and prawns 
Skipjack tuna 
(Katsuwonus 
pelamis) 
1,10m 
34,5kg 
12 years 
0 - deeper  15°C - 30°C 
fishes, crustaceans, cephalopods and 
molluscs, do cannibalism 
Yellowfin tuna 
(Thunnus 
albacares) 
2,4m 
200kg 
9 years 
0 - 250m 
 
15°C - 31°C 
 
fishes, crustaceans and squids 
Source: Compilation from Collette 2011; Froese and Pauly 2012 
Tunas of the WIO are present at tropical and subtropical temperatures (an average of 
approximately 20°C) though some species like albacore can accommodate colder 
temperatures for a short period. Some species are deep swimmers (yellowfin, southern 
bluefin tuna, longtail tuna, adult bigeye) whereas others swim more at the surface and 
associate with floating objects (skipjack, young yellowfin and bigeye, frigate tuna, 
kawakawa). Albacore is mostly caught in the Southern Hemisphere especially in the 30-45-
degree S regions and across the broader Indian ocean. Bigeye tuna is more abundant in the 
regions close to the Equator, and regions beyond the WIO, such as those close to Indonesia. 
Yellowfin tuna mostly concentrates on the western coast of India, and the regions around 
Madagascar, especially the regions across the Mozambique Channel and the Horn of Africa 
(FAO 2006; Kaplan et al. 2014). 
Some species, such as skipjack or yellowfin, undertake long-distance migration within the 
region and between oceans. Other species are more sedentary, such as coastal tunas which are 
found in the national waters of coastal countries (Fonteneau 2010; Nikolic and Bourjea 
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2013). Scientists attribute the movement of tuna schools to the search for food in a 
heterogenous environment. Interactions between tuna schools and their local environment 
guide their migration and can create complex distributions. Tuna schools use elements from 
the heterogeneity of their environment such water circulation, light, temperature and contrast 
of colours to guide them towards favourable areas and to stimulate their long-distance 
migration. They move with high sinuosity and low speed in rich feeding areas, and with low 
sinuosity and high speed in poor feeding areas in order to quickly pass those areas and find 
better areas of predation (Dagorn 1994). 
The catch of tuna in the Indian Ocean was estimated at around 700,000 tons in 2016, 
contributing to approximately 12% of the global catch of tuna (Coulter et al. 2020). Obura et 
al. (2017) estimate that tuna catch from the WIO (delimited in orange in Figure 2, with 
around ten countries) represents around 80% of the Indian Ocean catch. If we consider a 
broader geographical delimitation of the WIO than that used by Obura et al. (2017), the EEZs 
of India, Maldives, and the Seychelles are the most productive in the region, with a total 
catch of approximately 61,000 tons, 126,000 tons, and 116,000 tons respectively in 2016 for 
the main commercial species (IOTC 2018a).  While all four commercial species are present 
in the region, the most caught species across the region are skipjack and yellowfin, followed 
by bigeye tuna. Yellowfin and skipjack tuna represented 88 % of the catches made in the 
WIO in 2011, with purse seine vessels accounting around half of that catch (van der Elst 
2015). Other gears are also used in the region such as gillnets, handline, longline, pole and 
line and trolling (see description of gears in Appendix 3). If compared at the global level, the 
stock status of the Indian Ocean’s albacore, bigeye, and yellowfin is considered as presenting 
long-term declining trends in biomass along with the Atlantic Ocean bluefin and yellowfin 
tuna stocks (Gilman 2014; IOTC 2015).  
 
Tuna from the WIO is processed and consumed in coastal countries in the region and also in 
distant countries. For the three case study countries, the majority of the tuna caught in the 
EEZs is exported, mainly in the form of cans and other products. The journey of the tuna 
caught in the WIO can involve different countries until it arrives on consumers’ plates 
(Figure 3). Fishing countries include those of the WIO, countries of the Indian Ocean (Iran, 
Indonesia, or Malaysia) but also DWFNs including countries of the EU (mainly Spain and 
France – including territories, and to a lesser extent Italy), Japan, South Korea, China, or 
Taiwan. Processing factories are present in Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles as well 
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as in Thailand, Iran, Tunisia, Italy, Spain, Kenya, Yemen or Oman. End markets for tuna 
products caught in the WIO include countries of the WIO for domestic consumption and 
distant countries like France mainland, Italy, Germany, Spain, the USA, countries of the 
Middle East, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa mainland. As there is limited 
information on the tuna exploitation by the Asian fleet, the best known export market of tuna 
products from the WIO is the EU.  
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Figure 3: Production route of tuna from the WIO 
 
Source: Compilation from Poseidon et al. 20014 (Route of tuna caught by longliners might be underemphasised due to the limited knowledge on the activities of Asian longliners)
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The following sections will present the three case study countries and their tuna fisheries, 
including the different actors and segments of the fisheries involved. The last section will 
then present the distant actors that are present in the region. 
4.2. MADAGASCAR: A SEA OF FISHERS BUT A LIMITED TUNA FISHERY 
Madagascar, the fourth biggest island in the world (more than 580,000 km2), has a large 
coastline of more than 5,000 km and an EEZ of 1.2 million km2. With an increasing 
population of around 25 million, the population living within the thirteen coastal 
administrative regions represents more than 50% of the country’s population (INSTAT 
2011). A census by the department of fisheries estimated in 2013 that around 600,000 people 
lived in fishing villages and that the number of fishers amounted to 245,000 in those villages 
(MRHP 2013). Socio-economically, Madagascar is much poorer than Mauritius and the 
Seychelles, with a Human Development Index ranking of 162 (out of 189 countries) in 2019 
(UNDP 2019). Having an extensive land mass and coastline along with an array of natural 
resources, the case of Madagascar’s poverty remains a paradox for various scholars. A recent 
political economy analysis of the country explained that poverty is rooted within political 
instability through periodical political crises, persistent failure of economic and political 
strategies to improve the situation and a long-standing marginalisation of the rural population 
which forms the majority of the country’s population (Razafindrakoto et al. 2017).  
In this setting, fisheries and especially small-scale fisheries have long received little attention 
from the state. The contribution of tuna fisheries to the economy is almost 10% of the 
agricultural GDP but less than 1% of the national GDP (the economy being more focused on 
agricultural cash crops). The annual tuna production of around 10,000 tons is below the 
potential of tuna catch estimated at 15,000 tons (Breuil and Grima 2014; USTA 2017).  The 
country has an underdeveloped national tuna fishery mostly composed of small-scale coastal 
fishing and a handful of semi-industrial boats. The tuna cannery, ‘Pêche et Froid de l’Océan 
Indien’ (PFOI) - a private company based in Antsiranana, represents the main asset of 
Madagascar linked the tuna exploitation in the region, followed by its boat repair company, 
the SECREN.  
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4.2.1 Key players 
A vast number of local fishers  
For clarity, I have divided local fishers in Madagascar into three types: small-scale fishers 
that undertake fishing in a ‘traditional’ way by pirogues; those that are part of a fishing crew 
on a larger wooden artisanal boat (Illustration 8); and fishers that work on semi-industrial 
vessels.  
It was estimated in 2012 that there were around 85,000 fishers (those fishing with traditional 
pirogues and larger wooden boats) who supported 245,000 people in the country (MRHP 
2013). Spread across the coastal administrative regions, a significant majority of fishers are 
located on the west coast. No fishers specialise in tuna in Madagascar. Instead, most fishers 
merely target tuna when it is the tuna season. However, some villages are well known for 
their tuna fishing activities. Three of those villages (Amborovy, Ramena and Ste Luce) were 
visited for the fieldwork. According to the national census of 2012 (MRHP 2013), fishing 
was the sole activity of 85% of fishers nationwide and only 15% had a secondary activity. 
This corresponds to the reality observed in the field where fishers interviewed involved in 
tuna fishing had fishing as their sole livelihood. Within fishing communities, the household 
size is of four to six members. The age of fishers varies considerably in Madagascar, based 
on what was observed in the field. The majority of fishers were in their mid 20s, but some 
fishers – the more experienced - were 50 years old or more. Boat owners that were also 
fishers were in their mid-40s or more. Tuna fishing is mainly an activity undertaken by men, 
apart from in the north of the country where women actively take part in fishing. In all the 
villages visited, however, women played roles as intermediaries, boat owners or as the person 
in charge of the sale of catches. Most fishers have gained their fishing skills from their elders 
and have been involved in fishing from a very young age. Due to the degradation of the 
socio-economic context in general, migration from cities also takes place and brings new 
fishers from the city to coastal villages. Locals in the three fishing villages visited explained 
that many new people arrived from the city to become fishers as there was no job for them 
elsewhere. A fisher interviewed in Ramena, originally from the city, explained that he used to 
work as a security guard for a bank in the city, lost his job and as he could not find other 
opportunities he came to the village to fish as part of a fishing crew.  
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Very little information is available about semi-industrial fishers. Information regarding this 
segment is limited to its catch (as presented in section 4.2.2). Attempts to meet with boat 
owners and semi-industrial fishing companies during the fieldwork did not succeed so the 
profile of these fishers is difficult to establish. There are two fishing companies in the country 
(REFRIGEPECHE EST and SPSM) that have 7 semi-industrial vessels and employ fishing 
crews. While both are national companies, principally owned by Malagasy interests, they 
both have French shareholders and are often led by French nationals (APOI 2016; GAPCM 
website9)(APOI 2016). Both companies target various species of deep-sea and offshore fish, 
and not only tuna. While they do not specialise in tuna fishing, the companies catch, process, 
sell and export tuna.  
According to the national legislation of Madagascar, all fishers should register with the state, 
have a fishing card and register their boat and fishing gear. While the registration process is 
well known by most small-scale fishers, registration was mainly done by those who owned 
boats or sold fish. The rest were not registered as they considered themselves as part of 
fishing crews that did not require registration. In the case of semi-industrial fishers working 
for a fishing company, registration is not necessary as crew members are hired under an 
employment contract (MD 1010).  
Another type of Malagasy fisher – while not fishing locally but comes from different parts of 
the country – is the one that works as a seaman on European purse seiners. While they do not 
fish within the territorial waters, they fish within the Malagasy EEZ under a work contract 
with fishing companies. Around 13 Malagasies works as seamen on Spanish and French 
vessels every year (Caillart et al. 2018). 
A diversity of intermediaries  
Intermediaries play a key role in the supply chain of tuna in Madagascar, especially in the 
small-scale segment of the fishery. Intermediaries can be categorised into five groups. First, 
there are representatives of local fishing companies, fish shops or associations that come to 
collect the fish from landing sites. That was the case in Ste Luce where a representative of an 
exporting company (Le Martin Pêcheur SARL) came every day to collect the fish; and in 
Toamasina where a representative of a fishing association (TAZARA) was in charge of 
 
9 REFRIGEPECHE EST is described on the following page: https://www.gapcm.org/refrigepeche-est/ 
10 This is a code for an interviews. Interviews were coded according to where they took place, namely 
Madagascar (interviews coded as MD), Mauritius (coded as MU), the Seychelles (coded as SE), Bangkok (coded 
BK) and online by Skype (coded as SK) (see Appendix 1 for full list) 
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buying and selling the fish. Secondly, there are individuals who are long-term contacts of 
fishers and who buy the fish. In Ste Luce such individuals walked 15 to 20km to sell the fish 
in more remote areas inland (Illustration 2). Thirdly, there are fishers’ wives who buy the 
fish from their spouse and sell it to the local markets or to their regular clients. Various 
women met in Ramena and Amborovy had such a role. They were usually also in charge of 
managing the finances linked to the fishing including managing budgets for repairs, crew 
members’ salaries and equipment (MD 25, MD 63). Fourthly, there are boat owners. In all 
sites studied, some intermediaries also owned boats and fishing gear. The price of the fish is 
agreed in advance and intermediaries have exclusivity of the catch. Boat owners called 
‘patrons’ take care of the whole supply chain from funding the construction of boats, 
recruiting fishing crew members and having a member of their team in charge of selling the 
fish at fish markets or to individual clients. The fifth type of intermediary is applicable only 
to Antsiranana: the stevedores. They work on landing European purse seiners to sort out the 
fish and unload it to the cannery. They also buy or get offered bycatch fish from the purse 
seiners. The bycatch concerned consists of either small or damaged tuna that are not taken by 
the canneries or non-tuna species. Every evening when there is a landing, stevedores sell the 
fish outside the port to other intermediaries and to local residents. A typical landing evening 
in Antsiranana port consists of around a hundred men and women waiting for the fish to be 
brought by stevedores out of the port. These tunas also go from the port to local markets or is 
transported inland to remote villages through intermediaries. 
Illustration 2: Intermediaries (second type) in Sainte Luce 
 
Photo by the author 
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An underused cannery 
There is one tuna processing company in Madagascar, the cannery called PFOI (Pêche et 
Froid de l’Océan Indien). It is based in Antsiranana. The cannery was built in 1990 with 
financial assistance from French companies (Gilbert and Rabenomanana 1996). PFOI is 
owned by both the state and French interests. The main shareholder is the French holding 
“Thunnus Overseas Group” (TOG), a tuna processing and distribution group that processes, 
packages, and sells canned tuna. The holding is based in France and has two processing 
companies, one in Madagascar (PFOI) and one in Ivory Coast (SCODI). PFOI’s cannery has 
a capacity of processing 160 tons of raw tuna/day and a capacity of 15,000 tons in its cold 
storage. As of 2017, it was estimated that PFOI took 25,000 tons of tuna/year from European 
purse seiners fishing in the Indian Ocean or in other oceans. This represents less than half of 
its processing capacity. The cannery employs approximately 1600 people, of which 80% are 
women (It is the main employer in Antsiranana). Tuna is landed at the port of Antsiranana (in 
front of the factory).  
The cannery exports its products mainly to the EU. In terms of products, it makes frozen 
loins or pouches11 for other processing companies in France, Italy, Spain or Greece as well as 
cans and pouches for restaurants and other food businesses via wholesalers in France, Italy, 
UK, Belgium, Netherland Luxembourg, Germany, Spain, Greece and Morocco (Illustration 
3). A smaller part of its production is sold as cans for supermarkets in France and Germany. 
PFOI’s tuna brand is ‘Pompon rouge’. It exports, annually, and in all sizes, 20,000,000 units 
in cans, 4,000,000 units in pouches, and 400,000 units in frozen loins. The cannery also 
produces fishmeal with tuna waste.  
 
11 Tuna pouches are vacuum-sealed tuna in different forms, weights and brands according to the client’s 
requests and needs. 
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Illustration 3: Sample of PFOI products 
   
Photo by the author 
A decentralised government with structures in place for tuna fisheries  
As of January 2020, tuna fisheries are managed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries (‘Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Élevage et de la Pêche’). Prior to that, between 
2011 and 2019, they were managed by the Ministry of Fisheries, i.e. a ministry dealing 
exclusively with fisheries. Every change of government has brought different names to the 
Ministry and with a change of government in 2019, it was re-merged with the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Livestock again. Activities of departments linked to fisheries are funded by 
the state budget including through revenues generated by fishing access agreements and 
licences (developed in Chapter 6). Management of tuna fisheries takes place at two levels:  
the national level and the regional level. At the national level, there is a Division of Tuna 
Fisheries (‘Division Pêche Thonière’) mainly in charge of the industrial and semi-industrial 
segments, administering fishing access agreements and licences. The small-scale tuna fishing 
is managed by the General Directorate of Fisheries and Aquaculture (‘Direction Générale de 
la Pêche et de l’Aquaculture’). Regarding the regional level, Madagascar is divided into 22 
regions of which 13 have coastal access. Each of these coastal regions has a Regional 
Directorate representing the Ministry and is in charge of providing licences and permits, 
registering fishers and their gears and monitoring fishing activities.  
For tuna fisheries specifically, the Ministry also has a Statistic Unit (Unité Statistique 
Thonière d’Antsiranana – USTA) based in Antsiranana within the Regional Directorate, by 
the landing port of Antsiranana. The USTA was originally created by the Ministry in 
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collaboration with the French National Research Institute for Development (Institut de 
Recherche et de Développement – IRD). The IRD trained surveyors and developed protocols 
to monitor the catch of European purse seiners’ landings in Antsiranana. The same protocols 
of catch monitoring are used in the Seychelles where the IRD assists the Seychelles’ 
Fisheries department’s statistic unit. Since 2017, the USTA has attempted to open other 
offices to record and monitor local catch including in the towns of Mahajanga and Tolagnaro. 
As of October 2018, the offices were not operational yet, with surveyors waiting to receive 
their training (MD 107). 
Another important department within the Ministry is the Monitoring, Surveillance and 
Control division (Centre de Surveillance des Pêches – CSP). The CSP is in charge of the 
surveillance and control of the EEZ of Madagascar. Established in 1999 it has the mission to 
conduct fisheries monitoring and control operations at sea, ashore and in the air. It has three 
large vessels to undertake surveillance of fishing activities in the EEZ and seven speed boats 
for surveillance of activities within territorial waters. The CSP was originally funded by the 
EU and the French Agency for Development and is currently funded mainly by the state 
budget12. The CSP also enforces laws and regulations regarding activities linked to fisheries 
that are undertaken on land. This includes checking licences and permits for transport and 
sale of fish. In the WIO region, the CSP is an active actor in undertaking regional 
surveillance. For example, two of the CSP’s vessels are often used for regional patrolling 
missions within the WIO region, organised by the Indian Ocean Commission. 
4.2.2. The segments of the tuna fishery 
A diverse small-scale and artisanal tuna fishery 
The small-scale tuna segment in Madagascar is a multi-gear and multispecies one. While 
most fishers catch tuna when it is the season, during the fieldwork it was observed that some 
fishers invest more means into tuna fishing activity. Tuna fishing, compared to fishing for 
other species, tends to involve more time at sea, longer distances and specific equipment.  
The main species caught by the small-scale tuna segment are neritic tunas, and more 
specifically frigate tuna, bullet tuna, kawakawa and longtail tuna. During specific months, big 
tuna are also caught, such as yellowfin tuna, albacore or skipjack tuna. A few fishers 
interviewed and presented with the pictures of tuna species mentioned that they catch bluefin 
 
12 At the time of the writing (2019), the information came from the shrimp producers association 
“Groupement des Armateurs à la Pêche Crevettière de Madagascar” (GAPCM) website at  
https://www.gapcm.org/gouvernance/ 
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tuna on very rare occasions and especially in the south of the country. Neretic tunas – locally 
called ‘bonit’ – are considered as present most of the year, but more plentiful in the periods 
July to October and March to April. Commercial tunas – locally called ‘ampoho’, ‘loako 
thon’ or ‘lamatra’ – are also present between March and April, which is also the season for 
tuna in the Mozambique Channel.  
The main vessels used by the small-scale tuna segment are wooden pirogues and wooden 
boats between 2 and 15 metres. These are built locally. Fishers that use wooden pirogues 
catch tuna only by chance and usually fish alone or with another fisher. They go for one or 
two fishing trips per day, at sunrise and sometimes at night. They use trolling with one to 
three lines. On a good fishing trip, fishers may catch up to ten tunas of around 15 kg each 
trip. Those that use larger 8 to 15m wooden boats target tuna when it is the season and have 
crews of 8 to 15 fishers. In the north of Madagascar, this type of tuna fishing involves one or 
two fishing trips per day; fishing nets are used (a practice that is contested by the regional 
fisheries department as the use of small meshes is prohibited by the Fisheries Code); and 
during tuna season and on a good fishing trip, a fishing crew can catch from 250 kg to a ton 
of tuna (MD 24, 25, 26). On the west coast of Madagascar, fishing using a larger wooden 
boat involves fishing trips lasting one to three days; trolling is used; and on a good trip during 
tuna season, catches can be up to 1,5 tons (MD 51, 52, 69).  In Toamasina, a fleet of fibre 
glass boats of around 10 metres also catch tuna along with other species such as snappers, 
jacks and red mullet. The boats were donations by the Japanese government to the local 
fishing association called TAZARA. Fishers on the fibre glass boats use trolling and go for 
day trips. During the season, these fishers catch up to 500 kg of fish in one boat, per trip (MD 
94, 96, 97).  
There has been limited data regarding the extent of catches of small-scale fisheries, especially 
those fisheries’ catches of tuna. This is due partly to the limited capacity of the government to 
collect data given the large number of fishers and the large size of the country. However, it is 
also due to the lack of disaggregation of species of tuna and associated species in existing 
catch monitoring (MD 71), with the result that tuna and associated species are often lumped 
together, for the purposes of official data, under a single generic “tuna” label. As an 
illustration of catch data, a monitoring of tuna catches in three villages in the North of the 
country by the surveyors of the USTA during 6 months in 2016 described a total catch of 
only 18 tons of tuna (USTA 2017).   
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A limited semi-industrial segment 
While Madagascar has a high number of small-scale fishers and boats, its semi-industrial 
segment is the least developed compared to Mauritius and the Seychelles. With only 7 vessels 
in 2018, the semi-industrial fleet mainly fishes in the northeast of Madagascar, within the 
EEZ. The vessel sizes are around 12 metres and use longline or drifting longline as fishing 
techniques. Although the fleet belongs to nationally based fishing companies (SPSM and 
REFRIGEPECHE EST), those companies have to conclude access agreements with the state. 
The agreements have similar terms as private agreements with DWFNs (developed later in 
section 4.5) apart from the access fee, established at a different price.   
The semi-industrial fleet reports its catch to the USTA periodically and is required to do so in 
order to have its licences renewed (MD 10). The number of hooks deployed by the fleet in 
the past 15 years has been fairly stable at around 650,000 every year apart from in 2012 
where a substantial decrease in effort and catch was noticed (USTA 2017). Species caught 
include tuna – albacore, yellowfin and skipjack – for about 50% of the catch volume, 
followed by swordfish, sharks and other species. The annual catch rate is estimated at 0,76 
tons/1,000 hooks. The USTA reports that the catch in this segment averages around 500 tons 
every year (USTA 2017). Fishing is undertaken all year although the highest catches are 
between September and March, with a peak in December. The different species caught are 
processed by the fishing company concerned and is then sold nationally, as well as to La 
Reunion and Mauritius, in the form of pouches, filets and cubes, either fresh or frozen.  
A dominant industrial sector with foreign interests 
The industrial exploitation of tuna resources in the waters of Madagascar started with 
Japanese research in 1954 on tuna. In October 1960, 30 Japanese ships and several Chinese 
ships were looking for albacore tuna around Madagascar (Crosnier 1961). More research took 
place in the 1970s, led by The National Oceanographic Research Centre (CNRO) a state-
affiliated research centre, around Nosy-Be and Mahajanga. While the exploration targeted 
tuna in general, yellowfin tuna constituted more than 80% of the catch in Mahajanga during 
the research period of one year. In 1971, there was fishing exploration by a Japanese 
company (KGKK) followed by a Japanese-Malagasy cooperation company (COMANIP) 
(Gilbert and Rabenomanana 1996). In the 1980s, the European fleet entered the Malagasy 
EEZ and started fishing tuna under fishing access agreements. In the early 1990s, a regional 
western Indian Ocean Tuna Association was created (see Chapter 7). As part of a project to 
establish a regional WIO tuna fleet, a vessel operated by the Seychelles and funded by the 
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European Commission also fished in the national waters. However, the project lasted five 
years and did not manage to bring substantial quantities of catches (MD 55). Since these 
explorations, Madagascar has not managed to have a national or flagged industrial tuna fleet.  
The industrial segment in Madagascar is now undertaken mainly by DWFNs, through fishing 
access agreements (Table 8). In 2017, six countries were fishing in the waters of 
Madagascar: Spain, France, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and Malaysia (USTA 2017). 
Vessels flagged to the Seychelles and Mauritius were also fishing in the EEZ. While Spain 
and France access the EEZ through a public access agreement between Madagascar and the 
EU, some of its operators have private agreements with the Malagasy government. These are 
not accessible to the public. Private agreements are made with associations such as JAPAN 
TUNA, ANABAC and OPAGAC or with fishing companies such as Interatun and Dae 
Young fisheries. In 2017 and 2018 and according to surveyors interviewed on site, only 
Spanish vessels were landing in Madagascar, the rest preferring to land in Mauritius or the 
Seychelles (MD 48).  
The USTA estimates that the annual catch of tuna by the industrial fleets in the Malagasy 
EEZ is around 10,000 tons per year, of which the majority is caught by Korean and 
Taiwanese longliners (6,000 tons in 2016) (mostly albacore, yellowfin and bigeye tuna) and a 
minority is caught by European purse seiners (2,600 tons in 2016) (mostly skipjack, 
yellowfin and albacore). The remaining 1,400 tons were caught by European longliners, 
Japanese and Malaysian fleets (USTA 2017). The purse seiners are present in the Malagasy 
EEZ mainly between March and June in the Mozambique Channel whereas the longliners are 
present between October and March especially in the eastern and southern parts of the EEZ. 
The USTA also records the quantity and species caught as bycatch by purse seiners landing 
in Madagascar. It reports that an average around 500 tons of bycatch is landed every year. 
Within this the species caught include a mix of undersized or damaged skipjack and albacore, 
various non-commercial tuna species, frigate tunas, bonitos, triggerfish, barracuda, and 
sharks (USTA 2017). 
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Table 8: List of fishing access agreements concluded by Madagascar in 2016 
Party to the 
agreement 
Flag state Type of 
agreement 
Type of vessels Vessels 
authorised in 
2016 
Active 
in 2016 
European Union Spain and France Public Purse seiners 40 23 
Longliners 54 24 
Dae Young 
Fisheries 
South Korea/Taiwan Private Purse seiners 4 1 
Private Longliners 82 74 
Japan Tuna Japan Private Longliners 20 4 
ANABAC Seychelles/Mauritius Private Purse seiners 7 7 
OPAGAC Seychelles/Mauritius Private Purse seiners 1 1 
Interatun Seychelles/Mauritius Private Purse seiners 3 3 
Islanders 
Ventures 
Malaysia Private Longliners 15 3 
Source: Data I collected from a public presentation by the Ministry of Fisheries in 2017. 
To conclude section 4.2, it can be said that the small-scale segment is vast and important to 
the livelihoods of thousands of fishers and their families. However, there is a very limited 
knowledge still on the extent of the catch despite ongoing efforts of the state to collect the 
data. The semi-industrial segment is underdeveloped due to the limited number of vessels 
active in the fishery. The industrial segment, which covers the majority of tuna catch in the 
Malagasy EEZ, consists mainly of DWFNs, especially Asian longliners. 
4.3. MAURITIUS: FACILITATED INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS 
FOR TUNA EXPLOITATION 
Mauritius is ranked 66th in the 2019 Human Development Index report (UNDP 2019). 
Despite its small land mass of 2,040 km2, Mauritius has a large EEZ of 1,272,787 km2 within 
which two territories – Tromelin island and the Chagos archipelago – are contested with 
France and the UK respectively. Mauritius has a strong economy. Its GDP is 10 times higher 
than its neighbour the Seychelles, mainly through the high development of its tertiary sector 
focused on services provision (Sellström 2015, UNDP 2019). With a population of just over 
1,200,000 in 2018, Mauritius is well known for its diversity with people originating from 
India, Madagascar, China and Europe. Mauritius also has the history of having been 
colonised sequentially by the Dutch (1598-1710), the French (1715-1810) and the British 
(1810-1968). It gained independence in 1968 and since has had a relatively stable political 
environment characterised by political alliances amongst different parties (Sellström 2015).  
The tuna fishery forms the basis for local fish processing industries and is a valuable 
contributor to the country’s economy. Tuna is consumed locally and by tourists and is also 
imported frozen for canning and then re-exported. Revenues from the fishery contribute to 
less than 2% of the GDP as the country’s economy focuses on the tertiary sector of services. 
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With a production from the fishing of around 4,000 tons/year, tuna constitutes around 20% of 
exports in volume (COFREPECHE et al. 2016; GoMU 2017). The tuna fishery is much more 
developed than in Madagascar with a better-equipped small-scale fishery and a larger semi-
industrial fleet. Mauritius also provides the main transhipment port (Port Louis) for longliners 
operating in the WIO. 
4.3.1. Key players 
A few but vocal tuna-specialised local fishers  
Local tuna fishing is carried out principally on the western part of the island out of key 
villages such as Rivière Noire, Tamarin, Bain des Dames, Tombeau Bay or Pointe aux Sables 
where there are well-known tuna fishers. During the fieldwork, we were often redirected to 
meet or wait for a specific fisher who is well known for tuna fishing. In 2006, it was 
estimated that there were around 2,300 registered small-scale fishers in Mauritius of which 
764 were using line as a fishing gear (line is one of the gears used to catch tuna, notably 
handline and longline) (GoMU 2011). A project document dated 2016 estimated that 350 
local fishers were engaged in tuna fishing (IOC 2016b). Some tuna fishers of Mauritius hold 
leadership positions either as heads of cooperatives or as advocates for small-scale fisheries. 
One of them for example, based at Bain des Dames, has been in several television 
documentaries about tuna fisheries in the Indian Ocean and the role of artisanal fishers. 
Another one, in Tombeau Bay, is the head of a fishing cooperative.  
An array of trading companies and intermediaries 
According to the government database, there are three Mauritian companies that trade tuna 
that is landed or transhipped in Mauritius. Those are IBL International, Mer des 
Mascareignes and Island Marine Enterprises Ltd. The first two are associated with canneries 
in Mauritius (described further below). There is limited information regarding the third one. 
However, a news piece13 about a dispute over Japanese vessels fishing illegally around 
Tromelin indicates that the company is “Asian” and catches tuna in the waters of Mauritius. 
Two other companies were found through an online search of Mauritian seafood companies 
and tuna (Interview requests were sent to the two companies concerned but without any 
positive response.). They are Coruscan Seafood Ltd and Hassen Taher Seafood Ltd. Both 
companies have processing facilities in Mauritius and also work as traders of seafood 
 
13 Article in L’Express.mu titled “Giichi Onda Chairman of Islands Marine Enterprise Ltd”, published in October 
2004. Available at https://www.lexpress.mu/article/giichi-onda-chairman-islands-marine-enterprise-ltd 
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including tuna at the national level. They source their fish through imports but also from 
catches of longliners and local catches of small-scale fishers.  
At the local level, there are individual intermediaries who collect tuna from artisanal fishers. 
These are called by the artisanal fishers prior to landing. Intermediaries use the tuna in three 
ways: by selling to private individual clients, by selling to hotels or by keeping it in their own 
cold storage. This last method according to an interviewee is very profitable when tuna is 
abundant because when it is out of season, the tuna stored sells at a higher value. Two other 
types of intermediary, similar to Madagascar, are boat owners who collect the catches from 
the fishers they hired and wives of fishers that buy the fish from their spouses and then sell it 
in small shops (Illustration 4) or to their usual individual clients. Three local intermediaries 
were interviewed during the fieldwork and although they do not trade only tuna, they asserted 
that tuna provided a good revenue when it was the tuna season. One interviewee, involved in 
selling at the market for the past 30 years, stated that tuna added up to approximately 20% of 
his annual revenue (MU 08).    
Illustration 4: An intermediary and fisher’s spouse in Tombeau Bay 
 
Photo by the author 
Well-established processing companies 
Mauritius has been an attractive place for investment including for tuna processing 
companies, mostly due to the facilitated administrative procedures that the government offers 
and also due to its socio-political stability. In the fiscal year of July 2016 to June 2017, 
Mauritius exported a total of 46,074 tons of tuna products mainly in cans (37,183 tons) but 
also in jars (628 tons) and in pouches (8,263 tons) (GoMU 2017). Until 2015, there were two 
main processing companies in Mauritius: Princes Tuna and Thon des Mascareignes.  
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Princes Tuna is a subsidiary of the British group Princes Ltd, which is part of the Japanese 
multinational company Mitsubishi. Originally established with the assistance of Japanese 
investments in 1972 as Mauritius Tuna Fishing and Canning Enterprises, the cannery was 
bought by Princes Ltd in 1999 and rebranded as Princes Tuna (PT). With an original 
investment of 12 million GBP (Campling 2012a), it has grown to be the largest single 
employer in the country with more than 4,000 employees (COFREPECHE et al. 2015). 
Skipjack and yellowfin tuna are the main species processed by PT. The cannery imports tuna 
from various oceans including the Indian Ocean. Tuna provided by purse seiners comes 
mainly from the Spanish fishing companies Albacora and Echebastar (ibid). PT produces 
mainly canned tuna, with a capacity of approximately 800,000 cans per day (Havice and 
Campling 2018). Most of their products (around 70%) are exported to the UK and the rest to 
the EU and US markets (ibid). PT also produces tuna in loins for the EU and US markets. 
Thon des Mascareignes (TdM) was established in 2005 by the Mauritian company Ireland 
Blyth Ltd (IBL) - which owns 75% of the cannery – and by the Spanish fishing company 
Pesqueras Echebastar – owning 25%. The factory produces products other than just canned 
tuna, including tuna meat in pouches and glass jars and semi-finished products to be used by 
other canneries (COFREPECHE et al. 2015). The cannery employs around 750 people and 
has the capacity to process 200 tons per day (Campling 2012a; Havice and Campling 2018). 
Albacore, skipjack and yellowfin tuna are the main species processed by TdM and it exports 
its products to the EU including for supermarkets in Spain, Italy and France as well as the 
US.  
In early 2015, PT and TdM merged into one as Princes Tuna Mauritius (PTM) to position 
themselves more competitively in the global tuna industry (Undercurrentnews 2014). PTM is 
majority owned by Princes Ltd. With its two factories, PTM produces around 500 tons a day 
of tuna mainly in cans (280 tons) and loins and pouches (210 tons) (COFREPECHE et al. 
2015). 
At the time of the fieldwork (2017), there were three other companies known to process tuna 
in the country: Mer des Mascareignes (MdM), Pelagic Process and JLR Fisheries. MdM is a 
joint venture between IBL and the French fishing company SAPMER. The factory 
specialised in dry frozen tuna at -40 and -60 degrees that are aimed for the Asian market. The 
tuna is fished by SAPMER vessels (7 vessels flagged to France and Mauritius) and is frozen 
on board. Species processed include yellowfin, bigeye, albacore and skipjack and products 
include tuna in tins or pouches for the Asian and EU markets, especially French supermarkets 
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in contract with SAPMER (MU 26). On the company’s website14, MdM estimates its 
production as being around 3,600 tons of finished products. Pelagic Process (PP) is not solely 
focused on tuna. While incorporated as a Mauritian fishing business, PP is part of the Dale 
Capital Group, a holding company working in Sub-Saharan Africa in various sectors. PP 
operate longliners in the Mauritian EEZ which catch albacore, bigeye and yellowfin tuna. 
Products are exported mainly for the EU market and include frozen and packaged whole fish, 
loins, cubes and steaks (Pelagic export international website15; Seafood hub website). JLR 
Fisheries16 has Mauritian-flagged longliners that fish albacore, bigeye and yellowfin and sells 
tuna products in the form of chilled or frozen whole, halves, loins, steaks or portions. 
According to its website, JLR Fisheries has diverse distribution markets including the EU, the 
US, the Gulf region and Asia.    
Government agencies favourable for tuna exploitation  
Tuna fisheries are managed by the Ministry of Ocean Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries 
and Shipping. Considering its much smaller size compared to Madagascar and the size of the 
fishing industry, Mauritius have a more centralised system for the management of fisheries 
including tuna. While important decisions are taken within the fisheries division of the 
Ministry such as the conclusion of fishing access agreements or the allocation of grants and 
allowances to fishers, the operational activities linked to tuna fisheries management are 
undertaken by two key entities: the Seafood Hub and the Albion Fisheries Research Centre 
(AFRC). 
The Seafood Hub, while not an official sub-division of the Ministry, is a key part of it. It is a 
joint public-private sector initiative and works as a “one stop shop service” for trading, 
processing and distribution of seafood (according to the Seafood Hub website). It includes in 
one building various divisions in charge of the administrative procedures for the loading, 
unloading and export of fish and fish products. It also includes subsidiary services such as 
ship chandlery, bunkering, vessel husbandry, ship agency, ship building and repairs. Through 
the Seafood Hub, industrial vessels can, in one place, obtain the necessary permits, land, have 
their catch processed and have their vessels repaired. The Seafood Hub also hosts the division 
of Monitoring Control and Surveillance and the Port state Control Unit which undertakes 
inspection of fishing vessels that land and tranship at the port.  
 
14 http://www.mdm.mu/en/company 
15 http://pelagicexp-intl.com/portfolio-items/big-eye-tuna/?portfolioCats=6 
16 https://fisheriesjlr.com/products/pelagic/tuna 
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The AFRC, based in the coastal village of Albion, is a research centre established in 1981 
with the support of the Japanese government. Amongst its activities, the AFRC is in charge 
of monitoring small-scale fishing activities as well as catches from industrial vessels. For this 
monitoring, the AFRC has surveyors that collect data from local landing sites and in cold 
stores for the industrial and semi-industrial segments. The research centre also has the task of 
undertaking stock assessments and producing reports for the IOTC committees and 
commission. The Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) Monitoring Centre is also based at the 
AFRC and is in charge of the monitoring of fishing activities of local and foreign licensed 
fishing vessels in the EEZ of Mauritius.  
A branch of the Ministry that is relevant to local-level tuna fishing is the Fisheries Training 
and Extension Centre (FiTEC) which has as one of its objectives to develop off-lagoon 
fishing and the training of fishers. The FiTEC aims “to provide basic knowledge and skills to 
new entrants for a career in the fishing industry” and “to upgrade knowledge and skills of 
fishermen to operate in the off-lagoon area” (according to its description on the Ministry’s 
website). One of the training courses of the FiTEC is FAD fishery (fishing using Fish 
Aggregating Device) training which encourages fishers to target pelagic fishes including tuna 
through the use of FADs. The deployment and monitoring of FADs off the lagoons are also 
part of the tasks of the FiTEC.  
4.3.2. The segments of the tuna fishery 
A limited but resourceful artisanal segment 
Local tuna fishing in Mauritius is considered artisanal fishing takes place along the western 
part of Mauritius from the north around Trou aux Biches to the Southwest at Le Morne. 
Fishers state that the Southwest is especially favourable for tuna as it has good sun that 
warms the water. The fishing is often undertaken in a team composed of two to three other 
fishers in one boat. Crew members are relatives, neighbours or friends from the same village.    
Typical fishing vessels are fibre glass boats between 8 and 12 metres with engines from 8 to 
25 horse power (GoMu 2011). In 2016, it was estimated that tuna fishing was undertaken by 
a total of 115 small-scale fishing boats (IOC 2016b). Fishing techniques include handlines 
and longlines and the use of FADs set up by the FiTEC. Fishers have GPS devices that also 
have the coordinates of FADs. Fishing trips last around 12 hours with tuna fishers preferring 
to leave early morning around 3-4 am and landing at around 4-5 pm.  
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The catch composition varies according to the season. According to the fishers interviewed, 
albacore is caught between November and January while skipjack and yellowfin are abundant 
between March and June. These periods also correspond to the seasons during which the 
industrial vessels are present in the Mauritian EEZ (Kaplan et al. 2014). Fishers describe that 
during the tuna season, they might catch between 3 and 15 units of fish amounting sometimes 
to a total of 200kg, per day. The total annual catch of the small-scale segment was evaluated 
at 250 tons in 2014 (IOC 2016b).  
A developing semi-industrial fleet 
Semi-industrial fishing in Mauritius started with experimental longlining for tuna, which also 
caught swordfish, between 1986 and 1988. The segment is composed of a fleet of longliners 
of 13 to 24 metres. Mauritius has increased its semi-industrial fleet from 6 longliners in 2016 
to 13 in 2019 (Sheik Mamode et al. 2018). This increase of the semi-industrial fleet in 
Mauritius is a less well-known story in the region. However, during the fieldwork, it was not 
possible to observe any landings by longliners nor interview any longliner fishing crew or 
fishing companies’ representatives.  
The increase in number of semi-industrial longliners has increased the fishing effort. Around 
250,000 hooks were deployed in 2011 inside the Mauritian EEZ, the number has increased to 
more than 950,000 hooks in 2017 (Sheik Mamod et al. 2018). The semi-industrial fleet 
operating outside the Mauritian EEZ also increased its effort from around 300,000 hooks in 
2016 to more than 700,000 in 2017 (ibid). In 2017, the Mauritian longline fleet undertook 69 
fishing trips and spent 824 days at sea (ibid). The semi-industrial longliners mainly catch 
Swordfish (38% of the catch) followed by yellowfin (29%), bigeye (12%) and albacore (6%) 
with the remaining 15% consisting of billfishes, sharks and dolphinfish (Sheik Mamod et al. 
2018). 
In 2015, the catch of the semi-industrial segment was estimated at 250 tons. By 2018, the 
catch had increased to 821 tons (IOC 2016b; Sheik Mamode et al. 2018). Four vessels belong 
to the Mauritian fishing company Pelagic Process, and others belong to joint ventures 
between Mauritus and holdings based in East Africa (IOC 2016b). Most vessels operate 
inside the Mauritian EEZ, but three operate in the EEZ of Mozambique.  
A foreign-interest led industrial sector 
Industrial fishing in Mauritius started in 1979 with a Mauritian-flagged purse seiner, and then 
with two more vessels until 1997 when the vessels were sold off. Mauritius started granting 
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fishing access to DWFNs in 1989. The industrial fleet can be divided into two categories: 
Mauritian-flagged purse seiners and foreign-flagged longliners and purse seiners. The 
composition of the catch of the industrial longliners is mostly albacore followed by bigeye 
and yellowfin tuna. Catches of purse seiners are yellowfin, skipjack and bigeye tuna. 
Regarding the Mauritian-flagged purse seiners, these vessels are operated by Spanish or 
French fishing companies, notably Albacora or SAPMER. In 2013, Mauritius reflagged two 
purse seiners that catch skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye. In 2018, two vessels were still active. 
In terms of catch, in 2016, the catch of the two Mauritius-flagged purse seiners was estimated 
at 11,722 tons (Mootoosamy et al. 2017). This catch figure includes tuna caught within the 
Mauritian EEZ and across the WIO region.  
Regarding the foreign-flagged longliners and purse seiners, they are present in the Mauritian 
EEZ under fishing access agreements (Table 9). In 2014, around 40 purse seiners and 104 
longliners were fishing in the EEZ (COFREPECHE et al. 2015; Shung and Sheik Mamode 
2019). The longliners undertook 167 fishing trips, totalling almost 6,000 days at sea (Shung 
and Sheik Mamode 2019). The fleets are mainly operated by Taiwanese, French and Spanish 
fishing companies (COFREPECHE et al. 2015). According to IOTC data, the total tuna catch 
in the Mauritian EEZ by the foreign industrial fleet in 2016 was an estimated 1,683 tons for 
longliners and 2,629 tons for purse seiners (IOTC 2018a).  
The port of Port Louis is a hub for landing and transhipping by longliners and reefers. 
Reefers are carrier vessels that transport frozen tuna from the Seychelles and also take the 
catches from the Asian longliners. Tuna longliners fishing in the Mauritian EEZ land and 
tranship mainly albacore. In 2016, of a total of 847 vessel calls at port, 671 were by 
longliners and only 10 were by purse seiners (GoMu 2017).  European vessels usually stop at 
Port Louis to perform maintenance or repair and to unload catches. There were also purse 
seiners registered in Mayotte which land their catch, mainly from the Seychelles, into 
Mauritian canneries (Oceanic Development and MegaPesca 2011). 
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Table 9: List of fishing access agreements concluded by Mauritius in 2014 
Party to the 
agreement 
Flag state Type of 
agreement 
Type of vessels Vessels 
authorised 
Active in 
2014 
EU France and Spain Public Purse seiners 27 27 
Longliners 16 16 
Seychelles Seychelles Public Purse seiners 25 9 
Japan Japan Private Longliners 2 2 
Fishing company France Private Purse seiners 1 unknown 
Fishing company Spain Private Purse seiners 9 unknown 
Fishing company Korea Private Purse seiners 1 1 
Fishing company Indonesia Private Longliners 6 6 
Fishing company Malaysia Private Longliners 5 5 
Fishing company Taiwan Private Longliners 74 70 
Fishing company Comoros Private Handliners 5 5 
Source: COFREPECHE et al. 2015:67 
To conclude section 4.3, there is an active tuna fishing in Mauritius, in the three segments of 
the fishery. There is a limited small-scale segment, the semi-industrial fleet is increasing and 
Mauritius is a key country for transhipment by the Asian fleet and for tuna processing. 
Mauritius has also developed its industrial fleet by flagging European operated vessels.   
4.4. SEYCHELLES: THE WIO CENTRE FOR TUNA EXPLOITATION 
Seychelles, like its neighbour Mauritius, is classified as a country with high human 
development, ranked at 62 in the Human Development Index (UNDP 2019). With a small 
population of just over 97,000 inhabitants in 2018, the Seychelles has a small land mass of 
457 km2 spread over an archipelago of 116 islands, and an extensive EEZ of 1,3 million km2. 
It is a fairly new nation that gained independence in 1977 after British colonisation between 
1908 and 1976. The population of the Seychelles has mixed origin from Africa, Madagascar, 
India, China and Europe. It is also well known for its high number of migrant workers (8,6% 
in 2010) and tourists (up to 350,000 in 2017)17. 
In the Seychelles, tuna fisheries are at the centre of the economy. In 2011, tuna fisheries 
constituted approximately 20% of the GDP as well as more than 90% of exports (Marsac et 
al. 2014). the Seychelles has an important semi-industrial tuna fleet, and a small-scale fishery 
that catches tuna without targeting it. In 2015, the tuna catch in the Seychelles’ EEZ was 
estimated at around 60,000 tons (SFA 2016).  
The economy associated with tuna fishing activities began to develop from the 1980s with 
the improvement of port infrastructure at Victoria as a result of fishing agreements (Campling 
 
17 Population data: https://www.populationdata.net/pays/seychelles/ 
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2012a; Martín 2011). In the early 1980s, the Seychelles opened access to its EEZ to other 
countries' fleets, mainly to the Soviet Union. In the mid-80s, other countries, including Japan, 
South Korea, France and Spain, joined while vessels of the Soviet Union began to decline. 
Today, Spain and France achieve the highest catches. Fish processing started in the late 
1980s. The Seychelles plays a key role in the tuna fisheries of the WIO, having the most 
important port for the purse seine vessels to land and tranship as well as being in the middle 
of tuna fishing grounds. 
4.4.1. Key players 
Experienced local fishers  
Local fishers in the Seychelles can be divided into two categories: those engaged in small-
scale or artisanal fishing and those involved in the semi-industrial segment. Small-scale 
fishers do not target tuna; their preferred catch is mainly composed of demersal and small 
pelagic species. During the tuna season, however, they also catch tuna. The number of small-
scale fishers in the Seychelles has been estimated at around 2,000 in 2014 of which more than 
half-use handline which can catch tuna (Breuil and Grima 2014b). The small-scale fishers in 
Seychelles currently face the challenge of declining stocks due to increased fishing efforts in 
the past 20 years (Robinson et al. 2020). With smaller scale vessels having more difficulty to 
fish in offshore grounds, the tuna season can bring additional catch.   
In contrast to Madagascar and Mauritius where semi-industrial fishing is undertaken by 
fishing companies, in the Seychelles individual fishers own semi-industrial vessels. A 
handful of Seychellois boat owners and fishers have been involved in tuna fishing for more 
than 15 years at the same time as doing more general artisanal fishing. Three of them were 
interviewed during the fieldwork. They have family members, friends or members of their 
villages that take part as crew members. The rest of the semi-industrial boat owners are fairly 
new to tuna fishing, involved in the fishery in the past 7 years. They are either artisanal 
fishers that upgraded to semi-industrial vessels or local entrepreneurs that invested in the 
semi-industrial segment. Oceana Fisheries, a processing company, has also invested in some 
semi-industrial vessels. The newly arrived boat owners employ a mix of Seychellois and Sri 
Lankan crew for tuna fishing.  
Seychellois fishers and crew members have to register as fishers with the Seychelles Fishing 
Authority (SFA) and are then able to access subsidies from the state, such as a fuel 
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reimbursement scheme, sickness benefits, concessions and loans. Sri Lankan crew members 
are managed by the boat owner under a work contract.  
Another type of Seychellois fisher is the ones who work as seamen on purse seiners. They do 
not fish within the Seychelles banks. Instead they often fish within the Seychelles EEZ under 
work contracts with foreign fishing companies. In 2014, 45 Seychellois worked as seamen on 
16 Spanish vessels and 29 French vessels (SFA 2014). 
Processing companies as key to the economy 
There are two types of processing companies in the Seychelles: the main cannery that 
produces tuna cans; and the processing companies that specialise in other types of tuna 
products, such as sashimi grade tuna or tuna by-products.  
Indian Ocean Tuna (IOT) is one of the largest canneries in the world, with a production of 1,5 
million cans of tuna per day (Havice and Campling 2018). Established in 1987 as 
‘Conserveries de l’Océan Indien’ (COI) with investment from French manufacturers and the 
Seychelles government, the cannery was bought in 1995 by Heinz in a joint venture 
agreement with the Seychelles government (Campling 2012a). Heinz invested heavily in the 
cannery to increase its processing capacity, which is estimated at an annual 70,000 tons 
(POSEIDON et al. 2014). In 2010, Heinz brands were bought by Thai Union, a key actor in 
the global seafood business with USD 4 billion in seafood sales in 2017 (Havice and 
Campling 2018). IOT processes 20% of the tuna that passes through the Seychelles with the 
rest being transhipped (POSEIDON 2019). IOT employs around 2,500 people and is 
considered the largest single employer in the Seychelles, although, in 2014, it was estimated 
that 70% of this workforce was made up of foreign nationals (Goulding 2016; SFA 2014). 
The IOT cannery has two subsidiary companies, one that makes fishmeal using the cannery’s 
by-products and bycatch from the fleet, and one that extracts fish oil from tuna heads 
(POSEIDON 2019).  
There are two well-established Seychellois companies that also process tuna, along with other 
species. Those are Oceana Fisheries and Sea Harvesters. They have been present in the 
market for the past 20 years. Both companies have arrangements with specific semi-industrial 
vessels and process the tuna catch either for the local market or for the export market. They 
are the principal trading companies for tuna that is not canned. They also take bycatch 
species such as dorado, kingfish, sailfish or other pelagic species from purse seiners. 
According to an interview with a representative from Sea Harvesters, the company exported 
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around 400 tons of frozen fish in 2016 with the catch mainly exported to the US, the EU, 
Japan and other Asian countries. According to its website18, Oceana Fisheries exports to the 
EU, China, southeast Asia, the UAE and La Reunion. Clients of the company in the local 
market are mainly branded hotels in the Seychelles. Tuna products that are exported are sold 
as whole or packaged in loins, steak or cubes19. Until other companies became established to 
process tuna, Oceana Fisheries and Sea Harvesters were dictating the pricing of tuna from the 
artisanal and semi-industrial segments (SE 15, 45).  
At the newly built port of Providence, two other processing companies have recently been 
established with funding assistance from the EU. One is Ocean Basket which processes 
bycatch species from purse seiners and exports them to the non-EU market in the form of 
dried fish (POSEIDON 2019). The other one is Fresh Seafood, established in 2016. It takes 
catches from the semi-industrial fleet and exports to the US, the UK and Reunion Island (SE 
44).  
Seychelles also has individual intermediaries, who take the catch from fishers and resell it at 
the local markets to individual clients or to hotels. During the time of the fieldwork, one of 
these intermediaries was spotted at the local port but he was not available for an interview. 
Some small-scale fishers were also met at the local market where they directly sold their tuna 
catch of the day. 
An administration well designed for tuna exploitation  
Two entities are key to the management of tuna fisheries within the Government of the 
Seychelles. First, there is the Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture which is in charge of 
establishing policy and legislation such as the National Food and Nutrition Security Policy 
and The Fisheries Act. The Ministry is also in charge of international relations with other 
countries, for example when it comes to concluding agreements with other countries 
regarding fisheries trade agreements.  
Second, there is the Seychelles Fishing Authority (SFA).  This is the implementing arm of the 
Ministry and the main governmental actor for tuna fisheries. Established in 1984, the SFA is 
a parastatal organisation with autonomous legal and financial status. Its functions include 
issuing fishing authorisations, data collection and analysis, fisheries research, policy 
 
18 http://www.oceanafisheries.com/en/export  
19 http://www.oceanafisheries.com/product/yellow-fin-tuna/ 
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development and planning and fisheries infrastructure development (SFA website20). Another 
important activity of the SFA is monitoring, control and surveillance. There is a monitoring 
and evaluation system between the Ministry and the SFA with the latter planning and 
implementing actions that are reported regularly to the Ministry (SE 12). The SFA gets its 
funding directly from the Ministry of Finances with a program-based approach determining 
its budget (SE 12). The SFA plays a key role in providing management advice to the Ministry 
as well in generating revenue for the state through the negotiation of fishing access 
agreements and flagging arrangements.  
Another entity, the Seychelles Ports Authority (SPA), plays a significant role in tuna 
fisheries. It is in charge of managing the industrial fishing port in Victoria especially by 
ensuring that transhipment and landing operations take place efficiently. Transhipment is 
made between tuna vessels and reefer vessels or tuna vessels and containers. The SPA 
manages the landing of fish including the offloading of tuna into containers that go straight to 
the cannery. The SPA charges 4 Euros per metric ton for transhipment and 3 Euros per metric 
ton for landing of fish (Anon. 2017). 
The government of the Seychelles has also invested in a Maritime Training Centre. The 
Centre was originally built in 1979 as the Seychelles Maritime Academy with funding from 
the French government. The centre aims at providing “quality maritime training and 
professional qualification for participants with international standards leading to career paths 
in the maritime and related industry” (Tertiary education commission website21). During 
interviews, fishers stated that young Seychellois, although they know about Centre, were not 
interested in professions linked to fisheries. Due to this situation, the Centre has not had 
much impact on the development of the local workforce in fishing jobs.  
4.4.2. The segments of the tuna fishery 
An artisanal segment mainly catching tuna along with other species 
The small-scale fishery, also called artisanal fishery in the Seychelles, is a multi-gear and 
multi-species fishery. The fishing is undertaken by fibre glass boats of 5 to 15 metres, usually 
whalers, outboard or schooners with outboard engines and using mainly handline and trolling 
as the fishing technique. Some boats have echo sounders and GPS devices. Around 400 
artisanal vessels are active annually in the waters of the Seychelles: 425 were operating in 
 
20 http://www.sfa.sc/index.php/about-us/our-activities 
21 https://www.tec.sc/seychelles-maritime-academy 
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2015 (SFA 2016). Artisanal fishers operate around the Mahé Plateau and the Amirantes 
Plateau, as well as on the offshore banks, around the southern Coralline islands.  
The artisanal fishing effort has been evaluated as rather stable in the Seychelles with no 
significant increase over the years. the Seychelles is suffering from a crisis of lack of fishers 
despite the presence of the Maritime Training Centre. Two boat owners and fishers (SE 15, 
45) explained that the problem lies in the fact the young Seychellois do not see fishing as 
profitable enough and perceive it as requiring too much effort, especially regarding days 
needed at sea.  
The artisanal catch consists mainly of demersal fish such as snappers, groupers, emperors, 
bourgeois or mackerels. Fishers catch tuna as bycatch, especially during tuna season. The 
tuna catch often consists of small skipjack tuna and neritic tuna such as frigate and bullet 
tuna, all considered as “bonitos”. At times, yellowfin or bigeye tuna also get caught by the 
lines of fishers but rarely. From interviews with fishers, tuna season especially for yellowfin 
and bigeye tuna is between November and June. While the total artisanal catch was estimated 
at around 3,200 tons in 2015, only 103,6 tons was bonitos and 116,2 tons other pelagic 
species (SFA 2016). 50,604 days at sea was recorded in 2015 for the handline fishery (ibid). 
The catch of the artisanal segment is sold at local markets or hotels. Some fishers also have 
contact with trading companies that take the fish at an agreed price.  
A recent and fast growing semi-industrial sector 
The semi-industrial fleet in the Seychelles is composed of longliners from 14 to 22 metres 
long that catch large pelagic fish, mainly tuna and swordfish. Semi-industrial fishing in the 
Seychelles started in 1995 with a trial using an exploratory longline vessel of the Seychelles 
Fishing Authority. The number of vessels increased until the beginning of the 2000s, 
whereupon it drastically decreased in 2002 due to fishing products from the fleet not meeting 
EU quality standards and so not being able to access the EU market (Marsac et al. 2014). In 
2006, the Seychelles had one semi-industrial vessel (ibid). The increase in semi-industrial 
vessels is fairly recent. As of 2016, the fleet was composed of around 30 vessels (SFA 2016). 
Five of these are also fishing other non-pelagic species on the Mahé Plateau. The others are 
solely doing offshore semi-industrial fishing, not fishing within the Mahé Plateau (ibid).  
Each fishing trip lasts around 10 days and the majority of the crew is Sri Lankan. The fleet 
concentrates on fishing for swordfish and tuna off the Mahé Plateau, but without going 
beyond the EEZ of the Seychelles. Through discussion with long-term fishers involved in the 
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semi-industrial segment, they stated that production is at its best between September and June 
(SE 19, 50). There has been a significant increase in fishing effort, proportional to the 
increase in the number of vessels. 400,000 hooks were deployed in 2013 compared to more 
than 2,000,000 in 2017 (Assan et al. 2018). The 2018 report of the Seychelles to the IOTC 
showed that despite this increase of effort, the catch rate was variable and dropped from 0,66 
tons/1,000 hooks in 2013 to 0,57 tons/1,000 hooks in 2017 (ibid).  
Swordfish used to be predominant in catches of the semi-industrial fleet followed by 
yellowfin and bigeye tuna, until 2015. The catch ratio used to be 60/40 of swordfish/tuna 
(Martín 2011). Since 2015, yellowfin replaced swordfish and became the dominant species 
caught, as more than 50% of the catch, followed by bigeye tuna and swordfish (SFA 2016). 
Up until 2015, the catch was estimated at an average of 400 tons per year (IOC 2016b). By 
2017, the catch increased to more than 1,000 tons (Assan et al. 2018). The catch is generally 
refrigerated and exported to the EU (France, Italy and the United Kingdom) and, to a lesser 
extent, to Japan and the US (Martín 2011). 
A national industrial segment fueled by foreign fishing companies 
Industrial fishing in the Seychelles started in the early 1980s with exploratory fishing. First 
there was Japanese longline prospecting in 1978, then two pole and line vessels funded by the 
French government in 1979 which failed to operate efficiently and then the arrival of purse 
seiners, French ones in 1980 followed by Spanish ones in 1983 (Marsac et al. 2014). After 
three failed attempts of having its own fleet in the 1980s, due to lack of financial and human 
resources, the Seychelles mainly concluded fishing access agreements. Then, in the 2000s, 
the Seychelles started to flag (flagging will be developed in section 4.5) around 25 foreign-
owned purse seiners and longliners (ibid). The contemporary industrial fleet of the Seychelles 
belongs to foreign fishing companies of DWFNs mainly France, Spain, Taiwan and Japan. 
Flagging allowed the Seychelles to generate flagging revenues from Asian longliners and 
European purse seiners operating in the Seychelles EEZ and beyond. It also brought 
investment from the European fleets into Victoria port. Through flagging, DWFNs increased 
the number of vessels in their fleet without being subject to effort restrictions from the EU 
and less subject to IOTC measures (as developed in Chapter 7). 
The number of the Seychelles flagged vessels has increased over the years from 7 purse 
seiners in 2013 to 13 in 2017, and from 33 longliners in 2013 to 48 in 2017 (Assan et al. 
2018). Purse seine fishing activity focuses mainly on skipjack and yellowfin tuna whereas 
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longline vessels target tuna that are present at a certain depth, like bigeye tuna but also 
yellowfin tuna. Industrial tuna fishing takes place almost all year round in the EEZ of the 
Seychelles, especially March to June for the purse seine activities and the rest of the year for 
both types of fishing (Kaplan et al. 2014). Accordingly, the fishing effort has increased for 
the fleet, from less than 2,000 fishing days in 2013 for purse seiners to more than 3,000 in 
2017 and from 23 million hooks to 35 million for longliners (ibid).   
The Seychelles purse seiners’ catch has increased from just above 57,000 tons in 2013 to 
more than 120,000 tons in 2017. In 2017, 69,994 tons of skipjack were caught (representing 
57% of the total catch) followed by yellowfin (41,711 tons), bigeye (9,761 tons) and albacore 
(56 tons) (Assan et al. 2018). The annual catch rate has not increased substantially between 
2016 and 2017, with 31,69 tons/fishing day to 36,36 tons in that period. The purse seine 
fishing takes place within the EEZ of the Seychelles and across the WIO region from the 
Mozambique Channel to the Horn of Africa. For the catch inside the EEZ only, the purse 
seine catch in 2016 was estimated at around 29,000 tons by the IOTC (IOTC 2018a). Purse 
seiners operate mainly around FADs (97% of the catch) and to a very limited extent on free 
schools (3%) (Assan et al. 2019).  
For the Seychelles longline fisheries, the catch has not increased significantly despite the 
increase of vessels. While just over 11,000 tons were caught in 2013, the catch increased to 
just below 15,000 tons in 2017. Bigeye tuna used to dominate the catch in the longline 
fishery with more than 6,000 tons caught in 2013 followed by yellowfin, swordfish, marlin 
and shark. In 2017, the major composition of catch was a mix of albacore, sailfish, skipjack 
and mackerel, amounting to a total of 4,400 tons (representing 30% of the catch) followed by 
bigeye tuna (3,897 tons) and yellowfin (3,423  tons) (Assan et al. 2018). The annual catch 
rate of the longline fleet varied between 0,49 tons/1000 hooks in 2013 to 0,42 tons in 2017 
(ibid). The longline fishing takes place within the EEZ of the Seychelles and across the WIO 
region including in the southern part and along the Horn of Africa. For the catch inside the 
EEZ only, the longline catch in 2016 was estimated at around 4,000 tons by the IOTC (IOTC 
2018a) 
In addition to its flagged vessels, the Seychelles has also concluded fishing access 
agreements that provide access to the Seychelles EEZ to DWFNs. The agreements are 
concluded with governments (e.g. China, EU, Japan and Mauritius) or directly with fishing 
companies and associations (e.g. some Asian companies) (Table 10). Under these 
agreements, the catch by the foreign purse seine fleet in the Seychelles EEZ in 2016 
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amounted 71,300 tons while the catch by foreign  longliners totalled 8,500 tons (IOTC 
2018a). 
Table 10: List of fishing access agreements concluded by the Seychelles in 2015 
Party to the 
agreement 
Flag state Type of 
agreement 
Type of 
vessels 
Vessels 
authorised in 
2015 
Active in 
2015 
EU France, Spain and Italy Public Purse seiners 30 30 
China China Private Longliners 19 19 
Mauritius Mauritius Public Purse seiners 2 2 
Japan Japan Private Longliners 2 2 
TTA and TFI22   Taiwan Private Longliners 85 85 
Fishing 
company 
Thailand Private Longliners 2 2 
Fishing 
company 
Indonesia Private Longliners 1 1 
Fishing 
company 
Tanzania Private Longliners 1 1 
Fishing 
company 
Philippines Private Longliners 1 1 
Sources: Breuil and Grima 2014b; POSEIDON 2019:22; SFA 2016 
To conclude section 4.4, the Seychelles is considered to be at the centre of the WIO tuna 
fishery not only for its productive EEZ but also for its important processing companies and 
the contribution of the industry to the national economy. This place of the Seychelles was 
built progressively and was facilitated by a government that has promoted the tuna industry 
since independence and the continued interests of fishing companies and investors in the 
fishery. The development of its semi-industrial fleet and the considerable number of the 
Seychelles flagged vessels illustrate how the country has promoted the development of the 
fishery.  
4.5. DISTANT ACTORS  
4.5.1. Distant Water Fishing Nations, their fishing firms and fishing associations  
DWFNs and their fleets play a central role in tuna fisheries in the WIO. They record 
important levels of catch and have also invested in the development of the different 
processing companies and infrastructures (Figure 4). Foreign fleets cross the different EEZs 
of the WIO countries. While the waters of the Seychelles are the most visited, the fleets also 
pass through the EEZs of the two other islands.  
 
 
22 TTA stands for the Taiwan Deep-sea Tuna Longline Boat Owners and Exporters Association (TTA) and TFI for 
Top Fortune Agreement (TFI). 
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Figure 4: Timeline of involvement of DWFNs in the WIO 
1952-1954 Experimental fishing by Japanese longliners in the WIO 
1972 Cannery established in Mauritius with Japanese investment 
1974 Pole and line trial in Madagascar by Japanese companies 
1979 
Pole and line trial in the Seychelles by French companies 
Purse seiner trial in Mauritius by French companies 
1980 Mauritius and the Seychelles start flagging DWFNs vessels 
1982 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is signed  
1980-1983 Arrival of French and Spanish purse seiners in the WIO 
1986 First access agreement between the EU and Madagascar 
1987 
First access agreement between the EU and the Seychelles 
First access agreements between Japan and Madagascar 
Cannery established in the Seychelles with French investment 
1989 First access agreement between the EU and Mauritius 
1990 
Cannery established in Madagascar with French investment 
Regional WIO purse seiner funded by the EU 
Start of reciprocity agreements between Mauritius and the Seychelles  
Source: compilation from Campling 2012b; Gilbert and Rabenomanana 1996; Marsac et al. 2014 
The EU fleet plays an important role in the WIO and in the Indian Ocean in general. It 
records the highest catch amongst all fleets, estimated at more than 210,000 tons in 2016 in 
the Indian Ocean (IOTC 2018a). The EU fleet consists mainly of Spanish and French fleets, 
and at times the Italian fleet. The Spanish and French fleets in particular have dominated the 
catch since their arrival in the WIO in the 1980s (Campling 2012b). The Spanish fishing 
companies are gathered under two producers’ associations, OPAGAC and ANABAC while 
the French ones gathered under the fishing association ORTHONGEL (Table 11). Producers 
and fishing associations represent and defend the interests of tuna vessel owners to their 
government and to various regional fisheries management organisations. They also manage 
the use quotas amongst fleets and aim to improve fishing methods and conditions of sale of 
tuna products of its members. They can also contract private agreements with coastal 
countries in addition to their fleets being part of the EU agreement. That is for example the 
case for ANABAC in Madagascar. To increase catch but also competitiveness, intricate 
interactions take place between fishing firms, producers associations, processing companies, 
brands and the governments of coastal islands. These relationships and processes will not be 
analysed in this thesis and have been developed in the various works of other scholars (see 
for example Campling (2012a), (2012b); Havice and Campling (2017)). Fishers on EU 
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vessels are a mix of Europeans and crew members from ACP countries. In 2014, it was 
estimated that 344 EU nationals were employed on tuna vessels under EU fishing access 
agreements in the WIO and 308 nationals from third countries (Goulding 2016).  
Table 11: European producers’ associations, active in the WIO, as of 2015  
Fishing associations Fishing company Vessel flags 
Number of vessels 
active in 2015 
OPAGAC Albacora Group Spain and the Seychelles 
30 
ANABAC 
Inpesca 
Spain and the Seychelles 
Atunsa 
Echebastar 
Pevasa 
ORTHONGEL 
Compagnie Française du Thon 
Oceanique (CFTO) 
French and Mauritian 15 
Saupiquet 
SAPMER 
Industria Armatoriale 
Tonniera 
Italian 1 
Source: Campling 2012a; SFA 2016 
The next group of DWFNs that has an important place in the WIO tuna fishing is the Asian 
one. However, since they rarely land in the region, there is limited information available 
regarding their operation. According to the IOTC data, the tuna catch of China – including 
Taiwan, Japan and South Korea combined in 2016 was at around 99,600 tons in the Indian 
Ocean (IOTC 2018a). The Asian fleets fish in the WIO mainly through fishing associations 
and also directly through fishing companies. Two fishing associations have fishing access 
agreements with countries of the region: Japan Tuna Fisheries and Taiwan Deep-sea Tuna 
Longline Boat Owners and Exporters Association. Three fishing companies are also known 
to operate in the region: Dae Young Fisheries (South Korean), Top Fortune (Taiwanese) and 
Top Marine International Trading (Taiwanese). The more recent scrutiny that Asian fleets 
have been under due to poor labour standards and cases of slavery has led to various reports 
that show notably that Asian fleets are often composed of nationals from Philippines, 
Indonesia, Cambodia, Vietnam and China (Yea 2014). 
For the case of Mauritius and the Seychelles, the flag of convenience system blurs the 
identification of the national and foreign fishers. While both countries have flagged purse 
seiners and longliners, all the purse seiners are operated by French or Spanish fishing 
companies. The fishers are then principally Europeans (French or Spanish) and to a limited 
extent from the three island countries. For the longliners, these are operated mainly by 
Taiwanese fishing companies. In 2015, the Seychelles industrial longline fleet was operated 
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by the Taiwanese company Top Fortune (SFA 2016). Here the fishing crew does not include 
any nationals from the WIO region.  
4.5.2. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), NGOs and research centres 
An array of organisations is active in the WIO. Table 12 describes key organisations 
involved in tuna fisheries and which were also encountered during the time of the research 
process.  
Table 12: Main organisations active in the WIO region on tuna fisheries.  
Organisation Description Samples of activities on tuna in the WIO 
Federation of 
artisanal 
Fishermen of the 
Indian Ocean - 
FPAOI 
Association of small-scale fishers 
in the Indian Ocean 
• Promotes the interests of small-scale fishers at 
IOTC through statements 
• Gathers small-scale fishers in the region for 
workshops and exchanges on management 
and valorisation of tuna resources 
Greenpeace Non-profit campaigning on 
diverse issues including 
biodiversity, ocean, energy or 
agriculture 
• Campaigned against tuna brands in Europe 
that sourced their tuna from the Indian Ocean 
• Made documentaries about tuna fisheries 
Concluded an agreement with Thai Union for 
better management of tuna fleets supplying 
Thai Union 
International 
Pole-and-line 
Foundation - 
IPNLF 
Non-profit promoting pole and 
line as well as handline fisheries 
and aim to increase the market 
share of sustainably and equitably 
caught pole and line tuna 
• Supports the G16 group at IOTC 
• Supports countries like Maldives and 
Indonesia for the MSC certification of their 
pole and line and handline fisheries  
• Makes position statements calling for 
particular actions before IOTC meetings 
International 
Seafood 
Sustainability 
Foundation - ISSF 
Association of tuna branded 
processors, NGOs and scientists 
promoting tuna conservation, 
bycatch reduction, illegal fishing 
and capacity management 
• Provides various guidelines and workshops for 
a sustainable tuna exploitation 
• Makes position statements calling for 
particular actions before IOTC meetings 
Marine 
Stewardship 
Council - MSC 
Non-profit implementing and 
promoting the MSC certification 
program 
• Certification body that has certified fisheries in 
the WIO including the Spanish Echebastar 
tuna fisheries in the Indian Ocean and the 
Maldives pole and Line fishery 
PEW Charitable 
Trusts - PEW 
Global research and public policy 
organisation with a large portfolio 
including environmental, health, 
state and consumer policy 
initiatives 
• Published key reports on FADs and the value 
of tuna including in the Indian Ocean 
• Promotes the use of biodegradable FADs in 
the Indian ocean 
World Wide Fund 
for Nature - WWF 
Environmental non-profit working 
on forests, oceans, wildlife, food, 
climate & energy, and freshwater 
and addressing issues linked to 
markets, finance and governance 
• Partner in a tuna fisheries improvement plan 
in the Indian ocean led by the Seychelles with 
Spanish and French fleet 
• Established a platform for CSOs and private 
sectors involved in tuna fisheries 
• Supports IOTC members on proposals 
• Makes position statements calling for 
particular actions before IOTC meetings 
Sources: Organisations’ websites and personal observation 
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Other actors that play a non-negligible role in the WIO tuna fisheries are the researchers that 
are mandated by the DWFNs to monitor the fisheries and the evolution of tuna resources in 
the Indian Ocean. These are from the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD) for 
the French fleet and the Instituto Español de Oceanografía (IEO) for the Spanish fleets. Both 
research centres have offices in the Seychelles, with the IRD based at the SFA offices. In 
addition to monitoring the activities of DWFNs fleets (level of catch and management of 
FADs for example), the researchers are also active at the IOTC working parties. The IRD has 
also been pivotal in setting up the catch monitoring procedures that surveyors in Madagascar, 
Mauritius and the Seychelles are using as well as their training.  IRD-based researchers have 
published reference works that are used within the IOTC for example on the movement of 
tuna resources, their stock status and the use of FADs in the Indian Ocean.  
This diversity of work undertaken by civil society and research organisation in the WIO 
region shows the important role played by external actors, not involved directly in the 
fisheries, in shaping the management of the fishery of the WIO. CSOs in particular have 
various interests and impacts on the WIO and Indian Ocean tuna fisheries. While 
organisations such as the ISSF, PEW or the MSC are mainly targeting the improvement in 
the practice of tuna fishing especially in the industrial sector, organisations like the FPAOI, 
Greenpeace or IPNLF have put their focus on the role of small-scale and artisanal tuna 
fisheries in the Indian Ocean. The WWF, on the other hand, has been involved on both fronts 
and engaged on different initiatives both regarding industrial fishing and other segments of 
the fishery in the region. All NGOs have in common the pursuit of sustainability of tuna 
fisheries in the WIO and the broader Indian Ocean. However, the way to achieve it has been 
varied, often with different target audiences. At the IOTC in particular, CSOs have often 
supported one specific member party or another and have been involved in various advocacy 
activities, according to their interests. A more detailed example of this will be provided in 
Chapter 7, 
4.5.3. International forums  
The management of tuna fisheries is mainly decided at the regional level due to its migratory 
nature. Different regional organisations and forums are then available to discuss tuna 
fisheries. This diversity has been presented in various reports and studies, for example 
(POSEIDON 2014) have described the following organisations and platforms as relevant to 
tuna fisheries: 
- the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) 
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- the Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission (SWIOFC) 
- the South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) 
- the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
- the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) 
- the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
Governments are also key actors at the regional level within the above cited platforms. As it 
will be seen in Chapter 7, the regional dynamics surrounding tuna fisheries are different to 
national politics. Two intergovernmental platforms and one intergovernmental organisation 
are key to this thesis: the IOTC, SWIOFC and the IOC. They will each be presented briefly 
as follows.  
The IOTC is the most relevant platform for the management of tuna in the WIO. It is an 
intergovernmental regional fishery management organisation mandated under the FAO 
framework to manage tuna and tuna-like species in the Indian Ocean. Established in 1996, 
the objective of the Commission is “to promote cooperation among its Members with a view 
to ensuring, through appropriate management, the conservation and optimum utilisation of 
stocks” (IOTC 1993, Article 5(1).). It has the mandate to manage 16 migratory species 
including different types of tuna, associated species and other pelagic species such sharks as 
well as bycatch species such as marine turtles and seabirds. The IOTC has 31 members, 
which include coastal countries of the Indian Ocean as well as DWFNs that undertake fishing 
in the region. The commission also has a large number of observers that are admitted to the 
different meetings. Observers currently include 12 other intergovernmental organisations 
such as the IOC or SWIOFC and around 30 NGOs including those described above (IOTC 
website23).  
While the management of tuna is discussed within the different branches of the IOTC (Table 
13), its most important branch is the Commission. To discuss tuna fisheries, representatives 
from coastal governments are present either as delegates negotiating during the commission’s 
annual meetings, or as members of the different committees and working parties. High-
ranked officials of fisheries departments are usually the main negotiators at the plenary 
session and heads of tuna divisions and staff members of departments are members of 
subcommittees. 
 
23 List of observers at IOTC. Available at https://iotc.org/node/6378 
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Table 13: IOTC structure linked to the management of tuna resources. 
IOTC branches Mandate linked to management  
The Commission (of 
contracting parties) 
Decides by consensus on management measures and 
recommendations from the different committees and working 
parties 
P
ro
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d
vice
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n
 th
e
 sta
tu
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f sto
cks 
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The Compliance 
Committee (CoC) 
Monitors the compliance of members to adopted Conservation and 
Management Measures (CMM) 
The Scientific 
Committee (SC) 
• - Recommends policies and procedures for the collection, 
processing, dissemination and analysis of fishery data 
• - Assesses and report to the Commission on the status of stocks of 
relevance to the Commission and the likely effects of different 
fishing patterns and intensities 
Seven working 
parties24 
Analyse technical problems related to the management goals of the 
Commission 
Source: IOTC website https://iotc.org/about-iotc/structure-commission 
The IOTC has long been criticised for its lack of advancement in the management of tuna 
fisheries compared to other RFMOs (Campling 2012a; Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly 2010). Up 
until recently, the commission was monopolised by proposals, reports and statements mainly 
emanating from DWFNs and with no strict measures towards tuna management (Sinan and 
Bailey 2019). In the past 8 years, coastal countries have started to be more involved, under 
the lead of countries like Maldives, South Africa and Australia, with proposals such as 
harvest control rules and discussion of allocations (ibid). One of the difficulties faced by 
IOTC is its own decision-making mechanism. While resolutions are legally binding for its 
members, their adoption needs to be by consensus, which is very challenging to achieve 
especially when DWFNs and coastal countries set themselves as two antagonist sides within 
the IOTC (Abolhassani 2017). As of 2019, the IOTC is facing the challenge of managing the 
overfishing of yellowfin tuna. Its decisions in the next five years will be key to the state of 
tuna resources. As seen in other overfished fisheries such as the Atlantic cod, scientific 
challenges in stock estimation and delays in adopting and implementing measures resulted in 
the collapse of the fishery (McGuire 1997).   
The SWIOFC is another regional fishery body that is relevant to tuna fisheries in the WIO. 
Established in 2014 also under the FAO, the Commission is composed of coastal states (12 in 
the WIO region25) “whose territories are situated wholly or partly within the area of the 
Commission” which is all waters of the Southwest Indian ocean from the East African coast 
 
24 List of working parties: on Billfish (WPB), on Data Collection and Statistics (WPDCS), on Methods (WPM), on 
Neritic Tunas (WPNT), on Temperate Tunas (WPTmT), on Tropical Tunas (WPTT), and on Ecosystems and 
Bycatch (WPEB) 
25 Members as of 2019: Comoros, France, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, the 
Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, United Rep. of Tanzania, Yemen 
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and its parallel to the longitude 80° 00 E on the East side (SWIOFC website26). The 
commission has an advisory function to its members. It aims to “promote the sustainable 
utilisation of the living marine resources of the Southwest Indian Ocean region, by the proper 
management and development of the living marine resources, and to address common 
problems of fisheries management and development faced by the Members of SWIOFC, 
without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal states” (ibid). The governing body of 
SWIOFC is the Commission, composed of all its members. There is also a scientific 
committee and other committees and working parties, established on an ad hoc basis, 
depending on what the commission considers necessary. 
The SWIOFC differs from the IOTC on two fronts. First, it discusses fisheries matters other 
than tuna. Tuna matters are discussed within a working party on tuna collaboration and other 
items can be brought to the agenda if considered needed. Second, the commission only has 
the coastal countries as decision makers. Contrary to the IOTC, where DWFNs are full 
deciding members, DWFNs are only allowed to be observers within the SWIOFC. The only 
exception to this is France who sits as a full member because of its overseas territories in the 
WIO region. Observers are also not allowed to make statements; discussions and speeches 
are reserved to the coastal states, members of the commission. Due to its advisory status, the 
SWIOFC members do not adopt binding resolutions regarding the regulation of the fisheries, 
as it happens at IOTC. The SWIOFC has discussed different subjects regarding tuna fisheries 
such as regional monitoring, surveillance and control; minimum terms and conditions for 
fishing access agreements, and resolutions of coastal states to be submitted to the IOTC 
(FAO 2018a).  
The last entity that will be discussed in the thesis is the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). The 
IOC was established in 1984. It originally consisted of three island countries: Madagascar, 
Mauritius and the Seychelles, which, two years later, were joined by Comoros, and France 
(for Reunion Island) (Selltröm 2015: 199). A formative objective of the IOC was to improve 
relations and cooperation between these countries. Funded by diverse sources including the 
member countries and especially major donors such as the EU, the African Development 
Bank, the United Nations or the World Bank, the IOC has carried out various projects and 
collaborations between the member countries. Those initiatives gravitate around four 
strategic aims that cover an array of interventions and projects (Table 14), ranging from 
 
26 http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/swiofc/en 
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diplomacy to external trade and economic development, and from environmental protection 
to regional cultural interactions. 
Table 14: The large array of intervention of the IOC 
Strategic Axis Area of intervention Samples of project 
1 - A political and 
diplomatic force for 
human development  
- Stability and Diplomacy, Health, 
Gender and Mobility 
- Health monitoring 
- Capacity building in gender 
2 - A secure region that 
promotes smart economic 
growth  
- Economic Area and Regional 
Infrastructure 
- Blue and Green Regional Growth 
Centres, Specialisation and 
Economic Development 
- Regional integration projects 
- Maritime security 
- SmartFish 
- Regional plan of fisheries 
Surveillance 
- SWIOFISH 
3 - Resilient and 
sustainable island and 
ocean environments  
- Environmental Sustainability and 
Climate Change 
- ISLANDS - Supporting Sustainable 
Development in the Indian Ocean 
Region 
- Monitoring for environment and 
Security in Africa 
- Sustainable management of 
coastal zones 
4 - Promoting 
Indianoceania and its 
identity  
- Indianoceanian Identity and 
Development of Human and 
Natural Resources 
- ENERGIES - Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency Programme in 
Indian Ocean Commission Member 
states 
Source: IOC 2016a  
From the diversity of activities presented above, it can be said that the IOC intervenes in all 
areas possible and at different scales, from local interventions of health and capacity-building 
activities around gender to national and regional initiative covering coastal management or 
maritime security.  
To conclude this chapter, I showed that there is a vast array of processes, actors and 
interactions that take place within the WIO tuna fisheries. Each country has a diverse and 
multi-actor tuna fishery. The management of the WIO tuna fisheries is discussed within 
different regional platforms where more actors enter the scene. Each segment of the fishery in 
each country or each actor would be enough to study for a whole thesis. To focus the content 
of the thesis and make a pertinent academic contribution, the next three chapters will address 
specific questions associated with the field of political ecology. In addition to contributing to 
the field of ‘marine’ political ecology, it will also expand the knowledge on the WIO tuna 
fisheries with a multi-scalar approach.  
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After this presentation of the design and background of the research, I will now move to the 
result chapters of the thesis which will be the next three chapters. I will start with an analysis 
of how different actors, present at different levels, view the state of tuna resources in the 
WIO. 
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CHAPTER 5.  THE STATE OF TUNA RESOURCES IN THE WIO AS 
PERCEIVED BY DIFFERENT ACTORS 
 
“We urge the [IOTC] Commission to meet the IOTC Scientific 
Committee’s recommendation to reduce catches of yellowfin tuna by 
20%. Member states must immediately adopt measures to start 
rebuilding the depleted stocks of yellowfin tuna.” 
WWF Press Release, May 19, 2016 
 
The state of our oceans has received enormous media attention in the past ten years. News 
articles, reports and scientific reports display catastrophic declines in marine species 
populations, including tuna, with a decline of more than 70% between 1970 and 2010 (FAO 
2014; CBD Secretariat 2014; WWF 2015). One of the recognised drivers of the crisis is 
overfishing, especially by offshore industrial fishing. Beyond taking their targeted species, 
industrial vessels also catch huge amounts of other species as accidental catch (Coulter et al. 
2020; WWF 2015). Such stories are also present in the WIO at the regional, national and 
local levels, where I interacted with diverse actors involved directly or indirectly in the 
fishery.  
This first result chapter of the thesis will respond to the part of the research question that 
asks, “How do narratives around the state of tuna resource shape tuna fisheries management 
in the WIO?”. To address this, I will proceed in four phases. First, I will introduce the 
theoretical framework that will guide the chapter, explaining my use of the concepts of 
discourses, narratives and co-production as lenses of analysis.  
Second, through two subsections, I will paint an overview of the types of discourses 
circulating regarding the state of tuna resources, produced by the different actors at various 
levels of the fishery. Within each discourse, I dissect the narratives maintained by actors 
promoting a particular discourse. I will also present the way discourses and narratives are 
(co-)produced, identify the rationale behind each narrative and explore the implication of 
each narrative on the management of the fishery and access to the fish. I will show that while 
the discourse of depleted tunas is maintained by all the main actors, the narratives behind 
each representation of the state of the resources are diverse and sometimes conflicting. At the 
national level, local fishers convey a strong discourse of tunas being depleted by industrial 
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actors while fisheries departments focus on the idea of stable catches in their reports without 
establishing an increase or decrease of tunas in the national waters. On the other hand, at the 
regional level, tuna stock assessments are discussed and debated, with industrial actors 
claiming the unjust consequences of limited data available in other segments of the fishery. 
Narratives about the tuna stocks are then highjacked by bureaucracy and scientific language 
of probabilities that make the stock status difficult to determine.   
Third, I will present how the different narratives interact and how actors, including 
governments local fishers and industrial actors, mobilise narratives at different levels to the 
same end of perpetuating access to tunas.  
I will conclude the chapter with a summary of the discourses and narratives identified and 
their political implication in the management of fisheries and access to the fish. I also present 
a brief reflection on how using political ecology as a theoretical anchoring has helped expose 
the diversity of claims at different scales from an analysis of actors’ representation of the 
state of resources.  
5.1. BUILDING A FRAMEWORK EXPLORING NARRATIVES AROUND THE 
STATE OF TUNA RESOURCES 
5.1.1. Discourses and narratives in political ecology 
Political ecology has a substantial engagement with questioning dominant discourses and 
narratives in environmental issues such as deforestation, biodiversity use or overfishing 
(Adger et al. 2001; Escobar 1998; Mansfield 2011). Studies have highlighted that mainstream 
discourses on environmental problems have often unjustly burdened resource users (Bryant 
1998). They also produced solutions that further marginalise local users and have not 
addressed other important factors such as global production systems or colonial history 
(Campbell 2007; Vaccaro et al. 2013). Discourses have had an impact on how natural 
resources are accessed, such as limiting access to the resources for conservation, sometimes 
leading to conflicts; or promoting neoliberal approaches for access rights (Adams and Hutton 
2007; Budds 2004; Escobar 1998). In dominant discourses such as deforestation or 
desertification, political ecology has been used to analyse the structure of narratives 
sustaining these discourses and to present similarities, such as local actors being portrayed as 
the villains, exploiting the resources due to a cycle of poverty (Adger et al. 2001).  
The definition of discourse used here is “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categorisations that is produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices 
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and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1997: 16). As 
explained by Adger et al. (2001), discourses imply shared knowledge and perceptions of a 
phenomenon or shared beliefs about the causes and solutions to a particular problem. A 
discourse then contains homogenous messages or expressive means such as narratives and 
metaphors (ibid). Discourse analysis in social science often involves considering discourses 
as “a place of struggles and negotiations between actors who support each specific discursive 
formation linked with various strategies of power” (Pochet 2014: 2). My use of discourses in 
this chapter is more as an umbrella concept that helps me understand marine resource 
management by analysing the diversity of representations that various actors have (Svarstad 
2012). To this end, I pay particular attention to the narratives involved in the discourses about 
the state of tuna stocks. The concept of narrative used here is “a story with a chronological 
order (beginning, middle and end)” as well as an argument within which a problem is 
described with a corresponding solution (Adger et al. 2001: 685). A narrative also involves a 
particular structure regarding the role of actors in a specific phenomenon. This can generate a 
pattern of actors’ cast often categorised as heroes, villains and victims in an environmental 
issue (Adger et al. 2001). While investigating narratives can be used to analyse specific 
discourses, this section will focus on the narratives generated by different actors under two 
parallel discourses about overfishing of tuna in the WIO. The analysis aims at tracing patterns 
within the discourse used by actors and analysing in a realist perspective how mobilising 
specific narratives leads to a specific social outcome or practice (Adger et al. 2001; Scoville-
Simonds 2009).  
Discourses about the state of marine resources at the global level have been diverse and 
evolving. Fishing has long been at the centre of various civilisations and communities. From 
coastal communities of the Mediterranean or the North Atlantic, to island nations in the 
Pacific or in the Indian Ocean, the abundance of the ocean has provided bounty to many 
communities over many centuries (Illustration 5). Historically, discourses surrounding the 
state of fisheries resources in general have evolved and changed drastically. From an original 
idea of the ocean being plentiful and inexhaustible, it was assumed that their exploitation 
would not have any significant impact on fish stocks (Gordon 1954; Huxley 1883). After 
World War II, fishing activities intensified and industrialised in all oceans which eventually 
led to the decline of different species (Pauly and Le Manach 2012). The iconic case of the 
North Atlantic cod illustrates the situation of many fisheries in different oceans (McGuire 
1997). The overfishing discourse in the case of the North Atlantic cod contains an 
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industrialisation narrative of the fisheries as the cause of overfishing. This was facilitated by 
government policies and the difficulty to establish accurate scientific evidence regarding the 
stock status (ibid).  
Illustration 5: An example of the sea’s bounty – fishing and curing for sea cucumber 
 
Source: Drawing by Bevalet, M. (1868)27. Image available on the Freshwater and Marine Image Bank 
Discourses of overfishing are still widespread at present time and are commonly used by 
different international organisations like the FAO or the WWF (FAO 2014; WWF 2015).  
The reproduction of such discourse has prompted government, scientists and civil society 
organisations to discuss and adopt measures to manage marine resources. This has been 
achieved for example through international treaties such as UNCLOS, or the adoption of 
conservation measures such as setting up marine protected areas or through the management 
of access to the fish by quotas, ‘total allowable catch’ systems or access agreements 
(Campling and Havice 2014; Mansfield 2004). From this global discourse, various actors 
have also seen their practices impacted. Industrial actors, for example, are increasingly 
promoting the sustainability or the low impact of their fishing activities (Bailey et al. 2018), 
local coastal communities are often being depicted at the global level as being highly affected 
by the decrease in supply of protein (FAO 2015; Hicks et al. 2019). The overfishing 
discourse has therefore had numerous impacts on perceptions, practices and ways of using 
 
27 in Figuier, L. 1868. Ocean World : Being a Descriptive History of the Sea and its Living Inhabitants. P. 297.  
New York: D. Appleton & Co. 
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and managing the resources at different levels. The discourses analysed in this chapter focus 
on the state of the WIO tuna resources. 
5.1.2. The analysis of discourses and narratives in this thesis 
In this chapter, I will explore the different discourses regarding overfishing of tuna in the 
WIO. Considering that tuna fishing is undertaken with various types of gears and techniques 
for more than 50 years, I therefore ask what discourses exist in the WIO regarding the state of 
tuna resources? What narratives are produced by different actors to support the discourses 
they maintain? Do some actors share the same discourses or the same narratives? The aim in 
the chapter is to present the discourses regarding the state of tuna resources and to dissect the 
diversity of narratives that supports actors’ perspectives on the state of tuna resources (Table 
15). 
I start by presenting the main discourses present in the WIO regarding overfishing of tuna 
and the state of resources. In line of similar analyses undertaken by Adger et al. (2001), I 
identify the key elements of each discourse and the actors that are involved in producing or 
reproducing it. After this presentation, I analyse the different narratives that actors maintain 
to support their discourses. Four key actors and their narratives are analysed: the local fishers, 
NGOs, governments at both national and regional levels and industrial operators. Each 
narrative is described in its key contents, then a cast of actors is associated with each 
narrative and the solution envisaged by each actor under each narrative is also presented.  
The next step of the analysis consists of investigating how each discourse is co-produced 
based on the different narratives presented. I explore this co-production through three 
elements: (1) personal experience of actors and their link to the fishery, (2) the socio-
economic context they evolve in, and (3) the social practices that they are involved in when 
constructing their idea of the state of tuna resources. Co-production as envisaged by Science 
and Technology Studies is a way of interpreting and accounting for complex phenomena in a 
more holistic vision, avoiding deletion of some approaches. It shows the “appropriation of 
existing discourses […] and their selective retailoring to suit new needs” (Jasanoff 2006: 41). 
It also addresses questions such as how socio-technical objects “swim into our ken, achieving 
cognitive as well as moral and political standing” (ibid: 42). Co-production helps us to 
understand how some forms of knowledge are absorbed by different parts of society and 
shape discourses and representations. Co-productionist accounts allow us to investigate 
various phenomena with a rich description and explanation. This involves considering natural 
and social orders but also the diversity of human experiences, interactions and cultures that 
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shape socio-technical subjects such as climate change, endangered species or for this chapter, 
overfishing. Jasanoff (2006) contends that co-productionist stories present the opportunities 
of discovering new possibilities or alternative pathways in human development (ibid). In 
resource management, co-production, as described by Robbins (2002), sees the construction 
of the environment as the “scaffolding of knowledge that allows us to understand the material 
context of that knowledge […] this is further subject to the political work amongst people, as 
well as between people and the objects of their interaction” (Robbins 2012: 141). Robbins 
emphasised the role of ideas, even those rooted in material activities, in the production of 
landscapes. After establishing how the discourses are co-produced, I then present how the 
various narratives interact and analyse the potential overlaps and similarities. 
In this chapter, the analytical framework is then not based on a classic deconstruction of 
hegemonic discourses as usually done within political ecology (Adger et al. 2001; Escobar 
1998; Robbins 2012). It rather focuses on analysing different narratives that actors use 
regarding the resources and how social practices are influenced by and have influenced these 
stories. The analysis will highlight distinct, competing and sometimes congregating 
narratives from actors at the local, national and regional levels.   
Table 15: Flow of work on narrative analysis 
Stage of the analysis Elements investigated 
1. Presentation of actors’ discourse - Pattern of regularities 
- Means of expression 
2. Analysis of narratives - Key elements - beginning, middle, end 
- Cast of actors - heroes, villains, victims 
- Solution to the issue 
3. Analysis of co-production elements - Personal experience 
- Socio-economic context 
- Social practices 
4. Analysis of interactions between different narratives 
From the fieldwork I did and interactions with various actors during tuna landings and at 
international meetings, I identified 5 sets of actors and two major discourses that are present 
in the WIO. The first one is of tuna being overfished in the WIO and the second one is about 
the stock of tuna resources being difficult to assess. Both discourses have a number of 
narratives that are associated to specific actors (Table 16). In the following subsections, each 
discourse and narrative will be described and analysed through the above elements. 
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Table 16: Discourses and narratives regarding the state of tuna resources in the WIO 
Actors 
Discourses 
Narratives 
Tuna resources 
are depleted 
and overfished 
Tuna stocks 
are difficult 
to assess 
Local fishers 
 
X  
- Tuna as overfished by industrial actors 
Industrial 
operators 
X X 
- Overfishing cannot only be blamed on industrial 
operators 
- Lack of data on other fleets 
- Scientific evidence of overfishing at the IOTC 
level 
NGOs X  
- Scientific evidence of overfishing at the IOTC 
level 
Governments 
 
 X 
- The state of national tuna stocks is unknown but 
levels of catches are stable 
IOTC members X X 
- It is difficult to predict the trajectory of tuna 
stocks 
- Scientific evidence of overfishing after 
consecutive assessments   
5.2. TUNAS AS OVERFISHED IN THE WIO 
As most stocks of fishes have been assessed as fully exploited, the ecological footprint of 
fishing has also been evaluated as leaving severe damages to the marine ecosystems (Coulter 
et al. 2020). Tuna fisheries have not been spared by this discourse of depleted resources 
including in the WIO. The discourse of tuna being overfished in the WIO is produced by 
specific actors. After detailing more the elements and actors involved in this discourse, I will 
present the narrative that these actors maintain about overfishing.  
5.2.1. Elements of the discourse: local perceptions and written assessments  
The discourse of overfishing in the WIO contains three elements: strong local perceptions by 
fishers of tuna being depleted, the conflict between small-scale and industrial fisheries, and 
written evidence of tuna being overfished as presented in NGO and the IOTC reports. 
Regarding the first element of local perception, I analysed regularities within the discourse by 
interviewing actors regarding the state of tuna resources in the three countries studied. During 
interviews in the field, 88 actors provided their perceptions regarding the subject. Amongst 
these, 59 mentioned they noticed a decline in tuna resources, while the rest thought the 
situation was rather stable (15), the quantity of tuna increased (5) or that it was not possible 
to know (9). The 59 interviewees who spoke of decline included 35 artisanal fishers, 6 semi-
industrial fishers, 3 sport fishers, 6 intermediaries, and 9 surveyors within statistic units. 
When asked upon what their perception of reduced stocks was based, responses in the three 
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countries were similar. They included the following, ranked according to the repetition of the 
response: 
1. Fishers need to go further to fish, tuna used to come close to shore; now it is only 
caught by chance 
2. The quantity of catch has reduced a lot as well as the quality, the size of the fish is 
getting smaller, fishers do not catch big tuna anymore 
3. Fishers need a longer time to fish now, they used to catch tuna after few hours; now 
they need a whole day or stay at sea three to four days  
4. The price of tuna has increased, tuna used to be given away when caught by fishers, it 
is now a luxury product 
Amongst the interviewees, small-scale fishers recurrently mentioned the first three 
explanations as the basis of their perceptions with some were able to provide comparison of 
present and past catches (Table 17). Fishers in the semi-industrial sector in the Seychelles 
also told similar stories of a strong reduction in catch along with the need to fish longer to get 
tuna (SE 19, 21, 23, 42). The reduction in quantity of catch was also strongly expressed by 
those not directly fishing. They included intermediaries within the small-scale sector (MU 08, 
19; SE 44), processing companies within the semi-industrial sector (MU 33, SE 16), and 
surveyors of statistic units (MD 31, SE 02, SE 53). The latter did not perceive a decrease in 
volume of catch (SE 02, SE 30) but had a common remark on the decrease in quality and 
smaller sizes of fish caught in the national waters.  
Table 17: Perceptions about quantity of catch during tuna season now and ten years ago 
 Interviewee Catch 10 years ago Current catch - as of 2017 
Madagascar 
MD 02 30 tuna/day 10 tuna/day 
MD 19 400 kg to 700 kg/fishing trip 0 to 10 tuna/fishing trip 
Mauritius 
MU 04 10 to 15 tuna/day 2 to 3 tuna/day 
MU 07 30 tuna/day 12 tuna maximum/day 
MU 17 10 tuna/day 3 to 6 tuna/day 
MU 18 10 to 12 tuna/day 6 to 9 tuna/day 
MU 24 18 tuna/day 15 tuna maximum/day 
Seychelles 
SE 08 50 to 80 tuna/day 30 tuna maximum/day 
SE 09 2 or 3 tuna/day 0 to 2 tuna/day 
SE 10 40 tuna/fishing trip 0 to 13 tuna/day 
SE 11 20 tuna/day 0 to 5 tuna/day 
SE 24 5 to 6 tuna/day 0 to 4 tuna/day 
SE 58 1 ton/day 0 to 2 tuna/day 
SE 32 15 tuna/day 0 to 14 tuna/day 
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As we can see from Table 17, fishers in the small-scale sector, who are most vocal about 
overfishing, were catching very variable amount of tuna even 10 years ago (some days zero, 
some days 30, to take the outer bounds). However, as the catch has dwindled 5 to 10 times 
less than what was caught in the past, coupled with the increase of fishing distance/time and 
the lack of presence of tuna at shore, small-scale fishers of the WIO have constructed a 
legitimate claim regarding the state of the resources.  
The second element of the overfishing discourse is the imbalance and lack of equity between 
small-scale and industrial fishing. As it will be developed in Chapter 6, industrial fishing 
actors have means and resources that provide a tremendous advantage to industrial fishing 
fleets in catching more tuna in highly remote areas of the Indian Ocean. The investment of 
fishing companies in their fleets but also the subsidies provided by DWFNs produce a highly 
efficient industrial tuna fishing. Small-scale and semi-industrial tuna fishers feel 
systematically overtaken in the tuna exploitation. This is a venue for debate where fishers 
denounced the state of neglecting local fishers. In Madagascar, fishers make recurrent 
comments that they did not have the right boats nor enough equipment to fish tuna. One 
fisher explained that in Ramena village: 
“People work as crew members because having your own boat is way too 
expensive. An average boat such as speedboat costs at least MGA5,000,000 
(~EUR1,200) and to this you have to add the engine, the equipment. If you 
use nets, you need at least five people because it is a big net to manage. Only 
the few ‘bosses’ in the village can afford that and the government does not 
help us.” (MD 18).  
In a country like Madagascar where the socio-economic context is of poverty and limited 
means, the state can only contribute to fishing development through funding from donors 
who sometimes provide nets or a few speedboats. In Mauritius and the Seychelles, however, 
the state has made several investments to improve local tuna fishing. These include, for 
example, the set-up of anchored FADs in Mauritius to attract pelagic species, the 
improvement of local ports in the Seychelles or the establishment of loan schemes in 
Mauritius and the Seychelles to help local fishers upgrade into semi-industrial vessels. 
However, fishers claim that these investments have been limited compared to the attention 
given to the industrial fishing. Local fishers state that industrial vessels enjoy a highly 
serviced port in the Seychelles and facilitated formalities through the Seafood Hub in 
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Mauritius. Local fishers therefore claim that there is an apparent inequality of treatment by 
the state and it has caused them a reduced access to the tuna resources.  
A third element of the ‘overfished tuna’ discourse emerges from written reports of the IOTC 
and NGOs, where tuna species in the Indian Ocean are portrayed as declining. For the case of 
WIO and the broader IO, the status of the stock being overfished has been established 
through stock assessments. Since the stock assessment of 2015, one of the key species of the 
region – yellowfin tuna – has been assessed as overfished and subject to overfishing. The 
scientific committee of the IOTC reported that this was due to a “large and unsustainable 
catches […] over the last 3 years” (IOTC 2015: 84). In the 2015 report, the MSY was 
established at 421,000t. From the reported catch of 2014 (430,327t) and the updated catches 
of previous years, the status of yellowfin tuna changed to ‘overfished and subject to 
overfishing’ at a 94% probability (ibid). The IOTC assessments represent the basis of the 
view of the scientific committee of the IOTC, the NGOs and also the industrial operators.   
Other reports also present the state of tuna resources as having decreased including in the 
Indian Ocean. These corroborate local stories of overfishing. The 2018 report of the FAO 
regarding fisheries and aquaculture (The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture report) 
described that more than 40% of the global tuna stock was fished at a biologically 
unsustainable level (FAO 2018b). For the Indian Ocean, the FAO described that between 
1950 and 2015, the trend of fish landings – including tuna – has been on a continuously 
increasing trend” (ibid: 42). The WWF, in its 2015 report “The Blue Living Planet”, 
presented that tuna species and associated species were globally declined by 74% between 
1970 and 2010 (WWF 2015: 9). A regional report of the WWF regarding the WIO region 
confirmed the stock status presented by the IOTC (Illustration 6).  
Illustration 6: Presentation of yellowfin as overfished in a 2017 WWF report  
 
Source: Obura et al. 2017 
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Finally, the ISSF, in its tool of assessing tuna stock health, also confirms the stock status of 
yellowfin as presented by the IOTC. It presents that as of October 2019, 25% of the tuna 
stock in the Indian Ocean, including for the four commercial species, require improvement in 
its management while the other 75% of the tuna stock is in a healthy state. Regarding 
Yellowfin in particular, the stock health tool of the ISSF describes yellowfin as 100% 
needing improvement in its management (ISSF 2019).  
5.2.2. Actors (re)producing the overfishing discourse 
As we can see in the elements above, the discourse is present amongst local actors and also 
maintained by indirect actors. At the local level, the discourse of tuna being overfished is 
produced by local actors, namely fishers and intermediaries claim that overfishing by 
industrial vessels leads to a loss of livelihood and a risk to their food security. This is in line 
with the growing acknowledgement of the role of small-scale fisheries in contributing to 
livelihoods but also supporting thousands of coastal communities in the world (FAO 2015; 
IPNLF 2018b; Pauly 2018). It also aligns with the increased knowledge produced regarding 
the negative impact of the reduction of fish availability on health and nutrition amongst 
coastal people especially in developing countries (Golden 2016; Hicks et al. 2019). In the 
WIO, fishers reiterate the story of overfishing amongst themselves and to outsiders including 
researchers such as myself when tuna fisheries are discussed or to the press and civil society 
organisations. For the case of Madagascar for example, the story of local fishers being 
deprived from their fish has been the subject of various news articles including one in 
October 2019 criticising fishing access agreements for not being transparent and for being a 
source of reduction in fishing resources (Carver 2019a). In Mauritius and the Seychelles, 
well-known local tuna fishers have often told the story of overfishing by industrial vessels 
through documentaries. Three of them have been featured in documentaries regarding tuna 
fisheries in the Indian Ocean. The documentaries are: ‘Tuna Wars’28 in 2013 (an investigative 
journalist following a Greenpeace tuna campaign in the Indian Ocean), ‘Océans, la Voix des 
invisibles’29 in 2017 (a narration of the struggles of small-scale fishers against industrial 
fishing in different parts of the world including in the WIO) and ‘Cash Investigation, Pêche 
industrielle, Gros Poissons en eaux troubles’30 in 2019 (an investigation of the French 
 
28 A documentary presented by David O’Shea, produced by SBS Dateline. Available at 
https://www.sbs.com.au/news/dateline/tvepisode/tuna-wars 
29 A documentary produced by Mathilde Junot. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YklYotq2f9o 
30 A documentary presented by Elise Lucet, produced by France Tv. Available at https://www.france.tv/france-
2/cash-investigation/881123-peche-industrielle-gros-poissons-en-eaux-troubles.html 
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industrial tuna fishing including in the Indian Ocean). Through these media tales, the 
narrative of overfishing by industrial vessels and the challenges in daily livelihoods of tuna 
fishers are spread globally and provide to the local actors, especially fishers, a public venue 
to maintain their narrative.  
The next set of actors who reproduce the overfishing narratives is composed of civil society 
and international organisations. The FPAOI, the federation of small-scale fishers in the 
Indian Ocean, for example, attempts to bring the story of local fishers to the IOTC 
discussions by highlighting the importance of tuna for small-scale fishers and their strong 
concern regarding the reduction of tuna resources in the Indian Ocean (FPAOI 2017). 
Similarly, NGOs like IPNLF and the WWF tell the story of local fishers as suffering from the 
reduction of tuna available. They provide their assistance to coastal states by supporting 
proposals that ask for the opportunities of fishing tuna in the Indian Ocean to be mostly 
allocated to coastal countries (IPNLF 2018a; Obura 2017). International organisations such 
as the FAO or the ISSF also produce elements of the overfishing discourse. However, the 
discourse is a global one or a regional Indian Ocean one. An interesting specificity of these 
broader perspectives is the lack of agency in the storyline. While entities such as FAO or the 
ISSF recognise the overfished status of some tuna species, the reduction of resources is not 
assigned an agent responsible of the situation.   
5.2.3. The narrative of the WIO local fishers: “they take all our tuna”  
In this section, I dissect the structure and cast of actors within the narrative of local fishers 
which blame industrial vessels of DWFNs for the overfishing of tuna. The narrative is 
structured in the following set of events: the sustained fishing by industrial actors, the 
continuous decline of tuna available in the EEZs, and the current loss of livelihoods linked to 
tuna fisheries at the local level. The narrative also sets a precise role to actors involved the in 
the fisheries notably putting industrial fishers as ‘the villains’ and local fishers as ‘the 
victims’.  
Content of the narrative 
While fishing by industrial vessels started in the WIO since the 1950s, industrial vessels are 
often active offshore, out of sight of local fishers. Nonetheless, when industrial boats are 
close to the coast local fishers are questioning their presence in the EEZs. Discussions with 
fishers regarding their knowledge about industrial vessels highlighted their acknowledgement 
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of the long-standing presence of industrial vessels in the WIO. Older fishers made statements 
such as: 
“I remember many Taiwanese vessels came in the 70s, we were really worried 
about what they would do in our waters” (MD 68) 
“the government has allowed those big boats in our waters for a while; with 
their agreements with the EU and other Asian countries in the 2000s, they 
allowed so many boats in our waters that have had big impacts on our marine 
resources” (MU 25) 
“the industrial fishing in our waters has exacerbated, in the 80s purse seiners 
caught 300–400 tons; now they catch so much more, it has become out of 
control” (SE 47).  
These perspectives of local fishers that are transmitted to other fishers provide the narrative 
of overfishing an historical anchoring, reinforcing their views.  
Regarding the state of tuna resources in the WIO, interviewees in the three countries 
attributed four drivers to the reduction of tuna resources. These were: industrial fishing 
mainly by purse seiners, climate change, pollution of the ocean and the number of local 
fishers accessing the resources. However, industrial fishing was the most prominent reason 
given. Amongst the 59 interviewees that perceived a reduction of the resources, the impact of 
industrial fishing on the resources was seen as a major contributor with 42 interviewees. They 
mentioned the role of licences to purse seiners and longliners in the overfishing of resources 
as well as the use of FADs and support vessels. Common phrases from small-scale and semi-
industrial fishers included “they do not choose what to catch, small and big fishes” (MD 51), 
“they catch everything and not only tuna” (SE 19); or “they catch too much, they have very 
good equipment for that” (MU 25). Data from the USTA in Madagascar for example shows 
that some species caught by the small-scale fishery are also caught as bycatch of purse 
seiners or longliners (USTA 2017). Similarly, the semi-industrial segments in both Mauritius 
and Seychelles target the same commercial tunas and associated species. Processing 
companies’ representatives acknowledged the reduction in catch they found in their landing 
data while surveyors within the fisheries’ departments expressed that they had noticed a 
change in the quality notably through smaller size of fish. A smaller number of stakeholders 
attributed the reduction of resources to pollution of the ocean (4), increase of tuna fishers (4) 
or climate change (9) (Figure 5). The narrative of overfishing by industrial vessels was 
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strongly reproduced in the Seychelles and Mauritius where fishers had a more advanced 
knowledge on the involvement of DWFNs in their national waters. It was less present in 
Madagascar where the explanation of climate change was more favoured. 
Figure 5: Results of interviews regarding perceived causes of decrease in tuna resources 
 
These local accounts of overfishing are mainly based on knowledge of local fishers that the 
quantity of fish available has reduced. This has been built through their long-standing 
experience in fishing but also through the reproduction of the story amongst fishers. For the 
case of Mauritius and Seychelles in particular, the media and NGOs supporting similar views 
have also strengthened the story of tuna being overfished. The emphasis put on the impact of 
industrial fishing as depleting the tuna of the region has been incorporated as a belief 
amongst fishers. Industrial fishing is seen as an external intervention against local fishing 
practices and considered as a threat to marine resources.  
As for the loss of livelihood part of the narrative, a key element of the narrative is the idea of 
unjust access and resources grab that local fishers feel regarding the impact of industrial tuna 
fishing. While they are aware of the fugitiveness of tuna and have a common knowledge that 
“tuna travels”, there is also a strong sense of national ownership over the fish. It is generally 
described as “our fish”. Associated with local livelihoods and the dependence of fishers with 
the sea, this perception of ownership of the fish is a strong driver behind the resource conflict 
around the WIO tunas. It provides a justification for local fishers to claim that the industrial 
sector is depriving them and their communities from their fish and related livelihoods. 
Fishers often complain that the reduction of tuna quantity has led to less work opportunities 
for fishers during tuna season (MD 51, MU 24, SE 19).  
71%
15%
7%
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Overfishing by the industrial vessels Climate change
Pollution of the ocean Increased number of fishers
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Cast of actors and solution suggested in the narrative 
In the narrative of overfishing done by the industrial segment of the fishery, local fishers and 
industrial fishers are set as in conflict with industrial fishing operators considered responsible 
for the decline of tunas and local fishers as the victims. The state is considered as the one that 
could implement the solution. 
The solution to the overfishing problem promoted by fishers is restricting access to tuna to 
DWFNs. For fishers, this solution will replenish the sea with all kinds of fish, prevent marine 
resources from being taken offshore especially species that move between coastal waters and 
the EEZ, and will sustain their livelihoods. The request that access by DWFNs to the tuna 
grounds of the WIO be restricted is done by fishers themselves or fishing associations. 
During the fieldwork and also in the above-mentioned documentaries, fishers were asked 
about the solution they thought was needed to address the overfishing situation. Their 
responses varied between a soft “the government needs to reduce the licences it grants to 
industrial vessels” (MU 04, 08, 25, SE 09) to a more radical “the government needs to stop 
industrial fishing” (MU 20, 35, 40, SE 25, 26). Such claims have been frequent in the past ten 
years and have contributed to a few victories for the small-scale and artisanal fishers even if 
industrial fishing is still happening in the WIO. Two can be mentioned here. First, in the case 
of Seychelles, persistent pressure has led to the country’s delegation at IOTC having 
representatives from the local semi-industrial fishing, providing their opinion during debates 
especially regarding allocations at IOTC negotiations (pers. obs.). Second is the case of 
fishing access agreements between Madagascar and the EU. The negotiation of these has 
been put under strict scrutiny by the public. In 2019, the negotiation of a new SFPA with the 
EU took three unsuccessful rounds of negotiations as both parties were not satisfied with 
what was offered (MD 10). Civil society organisations have also mobilised the narrative to in 
their advocacy work. The FPAOI in its statements position at IOTC advocates for less fishing 
by DWFNs. It does so by supporting the reduction of FADs and support vessels which are 
known to increase the fishing capacity of industrial vessels (FPAOI 2017). They also 
opposed the proposal of allocation of catch that considered historical catch as the main 
criteria – which provides catches allocation mostly to DWFNs (ibid).  
5.2.4. The narrative of IOTC’s scientific committee: “the yellowfin tuna stock is 
determined to be overfished and subject to overfishing” 
The state of tuna resources being overfished in the WIO and more broadly in the Indian 
Ocean has also been established through assessments undertaken at the IOTC level. Different 
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to the first two, the IOTC narrative is based on scientific assessments which have established 
that tunas, more specifically yellowfin tuna, are subject to overfishing since 2015. The 
narrative is structured in the following set of events: a fast increase of catch since 2012, 
scientific committee warns of unsustainable increase of effort, and stock assessments of 
2015, 217 and 2018 establish high probabilities that yellowfin tuna is overfished. The set of 
actors include various fleets as responsible for the situation, IOTC members not taking 
measures but also the same members have the ability to improve the situation.  
Content of the narrative 
The elements of the narrative at the IOTC level about overfishing in the Indian Ocean can be 
found through an analysis of the scientific reports produced by the Scientific Committee that 
present stock assessments. Stock assessments are based on scientific models that use catch 
data submitted by members of the IOTC, as part of their obligations. The results of stock 
assessments are presented under a stock status trajectory plot (called the Kobe plot) which 
shows the probability of overfishing. A species is assessed as overfished when the spawning 
biomass is below the spawning biomass level that would provide maximum sustainable yield. 
It is considered as subject to overfishing when fish mortality is above the fishing mortality 
level at which it would provide maximum sustainable yield. The reports of the Scientific 
Committee picture the historical evolution of the catch since the 1980s and especially in the 
past 10 years. The event of the collapse of yellowfin tuna has to be put in its socio-economic 
context. For a start, the increase of catch in 2012 resulted from the return of fishing fleet to 
the WIO after piracy events that preventing fishing between 2008 and 2011. When the piracy 
issue was addressed, catch of different fleets increased fast. Reports of 2012, 2013 and 2014 
started to warn the IOTC commission about the risk of such increase notably with clear 
statements that were present in SC reports since 2011 such as “the stock is unlikely to support 
substantively higher yields based on the estimated levels of recruitment from over the last 15 
years.” (IOTC 2011: 107). Despite these, catches continued to increase and the status of 
yellowfin tuna being subject to overfishing was established with the stock assessment of 2015 
and in the reports that followed. The 2015 report adjusted the figures of catches since 2011 
(Figure 6) and reported 94% probability of overfishing (IOTC 2015). It also presented that 
the situation was “a direct result of the large and unsustainable catches of yellowfin tuna 
taken over the last three (3) years, and the relatively low recruitment levels estimated by the 
model in recent years.” (IOTC 2015: 84). Despite an improvement to a 67% probability of 
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overfishing in 2016, the status of the stock reverted to a 94% probability of overfishing in 
2018 (IOTC 2016a, IOTC 2018b).   
Figure 6: Evolution of yellowfin catch as presented in the SC reports of 2012 to 2018 
 
Each cluster of bars represents the level of catch reported by the reports of successive years (vertical 
labels). Each report presents the data of previous years catches (coloured bars). The graph shows that 
the level of catch for certain years evolved from report to report.  
Source: Analysis by the author 
In this narrative, the state of tuna resources has been established through the use of scientific 
models that consider various criteria including fishing efforts, mortality and maximum 
sustainable yields. The scientific committee is in charge of undertaking the stock 
assessments. Representatives of member parties present at the SC work together to undertake 
the assessment by using modelling techniques. Representatives are usually scientists of 
research institutes for the case of DWFNs and more developed coastal countries and 
representatives of units in charge of tuna statistics for developing coastal countries. 
Assessments are based on common scientific methods used within all RFMOs in charge of 
tuna, often developed by fisheries scientists of more developed countries and appropriated by 
other members of the SC. Despite the diversity of its members, the SC has relied on scientific 
  113 
models to produce its advice and warning about the potential collapse of the resources since 
2011.  
Cast of actors and solutions 
In the IOTC narrative of tuna being overfished, the cast of actors is less precise and points the 
blame towards most fleets including those using “longline, gillnet, handline and purse seine” 
(IOTC 2015: 84) as having contributed to the collapse of the resources. These gears account 
for 86,2% of the catch in the Indian Ocean and only exclude two fishing methods: pole-and-
line and trolling. Therefore, the IOTC attributes the role of villains to those using specific 
gears rather than specific members. The attribution of the hero role is however clearer. The 
SC, as an advisory committee to the commission, see members of the IOTC as able to reverse 
the situation. The solution proposed was prescribed in the management advice of the SC. In 
the 2015 report, the SC’s recommendation was to reduce the catches by 20% of the 2014 
level of catch to have a probability of 50% chances of recovery by 2024. For the SC, 
improving the state of the yellowfin stock required a reduction in catch and effort from most 
fleets to revert to a lower level of catch considered within MSY in 2014. This would allow 
the fish population to replenish and ensure that fishing could continue at MSY level in the 
Indian Ocean. As will be highlighted in the parallel narrative at the IOTC level, this 
recommendation of the SC was difficult to implement. This is mainly due to the fact that 
heroes and villains are related as the fleets responsible for overfishing are operated by IOTC 
members who have both the interests of conserving tuna under the mandate of the IOTC but 
also the economic interests of their fishing companies.  
5.2.5. The narrative of European industrial operators: “we are unfairly blamed for 
overfishing”  
The next set of actors that also see tuna as overfished is the industrial operators. Here an 
analysis of European operators’ views was possible and not those of Asian operators. As they 
take part in discussions within the SC and in implementing resolutions taken at the 
commission, industrial operators acknowledge the overfished status of tuna resources based 
on the IOTC stock assessments presented in the previous section. Their narrative is, however, 
distinct and could be seen as a counter-narrative to the one of local fishers. The narrative 
contains two elements: inequality of blame put on their exploitation and their socio-economic 
contribution to coastal countries. In this narrative, actors in the industrial segment often see 
themselves as being victims of injustice while some NGOs and coastal countries with 
contradictory views are seen as at the origin of the issue.  
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Content of the narrative 
The narrative of industrial operators has been mostly present in their public discourses. The 
first element consists of claiming an unfair burden on industrial fleets in implementing 
management measure regarding yellowfin in the Indian Ocean. During my first fieldwork of 
2017, the IOTC’s plan for rebuilding yellowfin stock had been in place for a year, with 
various limitations to catches for different gear types. Some parties to the IOTC, despite the 
high probability of overfishing established in the region, opposed the implementation of the 
rebuilding plan. First, some foreign fishing fleets, especially the Spanish one, claimed 
injustice regarding the 15% reduction required from purse seiners, even if the original 
scientific advice was a 20% reduction. The industrial fishing operators protested to the EU 
and to their individual governments. One of the Spanish operators in the WIO, ANABAC, 
made a formal complaint to the Spanish government for an “unfair closing of the fishery in 
the Indian Ocean” (Mereghetti 2017b). As the IOT cannery started to complain about the lack 
of yellowfin supply in the Seychelles because the quota of yellowfin was reached in the WIO 
(Undercurrentnews 2018), fishing operators accentuated the gravity of the situation. They 
claimed that there is an unfair treatment of the purse seine fleet compared to other gears in 
the Indian Ocean (Illustration 7). Here, business actors discount the scientific evidence of 
overfishing and promote a narrative of unfairness and impediment of their economic 
interests. 
Illustration 7: Reply form a representative of purse seiners on the yellowfin situation  
 
Another level of unfairness is also felt is within the European fleet itself. As the French fleet 
has fewer vessels and capacity than the Spanish fleet, discussions with crew members on 
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French vessels highlighted that Spanish operators are considered as taking more tuna by their 
French colleagues, seeing them as more responsible for the overfishing situation. An Ivorian 
crew member interviewed during landing in Seychelles commented, “we heard fishing 
yellowfin is now forbidden. We do not really understand the situation. We [on French boats] 
fish less than the Spanish and yet we get equally penalised. For us as fishers, it is very 
discouraging” (SE 63). In mid-2018, an interview with a representative of a Spanish fleet 
presented the case of implementing the catch limitations as “too difficult for the purse 
seiners” (SK 03). The interviewee explained that monitoring was highly difficult especially 
because the purse seine fishery does not only catch one species. For that reason, the Spanish 
fleet just fished until the limit was reached. Here, within the value chain, actors questioned 
the implementation of management measures as being ‘unfair’ between the different gears 
subject to the measure or even between the different fishing operators. 
The second element of the narrative of industrial operators, especially European ones, 
consists of reiterating the contribution of industrial fishery to economies of coastal countries. 
This includes the contribution of data that industrial fleet have submitted to the IOTC to 
establish stock assessments. Also, as various industrial operators have invested in the 
development of ports and canneries in the WIO region (as will be discussed in Chapter 7), 
they see the adoption of management measures on yellowfin, requiring purse seiners to 
reduce their catch more than other gears, as affecting both purse seiners and coastal countries. 
Industrial operators consider that their exploitation is key to providing tuna especially to the 
canneries of the region. While industrial fishing, and especially purse seiners, record the 
highest catches in the WIO (IOTC 2018a), they also depict themselves as being at the centre 
of the tuna economies in the region especially for countries like the Seychelles or Mauritius, 
with very active ports (SK 04). As expressed by a representative of industrial fleets:  
“The EU developed the canneries and also provides preferential custom 
tariffs for tuna products from the region, coastal countries have been 
benefiting from the industrial exploitation. Resolutions adopted at the IOTC 
might backfire at coastal countries” (SK 05).  
This view is also shared by some government officials in the WIO. When asked about this 
difficult balance between adopting measures and aligning with the interests of DWFNs, a 
government official from the Seychelles acknowledged: 
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“The truth is, whether we like it or not and unless there is an economic study 
that proves otherwise, we cannot do without industrial tuna fishing, in the short 
and long term. We have tried pole and line and it did not work, the current 
increase in the semi-industrial fleet is lacking fishers, what is the point of 
developing a fishery if it is to recruit foreigners? The public is also not really 
aware of the true value of tuna fishing, including the important volume of 
reefers and containers going through the port. Without all that, the port would 
not be so important. It provides jobs for many people, but it’s not known.” (SE 
40)  
This second element of the narrative by industrial fishers presents the socio-economic 
contribution of industrial fleets as also affected by management measures addressing 
overfishing.  
Cast of actors and solution suggested 
Within the narrative of industrial fishers being unjustly and unequally subject to management 
measures, the cast of actors is made clear especially when it comes to discussions at the 
IOTC. Countries like Australia, Maldives or South Africa are seen by some representatives of 
the industrial segment of being involved in hostilities against industrial actors (SK 03, 04, 
06). Representatives from the industry interviewed during the fieldwork acknowledged that 
countries such as Maldives, highly dependent on tuna, were rightfully pushing for 
management measures (SK 05). They, however, considered other countries as tied up in 
measures that might not be beneficial to their national economies (SK 04). Another actor, the 
IPNLF is also considered by some as orchestrating the adoption of management measures 
with limited interests in other countries than Maldives (SK 04, SK 06). In this setting, 
industrial actors and by extension DWFNs see themselves as victims of machinations against 
their interests. This applies to the European fleet as it was not possible to discuss this issue 
with representatives of Asia fleets.  
The solution propelled under this narrative is twofold. First is the adoption of measures 
requiring reduction of catch to be higher for other gears like gillnets. For industrial operators, 
this would improve the status of the yellowfin stock as restrictions would be increased for all. 
Improvement of the yellowfin stock would ensure a continued fishing of this commercial 
species for the industrial segment and is also necessary for some of the fleets to access MSC 
certification or to maintain it – for the case of the Spanish Echebastar Group. Second is 
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improving alliances between industrial actors and countries of the WIO region. As expressed 
by one representative of industrial fleets “it is necessary to find a consensus and common 
interests instead of focusing on debates that will bring us nowhere; more dialogues and 
exchanges are needed between the industrial fleets and coastal countries in order to find a 
common ground” (SK 04). Through suggesting dialogue, the industrial fleets aim to reinforce 
their ties with coastal countries and achieve more consensus about management measures at 
the IOTC level.  
5.2.6. The narrative of NGOs at the IOTC level: “yellowfin tuna catches need cuts to 
prevent collapse” 
In the WIO region and more broadly at the Indian Ocean level, the narrative that NGOs are 
presenting is that overfishing is due to the lack of engagement of member parties at the IOTC 
in adopting management measures. The case of yellowfin tuna illustrates this narrative. The 
narrative is structured in the following set of events: the scientific committee of IOTC 
warned of unsustainable yields, member parties of the IOTC continued exploitation of 
resources leading to the current overfished status of yellowfin tuna, the tuna industry and 
local livelihoods are put at risk. In contrast to the narrative held by local fishers, the narrative 
here assigns less of a villain/victim role to actors.  
Content of the narrative 
In the early 1990s, the predominant discourse at the international level was one of global 
fishing resources being in crisis (Hubbard 2014). It was increasingly recognised that any 
taking from the ocean reduced the population of fish (Holmes 2014). Fish in general is also 
increasingly considered as a scarce commodity requiring conservation efforts (FAO 2016). 
The overfishing of species such as cod in New England or bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean 
has involved various narratives of degradation of livelihoods and local economies needing to 
be rebuilt (Longo and Clark 2012; McGuire 1997). Within this discourse, the narrative that 
NGOs promote is one that demands governments, scientists and civil society organisations to 
discuss and adopt measures to manage marine resources. NGOs have also supported local 
communities and fishers in various countries to conserve the marine resources locally and to 
mobilise themselves in groups to amplify their voice at the global level (CFFA-CAPE 2019; 
Rocliffe et al. 2014). They have also been involved in policy advocacy and lobbying at 
international meetings in order to push for the adoption of conservation measures.  
For the case tuna in the Indian Ocean and more specifically at the IOTC, a group of NGOs 
have been active in pushing for the adoption of management measures, especially in light of 
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the overfished status of yellowfin tuna since 2015. Amongst them, two NGOs can be 
mentioned here: the WWF and the IPNLF. At the time of the fieldwork in 2017 and 2018, 
both NGOs were involved in encouraging parties to the IOTC to adopt measures. The 
narrative regarding the overfished tuna in the Indian Ocean is based on the findings of the 
Scientific Committee (SC) of the IOTC. In its 2012 report, the SC already stated that “the 
stock is unlikely to support substantively higher yields based on the estimated levels of 
recruitment from over the last 15 years” (IOTC 2012: 103). In 2013 and 2014 reports, the 
tuna catches saw an increase from 368,663t in 2012 to 402,084t in 2013, despite a Maximum 
Sustainable Yield (MSY) established at 344,000t by the IOTC (IOTC 2013, 2014).  
Based on this evidence from the SC, NGOs have called members to the IOTC to take action. 
A press release from WWF prior to the 2016 IOTC meeting prompted in its subtitle “follow 
the science to save your tuna industry, WWF warns Indian Ocean Tuna Commission” (WWF 
2016b: 1). Here the member parties of the IOTC are targeted by NGOs as having contributed 
to the overfishing of tuna resources by ignoring the warnings from the SC. The inaction of 
IOTC members has resulted in an increase of catch levels in the past five years (Figure 6) 
and a 67 to 94% probability of yellowfin being overfished (IOTC 2018b). Other NGOs also 
made statements in the same line. The ISSF argued that “it is vital for IOTC to end the 
overfishing of yellowfin and demonstrate that it can effectively manage the stocks under its 
purview” (IOTC 2016d). The IPNLF advocated in its statement that “options for reducing 
yellowfin catches across the range of gears should be explored taking into account the 
impacts on juvenile yellowfin and other vulnerable marine species of different gear types.” 
(IOTC 2016e). NGOs here are urging members to the IOTC to adopt concise measures based 
on the scientific committee’s recommendation.  
Within the narrative, NGOs present the impact of this overfishing of tuna as devastating for 
the tuna industry and especially for local coastal communities. In the above-mentioned press 
release of the WWF, it is mentioned that “the seafood industry and communities that rely on 
a healthy yellowfin stock are highly concerned by the IOTC scientist’s predictions of a 
possible stock collapse in the near future, which would place their livelihoods under threat.” 
(WWF 2016b: 1). Similarly, the IPNLF stated in its position statement that “a large 
proportion of the Indian Ocean catch is taken by artisanal fisheries in developing coastal 
states […] These catches are critical to local food security and livelihoods in coastal 
communities.” Through these assertions, we can see that NGOs see the consequences of 
overfishing as affecting various actors involved in the tuna industry but especially the local 
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communities and their livelihoods. This element of the narrative of NGOs is also seen in the 
narrative of local fishers.  
Cast of actors and solution suggested in the narrative 
In the narrative of NGOs blaming the inaction of members to the IOTC for the overfishing of 
tuna, the cast of actors is less clear-cut as in the narrative held by local fishers. Here, 
governments are seen as both responsible for the situation but also the heroes that can save 
the tuna. While tuna is the victim of inaction, NGOs also consider coastal communities and 
the tuna industry in general as being the victims. 
Solutions proposed by NGOs to overfishing and especially regarding yellowfin tuna have 
been according to the scientific advice of the IOTC’s scientific committee. For NGOs, 
improvement of the status of the resources will benefit the various segments of the fisheries 
and coastal communities but also help NGOs achieve their conservation agenda in the Indian 
Ocean. The WWF for example has campaigned for the adoption of management measures at 
the IOTC since yellowfin has been assessed as overfished in 2015. Prior to the 2016 meeting, 
the NGO argued that “yellowfin tuna, a high-profile species that makes up a significant and 
valuable proportion of exports from the [Indian Ocean] region, is seriously affected by 
overfishing and is in need of urgent measures to recover.” (WWF 2016a) and that “the lack of 
these control rules in this region has contributed to the current plight of yellowfin tuna” 
(ibid). The adoption of the yellowfin tuna rebuilding plan at the 2016 meeting was seen by 
the WWF as an “historic measure” (WWF 2016b). Another NGO active in proposing 
solutions is the IPNLF (as will be discussed in Chapter 7). On two specific occasions, the 
NGO has been supporting the Maldives in introducing management measures at IOTC. One 
was the adoption of harvest control rule of skipjack in 2016 seen as “a precautionary measure 
that outlines pre-agreed steps that will be taken should the skipjack fishery become 
unsustainable in the future” (IPNLF 2016: 1). The other one was the support of the allocation 
proposal led by Maldives (also discussed in Chapter 7). Regarding the adoption of measures 
for the yellowfin species, the IPNLF presented that “the very fact that a yellowfin 
management measure was adopted was a highly encouraging step in the right direction.” 
(ibid: 2). In the making of solutions regarding the issue of overfishing, NGOs therefore play 
an important role in policy advocacy at the Indian Ocean level.  
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5.2.7. Co-producing the discourse of tuna being overfished  
To conclude this section, it can be said all the main actors involved in tuna fisheries see tuna 
and especially yellowfin tuna as overfished. However, actors’ views are based on different 
grounds. There is the narrative of overfishing by industrial vessels that is entrenched in the 
WIO region especially amongst local fishers. The narrative is co-produced through a mix of 
personal experiences in the fishing, the sense of loss of access over the tunas and the strength 
of the story being reproduced at the local level and by the public media. The narrative also 
relies on the importance given to local livelihoods and food security being at risk, and 
requiring the solution of demanding that industrial vessel have their access to tuna resources 
limited. The second narrative, one of overfishing being caused by inaction the IOTC 
members has been promoted by NGOs active in the region. This narrative is co-produced not 
only by the NGO’s vision on how tuna fisheries should be managed, but also on their reliance 
on the scientific advice of the scientific committee. To this is added the strong consideration 
of local coastal communities as being affected by overfishing. Here, the call for action by 
NGOs has been strong at the IOTC and eventually led to the adoption of management 
measures. The third narrative is more nuanced one coming from the industrial sector 
especially the European fleet. While representatives of the sector recognise the fact that tuna 
is overfished based on the IOTC’s assessment, they see this overfishing as unjustly attributed 
to the purse seiners especially as other gears were also considered as contributing to the 
situation. Within the European fleet itself, the feeling of unjust blame is present between 
crew members of the French fleet, considering themselves fishing less than their Spanish 
colleagues. Here, their narrative is co-produced by both a long experience in the fisher of 
crew members and reliance on the IOTC’s assessments by the SC. The last narrative held by 
the IOTC’s SC is of overfishing due to the unsustainable catch of fishing fleets in the Indian 
Ocean. Here the narrative is co-produced by the use of scientific models and the 
interpretation of results by the members of the SC. This section has shown that the discourse 
of tuna being overfished is present at both the local and regional level and has been co-
produced by local perceptions, experience in the fishing, scientific evidence, but also 
perspective being unjustly burdened by management measure and the political divide 
between members of the IOTC.  
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5.3. TUNA STOCKS AS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS – A PARALLEL VIEW 
While there seems to be a strong discourse of tuna being overfished maintained by local 
fishers and NGOs, in this section I argue that there is parallel discourse that exists at the WIO 
and IO levels. That is a discourse of the state of tuna stocks being unknown or difficult to 
predict. This discourse is produced and reproduced by government officials, representatives 
of industrial fishing and the IOTC members within the scientific committee of the IOTC.  
5.3.1. Elements of the discourse: limited national and regional data and scientific 
uncertainties 
In parallel to the discourse of tuna being overfished, there is a discourse within the WIO and 
more broadly the IO of describing tuna stocks as challenging to assess. Such discourse is 
mainly based on two elements: the limited knowledge of on the state of tuna resources and 
the challenges presented by scientific models used for stock assessments. The narrative of 
limited knowledge regarding tuna is evident through a look at national reports from fisheries 
departments. Here, the latest (up until 2018) two fisheries reports produced by the fisheries 
department were analysed for each country studied. I will present the structure of fisheries 
reports in the three countries and show how there is indeed no information regarding the 
decrease of tuna in the national waters. While the reports are filled with catch statistics and 
information regarding tuna, these do not allow fisheries departments to build a clear picture 
of stocks status.  
For the case of Madagascar, information regarding tuna is produced by periodical bulletins of 
the USTA. It is divided into four parts: the catch by foreign vessels in the Malagasy EEZ, the 
catch by national vessels, the quantity and type of bycatch landed and the quantity of the tuna 
landed and transhipped at Antsiranana port. Data on catches by foreign and national vessels is 
retrieved through catch logbooks that vessels send to the USTA. The USTA reports make no 
conclusions about the state of the tuna stock in the Malagasy EEZ. Instead, they present, for 
example, the increase and decrease of catches in the industrial fishery, the stability of catch in 
the semi-industrial segment, or the results of recent data collection that they started to do on 
catches within small-scale fishing. In the two bulletins (2015 and 2017) analysed, the USTA 
estimates the catch being according to fishing effort and number of boats fishing in the EEZ. 
In fact, they even suggest that there are more tunas available in the EEZ that requires 
exploitation. The USTA states in its 2017 bulletin that: 
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“the analysis of catch per unit effort showed that the tuna stock in the 
Malagasy waters is not subject to overexploitation and that Madagascar could 
still increase its fishing effort (number of vessels) in order to improve the 
quantity of catch.” (USTA 2017: 21) 
The Seychelles has a slightly different system from Madagascar as it produces both 
periodical statistical bulletins and annual fisheries reports that both include information on 
tuna. The SFA is the author of both types of documents. The statistical bulletin is structured 
rather similarly to the one of the USTA with catches of different segments of tuna fisheries 
and quantity transhipped at port or landed at the IOT cannery. The annual reports include a 
condensed version of the information from the statistical bulletins. Catch data from the 
industrial and semi-industrial segments come from logbooks as well as from the transmission 
of landing and transhipment forms by fishing vessels to the SFA. The SFA gets a regular 
submission of logbooks from purse seiners, but complains about the lack of consistency in 
submission from the longliners. Data is also collected via the tuna sampling programme 
conducted during landings in Port Victoria. The number of vessels active in the waters of the 
Seychelles has been considered stable in the past 10 years (SFA 2016). Statistical bulletins 
produced by SFA are highly detailed compared to the ones in Madagascar. The SFA presents 
information not only by catches of the different segments of the fishery but also by access 
regime, by flag, by geographical area and even by different ports of the WIO. However, the 
diversity of information produced revolves around catches presented in different ways 
including in text, tables, figures and maps. 
Different to the Malagasy bulletins where conclusions are made at the end, the bulletins and 
reports from the Seychelles do not include such conclusions. They only present increases or 
decreases of catches in the different segments. The catch trends in the different segments of 
the fisheries are mainly described as “stable” or “more or less constant”. For the case of purse 
seiners for example: 
“Trend analysis of the purse seine catches in the Seychelles over the last 10 
years shows that following a significant drop of 37% in catches in 2007 from 
the previous year, the purse seine catches have since then remained more or 
less stable” (SFA 2016: 3) 
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In such setting, it is challenging to establish a decrease or increase of tunas in the waters of 
Seychelles. From the reports and bulletin contents, it could be implied that the tuna resources 
are stable if viewed from the catch trends.  
The case of Mauritius is different from the two other countries. Fisheries reports are produced 
by the Ministry of Ocean Economy to which the Albion Fisheries Centre provides data. The 
latest two reports that are accessible to explore information regarding tuna in Mauritius are 
the 2016 performance report of the Ministry and the 2011 fisheries report. The 2016 
performance report was as it is called about performance, information regarding tuna are 
labelled under “achievements” of the fisheries division. The report presents the tuna catch 
between July 2016-June 2017. The 2011 report and previous reports present data relating to 
tuna under a specific section called ‘licencing/tuna fishery/imports and exports’ and had 
information regarding tuna catches of that year. From the structure and content of national 
reports in Mauritius and also the gap in reports produced, it is therefore difficult to establish 
the state of tuna resources or even establish the history of catches in the Mauritian EEZ.  
From this investigation of fisheries reports, available national reports paint a picture of more 
or less stable exploitation at least between 2012 and 2016 in the three countries.  
The second element of the discourse is the difficulty of undertaking stock assessments at the 
IOTC level. At the current time, catch data that is used for stock assessments mostly come 
from industrial fleets, the national report regarding catches from their semi-industrial fleet 
and to a very limited extent from small-scale fisheries catch data. As a consequence of the 
limited knowledge on the national stock status presented above, coastal countries have 
struggled to provide data regarding the catch of their small-scale fisheries. Actors involved in 
stock assessments consider that the current model used for stock assessments is impaired by 
the above issue of insufficient data. As expressed by a researcher involved:  
“There are a lot of mistakes in the calculation under the current model of 
stock assessments. There is a large underreporting of catches for more than 
50% of the Indian Ocean fleet, mostly from gillnets and other gears. Even if 
the model could be good, it is not able to consider these fleets that are not 
reporting their data. This can lead to false and artificial assessments” (SK 
08). 
Such comment is at the centre of the discourse of difficult assessment of tuna. Parties to the 
IOTC have no other choices than relying on the model to predict the trajectory of the stock. 
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Actors involved in the stock assessment exercise are, however, aware of the limitations of the 
system which are the foundation of various uncertainties regarding the stock status.  
5.3.2. Actors (re)producing the unpredictability discourse 
Three sets of actors are producing this discourse of unpredictability of tuna stocks. Their 
individual narrative will be presented in more details in the following sections. The first 
actors that produce the discourse are the coastal countries’ governments notably the fisheries 
departments. The discourse is mostly produced through their written reports as well as in 
their public speeches. Representatives from fisheries departments are also present at the 
IOTC level as members of the scientific committee that undertake stock assessments. The 
discourse is then produced and reproduced in a different form than in national reports, this 
time through conclusions of stock assessments. The last set of actors that reproduce this 
discourse is the industrial fleet operators. The latter are present at the IOTC and have agreed 
to adopt management measures for the case of yellowfin tuna in 2016. However, they argue 
after the 2016 meeting that the measure was not adopted based on a fair consideration of all 
IOTC members and that it has caused prejudice to the industry.  
5.3.3. The narrative of governments at national levels: “we cannot know the national stock 
of tuna” 
The first narrative that presents the status of tuna stock as being difficult to establish is at the 
governments’ level. The narrative presents two elements: the migratory feature of the tuna 
making the knowledge on the state of the resources only available at the regional level and 
the argument of the importance of tuna fisheries for the economy. The narrative does not 
establish roles of actors as clearly as in the narrative linked to overfishing. 
Content of the narrative 
Discussions on the state of tuna resources during interviews of government officials often 
highlighted the comment that it was not possible to know the state of resources at the national 
level. From the reports and interviews, the main argument that sustains the narrative of 
limited knowledge on the national tuna stocks seems to lie within the fugitiveness of the tuna. 
Since the tuna travels across EEZ boundaries, fisheries departments argue that it is 
challenging to know how much tuna there is within a particular EEZ. The argument is 
supported by two facts. First, stock assessments of different species are undertaken only at 
the Indian Ocean level through the IOTC. These assessments are based on catch data 
provided by fishing fleets which include national fleets of coastal countries but also fleets of 
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DWNs which fish both in various EEZs and in the high seas. While fishing vessels are 
required to provide the coordinates of their fishing, each member party presents its national 
report at the IOTC with their catches across the Indian Ocean. Catches are presented by 
member party, fishing in their EEZ and beyond. Second, it can also be argued that the level 
of compliance of DWFNs in sending logbooks is mediocre and sometimes inexistent for 
Asian fleets (MD 10, MD 71). Catch data at the national level are therefore incomplete and 
currently rely mostly on catch reported by EU vessels. Another way for countries to record 
their catch is through the monitoring of vessels landing at ports from which statistic units can 
retrieve logbooks straight away from captains. While this is mostly feasible for the 
Seychelles and the fleet of purse seiners regularly landing in Victoria; it is challenging for the 
monitoring of Asian fleets which sometimes land in Mauritius, rarely in the Seychelles and 
never in Madagascar. For a country like Madagascar where the number of landing vessels has 
drastically decreased, its knowledge about the status of stocks in its EEZ is produced through 
statistical data that is highly reliant on the good faith of non-landing fishing vessels of 
sending logbooks and getting logbooks from the few landing Spanish vessels. For these 
reasons, governments have relied on the IOTC to produce data regarding the tuna stock.   
This narrative is also contributing to sustaining industrial fishing in the region. Tuna fishery, 
especially industrial, is perceived at the government level as bringing economic development. 
Tuna fisheries have always been a strategic fishery in the WIO and especially for the three 
countries studied. The strong discourse of economic development stems from the 
contributions of tuna fisheries to the economies of the three countries. These include the 
revenues from fishing access agreements and tuna exports as well as jobs at the canneries and 
ports. Revenues are key to national budgets and tuna export is an important source of foreign 
currency. Furthermore, canneries are often praised as being one of the largest employers in 
Mauritius and the Seychelles or in Antsiranana, Madagascar. Under this economic 
dependence of countries on tuna fisheries, governments have a strong economic interest in 
sustaining tuna fisheries including industrial fishing in the WIO.  
The narrative of limited knowledge is then used to justify continued access by DWFNs to the 
coastal waters on the ground of economic development. With an unknown stock status and 
catch data showing a stable exploitation, governments argue in their national reports that they 
are able to continue the practice of concluding fishing access agreements with DWFNs. 
Fishing access agreements are based on the idea of fishing the “surplus” of total allowable 
catch in national waters (Article 62 of UNCLOS). However, that surplus has not been 
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established in the countries of the WIO nor at the Indian Ocean level. For the case of tuna 
resources and other migratory species, its determination appears inaccessible in the current 
capabilities of catch monitoring in the region as it would require the availability of data 
regarding all catches at national levels but also in the high seas. When offshore fishing by 
DWFNs started in the 1980s, there was no local fleet fishing beyond territorial waters which 
created the assumption that there was a surplus. While that could have been a valid argument 
at the start of tuna fishing in the WIO region, it is not the case anymore considering the 
development of national fleets and local fishers having to fish further. However, fishing 
access agreements continue to exist and rely on existing catch data, which pictures fish as 
being available. Despite the existence of maximum sustainable yields for the main 
commercial tuna species and discussions of the allocations of fishing opportunities at the 
Indian Ocean level, there is currently no repartition of the total allowable catch of the 
different species of tuna between the countries of the region.  
The difficulties that fisheries departments encounter in gathering data regarding the national 
state of tuna resources fuel the narrative of limited knowledge on stock status at the national 
level. It is not only the result of fisheries departments’ limited means to collect and produce 
data regarding the stock. It is also co-produced by practices of stock assessments of migratory 
species that are only feasible at a regional level, along with fishing vessels not passing 
through ports and logbooks not being submitted to statistic units. These elements blend 
within a context where the economic development rhetoric is dominant. 
Cast of actors and solution suggested in the narrative 
In this narrative of limited knowledge about the tuna resources, governments can be seen as 
the victims of the nature of tuna being migratory. The IOTC is then considered as the entity 
bringing the solution of producing more knowledge and data regarding the tuna stock.  
In this acknowledgement of the role of the IOTC, fisheries departments also recognise that 
the data available either at the national level or at IOTC level is currently dependent on the 
industrial segment and their submission of logbooks. Data about local catches is often limited 
(for the case of Madagascar) or lack disaggregation (for the case of Mauritius and the 
Seychelles). Without the current data provided by DWFNs, there will be even less knowledge 
regarding the catches and the state of tuna resources in the national waters. Input from 
DWFNs is therefore seen as key to build the knowledge on tuna. Another solution emerging 
from this narrative is the need for more investment in improving the capacity of fisheries 
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department in gathering data. The limited knowledge narrative has then been harnessed by 
fisheries departments to justify requesting more financial assistance to donors to improve 
their research capacity. This is particularly true for Madagascar, for example, which was 
granted a EUR 67 million funding from the World Bank in 2017 for the SWIOFISH project 
under which the improvement of statistics was an important component. Over the years, tuna 
tagging projects have also been funded involving the different statistic units in the WIO in 
order to improve knowledge on the Indian Ocean tuna stocks (POSEIDON 2014).    
5.3.4. The uncertainty narrative at IOTC: “it is difficult to predict the trajectory of the 
stock” 
A second narrative through which the discourse of unpredictability is expressed is at the 
regional IOTC level and more specifically within the scientific committee where stock 
assessments are discussed and undertaken. The narrative has two components: the uncertainty 
of stock assessment models and the difficulty in adopting management measure. The 
narrative puts the blame of the situation on the scientific model on which the stock 
assessment relies whereas solutions are expected from the IOTC members. While the 
scientific committee reached the conclusion in 2015 that yellowfin tuna was probably 
overfished, the process towards reaching that conclusion included a few years during which 
uncertainty prevented to reach the stock status earlier. That process is described in the 
narrative below.  
Content of the narrative 
To analyse the content of this narrative, I use the case of yellowfin tuna, which is illustrative 
of the complexity of establishing the state of resources at the regional Indian Ocean level. 
Here, I analysed seven reports (2012 to 2018) from the IOTC’s Scientific Committee (SC) 
detailing the state of yellowfin tuna stocks in the past five years. Stock assessments were 
undertaken periodically for the species, notably in 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2018. In the 
2012 report, the catch level of 2010 (299,000t) was presented and considered to have been at 
a “sustainable level” (IOTC 2012). In 2013 and 2014 reports, the catches saw an increase 
beyond the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) (IOTC 2013, 2014). While the statement that 
‘the stock is unlikely to support higher yields’ was in both 2012, 2013 and 2014 reports, the 
reports also noted an increase in catch rates for different gears including purse seiners. 
Despite this, both reports still stated that “it is difficult to know whether the stock is moving 
towards a state of being subject to overfishing” (IOTC 2013: 108; IOTC 2014: 134).  
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This close look at how the state of yellowfin tuna stock has been assessed and presented in 
the different reports shows the continuous trend of high exploitation of yellowfin at the 
Indian Ocean level. Authors of scientific reports delayed the assessment of stock as being 
overfished due to the uncertainty of data, as well as the uncertainties on the projections and 
models used by the IOTC. The use of words such as ‘uncertainty’ and ‘unpredictable’ gave 
green light to a sustained exploitation of the resources in the Indian ocean. The second 
element of the narrative is the difficulty to adopt management measure at the IOTC. The 94% 
probability of overfishing from the 2018 stock assessment was mainly due to the lack of 
success in rebuilding the stock through the reduction measure adopted in 2016 (IOTC 
2018b). To start with, the highest limitation adopted in 2016 was 15% for the purse seine 
fleet, despite the scientific advice of reducing all types of exploitation by 20% (IOTC 2016a). 
Furthermore, the implementation of the rebuilding plan in the end led to an increase in catch 
by different members. As presented in the 2018 report, “while catches for fleets subject to 
Resolution 18/01 decreased by 1% in 2017 compared to the baseline (2014/2015), the total 
catches of yellowfin in 2017 increased by around 3% from 2014/2015 levels” (IOTC 2018c: 
39). According to the report, countries subject to the reduction measures exceeded their limit, 
notably by 7% for the Seychelles flagged purse seiners, by 33% for Iranian gillnets, and by 
1% for handliners from the Maldives31. The EU only managed to reduce its catch by 5% 
despite its obligation of 15% reduction for the purse seiners (IOTC 2018c). Since Seychelles 
purse seiners are EU operated, it can be inferred that the EU did not comply at all with the 
reduction requirements and even exceeded their limits. Countries that reported compliance 
with their reduction requirements were Korea (purse seine), China (longline), Sri Lanka 
(longline), India (gillnets) and Maldives (bait boats). The 2018 report pictured a lack of 
improvement in the status of the yellowfin tuna stock. The adoption of conservation measures 
to rebuild the stock has not been efficient and even led to more exploitation of the resources.  
As seen in other post-structural studies such as those of Jennifer Telesca, the 
conceptualisation of animals into technical words such as stock, biomass or population in 
fisheries science has consequences. It has made marine resources abstract, legible for policy-
makers and commodified for capitalist accumulation (Telesca 2017). In her historical 
analysis of the word ‘stock’ in fisheries, she argued that the trust of fisheries scientists and 
policy makers in quantification is a strategy of simplification (Scott 1998). This renders 
 
31 At the 2019 IOTC meeting, the Maldives objected to the calculations by the Secretariat of the IOTC on the 
basis that the figure was cumulative of all its fleets while only vessels of less than 24m were subject to the 
management measure and these were compliant (IOTC 2019d).   
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problems of the ocean technical and only solvable through state regulation (Li 2007). For the 
case of yellowfin tuna, words such as ‘uncertainty’, ‘probabilities’ or ‘projection’ filled the 
scientific reports, have made the resources abstract and still available for harvesting. 
Scientists of the IOTC have attempted to control and manage tuna fishing with this anchoring 
in quantification and models, so far without success. While parties to the IOTC have agreed 
to reduce their catches, they have mostly failed to achieve their reduction targets by 
continuing to fish at high rates.  
Cast of actors and solution proposed 
Within this narrative, there is no typical actors that could be considered as responsible for the 
overfished status of yellowfin tuna. Ultimately, members of the scientific committee have 
relied on scientific models to establish the status of the stock and the model presents levels 
and variables of uncertainty. It could, however, be argued that a precautionary approach 
could have been taken by the IOTC members as early as when reports mentioned that the 
tuna stock would not be able to sustain higher yields. Here, members of the IOTC can be put 
to blame – as seen in the narrative of NGOs – for their delayed reaction. The tuna here 
remains the victim of bureaucratic science and political reluctance to adopt management 
measures.  
The solution proposed in this narrative is then twofold. First, members of the scientific 
committee continue to rely on the technical solution of stock assessment to provide an 
improved prediction of the stock. To this end, the quality of data within the IOTC is 
discussed as needing improvement from all segments of tuna fisheries (IOTC 2018c). 
Scientists involved in stock assessments reiterate that “one of the biggest challenges in the 
region is the lack of data: the quality is poor and the uncertainty is too high and cannot even 
be quantified” (SE 52). Second, parties to the IOTC are also expected to adopt conservation 
measures according to the advice of the scientific committee. Since this management advice 
of the SC was not followed from the start, there is a low prospect of member parties to the 
IOTC adopting more stringent measures to help the tuna populations to recover.  
5.3.5. The parallel narrative of industrial operators: “there is a lack of data from other 
segments” 
While industrial operators recognise the status of tuna stocks being overfished, there is also a 
parallel narrative within which industrial fleets consider that knowledge about the tunas is 
still limited in the Indian Ocean. This narrative has two elements: the lack of data from other 
segments and the unpredictability of the fish. Here the cast actors include some local fleets 
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not providing data to the IOTC that shift the blame of overfishing to those providing data 
(here the industrial fleet). Governments here are seen as able to bring the solution by 
improving the reporting of its local tuna fishing. The fish here is regarded as dictating the 
level of exploitation possible. 
Content of the narrative 
In this parallel narrative, the industrial sector and in particular the European fleets, also 
concur with the regional narrative of tuna being difficult to assess but on different grounds. 
The storyline of this narrative is set as follows: the industrial sector is providing data to the 
IOTC for the purpose of assessments of the state of the resources, while other fleets 
especially coastal ones such as gillnets provide less to no data to the IOTC. The only 
knowledge produced is from the exploitation by industrial operators which ultimately puts 
them as responsible for overfishing. As expressed by a representative of the Spanish fleet:  
“The knowledge about the stock of tuna in the Indian Ocean is based on data and 
information provided by the industrial fleet. We are always blamed to be the bad 
guys, but we are the only ones that provide the data. We know very little to 
nothing about the extent of artisanal fishing in the Indian Ocean and we know 
for example that gillnets is very detrimental to the environment and it is widely 
used by some countries.”  (BK 05)  
This limited knowledge about artisanal fishery at the Indian Ocean level is then pointed at by 
industrial fishing actors as a failure of coastal states in managing access to the resources by 
local fishers. As seen in section 5.1.1. this disparity of data available is seen as affecting the 
model of stock assessments. In response to this argument, my discussion with a 
representative of local fishers brought up the following remark:  
“Regarding the critics of gillnets at IOTC, to me it is just a diversion. Those 
practices have been there for thousands of years and feeding the coastal people. 
For coastal communities there is an issue of food security here compared to 
selling tuna cans to supermarkets in Europe.”  (SE 47)  
Here we can see that local fishers and representative of the industrial segment have 
strong statements against each other that are often used in public discourses or during 
discussions at the IOTC.  
The second element in this narrative is the unpredictability of the fish, which is claimed by 
different actors in the industry sector including fishing crew or representatives of fishing 
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companies as rendering the state of tuna stocks highly difficult to know or predict. A captain 
on a Spanish purse seiner expressed:  
“It is impossible to say if there is more or less fish. Some years there is no fish in 
one place (like around the Chagos, in the western part of the Indian Ocean, in the 
Mozambique Chanel) and some years there is fish everywhere. Sometimes you 
need a long time to find them. It happens that you go fishing for two weeks and 
there is no fish. Maybe the fish is more intelligent than we think…” (SE 66).  
While such a statement seems improbable considering the amount of technology that is 
available to fish and locate the fish, it is also echoed by other actors in the sector who 
argue that tuna is productive in cycles and that history has shown that some years have 
been really low and some years it has been more productive (SK 09). Here, the state of 
tuna stocks is considered as unpredictable and fishing as depending on the variable 
productivity of the fish. Interestingly, such arguments find an echo in the discourses of 
certain local fishers (often small-scale or artisanal fishers not directly involved in tuna 
fishing) who consider tuna productivity and tuna catch unpredictable (MD 13, MD 24, 
MU 39, SE 04, 46).  
Cast of actors and solution proposed 
Within this narrative held mainly by the European fleets, the coastal fleets and their 
governments are seen as contributing to the issue of limited data available and exacerbating 
the unjust blame put on the purse seiners regarding overfishing. The IOTC commission here 
is seen as able to fix the problem by being more or equally strict on other fleets in the Indian 
Ocean regarding data reporting. This also presents its challenge as decisions at the 
commission are taken by the same coastal country governments that are struggling in the 
reporting of their local tuna fishing. This solution therefore remains difficult to achieve but 
industrial actors continue to advocate for such improvement both in their public discourse 
and their debate at the IOTC commission.  
5.3.6. Co-producing the discourse of unpredictability of tuna stock  
As highlighted by the three narratives above, there is an equally powerful discourse of tuna 
stock being difficult to assess in different arenas of the tuna exploitation and management. 
While it is less seen in the media compared to the overfishing discourse maintained mainly 
by local fishers, it currently drives how management measures are adopted at the national and 
regional levels. The three narratives have also highlighted processes that co-produce the 
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discourse. At the government level, the narrative is co-produced by challenging socio-
economic context of countries leading to inability to assess the stock, the simple assumption 
that regional processes will establish the state of resources, and the reliance on tuna 
exploitation as a provider of economic development. At the IOTC level, co-production is 
present as the establishment of a stock status is the result of not only the limited data supplied 
to the models but also the bureaucracy and technical constraints of IOTC members when 
establishing the stock status and adopting management measures. The narrative of the 
industrial sector relies on three elements of co-production: their perspective on the lack of 
data from other fleets and the unpredictability of the fish and its productivity. Overall, the 
discourse of tuna being difficult to assess is reproduced amongst government actors and 
industrial actors and to some extent within the scientific committee of the IOTC. While it 
ultimately leads to the ability of actors to sustain the exploitation of resources and delay the 
adoption of management measure, actors themselves have been constrained by other 
elements beyond their views and actions. Diverse considerations regarding the fish 
productivity, socio-economic contexts of tuna exploitation or the efficiency (or lack of 
efficiency) of scientific models have shaped the discourse and its reproduction amongst 
actors.  
5.4. INTERACTION BETWEEN NARRATIVES 
We can see that there is a diversity of narratives regarding the state of tuna resources in the 
WIO. While a discourse of tuna being overfished and reduction of resources is present 
amongst various actors involved in the fishery, their narratives are different according to their 
diverse interests. While local fishers and representatives of industrial fleets put the blame on 
each other for the decrease of resources, NGOs and the SC see IOTC members including 
governments and their fishing fleets as responsible for the situation and lack of management 
measures.  
The local, industrial and NGO narratives are known but not really considered at the decision-
making level regarding the fishery, may that be at the national or the regional level. This is 
made apparent with the continued practice of concluding fishing access agreements at the 
national level despite the long-term outcry of local fishers, the differentiated measures for 
different fleets adopted at IOTC despite demands of industrial fleets or the adoption of less 
stringent management measures despite the SC’s advice at the regional level. Nevertheless, 
actors such as the FPAOI or NGOs supporting local fishers attempt to increase the reach of 
their narrative at the IOTC level, which is already well received in the international media 
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and aligns with the more global discourse of overfishing and depletion of resources. Local 
fishers, expressing their views from a long-standing experience in the fishery, continue to 
claim that the government lacks consideration of their needs and the state of the resources. 
On the other hand, industrial actors such as the EU can show contradictions in their narratives 
and practices, acknowledging the existence of reduced tuna stocks and accepting to adopt 
management measures but then claiming unfairness after adoption. This situation shows that, 
under group pressure or various lobbying from backstage actors like NGOs, members to the 
IOTC can adopt measures that, when put against their national and economic interests, are 
highly challenging to implement.  
Narratives maintained by the governments in the three countries reflect the pressure from the 
economic development imperative present within tuna fisheries. While a narrative of limited 
knowledge regarding the national state of the resources is expressed, fisheries departments 
are aware of the level of catches in their waters. The narrative of overfishing maintained by 
local fishers clashes with the narrative of more or less stable exploitation sustained by the 
government regarding tuna exploitation. The positions of governments also change when it 
comes to regional discussions where government representatives of each country are also 
present and contribute to the production of knowledge on the state of the resources at the 
Indian Ocean level. The national narrative of ‘we cannot know’ is replaced by one of ‘we 
cannot be sure’ then a ‘96% probability of overfishing’ at the regional level. These three 
positions of governments show that governments’ views are strongly influenced by the 
different settings and socio-political environment that these perspectives are built and 
promoted.  
The two parallel views on the resources and the seven narratives presented above show that 
while the state of resources seem to convene around two more or less uniform stories, 
narratives of actors and interests are distinct which makes decision-making on management 
highly challenging as storylines of actors can be different at different scales.  
A common trait of the narratives of local fishers, industrial segment and governments is that 
they are produced ultimately to sustain access to the tuna resources. From the local fisher 
asking for industrial fishing to be reduced or stopped to the industrial fisher complaining 
about unfair management measures, and governments presenting a stable exploitation in 
national waters, actors with their individual interests use their version of the story of the state 
of tuna to be able to continue benefiting from the resources. NGOs in their endeavour of 
assisting countries either regarding management policy or through projects also have an 
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interest in sustaining the resources of the WIO and managing its access towards 
conservationist goals. As for the IOTC, representatives of IOTC members are bound by the 
science of models and its uncertainty when at the scientific committee while they are 
mandated to both conserve the resources and sustain access during the commission’s debates.  
5.5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION  
In this chapter on narratives, stories and ideas around the state of tuna resources have been 
explored from the perspective of different actors according to the particular context of their 
actions (Table 18). I have shown that in the WIO, the state of tuna resources is not only 
under a discourse of depleted and overfished resources. Another discourse around uncertainty 
and unpredictability of the stock is also present at the national and regional levels. The 
existence of discourses other than the one about depleted resource can be explained by the 
drive of countries and members of the IOTC to continue fishing the resources. To this is 
added the fact that the IOTC is caught up in its own political struggles – amongst members 
and its bureaucracy. This makes the management of tuna stocks impeded by elements such as 
reference numbers, uncertain models, economic and political interests.  
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Table 18: Diversity of claims and discourses regarding tuna resources in the WIO 
Using political ecology as a lens of analysis in this chapter, by dissecting contents of 
narratives and the diversity of representations that various actors have (Adger 2001; Svarstad 
2012), has allowed a multi-scalar view of competing discourses in environmental issues such 
as the case of the state of tuna resources in the WIO. The chapter has highlighted that local 
actors in the WIO have developed strong discursive claims that they use at different levels to 
contest exploitation by the industrial actors. The industrial actors, on the other hand, while 
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NGOs 
Scientific 
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the IOTC level 
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Fisheries 
departments 
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national tuna 
stocks is 
unknown but 
levels of catches 
are stable 
- Knowledge that stock 
assessments are done 
at the Indian ocean 
only 
- Formats of national 
reports only picturing 
catches 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Limited data 
available 
 
Perpetuating 
the practice of 
granting access 
to DWFNs 
IOTC scientific 
committee 
members 
It is difficult to 
predict the 
trajectory of 
tuna stocks  
- The way stock 
assessments models 
produce information 
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- Scientific language of 
lack of certainty 
- Political setting at 
IOTC meeting 
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Slow adoption 
of stringent 
management 
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Industrial 
fleets 
There is limited 
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segments and 
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experience in fishing 
- Consideration of being 
the ‘good’ ones by 
providing data 
Demand of 
stronger 
attention to 
other fleets 
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providing data that helps establish the overfished status of yellowfin tuna, have relied on 
scientific uncertainty to justify their continued exploitation of the resources. In the current 
conflict between small-scale and industrial fishing in the WIO, we have shown the presence 
of a ‘discursive power’ that is not only exercised by usual powerful actors, here the industrial 
actors. Usually considered less powerful actors, here the small-scale fishers, have built over 
the years a powerful narrative of tuna being overfished, with the support of actors such as 
NGOs and the media. 
Coming back to the framing of co-production, this chapter has shown how discourses about 
the state of tuna resources in the WIO and overfishing of the yellowfin tuna in particular are 
co-produced. They are co-produced by discursive practices but also by fishing practices, 
technical report writing and stock assessment models. Using co-production helped to explain 
the broader range of elements that constructs the diversity of views regarding the state of tuna 
resources being overfished or not in the WIO. It showed that in the end, actors’ narratives are 
not only produced by what is said or the management decisions made. At each level explored, 
it showed that there is a broader and important context that serves as a scaffolding for the 
knowledge produced regarding the tuna resources.    
Reflecting on the use of PE in this chapter, the focus was put on five actors involved in the 
use and management of tuna resources. This shed light on narratives of specific sets of actors 
namely local fishers, government officials, NGOs and industrial actors. What this chapter on 
discourses and narratives has not succeeded in doing is to analyse other narratives that are 
also relevant to tuna fisheries in the WIO. For instance, global narratives linked to tuna 
sustainability or tuna certification are currently gaining terrain in tuna fisheries, including in 
the Indian Ocean. For example, some of the purse seine fleets in the Indian Ocean claim to be 
sustainable because they have an MSC certification of some parts of their tuna catches. 
NGOs like IPNLF or WWF are questioning such claims. Overall, providing a picture of how 
the various ways discourses and narratives are produced has helped understand how actors 
justify their access to the resources and their aspiration regarding the management of tuna 
fisheries.  
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CHAPTER 6. ACCESS POLITICS AND THE WINNERS AND LOSERS 
IN THE WIO TUNA FISHERIES  
“If 3500 years of tuna history makes one thing clear, it is that where 
tuna is captured, human conflict and issues around governance are 
never far away… This law prevailed, independent of time and place.” 
(Adolf 2019:248) 
If the previous chapter has focussed on analysing the perspectives on the state of the tuna 
resources in the WIO at different levels and by different actors, I will now move to exploring 
the politics of access to tuna in the WIO. Within this next step of my political ecology 
analysis of the WIO tuna fishery, I aim to categorise the winners and losers in terms of how 
they access the resources. This follows the analysis of perspectives regarding the state of 
resources, as the former are also shaped by the types of access that actors have to the tuna 
resources. Since actors are so diverse, this chapter aims to unveil who has access to what and 
with what means and how different actors benefit from the tuna resources. To this end, the 
chapter will answer the research question: how do the politics of access to tuna resources 
shape the fishery and its management in the countries of the WIO? To respond to this 
question, I will use Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) theory of access to investigate the different 
mechanisms that actors use to access tuna resources and will bring my own contribution to 
the framework.  
The chapter will proceed as follows. I will start with a presentation of the theoretical 
framework where I discuss the theory of access and the need to integrate the concept of 
materiality which I consider important while studying a mobile resource such as tuna. The 
chapter continues by expanding the different elements of the theory of access. It first presents 
the different rights-based mechanisms applicable in tuna fisheries from the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and permit systems, to national conservation measures and 
illegal means of access. It then looks at the eight relational and structural mechanisms of 
access that Ribot and Peluso suggest to look at. This use of the theory of access will show the 
diversity of means that are available to actors fishing in the WIO but also how some 
mechanisms have key impacts on the quantity of benefits accessed in the fisheries.  
The third part of the analysis consists of unveiling the materiality infused theory of access. 
By exploring the different ways in which the materiality of tuna influences the access process 
and also becomes into-being or changes through practices, I will emphasise that an 
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exploration of access to marine mobile resources such as tuna, requires a great deal of 
attention to the spatiality of the sea and the materiality of the resources. From an exploration 
of materiality in other studies of natural resources, I will present how the concept will be 
integrated to produce an enhanced theory of access.  
In concluding sections, I start with a classical political ecology analysis of patterns of winners 
and losers in the WIO tuna fisheries. I will show that establishing such patterns requires a 
special look at national contexts, the impact of specific access mechanisms and geographical 
scale. I continue my reflection by looking back at the use of the theory of access and 
materiality, presenting the contributions and limits of the chapter.  
6.1. THE THEORY OF ACCESS AS A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
My choice of using the theory of access of Ribot and Peluso (R+P) stems from my 
observation of the diversity of actors and processes behind tuna fisheries in the WIO. By 
using access theory as proposed by R+P, I was able to highlight the differentiated way that 
tuna resources are accessed as well as show how benefits are gained or not by different 
actors. Before expanding on these results, in this section. I will present the theoretical 
foundation of my use of the theory of access and the rationale for its enhancement. I will start 
with a presentation of ‘access’ as a concept. The section continues with my interpretation of 
the original framework of R+P as applied to tuna resources. Finally, I will show, based on the 
literature, the need to improve the original theory of access.  
6.1.1. The concept of access  
Studying access requires a clarification of the term. Here it is used in the context of access to 
natural resources in the realm of environmental management. Ribot and Peluso (2003) define 
access as ‘the ability to benefit from things – including material objects, persons, institutions, 
and symbols’ (p.153). I then see access as including physical access to the resources, their 
use and the ability to gain benefits from that use. Those three elements are covered within the 
theory of access of R+P (2003) that I will mobilise in this chapter. My definition of access 
also aligns with the one used by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) who see access as ‘the right to 
enter a defined property’ and ‘the authority to enter a resource’ (p.250), here the right and 
authority to access tuna resources. To that definition, I also align to the improved definition 
proposed by (Sikor et al. 2017) reworking the conceptual framework of property regimes. 
Their definition adds ‘use rights’ as a key element of access, beyond physical access. 
Through the use of the theory of access, I also look at the benefits generated from tuna.  
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Questions of access have been discussed mainly under the framework of studies of property, 
with different regimes of property providing various types of access to the resources (Blaikie 
1989; de Janvry et al. 2001). In an open access regime, resources can be accessed without any 
restriction, with no specific rights assigned or claimed by holders (Fennell 2011). In other 
regimes, such as private, common or public property, completion of specific conditions is 
required to gain and maintain access, for example property rights or other forms of 
entitlement (Koch 2008; Ostrom 1999). In a common property regime, where common-pool 
resources such as communal forests, fishing resources or grazing areas are used by more than 
one individual or group, rules are established to control access to the resources. These rules 
can consist of limiting access to the ecosystem or limiting “the amount, timing, and 
technology used to withdraw diverse resource units from the resource system” (German and 
Keeler 2010; Ostrom 1999; Wade 1987).  
Access has also been explored beyond discussions of property regimes. The field of political 
ecology has investigated the question of discourses or the interconnection between the local 
and the global and their consequences on people’s access to natural resources. Blaikie (1985), 
in his work on soil erosion in developing countries, talked of spatial marginalisation, property 
and the role of capital and social identity in shaping access to resources. Berry (1989), 
through her work on agriculture in Africa, developed the concept of access by adding the 
complex yet key role of institutions, political and socio-economic factors in modelling 
resource access in agriculture. Later on, Peluso (1992), through her work on forest resources 
in Java, further framed the concept by integrating the implications of historical factors and 
the dynamics of power between villagers, the state and corporations in access to the 
resources. Using the concept of social capital while looking at access to resources, 
Bebbington and Perreault (1999) mentioned the existence of norms, values, networks, or 
relationships that can facilitate certain actions of actors in one structure. Using commodity 
chain as a framework, Ribot (1998), developed a ‘mapping of access’ in which he examines 
how the various benefits are obtained by different actors at different levels of resource 
exploitation, through direct access to the resources or through other channels of access. 
Regarding the access to marine resources, the ocean and its fish have been often been 
pictured as either lacking ownership or being under a problematic common property regime 
(Hawkshaw et al. 2012; Mansfield 2004). Campling & Havice (2014), in particular, 
investigated the complex question of property rights and access in industrial fisheries due to 
the social struggles that the ocean creates between the state and fishing operators. To address 
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this issue, diverse options to manage access to the ocean and its resources exist. These 
options include for example models that suggest regulating the sea by combining instruments 
like quotas or harvest seasons with the behaviour of the industry including fishing capacity, 
biological factors such as biomass level and other factors such as market changes (Homans 
1997; Homans and Wilen 2005). Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) are another example 
of tools that are used to manage access to fisheries and are designed to provide, to their 
owner, exclusive and transferable rights of a given portion of the total allowable catch of fish. 
In these examples, access is mostly managed through various types of entitlements.  
6.1.2. Ribot and Peluso’s ‘theory of access’ 
The above studies served as precursors to the work of Ribot and Peluso (2003), who propose 
a framework to theorise access. Going beyond the discussions of rights within property 
theory, they focus on the ability to benefit from resources through the social relationships 
between people and the webs of power that configure resource access. The theory consists in 
an analysis of access in three steps: (1) mapping of the flow of benefits from a resource, (2) 
identifying and situating the mechanisms used by actors to gain, control and maintain access 
and (3) analysing the political relations involved in the process. Ribot and Peluso explain the 
complementarity between the gain, control and maintenance of access: gaining access as “the 
process to establish the access”; control as “the ability to mediate others’ access and the 
power to direct others’ actions” and maintenance as “the use of resources and powers to keep 
access to the resources” (Ribot and Peluso 2003:158-159). They identified various 
mechanisms which include means, processes and relations and with which access to 
resources is gained, controlled and maintained.  
Ribot and Peluso categorise two types of access mechanisms. The first category is rights-
based access mechanism, mainly used to ‘gain benefits’ while the second category refers to 
structural and relational ones to shape and reinforce the access gained. They describe rights-
based mechanisms as those derived from law, customs or conventions which can include 
property rights. Those mechanisms can be held by one actor such as the leader of a 
community with which those willing to access the resource need to build a relationship. In 
their telling, these mechanisms also include illegal mechanisms such as the use of coercion 
and stealth to gain, control and maintain access. Structural and relational mechanisms are 
those that derive from the specific political-economic and cultural context of resource access 
and shape the questions of access itself. They present 8 mechanisms that influence access 
(Table 19).  
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Table 19: Access mechanisms in R+P’s access theory applied to tuna fisheries 
Source: Ribot and Peluso’s framework (2003), illustrated for terrestrial resources (Ribot 
1998) and tuna resources (my research). 
Category 
Role in access to the 
resources 
In the charcoal commodity 
chain (Ribot 1998) 
In tuna fisheries  
(my research) 
Rights-based mechanisms 
Law, 
conventions, 
permits, 
Provide rights-based access  
Permits, licences and quotas 
to access the resources and 
market. Forest policies to 
manage the use of resources 
The international Law of the sea, 
permits and licences, fisheries’ 
policy 
Illegal means 
Provide access by mobilising 
non-legal processes in direct 
opposition to rights-based 
access 
Threats, coercion or violence 
Piracy, illegal fishing through the 
use of prohibited equipment or 
through non-compliance to 
regulations 
Structural and relational mechanisms 
Technology 
Equipment of all sorts that 
improves access or allows 
its control 
Technical skills of 
woodcutters 
Vessels’ technology to locate and 
catch the fish 
Capital 
Finances that enable actors 
to gain and control access 
and benefits 
Financial capital of 
wholesaler in accessing large 
quantities of charcoal 
leading to monopoly 
Financial capital by fishing firms 
leading to more efficient vessels 
with more technology  
Market 
Access to markets 
influences who can benefit 
from the resources 
Control of market access by 
merchants through licences, 
permits and social ties with 
distributors, retailers and 
state agents  
Tuna both go to the international 
market, controlled by DWFNs 
through permits and rule of 
origin, and to local markets 
through fishers and 
intermediaries 
Labour 
Relations and opportunities 
that provide benefits to 
those in control and access 
to those without rights 
Labour opportunity of 
woodcutters controlled by 
merchants  
Labour opportunities to access 
the resources at fishing stage 
(controlled by industrial fishing 
companies and local boat owners) 
and at landing (controlled by 
handling companies) 
Knowledge 
Provides access through 
belief systems and by 
shaping justifications of 
access 
Technical knowledge of 
woodcutters, knowledge of 
price and demand by 
vendors to control 
distribution  
Ecological knowledge about the 
fish by local fishers, through 
technology and research. 
Knowledge of subsidies through 
social ties with the state  
Authority 
Allows the control of access 
and influences who benefits 
Power of local leaders to 
decide forest disposition 
Governments authority in 
deciding management measures 
Social 
identity 
Can provide access through 
local status or membership 
of a group 
Ethnic identity to access 
labour opportunity 
Coastal states nationals to access 
labour opportunity on foreign 
industrial vessels 
Other social 
relations 
Friendship, trust, 
reciprocity, patronage, 
dependence that can be 
used to control and 
maintain access to the 
resources, markets and 
labour opportunities 
Social ties between 
wholesalers, vendors, the 
state and merchants to 
maintain access to the 
market and control access to 
distribution 
Patronage and trust within small-
scale fishing, patronage and 
dependence at the industrial 
fishing scale 
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The theory of access presents three important and relevant ways for studying moving 
resources like tuna. First, it allows a detailed identification of actors involved, those that 
benefit or not from the resource, the ways they access and use those resources and in which 
circumstances (considering historical moment and geographical scale). As resources move 
and travel, an understanding of who has access to them, how and especially when and where 
provides clarity on the various uses of the resources by different actors. Second, through its 
rights-based mechanisms, the theory also questions the issues of gaining access through 
different types of formal or informal conventions. For moving resources this provides a 
venue to discuss questions of ownership and access to resources that are in a diverse socio-
spatial setting or do not stay in one place. Third, through its structural mechanisms, the 
theory gives attention to political-economic circumstances that may affect the access rights of 
one group or another. In the context of managing access to moving resources, structural 
mechanisms unveil the differentiated ways in which this management of access is established 
and implemented according to national and regional contexts. They also help understand how 
structural settings influence the various power relations created around the benefits gained 
from the resources. Using the theory therefore aims to explore through one framework 
questions of agency, structures and power relations in the making of access politics and 
management of the resources use. 
6.1.3. Rationale for an enhanced theory 
R+P’s theory of access has become widely used in studies of property, access, use of natural 
resources and other related topics. In early 2019, a review showed that close to 2000 
publications were using the theory as a framework (Myers and Hansen 2019). Some scholars 
have attempted to enrich the theory with social concepts such as gender and livelihoods or 
other concepts such as socio-economic disadvantage (Szaboova et al. 2019). Others have 
expanded some components of the theory like power or authority (Hall et al. 2011; Nolan 
2019; Sikor and Lund 2009). Authors have also pointed out weaknesses of the framework. 
For instance, Koch (2008) mentions the lack of precision in the distinction between rights-
based and structural mechanisms as rights-based means could also be seen as structural 
or/and relational. The same author also argues that R+P’s definition of power is confusing, 
because it does not allow a shift of the bundle of powers between individuals and does not 
provide enough theory regarding agency. More recently, in the reworking of the conceptual 
framework of property of Schlager and Ostrom (which includes access), Sikor et al. (2017) 
consider access as part of use rights and as “social actors’ ability to benefit from resources” 
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(ibid: 339).  While acknowledging the need to look at benefits from the use of resources, 
these authors emphasise the role of other types of rights such as control or authoritative rights 
which influence the benefits generated from the resources’ use. Myers and Hansen (2019) in 
their review also exposed one of the flaws of the theory as not being grounded enough within 
other related concepts such as entitlements.  
Other studies have used the framework while suggesting additions or precision to it. Neimark 
(2010), built on the theory of access to show how power, regulation and exclusion can 
influence who can benefit from resources. He looked at the different ways firms gain or 
control their access to resources by negotiating with institutions, such as NGOs or politicians, 
which are indirectly involved in the use of resources. In a further look at this actor-oriented 
approach, Neimark also used the eight structural mechanisms of access to assess the change 
in power amongst actors across environmental, social and economic dimensions during a 
surge of price in a valuable commodity (Neimark et al. 2019). He further analysed how such 
change can impact sustainability initiatives (ibid). Sikor and Lund (2009) have elaborated on 
the role of struggles over access. They discussed how struggles over access impact on the 
process of state formation and how authority and power are used to control.  Langridge et al. 
(2006) used the theory to map the access to water and link it to the construction of resilience 
to water scarcity in local communities. In addition to the social and politico-economic frame 
that the theory provides, they take environmental circumstances, notably geographic location, 
climate of a region and ecological integrity of the resource as factors that can affect access. 
Hicks and Cinner (2014) used the various mechanisms of access to assess the ecosystem 
services provided by coral reefs to fishing communities. To complete the content of the 
theory which mentions that “people and institutions are positioned differently in relation to 
resources at various historical moments and geographical scales” (Ribot and Peluso 2003: 
154), they emphasise that “context is a key determinant of how these mechanisms play out 
and whether they ultimately increase or decrease the options people have available to them” 
(Hicks and Cinner 2014: 17794).  
The above studies show that there are improvements that can be brought to the framework 
and that it can be developed and adapted according to the resources studied. Langridge et al. 
(2006), in particular, discussed the need to consider ecological factors. The access framework 
could be further strengthened by establishing a better link between the political and the 
ecological aspects. In line with these scholars that have attempted to expand the theory of 
access, the contribution of this chapter is to apply the theory to resources that move. This 
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requires giving attention to two specificities of mobile resources, in addition to the 
framework of access they are in: their materiality and spatiality. 
6.2. MECHANISMS OF ACCESS TO TUNA RESOURCES IN THE WIO  
By mobilising the classic theory of access described above, I will present how various actors 
access the resources through a mix of access mechanisms. Through the analysis of these 
mechanisms, I will be able to highlight how and why some actors benefit more from the 
resources than others.  
My use of the access mapping process differs slightly from the original three stages proposed 
by R+P. While they start by mapping the benefit(s) from the resources, my analysis will start 
by identifying the access mechanisms to the resources and analyse from there the diverse 
types of benefits and power relations generated. I chose this approach because the benefits 
from tuna fisheries go beyond just tuna resources or the revenues. I wanted to present this 
diversity in the analysis, differently from the original framework of R+P which focuses on a 
specific benefit.    
The section is structured as follows. It first analyses the rights-based access mechanisms 
under which tuna resources are accessed. From international frameworks to national 
regulations and illegal means, I will show that while the management of access has various 
legal foundations, implementation is challenging and makes the tuna available in a 
differentiated way, to the advantage – or not – of various actors. The section continues with a 
focus on six of the eight structural mechanisms of access suggested by Ribot and Peluso 
(2003). While exploring how through each mechanism various benefits are generated, I will 
also show how some mechanisms are key in creating conflicts over the resources and in 
shaping power relations.   
6.2.1. Rights-based access to tuna resources  
I will start the analysis of access mechanisms by looking at those that are based on rights. In 
R+P’s theory of access, rights-based mechanisms include the various legal frameworks and 
entitlements that establish the legal right to access the resources. Access to tuna resources in 
the WIO is determined by six types of mechanisms that intervene at the global and at the 
national scale.  
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The law of the sea: legal access established from the global level 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted by 168 countries 
in 1982, set up a system of access rights to marine resources. The UNCLOS established 
geographical boundaries for national waters which include countries’ territorial waters and an 
economic exclusive zone (EEZ). Coastal states were given full control over natural resources 
within the EEZ: the rights to access, use and manage the resources within those limits, 
determine who can have access and use rights and finally lease or sell the previously 
mentioned rights32. The convention, therefore, puts tuna resources under the control of 
coastal states when they are in the countries’ territorial waters and EEZs (Figure 7). 
Figure 7: Spatialisation of the ocean and tuna fishing by the Law of the Sea 
 
Source: Adapted from FAO 2000 
In the WIO region, the countries’ EEZs are contiguous between the islands and in the 
Mozambique Channel, but open to the high seas towards the rest of the Indian Ocean (Figure 
8). This makes the tuna subject to regulation that varies from national property (in territorial 
water) to full control of access (within the EEZs). Control from one country is lost when the 
tuna moves to the EEZ of neighbouring countries and to the high seas. The management of 
migratory resources in general is also mentioned by the UNCLOS as requiring the 
 
32 Art 56 of UNCLOS: “In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has: (a) sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-
living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other 
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the 
water, currents and winds […]” 
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cooperation of coastal states and others in order to conserve and use the resources within and 
beyond the EEZs (Article 6433). The UNCLOS has also played a key role in introducing 
external actors in the tuna fisheries of the WIO. It has allowed the access to the resources to 
DWFNs and it was also the foundation to establish the IOTC as the RFMO to manage tuna 
through cooperation, as recommended by the text. 
Figure 8: EEZs of the countries of the WIO region 
 
Source: adapted from EEZ maps within sea around us project34 
 
Fishing access agreements with DWFNS: access through bilateral negotiations 
The same convention also mentions in its article 62 that countries with a limited capacity to 
harvest their resources to the allowable catch, shall provide access to the resources in surplus 
 
33 Art 64 of UNCLOS: “The coastal state and other states whose nationals fish in the region for the highly 
migratory species listed in Annex I shall cooperate directly or through appropriate international organizations 
with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such species 
throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone. In regions for which no 
appropriate international organization exists, the coastal state and other states whose nationals harvest these 
species in the region shall cooperate to establish such an organization and participate in its work.” 
34 Available at: http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez 
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within their EEZs to other states (UNCLOS 1982)35. This provision created the possibility for 
the second type of rights-based access mechanism: bilateral fishing access agreements 
between host countries and Distant Water Fleets Nations (DWFNs). In the Western Indian 
Ocean, those are mainly Spain, France, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Spain and France are 
often treated together under a European Union agreement called Sustainable Fisheries 
Partnership Agreement – SFPA. These agreements determine the modalities of access to the 
fishing grounds of tuna within the EEZ. They include for example the number of vessels that 
can be licenced to access the EEZ of the country, the area that is accessible, the tuna species 
that can be fished and other fishing conditions such as the obligation to have satellite devices 
on-board. They also set fees to be paid in exchange for access. In the case of SFPAs, a part of 
this contribution is to be dedicated to the improvement of fisheries policies in the host 
countries. A summary of agreements between the EU and the three countries studied that 
were active in 2018 is provided in Table 20. The EU agreements are publicly available 
whereas the Asian agreements are confidential and cannot be publicly accessed.  
Table 20: Summary of SFPAs between the EU and the three countries as of 2018 
Country 
Start date 
Expiry date 
Total EU contribution 
(p.a) 
Sectorial 
support per 
year 
Reference 
tonnage 
Vessels licenced 
Seiners Longliners 
Madagascar 
01.01.2015 
31.12.2018 
1 566 250 € in 
2015/2016 to 
1 487 500 € in 
2017/2018 
700 000 € 
15 750 t./year 40 54 
 Mauritius 
08.12.2017 
07.12.2021 
575 000 € 220 000 €  
4 000 t./year 
40 45 
Seychelles 
18.01.2014 
17.1.2020 
5 350 000 € in 2014 
To 5 000 000 in 2019 
2 600 000 € 
 
50.000 t./year 
 
40 6 
Source: European Union website of bilateral agreements 36 
Three elements are worth clarifying from the above table. First, regarding the financial 
contribution, around half of the annual financial contribution of the agreements are dedicated 
to sectorial support. This part of the access fee provides funding for diverse fisheries 
development activities in the host countries (as developed in Chapter 7). The rest of the 
 
35 Article 62 of UNCLOS: “Where the coastal state does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable 
catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions, laws and 
regulations referred to in paragraph 4, give other states access to the surplus of the allowable catch”  
36 EU database of fishing access agreements: https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements_en 
Accessed February 20th, 2018 
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access fee enters directly into the countries’ national budgets. Second, the reference tonnage 
does not represent a quota but a rather an approximation of annual catch by the fleets (MD 
02). Every ship owner is required to pay from 60 to 70 Euros per tonne effectively caught. 
Third, the number of vessels authorised to fish in the EEZs of countries is not always the 
number of the vessels effectively fishing. In the year of 2015 for example, despite there being 
around 150 EU vessels licensed to fish in the WIO, the number of EU vessels effectively 
fishing was 26 in the waters of Madagascar and 31 in the Seychelles (USTA 2017, SFA 
2016).  There were around 25 EU boats in the waters of Mauritius between July 2016 and 
June 2017 (GoMU 2017). 
Fishing access agreements have often been criticised for their lack of sustainability, equity 
and transparency (Gagern and van den Bergh 2013; Le Manach et al. 2013). They also 
constitute a conundrum from a coastal state perspective for two reasons. First, negotiations of 
such agreements are highly geopolitical. Coastal states often have lower capacity of 
negotiation and are beholden to DWFNs as providers of development aid (as developed in 
Chapter 7). Second, states often struggle regarding the setting of the appropriate rent as they 
are put in the challenging position of managing influences from DWFNs and the global 
production dynamics along with handling the national pressure to distribute the benefits of 
the tuna fishery (Barclay and Cartright 2007; Campling and Havice 2014). Access to tuna in 
countries’ EEZs via fishing agreements is therefore an arena shaped by competing powerful 
political and economic interests (Barclay & Catwright 2007; Schurman 1998). Negotiations 
of fishing access agreements can be linked to economic national necessities that can influence 
government officials when providing access to the resources. In terms of management of tuna 
fisheries, the establishment of fishing access agreements also set challenges for coastal states 
especially developing ones with limited means of monitoring, control and surveillance. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, government often rely on good faith of foreign fishing fleet to submit 
data regarding the monitoring of catch. Furthermore, surveillance of fishing activities within 
the entire EEZs cannot always be ensured and risk of illegal fishing activities remain high. 
While there is an economic rationale behind the conclusion of these agreements, their 
implementation in terms of management can be problematic especially for developing coastal 
countries like Madagascar. 
Intra-regional fishing access agreements: access through flagging and reciprocity 
A second, less known type of fishing agreement takes place between countries of the region. 
Mauritius and the Seychelles for example have established fishing agreements since the 
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1990s. These agreements allow reciprocity in terms of fishing grounds, in that specifically 
licenced boats from each country may access both EEZs. For the agreement signed in 2017 
for two years, 25 fishing boats (including purse seiners and longliners) from both countries 
were to operate in the EEZs of both countries at a fee of $110,000/$30,000 per purse 
seiner/longliner per year to be paid by Mauritius and $30,000/$24,000 per purse 
seiner/longliner per year to be paid by Seychelles (Seychelles Nation 2017). Considering that 
neither of the two countries have national industrial purse seiners and they both have a 
limited number of national longliners (SFA 2016, GoMU 2017), it can be concluded that the 
agreements cover boats that are foreign-owned but flagged to one or the other country. Some 
foreign operators in the WIO region, mainly Spanish, French and Taiwanese, flag their boats 
in Mauritius or Seychelles against a flagging fee. This bilateral yet multi-faceted agreement 
brings another type of legal access: the flagging of vessels. Such flagging transactions allow 
foreign owned vessels to be counted as part of the national fleet and thus eligible under 
bilateral agreements outside the main EU agreements as presented above. While considered 
beneficial by coastal states, the process of flagging actually extends the sovereignty of 
DWFNs over the tuna resources of the WIO while being a strategy to operate within opaque 
taxation structures and lower labour standards (Campling and Colás 2017). Access by foreign 
nations can therefore be gained through inter-coastal states negotiations and not only through 
a bilateral agreement between the foreign nations and the coastal country. Bilateral 
agreements and flagging are two facetted when it comes to the management of tuna fisheries. 
In cases where fleets are flagged to the coastal countries, monitoring of catch and reporting 
including to the IOTC are under the responsibility of the flag state. This can contribute to the 
building of knowledge regarding the tuna resources in the region. On the other hand, these 
operations can also blur the actual fishing effort by various members of the IOTC. Flag states 
like Mauritius and Seychelles are in reality contributing to the fishing effort of European and 
Asian fleets. As it will be discussed in Chapter 7, this has an impact on the implementation of 
IOTC management measures.  
Licensing system: control of access within territorial waters and the EEZ 
In the three countries studied, access to the resources by national operators in national waters 
– including the territorial waters and the EEZ, relies on a licencing system. Licences to be 
obtained depend on the types of fishing that is undertaken and the final market of the catch, 
either for the local market or export (Table 21). It can range from fisher’s card to various 
permits and agreements (GoMA 2015; GoMU 2007; GoS 2014).  
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Table 21: Different types of permits to access the fishery and sell the catch 
  Madagascar Mauritius Seychelles Geographical coverage 
Artisanal/ 
subsistence 
Fisher’s card Fisher’s card Territorial waters 
Boat licence 
Local semi-
industrial 
Fishing access 
agreement 
Fishing permit Territorial waters and 
the EEZ 
Boat licence Boat licence 
Selling to local 
market 
Selling permit for fishers 
Within the country 
Collection and selling permit for intermediaries 
Exporting Exporting permit for fishers or processing companies 
Various countries 
abroad 
This licencing system has diverse consequences. In Madagascar for example, considering the 
important number of coastal communities and limited means of the fisheries department, this 
licencing system often does not cover the entire fishing activity of local fishers. This situation 
prevents the fisheries department from evaluating the extent of artisanal fisheries’ catch 
including tuna. It, therefore, makes it difficult for the government to assess the status of the 
coastal stock of tuna, with the perverse result that tuna fishing by local fishers is considered 
negligible. This is also due to the low quantity of catch attributed to the small-scale fishery 
that is officially recorded. When interviewing government officials, common phrases by 
government officials were “artisanal fishers do not really catch tuna here” (MD 50) or “it is a 
very small catch” (MD 04). When asked about this situation, local fishers often respond that 
they do not trust or rely on the state. Licencing is perceived as a way to control local fishers 
and penalise them when possible. One fisher said “The small-scale fisherman is independent. 
He comes and goes whenever he wants. The state only sees and considers the fishermen 
when it is the period of fisheries closure and they want to prosecute us. The small-scale 
fisherman cannot depend on the state.” (MD 59). Another fisher said “There are problems 
with the state but there is no real solution, we are not consulted for the measures they take.” 
(MD 25).  
In more developed countries like Seychelles and Mauritius, registered fishers receive 
subsidies for their activities and have an interest in registering as a fisher (Table 22). When 
asked about the licences that they need to have for fishing, fishers of the Seychelles proudly 
say “of course” (MU 04; SE 60). Fishers have therefore a high interest in being registered as 
a fisher to be able to access support from the state. 
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Table 22: Types of subsidies available to fishers in Mauritius and the Seychelles 
Mauritius Seychelles 
Allowances (Bad weather, closed season, sick leave) 
Buy-back scheme for nets 
Loan and grant schemes on boats 
Fuel Incentive Scheme 
Sickness Benefit Scheme 
Loan and concession on equipment  
The licensing systems in place within the WIO are currently the policy tools that help coastal 
countries manage their tuna fisheries in the territorial waters and in the EEZ. In more 
developed islands like Mauritius and Seychelles, they have allowed a monitoring of catch and 
effort in the different segments of the fishery. They have also helped the process of marine 
spatial planning for the case of Seychelles. In a developing country like Madagascar, the 
government is still in the process of establishing the extent of fishing activities in the national 
waters. Knowledge about small-scale and artisanal tuna fisheries in particular is still at its 
infancy.  
Conservation measures as regulating access to fishing grounds 
Rights-based access mechanisms also include formal restrictions to access for conservation 
and other purposes, including no-take zones from marine protected areas, fisheries closures, 
prohibition of some types of gear, or local conventions between community members. 
Various studies have explored the question of restriction of access through such mechanisms 
(Barley Kincaid et al. 2014; Bennett and Dearden 2014; Walker and Robinson 2009) that will 
not be developed here; however, what will be discussed is how tuna fits within these forms of 
regulation.  
In the three countries studied, tuna is not subject to any period of closures nor considered as a 
species for priority conservation, the reasons being that most tuna is caught further from the 
coast and their movement combined with seasonality make it difficult to establish a closure. 
Setting up closures, marine protected areas or locally-managed marine areas (LMMAs) are 
also often initiatives that emanate either from the state or from NGOs promoting local 
management or the conservation of specific species. In the WIO, tuna has not received 
conservation interest yet at national levels. Considering the movement of tuna, enforcement 
of conservation measures also entails monitoring the entire EEZs, which requires substantial 
investment for coastal states in control and surveillance.  
The case of sedentary tunas (such as bonitos) can, however, be mentioned as they are present 
close to the coast and could be present in marine protected areas and LMMAs, hence having 
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their access limited. In Madagascar and Mauritius, marine protected areas were not 
mentioned by fishers I interviewed as a major obstacle to their fishing because their fishing 
grounds were not close to MPAs (MD 51, MU 18).  Marine protected areas in Madagascar 
for example focus on restricting access to species such as sharks, sea cucumber, lobster and 
cetaceans (Cripps and Gardner 2016; Francis et al. 2002).  They do not mention tunas even 
though MPA restrictions apply to them too. Madagascar has also developed many local 
conventions in managing its marine resources within LMMAs. However, while it has 
restrictions on species such as octopus, crabs and sea cucumbers, these restrictions do not 
address big pelagic species like tuna (MD 80, 81). In the Seychelles, however, news about an 
upcoming large new MPA raised concerned amongst fishers as a threat to access to tuna 
grounds (SE 29, 47, 48).  
Beyond national waters, IOTC members including the three countries studied have also 
adopted measures that aim at improving the management of tuna fisheries including by 
managing access to the tunas. As an example, since 2016, the commission adopted and 
updates yearly the rebuilding plan for the overfished yellowfin tuna, assigning catch limits 
for different gears and setting measures in case of over catch (IOTC 2017b, 2019). The 
different levels of reduction of catches, as seen in Chapter 5, included 15% reduction from 
2014 levels for purse seiners, 10% reduction for longliners, 10% for gillnets and 5% for other 
gears (IOTC 2016c). As seen in Chapter 5, managing access to the resources by limiting 
catches has proven challenging especially as it requires a robust monitoring of catches that 
IOTC member parties have not yet managed to establish.  
IUU fishing as granting access to the resources through contravening rights-based 
structures  
Ribot and Peluso also discuss illegal access through coercion as a mechanism. In the field of 
fisheries, IUU fishing includes illegal fishing – as activities contravening existing laws and 
regulations, Underreported – fishing that has not been reported, or has been misreported, and 
Under-regulated – fishing undertaken in contravention of management measures and 
procedures or in areas with no management measures (FAO 2001). In the WIO for example, 
it has been estimated that 400 million USD in revenue is lost by countries due to IUU fishing 
(IOC 2017). With tuna being one of the key species affected by this issue. During my 
interviews questioning access, I have gathered actors’ views by questioning only about illegal 
fishing as fishing “without the permission of the state, or in contravention of its laws and 
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regulations” (ibid). This illegal fishing is, however, perceived differently depending on the 
positionality of the actors and often includes the other components of IUU fishing.  
From a governmental perspective, what is considered illegal tuna fishing falls between illegal 
and unregulated fishing. It takes the form of unlicensed boats that are fishing in the EEZ or 
licenced boats that are not fulfilling the conditions of fishing in their access agreements for 
example by turning off their mandatory satellite apparatus. According to regional inspectors 
(MD 37, SE 31), in the WIO region, those practices have largely decreased mainly due to a 
regional monitoring system led by the countries of the region, managed by the IOC (IOC 
2015d). I discuss this further in Chapter 7.  
NGOs working on the subject have also documented transhipment of tuna at sea, a practice 
that is illegal. Greenpeace for example has campaigned in the Indian Ocean for many years to 
stop this practice. For NGOs, illegal fishing is considered to be an important mechanism of 
access to the resources that impedes on the access to resources by small-scale fishers and 
affect sustainability. This is illustrated for example in various documentaries that have 
uncovered illegal fishing practices in the Indian Ocean (see for example ‘Tuna War’ in 2013 
or ‘Cash Investigation’ in 2018 – described in footnotes 29 and 31). 
For artisanal fishers, illegal tuna fishing is mainly big boats that they see at the horizon that 
they think are illegally fishing as they are fishing too close to the coastline. When asked 
about the details, not all of them were sure about the illegality of the fishing as some of them 
could be licenced foreign vessels. Fishers make statements such as “there is illegal fishing. 
We do not know who they are but they come too close to the coast to be legal boats” (MD 
06) or “there are big boats that do illegal fishing in our waters, they come close to the coasts 
at night” (MU 06, 11, 25). This perception of illegal fishing by artisanal fishers exacerbates 
the issue of fishing access agreements raised above as it is seen by fishing communities as an 
illegitimate access to the resources.  
Illegal fishing is certainly a way to access tuna resources in the WIO at the margins of official 
regulated access. While opinions differ as to its scale, at least two sets of actors, NGOs and 
artisanal fishers accuse industrial vessels of being involved in this practice.  
To conclude this section, rights-based access mechanisms in tuna fisheries of the WIO region 
cover a broad range of mechanisms from international laws to national regulations to illegal 
practices at the margins of those regulations. Tuna resources are governed by multiple 
frameworks of access established at multiple levels of governance. These frameworks also 
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influence the power and negotiation leverage of fishery actors, with a strong historical place 
given to the DWFNs who legally gained access to tuna resources in coastal countries waters 
through UNCLOS and subsequently fishing access agreements. They also set the multiple 
uses and intrinsic values of tuna in the different national contexts. Tuna is an instrument of 
fishing reciprocity between countries, a species with limited conservation priority while also 
being a widely regulated and high value commodity. This diversity of what tuna represents 
mainly shapes the way how access and benefits from the resources are gained. The extent to 
which this access is maintained and these benefits sustained is influenced by relational and 
structural mechanisms of access.     
6.2.2. Relational and structural means of access to tuna resources  
I now move to structural mechanisms, which reinforce access and shape “how benefits are 
gained, controlled, and maintained” (Ribot and Peluso 2003: 162). While R+P explore eight 
structural mechanisms in their framework, I will focus here on six of them that play an 
important role in shaping access in the case of tuna and also generate a diversity of benefits. I 
will start with three mechanisms that directly improve access to the tuna resources – 
knowledge, technology and capital; then continue with three others that help maintain and 
control access to the resources as well as influence the types of benefits generated from the 
resources – market, labour opportunities and state authority. These six structural mechanisms 
are key as they highlight the differences within the segments of the fishery and they also shed 
light on indirect actors and socio-economic factors influencing access and benefits from the 
resources. Two mechanisms in R+P framework, social identity and other social relations, 
were not directly addressed in this thesis as they required a deeper investigation of actors’ 
relationships at a specific level, especially locally. This was not feasible due to time 
constraints and as my focus on covering relevant sites.    
Knowledge: knowing the tuna and the fishery to gain benefits 
The category of “knowledge” as a structural and relation means of access include 
components such as beliefs, ideological control, discursive practices or systems of meaning 
(Ribot and Peluso 2003). In this section, I will discuss two types of knowledge that are based 
mainly on experience but also on local beliefs and technology. This knowledge has an impact 
on the quantity of fish gained but also on perceptions regarding the tuna resources and access.  
The first type of knowledge is about the tuna itself and about tuna fishing practices. This 
knowledge is held by fishers and produced through long-standing experience in the fishing 
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activity. This knowledge is generated differently between the small-scale and industrial 
fishers and is key in determining where the tuna is but also what species is there to be fished 
at which period of the year. The mobilisation of this knowledge also shapes narratives and 
discourses of access to tuna grounds in the WIO. 
At the local level, such knowledge is key for fishers to access tuna and is transmitted through 
oral history and storytelling among fishers and through generations of fishers. In the recent 
years, academic scholars and fisheries managers have increasingly recognised the importance 
of local knowledge of fishers. While originally undermined in fisheries management (Gordon 
1954), fishers’ knowledge is now seen as contributing to a better management of fisheries 
through local rules and institutions in place as well as providing key information regarding 
the socio-ecological state of marine resources and ecosystems (Robinson et al. 2014; St. 
Martin et al. 2007). 
For artisanal and semi-industrial fishers, interviews with those involved in the fishing 
between five and twenty years highlighted a rich knowledge, often transferred between 
generations regarding the biophysical characteristics of the resources or the optimal 
conditions for fishing tuna, including the seasons, the warmth of water preferred by tuna, the 
area and distance where the tuna can be found (Table 23).  
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Table 23: Types of knowledge, context of knowledge production and sample of quotes 
T
yp
e
 
Context of production Sample of quotes 
Lo
ca
ti
o
n
 o
f 
tu
n
a
 f
is
h
in
g
 g
ro
u
n
d
s 
• Long-standing experience 
in fishing in the same 
place 
• Place-based knowledge of 
the geography of the coast 
and the sea 
• Relying on technology 
available  
• Interpersonal and 
intergenerational transfer 
“the tuna is located at a place called Ampasinjoby, just outside the 
Bay” Fisher in Ramena (MD 13) 
“we go 30 to 50km from the coast, we go East in the canal” Fisher 
in Ramena  (MD 22, with similar comments by 57,64) 
“to fish tuna we go 200km around the St André Cap.” Fisher in 
Majunga (MD 51, 68)   
“we have to go between 5 and 12 NM to find tuna” Fishers in 
Mauritius (MU 06, with similar comments by 15, 24, 25, 31) 
“during the day tuna like cooler waters in the deep” Fisher in 
Mauritius (MU 04) 
“we can find tuna around the Mahe plateau, as close as 25NM to 
70-100 NM around Bird Islands” (SE 04, with similar comments by 
SE 07, 09, 10, 25, 26, 28, 34, 43) 
Se
as
o
n
a
lit
y 
o
f 
th
e
 f
is
h
 
• Prediction of presence of 
different tunas associated 
with seasons 
• Empirical and historical 
knowledge of climate 
patterns 
• Oral transmission of tuna 
seasons amongst fishers 
and through generations 
 
 
“the dry season is when the tuna is most abundant” Tuna fisher in 
Antsiranana (MD 12, with similar comments by MD 13, 20, 22) 
“if the summer has a lot of rain, then the dry season would be full 
of tuna” Fishers in Antsiranana (MD 27, with similar comments by 
MD 28, 35) 
“tuna is around in the Spring from April until around October” 
Fishers in Mauritius (MD 51, with similar comments by MD 56, 58, 
64, 67) 
“yellowfin and skipjack can be caught between March and April 
and Albacore during November and December” Fishers in 
Mauritius (MU 05, with similar comments by MU 10, 11, 15, 18, 
20) 
“all year long there is tuna of about 5 to 10 kg, in the winter you 
have big tuna of 15 to 25 kg and in the summer you can get tuna of 
40 to 100 kg” (MU 31) 
“you can catch yellowfin and skipjack in the winter and Albacore in 
the Summer” Fishers of Mauritius (MU 13, with similar comments 
by MU 24, 25, 40) 
“There is yellowfin tuna when there is the Southeast monsoon, 
between April and October” Fishers in the Seychelles (SE 03, with 
similar comments 04, 09, 24, 46) 
“bonitos and small tunas are found all year round” Fishers in the 
Seychelles (SE 03) 
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• Experience in fishing the 
whole year 
• Local belief of tuna as an 
unpredictable gift from 
nature    
• Empirical knowledge on 
the evolution of catch 
“you do not systematically catch tuna, it travels to the East and we 
follow them” Fisher in Antsiranana (MD 14) 
“you cannot catch it every day, the creator ‘Zanahary’ gives or not” 
Fisher in Antsiranana (MD 20) 
“tuna is a traveller, it travels a lot from here to the East” Fishers in 
Antsiranana (MD 25, with similar comments by MD 29, 31) 
“most of the tuna is fished in the South West because the fish like 
the lagoon, the heat of the sunset of this zone.” Former fisher in 
Mauritius (MU 02) 
“big tuna is only caught by chance, you need to go far to find it” 
Fisher in the Seychelles (SE 07) 
Source: Quotes of artisanal fishers in Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles about tuna (translated 
from Malagasy, Creole and French for the case of Madagascar and Mauritius) 
Through this local knowledge anchored in experience, beliefs, oral history of fishing and to 
some extent technology, local fishers have accessed tuna through the years and generations in 
different places and at specific seasons. However, this richness has been contained within 
national or even local borders. In Madagascar for example, there are very little exchanges on 
tuna fishing practices between fishers from different areas, due mainly to the distances 
between fishing sites. At country levels and the regional Indian Ocean level, there is little 
visibility of this wealth of local knowledge about the tuna resources. This is illustrated by the 
industrial segment often claiming that there is very little known about local tuna fishing 
especially the extent and impacts of the fishing.  
In the special case of the Seychelles semi-industrial fishing where the crew is mainly 
composed of Sri Lankans, knowledge regarding tuna fishing is mainly produced by the Sri 
Lankan crew. Considered as better seafarers for tuna, boat owners talk of their Sri Lankan 
crew members as knowing where and how to fish tuna better than Seychellois. Boat owners 
(often former artisanal Seychellois fishers) make statements such as “they look at the moon 
and know where the fish is going” (SE 42) or “they – the Sri Lankans – have fished tuna for 
many years in their country, their fishing technique is better, the catch is better with them 
fishing” (SE 13, with similar comments by SE 35, SE 60). This integration of other WIO 
nationals within the Seychelles’ tuna fishing is seen by boat owners as improving their access 
to the resources and the amount of tuna that is caught, leading to more financial revenue.   
In the industrial sector, there is an extensive knowledge regarding the tuna as well as the most 
recent and efficient ways of fishing. Regarding tuna’s localisation and their biological 
characteristics, knowledge is produced through numerous channels. There is first the 
experience of fishers. Some Spanish captains of European purse seiners have been fishing in 
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the region between five and ten years (MD 44, 45), accumulating knowledge about the 
migration pattern of tuna in the WIO. Considering that foreign fleets have been present in the 
WIO since the 1980s, knowledge about fishing in the region has also been transmitted within 
fleets over the years mainly through accumulation of data on board. Second, technology also 
plays a key role in the production of knowledge regarding tuna. Vessels are equipped with 
various radars and screens that indicate where the fish is located from buoys and Fish 
Aggregating Devices (FADs) that have been placed during previous fishing trips. This 
equipment provides key information that hugely facilitates access to the resource. Finally, 
knowledge is also generated through research that specifically aims to understand patterns of 
fisheries in the region. This is mainly undertaken by research institute of DWFNs fishing in 
the WIO region. The European fleets for example have access to their home countries’ 
research institutes, observers on board and specific research activities that are dedicated to 
produce knowledge based on catch data, tuna behaviours and fishing practices of fleets. The 
knowledge produced is then shared with fleets and managers of the fisheries, via the 
shipowner associations or the country representatives negotiating at the regional management 
meetings of the IOTC. Those research institutes are often based in the host countries: the 
French Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD) and the Spanish Instituto Español 
de Oceanografía (IEO). This large array of means that DWFNs maintain to produce 
knowledge implies a much-improved access to the resources.  
The high availability of knowledge production raises the issue of equity between artisanal 
and industrial fishery as well as the power of knowledge that is held by foreign fleets 
compared to national and especially local ones. Fishing associations of artisanal fishers claim 
that industrial boats would know exactly where the fish is and the quantity available before 
they even leave the port. A member of the FBOA vigorously argued that “there is a 
substantive problem regarding access to the tuna as the purse seiners, before leaving the port, 
already appropriate the fish” (SE 29) or that “research on tuna is mostly funded by the 
industry, means that are not available to local fishers” (SE 47). Artisanal fishers in the region 
strongly perceive this access to knowledge (produced through experience, technology and via 
scientific research agencies) as unbalanced, giving the industrial segment an unfair advantage 
by gaining an improved access to the tuna resources. The industrial segment, on the other 
hand, argues that this production of knowledge also benefits the region notably through the 
various reports that fleets have to submit either to the fisheries department or to the IOTC (as 
seen in Section 5.3.3.).  
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The second type of knowledge is contextual to the fishery including the state of resources and 
fishing activities in the region. This knowledge is produced by indirect actors in the fisheries, 
such as associations or NGOs, through knowledge sharing activities or communication 
materials. In Mauritius and the Seychelles, fishers’ associations represent a forum that allows 
fishers to share their knowledge on fishing techniques and state of the resources or obtain 
knowledge from others about the tuna. In the Seychelles for example, the Fishing Boat 
Owners Association (FBOA) serves as an interface to inform fishers about the state of the 
resources in the Indian Ocean that is produced by the IOTC assessments. Similarly, it also 
tries to enhance the capacity of its members on tuna fishing through workshops and training 
that are organised in the region. For instance, in February 2018, tuna fishers took part in a 
workshop on improving the value of small-scale tuna fisheries in the WIO (IOC 2018b). 
In the WIO region, NGOs and the media also play a non-negligible role in producing 
knowledge regarding tuna fisheries. WWF for example produced various reports presenting 
the value of tuna fisheries for the WIO region, its economic contribution to coastal countries 
or the state of various species in the region (Barnes and Mfodwo 2012; Obura et al. 2017; 
WWF 2015). While such knowledge is not used to access tunas directly, they are used by 
fisheries managers such as fisheries departments as background information for their 
decision-making regarding management of access. Another NGO that is active in the region 
is Greenpeace. The NGO has long campaigned in the Indian Ocean regarding illegal fishing 
or the reduction of marine resources including tuna (see, for example the documentary tuna 
war, mentioned above). In Mauritius and the Seychelles, the state of tuna resources has been 
documented by the NGO and shared with artisanal fishers, often also interviewed in their 
campaigns (this was the case for example for MU 25). In the Seychelles, where the tuna 
fishery is central to the economy, the media and especially the written press plays an 
important role in sharing knowledge regarding tuna fisheries mainly regarding the decrease 
of tunas, new actors in the fishery and legislation affecting the tuna fishery sector (Marivel 
2017a; Nation 1990). This knowledge influences local perspectives regarding the fishery and 
is also mobilised by the state to disseminate policies and management measures including 
regarding access. During my daily encounters with locals in the Seychelles, they were, 
through the media, aware of the tuna situation or knew about the existence of negotiation of 
access by foreign fleets.   
This second type of knowledge, while produced by indirect actors in the fishery, plays a 
significant role in shaping discursive practices regarding tuna fisheries in the WIO. The 
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perception of local fishers about the reduction of tuna available or the perceived unequal 
benefits that the different segments of the fishery gain are based not only by experiential 
knowledge but also by this contextual knowledge that is produced on the fishery. This 
reinforces local views regarding how access is currently managed in the region and how 
actors benefit or not from the fish.     
This diversity of knowledge produced surrounding the WIO tuna fisheries has fuelled the 
strong discourses from both segments of the fishery. There is also a multiplicity of views on 
how each segment uses this knowledge to access tuna and influences the quantity of fish 
available. The two segments of the fishery would claim either a lack of knowledge (claimed 
by the industrial actors, about local fishing activities) which prevents an adequate 
management or an excess of knowledge (claimed by local fishers, about industrial fishing) 
which leads to an excessive access to the resources. These discourses shape access to tuna in 
the WIO region through the management needs they convey at the national and regional 
levels.  The artisanal segment carries a discourse of unbalanced access to the resources. This 
is supported by indirect actors such as NGOs which often put pressure on national 
governments to improve the management of access by DWFNs in national waters and at 
negotiations at the IOTC levels. The industrial segment, on the other hand, hides behind the 
discourse of insufficient knowledge about local fishing activities and the opacity of artisanal 
catch data to divert attention from their own activities at management discussions at the 
regional level. In discussions of total allowable catches and stock assessments, reports have 
each time requested that more attention is given to the catch from the artisanal fishery (IOTC 
2017a). Management of access to the resources are then significantly shaped by how the 
knowledge about tuna fisheries is mobilised at different levels.  
Technology: a key determinant to the amount of tuna accessed 
The discussion above of knowledge has already indicated that technology plays a crucial role 
in access to the resource in the WIO. The evolution of technology after World War II has 
been well documented as the main factor behind a drastic increase in fish catch and an 
improvement of efficiency in fishing techniques (Pauly & Le Manach 2012; Sumaila, 
Bellmann, et al. 2016). For tuna fisheries, technology has brought more powerful vessels, a 
diversification of fishing strategies and especially highly efficient fish detection devices 
(Torres-Irineo et al. 2014). Similar to the availability of knowledge, the amount of 
technology available in the two segments of the fishery varies considerably and impacts the 
quantity of fish that can be accessed.  
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In the artisanal fishery, tuna is fished with wooden boats of 2m to 8m in Madagascar 
(Illustration 8) and motorised fibreglass boats of 5m to 8m in Mauritius and the Seychelles. 
Fishing techniques consist mainly in hand line and trolling (Described in Appendix 4). GPS 
devices are also used by fishers to locate the fish in Mauritius where the fisheries department 
has installed fish aggregating devices around the lagoon to attract offshore species. The tuna 
catch of this sector is not entirely known, as most fishers in the three countries studied other 
species of fish as well and reporting is not systematic.  
Illustration 8: Artisanal boat used for tuna fishing in Ramena, north of Madagascar 
  
Photo by the author 
In the semi-industrial fishery, vessels are around 24m long (Illustration 9) and the technique 
used is longline: a couple of lines with around a thousand hooks on each. GPS devices are 
also used as well as long view binoculars. In the three countries studied, the semi-industrial 
fleet provides a limited catch not exceeding 500 tons a year, with the exception of the 
Seychelles in recent years where catches in this segment have been reaching 1000 tons in 
2017 (GoMU 2017; SFA 2016; USTA 2017).  
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Illustration 9: Semi-industrial tuna boat in Victoria, Seychelles 
  
Photo by the author 
In the industrial fishery, which has the largest catch in the WIO, operators have large vessels 
up to 70m in length and with two distinct fishing techniques: longline or purse seine (a large 
net that encircles the tuna schools) (Illustration 10). Two technologies have highly increased 
the catch of industrial fishing in the past ten years in the WIO region: one is Fish Aggregating 
Devices (FADs). FADs are man-made floating objects used to attract fish. They can be 
anchored (consisting of a float, mooring line, anchor and some type of underwater 
structure/attractant) or drifting (that can be made of a floating structure such as bamboo raft 
or using naturally occurring floating objects such as logs). They are accompanied by locating 
buoys and sometimes an echo sounder that can predict biomass (Dagorn et al. 2013; PEW 
2011) (Illustration 11). The numbers of FADs deployed in the IO had no limitation until 
2016 (IOTC 2017a). The second technological advance in the IO is the use of support 
vessels, or vessels that help to locate the tuna and supply fuel to the tuna vessel.  
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Illustration 10: Head of a Spanish purse seiner landing in the Seychelles 
 
Photo by the author 
 
Illustration 11: Sample of tracking device for FADs on a Spanish purse seiner 
 
Photo by the author 
The role of technology in shaping access to tunas lies in the fact that the amount of fish 
extracted depends on the technology that is used. Artisanal fishers with limited assistance 
from the state like in Madagascar can fish a very limited amount of tuna. In Mauritius and the 
Seychelles, artisanal fishers receive assistance in the form of loans to buy boats, or can access 
more productive waters due to FADs installed by the fisheries departments. In the small-scale 
fishery, being registered as a fisher through licences is the key condition to access financial 
support such as interest-free loans to buy gear and boats.  
For the semi-industrial segment, Mauritius has for example launched a campaign in 2017 led 
by the fisheries department to help fishers buy semi-industrial boats in the form of half-loan 
by the Mauritian Bank and a grant by the state (up to 4 million rupees). The conditions were 
that fishers would need to be part of an officially registered fishing cooperative. Five 
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cooperatives out of 11 applications received this financial support in 2017 (GoMU 2017). In 
the Seychelles, loans to purchase semi-industrial boats have been encouraged in the past 5 
years. The number of semi-industrial boats has increased from 4 in 2006 to 21 in 2016 (SFA 
2016). Financial solvency of the investors was the main criteria for accessing loans (SE 60).   
Similarly, in the industrial fishery and especially for foreign fleets, investment in technology 
is high and state subsidies are available to ship owners. A global study of subsidies estimates 
that around 20 billion USD was invested solely in 2009 by developed countries in capacity-
enhancing subsidies, with around 5 billion USD by the EU and 3.5 billion USD by Japan 
(Sumaila, Lam, et al. 2016). Those include subsidies for boat construction, renewal and 
modernisation programs or tax exemption through fuel subsidies. 
As an illustration, the EU has a fund that helps its member states fund projects linked to 
fisheries. The types of projects funded evolve with the change of the European Common 
Fishery Policy but include adjustment of the fleet, aquaculture, processing and marketing, 
inland fishing, and development of fisheries areas or technical assistance to fund 
administration (Table 24). Subsidies from these funds are managed by individual countries, 
which agree to an operational programme with the central EU administration, according to 
some basic principles and procedures by Council regulation, and then set up their criteria and 
requirements to access the funds.  
Table 24: History of EU funds available for EU fleets covering technology 
EU fisheries funds Projects line – linked to technology 
Financial instrument for 
fisheries guidance (FIFG) 
1994-2006  
EUR 3.7 billion 
• Renewal of the fleet (such as the building of new boats) 
• Modernisation of the existing boats (through fishing gear, safety, 
new radar)   
A total of EUR 829.16 million (Ex-post evaluation of the 1994-2006 FIFG) 
European fisheries fund (EFF) 
2007-2013  
EUR 4.3 billion 
• adjustment of the fleet (e.g. to support scrapping of fishing vessels, 
selective gears replacement of engines for energy efficiency) 
(European Fisheries Fund factsheet 2006) 
A total of EUR 91.5 million used under the fund [and individual countries 
contributed to an additional total amount of 408.5 million for fleet 
investments] (Ex-post evaluation of the 2016 EFF) 
European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund (EMFF) 2014-
2020 
EUR 6.4 billion 
• promoting environmentally sustainable, resource-efficient, 
innovative, competitive and knowledge-based fisheries 
A budget of EUR  150 941 071 for France and 352 491 260 for Spain under 
the fund (France and Spain EMFF Factsheets)  
Source: EU website, Funding of the policy section37 
 
37  The Common Fishery Policy page. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/. Accessed June 10th, 
2019 
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The divide between the different segments of the fishery is clear when viewed through the 
lens of technology. The domination of the industrial sector in the fishery is apparent: not only 
does it have the technology to find and harvest more fish, it also receives the most financial 
assistance to access that technology. To this is added that vessels such as purse seiners do not 
only catch tuna and have high rates of bycatch often including coastal tunas and other species 
caught by local fishers (Illustration 12). Here, access to the tuna resources is structurally 
facilitated by the financial power held by the industrial segment through their investment 
capacity and state subsidies. This domination through technology, as discussed in Chapter 5, 
is sometimes perceived by host countries through their local fishers especially, as a key 
contributor to the overfishing of tuna resources in the region.  
Illustration 12: Sample of bycatch caught on purse seiners.  
 
Photo by the author 
Capital: differentiated investments shaping access to technology 
In Ribot and Peluso’s framework, capital refers to different forms of wealth including 
finance, equipment or credit that enables actors to control and maintain access to tunas and 
related benefits. This section will focus on the role of financial capital, closely linked to 
technology but also social capital, as having a substantial impact on the access to tuna 
resources in the WIO. Looking at capital in the WIO and especially the three islands involves 
a consideration of the political and socio-economic context of the three islands. While the 
  166 
case of Mauritius and the Seychelles can, to some extent, be put in the same category of 
capital being accessible to fishers through the state for example, it is not the case for 
Madagascar. The case of the foreign industrial fishery is also entirely different.  
Building individual financial capital within local tuna fishing 
For the case of local fishers, the three island nations need to be looked at individually. For 
Madagascar, fishers in general have limited access to capital to invest in vessels and 
equipment (MD 01,09,61,65; Pers. Obs.). As tuna fishing involves long-distance fishing with 
more powerful boats, actors that have financial capital for local tuna fishing in Madagascar 
are boat owners and intermediaries that own vessels and equipment (Illustration 13).  
In the north of Madagascar, financial capital is then held by a handful of boat owners that 
have accumulated wealth through two to three generations of family members involved in 
fishing and selling fish. This family wealth has been accumulated through an organised sale 
of catch in the village and neighbouring towns including the city centre of Antsiranana. The 
boat owners have also built strong social capital through the connections and social relations 
they have created within the community. Villagers are aware that boat owners are providing 
labour opportunities for those willing to go fishing.  
Illustration 13: One boat owner’s nets and a boat under construction in the background 
 
Photo by the author. 
In the west (Mahajanga) and southeast (Sainte Luce village) of Madagascar, for tuna fishing 
especially, financial capital lies in the hands of intermediaries who provide the boats and the 
  167 
equipment to fish tuna. Fishers are then entitled to sell their catch to the same intermediaries 
at an agreed price. In Mahajanga, intermediaries provide 8 metre boats to fishers who in turn 
are in charge of hiring other crew members. They are often neighbours, family members or 
friends that they are used to fishing with. In Sainte Luce, intermediaries provide the funds for 
fishers to build or buy and repair pirogues that fishers can consider as theirs. In this latter 
case, the fishers see themselves less as workers and more as partners of the intermediaries. 
Amongst the 10 fishers interviewed in Sainte Luce, 6 mentioned they were ‘working with’ 
such intermediaries rather than ‘working for’.  
In these three villages investigated in Madagascar, the reliance on a boat owner or an 
intermediary for capital is not uncommon and widely accepted by fishers. More capital is 
needed in tuna fishing than in other types of fisheries. Fishers in the three areas commonly 
mentioned that tuna fishing required a lot more investment with stronger boats, more 
equipment and more time at sea (MD 09, 18, 61, 65). They also recognise that due to the 
limited means for fishing, income from the fishery does not allow them to invest in their own 
tuna fishing (MD 09, 18). Some fishers expressed that there was maybe more tuna available 
but not enough equipment to catch them (MD 61, 65). The low access to capital is the 
strongest obstacle to the development of local tuna fisheries in Madagascar and engenders a 
limited access to the tuna resources and the benefits their sale provides.   
In Mauritius and the Seychelles, local fishers have higher individual financial capital in hand 
and many own their own boats. Amongst the 50 fishers interviewed, 12 fishers out of 24 in 
Mauritius and 9 out of 26 in the Seychelles owned their own boats. However, tuna fishing, 
involving fishing beyond the reefs, requires more fuel and more powerful engines. Only a 
limited number of fishers have a direct access to the capital needed for such input. For that 
reason, fishers specialised in tuna fishing are fewer in Mauritius and are well known in their 
village. Four of those fishers were interviewed in different villages of the west coast of 
Mauritius. Their financial capital was built from a long experience in the fishing and sale of 
their products either directly or through intermediaries. For the case of Seychelles, local 
fishers targeting tuna have larger boats and are categorised as semi-industrial. Access to 
capital for local fishers in the Seychelles has evolved in regards to funding tuna fishing. 
Local semi-industrial boats are either solely owned by Seychellois, partly funded through 
loans from the state or through investments by Sri Lankan partners (SE 60). This has strongly 
increased the number of vessels in the Seychelles semi-industrial fleet within the past 10 
years (SE 59). Despite the favourable socio-economic context in Mauritius and the 
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Seychelles, access to capital is still limited to a few fishers who have been in the fishery for 
several years or assisted financially by the state or private investments. 
Subsidies and firms’ investments as fuelling tuna fishing by DWFNs  
As for technology, the importance of financial capital in tuna fisheries is starkly apparent in 
the industrial tuna fishing sector. As seen in a previous section, capital is needed to access 
technology in this segment of the fishery. This capital used by the foreign industrial fleets has 
two main sources: governments and the fishing firms. The different DWFNs fishing in the 
WIO all have subsidy programs that allow their fleet to access capital either for acquiring or 
repairing vessels or equipment as well as for fuel (Sumaila 2016b et al.). In the case of the 
EU, these subsidies have been criticised as contributing to overfishing through the 
improvement of fishing capacity while subsidies are also funded by the European taxpayers 
(Sumaila 2016b et al., Le Manach et al. 2013). Fishing firms also mobilise capital in order to 
access advanced technology and different types of tuna vessels. Profits gained through 
fishing in the WIO represents an important input to this capital and also constitutes a key 
element to gain other sources of finance, such as loans or external investments (Carvalho et 
al. 2020; Dentes de Carvalho Gaspar et al. 2017). The cost of access to the tuna resources in 
the WIO is considered marginal compared to the profits fishing vessels make from the 
fishing. This access cost is estimated as representing around 5% of the profits that firms gain 
from the fishery for the case of access to the waters of Madagascar and the Seychelles 
(Caillart et al. 2018; Macfadyen et al. 2015). As we saw in Chapter 4, large fishing firms as 
well as important DWFNs are involved in the WIO tuna fisheries. Their contribution to 
increased access to capital for their fleet is a key determinant in the access to tuna resources 
in the WIO. Considered the “last frontier” (Campling 2012b), the WIO has been the stage for 
the most sophisticated and modern capitalist exploitation. For instance, in the WIO, the 
Spanish fleet, both through the EU subsidies but also through the investment of their fishing 
firms, have a large amount of capital available allowing them to access cutting-edge 
technology. As expressed by a French industrial vessel’s captain,  
“The Spanish have very sophisticated means it is quite another story. However, they 
also invest a lot. If there is a new technology of 300,000 Euros, they will pay. But 
that’s also why they need to make their fishing profitable” (SE 51).  
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This quote is highly illustrative of the role and impact of access to capital in the industrial 
tuna fishing. As it is key to technology access, it is also leading to a more extractive type of 
exploitation of the resources.  
The role of the state in access to financial capital 
The state plays a key role in various aspects of the tuna fishery, including by providing access 
to capital. The states of the three island countries studied have distinctive interventions. In 
Madagascar, financial support does not go directly to fishers, but is channelled instead 
through general support to the sector and via specific projects. For instance, fishing access 
agreements with the EU or development aid from the Japanese development agency have 
funded distributions of fishing nets or donated small-scale fishing vessels. Therefore, fishers 
may be provided equipment under various projects rather than the financial capital to buy that 
equipment.  
In Mauritius and the Seychelles, the state is more involved in directly providing financial 
capital. As seen in Table 22, the two countries have various government schemes available to 
local fishers, including loan systems or subsidies for engines, nets, fuel or ice (SE 12, 46, 59, 
60, MU 34, MU 27). As the tuna fishery requires specific investments for small-scale fishers, 
the return from the fishery does not always allow for fishers to build strong solvency which is 
a key condition to access the loans. Access to this type of financial capital becomes restricted 
to a handful of fishers. For the Seychelles, it is accessible to those who have accumulated the 
initial capital or joined other investors to be solvent. As of 2018, the majority of semi-
industrial boat owners in the Seychelles were investors rather than fishers (BK 03). For 
Mauritius, it required fishers to be organised in cooperatives. While Mauritius has various 
associations of fishers, it does not have any that are solely dedicated to tuna fishing. Tuna 
fishers are scattered all over the island and need to join existing and more general fishing 
associations in order to meet the state’s condition of being part of an association. 
In the three countries, and to a larger extent the WIO region, the development of the fishery 
and hence the access to tuna resources, relies strongly on the state’s ability to provide 
schemes that help fishers to invest in vessels and various equipment. The Seychelles have in 
recent years promoted the development of the fishery and have facilitated access to financial 
capital to fishers. In Mauritius, this interest has also increased and the willingness of local 
fishers to upgrade their vessels and fish more offshore for species like tuna is welcomed by 
the government. Investments in ports infrastructure, ice facilities and equipment are intended 
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to help local fishers increase the quality and quantity of their production and improve the 
importance of local tuna fishing in the countries. As will be seen in Chapter 7, developing 
tuna fisheries also present challenges including in finding local fishers willing to undertake 
semi-industrial fishing, for example. Similarly, the development of the fishery might require 
sustained funding that coastal states will need to ensure in the longer term. As seen in the 
foreign industrial segment, subsidies play a key part in the viability of tuna fishing activities. 
For the case of Madagascar, the lack of financial capital is rooted in a challenging socio-
economic context with limited individual capital. To this is added the fact that the 
government focuses more on the industrial segment run by DWFNs rather than the national 
artisanal and semi-industrial fleet.  
The role of access to capital in the WIO tuna fishery in undeniable. While capital is still 
highly limited in the small-scale fishery, especially in Madagascar, countries like Mauritius 
and the Seychelles have started to provide more schemes to allow the development of semi-
industrial fishing. The high availability of capital in the industrial segment is ultimately a 
determinant of why DWFNs have a facilitated access to the tunas and to the financial benefits 
they provide. This improved access is, however, considered by some actors as the main driver 
of a continued decrease in the marine resources, as seen in Chapter 5. Considering the 
existing declining trends and particularly for the case of yellowfin tuna, the continued 
availability of capital, especially in the industrial sector can be questioned in terms of long-
term sustainability of the tunas. I return to this observation in the conclusion of this thesis. 
The market: a key driver for the political economy of tuna   
In their analysis of access, Ribot and Peluso see the market as a significant determinant of 
how actors can benefit from resources. They discuss the role of both market access – “the 
ability of individuals or groups to gain, control, or maintain entry into exchange relations” 
(Ribot and Peluso 2003: 166) and market forces of supply and demand as elements that 
influence benefits from the resources and their distribution. In this section, I will focus on 
access to market in the different segments of the fishery and analyse how they generate 
benefits for the actors involved. 
The importance of local markets for the artisanal fishery in Madagascar and Mauritius  
In Madagascar and Mauritius, tuna catches are mainly consumed by the fishers themselves or 
sold at local markets for local clients. In Madagascar, the latter mainly involves the local 
population of coastal towns. In the north of Madagascar, the tuna is sold either in the village 
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or further in the local market of the regional capital city of Antsiranana. In the latter case, as 
soon as the fish is landed, boat owners call their usual sellers at the market to negotiate price 
of the catch before it is sent straight to the market (MD 25). Access to market is here 
established through long-term personal relationships between fishers and sellers based at the 
market. The two boat owners interviewed mentioned that there is always a taker for the fish. 
It is also a practice that spouses or other family members linked to the fishers or their crew 
take the fish and sell it themselves at the market (pers. obs.). The price of tuna (all species 
mixed together) is around 2 USD/kg. The only time that the price varies is when tuna is also 
landed by industrial boats at the port of Antsiranana and sold by stevedores in town and 
surrounding villages including in Ramena. When asked if this situation created a competition 
between the two types of landings, boat owners acknowledged the reduction of price of their 
catches. However, they did not consider that as a major issue for two reasons. First, they saw 
the quality of their catch as different and better than what is sold by stevedores. Indeed, tuna 
from the industrial boats are much saltier than tuna caught in Ramena (pers. obs.). Second, as 
tuna is more and more considered a luxury product in Antsiranana in general (MD 39, 41), 
fishers are still able to sell their catch despite the competition (MD 26). Here, the access to 
local markets of locally caught tuna generates sustained benefits for fishers, boat owners and 
the communities they support. It is also interesting to see that the competition between locally 
and industrially caught tuna is not perceived locally as an important source of conflicts over 
the resources.     
In Mauritius, clients include the local population as well as hotels that serve local and foreign 
clients. The tuna can take a longer route compared to Madagascar, as it tends to go through 
intermediaries. Those intermediaries are contacted by fishers when the fish is about to be 
landed, and the fish is sold directly on the beach (Illustration 14). The price of the tuna here 
is between 2 USD to 5 USD /kg. This price varies according to the abundance of different 
tuna species during the year. An economic relation is then in place between the fisher and 
intermediaries. While this relation presents the advantage of the catch being taken and sold 
without much effort needed from the fisher to access the local market, the seasonality of tuna 
makes it that in a peak season, the price is set low by intermediaries and renders the fishers’ 
effort less profitable (MU 11). The amount of financial benefits that fishers get from the tuna 
is mediated by intermediaries who, through their facilitated access to the local market, are 
able to fix the price of tuna. When asked about this economic factor, tuna fishers both 
expressed discontent about this price fixing, and yet also acknowledged the advantage of 
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having buyers for their fish (MU 10, 15). The overall benefit they gain from having buyers is 
usually considered more important than the reduced price of tuna at peak seasons.  
Illustration 14: Sale of yellowfin between a fisher and an intermediary in Rivière Noire 
 
Photo by the author 
The reliance of the semi-industrial fishery on local processing companies in the Seychelles 
In the semi-industrial segment in the Seychelles, the market for tuna is both local and 
international. Semi-industrial fishers do not have a direct access to these markets as the fish is 
handled by processing companies. The majority of the catch (composed of yellowfin, bigeye 
and swordfish) are handled by three processing companies: Fresh Tuna, Oceana and Sea 
Harvester (Illustration 15). These three companies buy the tuna at the price of around 7 
USD/kg depending on the quality of the fish and send it by airfreight to USA, Japan, or EU 
countries such as Italy or the UK (SE 16, 44). Here the catch is aimed for high-grade sashimi 
tuna markets at the international level and for retailers for fresh products – usually another 
branch of the processing company – at the local level. The economic relation here is between 
the processing companies – which buy the fish and also can provide ice and bait – and the 
boat owners – who are ensured their catch is taken at an agreed price from which costs of 
inputs are deducted from the final payment.  
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Illustration 15: Control of tuna landing at the local processing company in Victoria  
 
Photo by the author 
Here tuna fishery generates benefits on three fronts: tuna for the processing companies to 
send abroad, catch revenue for the boat owners and salary for the crew members. A small 
portion of the catch stays at the local level, mainly for hotels. This route of the tuna is set 
through individuals that have a close contact with the boat owner and have an arrangement to 
take some fish from the boat when it is landed (SE 19, 21). In the semi-industrial segment of 
tuna fishing in the Seychelles, access to market is a key element in shaping the supply chain 
and it also determines in a structured way the types of benefits generated for each actor 
involved.  
The rise of the ‘European tuna’ fished by purse seiners in the WIO 
The purse seine fishery in the WIO catches tuna, mostly skipjack and yellowfin, for the 
canneries of the WIO region, including those based in the three case studies. The fish is then 
re-exported, mainly to the EU. As presented in Chapter 4, the supply chain of tuna caught by 
the purse seine industry has been widely explored in other studies. Authors have for example 
analysed the role of international demand of tuna in the future of its exploitation or the 
importance of trade rules and market fluctuations in firms’ strategies to access tuna resources 
(Campling 2012a, 2016; Mullon et al. 2017).  
A topic that is relevant to reiterate is the analysis of the ‘economical nationality’ of the tuna 
of the WIO, especially the tuna caught by the EU fleet. In addition to these discussions in 
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Campling 2016; Campling and Colás 2017; Campling and Havice 2013, looking at this the 
topic can contribute to the argument of differentiated access to market. According to the EU 
regulations, tuna is assigned a country of origin depending on where it is caught and by 
whom and more specifically: “caught from the national waters or if it is caught by a vessel 
flying the country’s flag, registered in the country and owned by either a national of the 
country or a company that has its base in the country and is owned at least 50% by nationals 
of the country” (EU 2013). When caught in the high seas, the nationality of the fish is 
determined by the fishing vessels. In WIO, as purse seiners are fishing both in the EEZs and 
in the high seas, the tuna can be officially either from the EEZ’s country or European. When 
they are fishing, vessels have to record the geographical area of their catch, distinguishing the 
high seas with national waters. When tuna is landed in a cannery, the tuna with “European 
origin” is then considered imported to the WIO countries, as it has acquired the nationality of 
its fishing fleet. This tuna is then re-exported to the EU with an exemption of tax if it fulfils 
the conditions of origins under the EU East-South African economic partnership agreement 
(ESA-EPA) to be “wholly obtained” and “sufficiently worked or processed” products in the 
country members to the agreement. In this setting, tuna caught by EU vessels are the most 
likely able to fulfil the requirements of the EU rules of origin (Havice and Campling 2013). 
Processing companies that wish to access the EU market are then under the economic 
pressure to source tuna from the EU fleet to comply with trade regulations.  
As the canneries of the WIO mainly have the EU as a market target, the three countries 
studied have benefited from a derogation to the rule of origin regulation under the ESA-EPA. 
Under the derogation, the three countries are allowed to export tuna, with European or non-
European origin, tax-free to the extent of 8000 tons in cans and 2000 tons in loins (EU 2017). 
Here, the access to the EU market for tuna caught by purse seiners in the WIO is then 
dependent on broader economic agreements between countries. In line with Campling (2016), 
I argue here that tuna processing activities are influenced by broader policies such as trade 
preferences and tariff liberation. Hence, the benefits from the tunas, here revenues for 
canneries, are principally shaped by broader geopolitical and economic policy negotiations 
that determine access to the EU market. The trade policy established by the EU dictates the 
way the resources are accessed and marketed in the WIO. The canneries and by extension 
their local staff are highly dependent on this access to the European market. While it appears 
that the derogation is a boon for WIO countries, the EU also largely benefits from it via a 
cheap supply of tuna products from the WIO (Mereghetti 2017a). With such market access 
  175 
restrictions, DWFNs such as the EU manifest their strong position in shaping the rules of 
how benefits from tuna can be accessed by WIO countries, here mainly the canneries.  
Based on the above exploration of the role of access to markets in gaining benefits from tuna, 
we can see that tuna from the WIO is equally important to local and international markets. 
Access to these markets is controlled not by fishers themselves but other actors such as boat 
owners, intermediaries, processing companies or by international trade policies and 
regulations. These actors maintain economic power over the rules of access to the market 
while also gaining economic benefits from the resources. They also play a key role in 
supplying tuna to locals and consumers at the global level. Ultimately, with the increasing 
demand for tuna both at the local and global level, the ability to access these markets will 
continue to shape how economic benefits from the tuna are maintained by actors at various 
stages of the value chain. 
Labour opportunity:  expanding local livelihoods and providing indirect access to tuna  
Access to labour and labour opportunities is seen by Ribot and Peluso as a key construct of 
who can benefit from resources. Actors who control labour can allocate it where it is needed 
to access the resources. Conversely, those who have physical access can influence who gets 
to work to extract or produce the resources or provide access to others through working 
relationships (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Within the commodity chain of tuna, labour plays a 
key role from production to retail. While technology is present at all stages of the supply 
chain, human labour plays an equally important role. From the fishers that pull the net or line 
to the cannery workers and retailers, tuna is dependent on human labour (Campling 2012a; 
Dentes de Carvalho Gaspar et al. 2017; Lecomte et al. 2017). In this section, I will focus my 
analysis on labour opportunities that tuna fisheries provide to different actors in the WIO and 
particularly to those that are involved in the production of tuna during fishing or at landing. I 
wanted to focus on these labour opportunities, particularly to show the contribution of the 
fisheries to local livelihoods and to shed light on actors that are less visible in the process of 
tuna production, and yet play valuable roles.  
Local labour opportunities and local livelihoods  
Access to tunas and their benefits through fishing at the local level is strongly linked to 
building and maintaining relations of trust and reciprocity within the community (Berry 1989, 
1998). In Madagascar and Mauritius, not all fishers have a fishing card/permit, either because 
the system has not reached all fishers yet (case of Madagascar) or that the process to receive 
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the permit is too long (case of Mauritius). Those that do not have such a permit, while not 
able to access subsidies from the state for example, can still access the resources through 
working relations with boat owners or other fishers that are permit holders. Local tuna fishing 
usually involves a group that would include individuals from the same family or village 
without a formalised right. In this instance, the participant receives a part of the catch that 
would have been divided between the crew members. This social relation is embedded within 
a reciprocity principle of offering to help a relative, friend or neighbour in the same fishing 
community. Access to labour opportunities here is not formalised and is rather horizontal, 
based on trust and reputation building. Each fisher can ask for work by approaching the boat 
owner. In Ramena village, boat owners are well known to accept members of the village that 
are looking for and willing to work, including women. One boat owner declared “In Ramena, 
fishing is a matter of survival, I accept anyone who is in need of work, there is always 
something to do in the fishing, whichever your skill” (MD 24). Here, the labour opportunities 
are not limited to the job of fishing only, but also include a large array of tasks from net 
making/repair, boat maintenance, fish handling and preparation for sale or transport. Local 
tuna fishing, therefore, generates benefits through labour opportunities to various members of 
the community.  In Mauritius, the crew members are either family members or friends from 
the same village who appreciate fishing with their relatives or neighbours. The same crew 
composition applies in the Seychelles, where catching tuna is opportunistic as fishers target 
other species such as jackfish or groupers. The artisanal tuna fishery is therefore a segment 
where labour opportunities are offered on the basis of personal relationships within a 
community. These social relations allow non-registered fishers to gain access to the resources 
and get either economic benefit or/and tuna to consume or sell. 
Illustration 16: Landing of catch from an artisanal boat in the north of Madagascar 
 
Photo by the author 
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Relations of trust are also apparent at the time of sharing catch and benefits from the fishing. 
In the Seychelles, the system of revenue share is that 1/3 is given to the boat owner and the 
rest is equally divided between the crew members. When asked about this distribution, 
members of the crew expressed their appreciation or satisfaction they had from the 
relationship they had with the boat owner they were working with. Madagascar and Mauritius 
share the same system of revenue allocation where the revenue is divided equally between 
the fishers after deduction of the boat owner’s share and the cost of fuel. In the north of 
Madagascar, fishers make statements such as “bosses are not greedy here, they take care of 
you” (MD 27, MD 22) while in Mauritius and the Seychelles, fishers do not refer to boat 
owners as “bosses” but more as their equals. The mention of “comrades” between fishers in 
Mauritius and the Seychelles were common (MU05, MU06, MU17, SE 06, SE 24). In the 
three countries, the economic benefits received by each fisher is therefore variable, dependant 
on the catch and the season. They are not provided a fixed salary. Despite the difficulty of the 
fishing activity, fishers still find reward in working with their peers at sea.    
As I have shown, there is therefore a broad network of actors which benefits from access to 
tuna resources in the small-scale tuna fishery, through labour opportunities and other local 
livelihoods. To maintain the benefits of the fishery to the local economy implies hoping for 
continued access to a healthy tuna fishery, by both fishers and other indirect actors. This is 
presently achieved through the low-intensity way that tuna is exploited: use of smaller boats 
and limited fishing effort. While it could be argued that the situation shows a lack of 
development in the fishery, the social interactions and impacts of the fishery demonstrate that 
this way of fishing does benefit local actors, even if just from a labour perspective.  
The less well-known labourers of the semi-industrial and industrial fishing  
The case of the semi-industrial sector in the Seychelles is worth mentioning here in terms of 
the labour opportunities it brings. In the past five years, the Government of the Seychelles has 
strongly invested in developing its semi-industrial tuna fishery. With a national fleet of 
around 30 boats in 2017, demand for crew was not satisfied. As a result, fishers from Sri 
Lanka have come to work on Seychellois vessels. The few Sri Lankan fishers interviewed 
expressed satisfaction regarding their working conditions, including being able to send 
money back to Sri Lanka and fishing more tuna than in the Sri Lankan waters (SE 22, 50). 
Local views on this influx of Sri Lankan fishers have, however, been mixed. Some consider 
them as taking the jobs of local fishers at a lower cost, views carried by small-scale fishers 
and some government officials (SE 19, 31); while others, mainly boat owners, see them as 
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contributing to the development of the fishery and filling the labour shortage, with young 
Seychellois willing less and less to take part in fishing (SE 21, 35). Because of the social 
context in the Seychelles, the fishery has provided access to foreign labourers who otherwise 
would have not ventured to the EEZ of the Seychelles.  
Another set of actors that I wanted to shed light on emerge from my encounter with purse 
seiners’ fishing crew members, and stevedores during landings in Antsiranana and Victoria. 
Labour opportunities on board purse seiners are controlled by EU fishing firms. A typical 
purse seiner fishing in the WIO region has crew composition of around 20 people. Around 
half of the crew is European - the captain, officers and technicians - and the other half is 
Senegalese, Ghanaian, Ivorian, Seychellois or Malagasy, with non-specialised roles. The 
Fishing Access Agreements require a percentage of the crew to come from African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, including from host countries where the fishing takes 
place (Goulding 2016b; Macfadyen 2015). In the Indian Ocean, an average of 700 ACP 
nationals are annually employed by EU tuna fleets (Campling 2012a; Macfadyen 2015). 
Nationals of the three countries studied have, however, only benefited from this labour 
opportunity to a limited extent, with an average of 10 to 15 seamen from each country 
involved every year (Caillart et al. 2018; COFREPECHE et al. 2015; POSEIDON 2019). 
Those non-EU crew members directly access the resources through employment with the 
fishing company and gain a financial benefit through wages rather than fish. When asked 
about the amount of benefits they receive from the fishery, many of them responded that they 
were satisfied by the wage and work conditions they had compared to what they can make in 
their home countries. However, the same crew members mentioned they did not feel they 
were getting as much benefit compared to what the fishing companies are making (MD 42, 
46, 87). These observations were made by non-EU crew members that were involved on EU 
vessels for more than five years. Sentences like “I make a good living compared to what I can 
earn at home” (MD 46) were stated amongst the non-EU crew along with, “In the end it’s the 
big bosses sitting in Madrid that make the money, we are only fishers, we do not gain much” 
(MD 87). Non-EU crew members were often performing non-specialised roles on tuna 
vessels. Therefore, despite the labour opportunity, their wages are much lower than EU 
nationals on board, estimated at around 7 times less (Campling 2012a). Similarly, while the 
wages are usually considered a substantial operational cost for EU vessels (amounting around 
30%), the EU fleet in the Indian Ocean, including in the WIO has been evaluated as highly 
profitable, generating more than 100,000,000 USD in gross profit for 2016 (Dentes de 
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Carvalho Gaspar et al. 2017). Considering the important number of non-EU crew members, 
they play an important role in the access to tunas as they generate high profits for EU fleets. 
Here, these non-EU crew members both benefit and lose from this access to the resources: 
while they gain more revenue than other home-based fishers, they gain much less than their 
EU peers on-board.  
In host countries, another labour opportunity provided by foreign fleets is stevedoring at the 
port. In Madagascar, landing boats employ local stevedores to unload the fish to the cannery. 
In this process, non-tuna species, damaged or undersized tuna are provided or sold to them at 
USD 0.1/kg, on top of their wages (USTA 2017). With an average landing of 480t/year, these 
fishes are then sold at the port by stevedores on the evening of landings at USD 1 to USD 
1.5/kg (USTA 2017). The socio-economic context in Madagascar implicates that wages for 
these positions are not very high (less than 2 USD/hour according to MD 04). Stevedores are 
therefore making the most of their ‘real wage’ through the sale of fish they are offered. The 
importance of these local market events has made access to these jobs a very competitive 
business where relations of patronage are established, requiring stevedores to build personal 
and economic ties with those with authority at the handling companies, including through 
financial gifts (MD 04, 36). The supply of bycatch fish in Antsiranana by industrial vessels is 
seen by some as unwanted competition to local tuna fishers (SK 07), and by others as a 
welcomed source of cheap fish in a city with a high cost of living (MD 05, 39). One resident 
emphasised that “the coming of tuna from the big boats periodically regulates the price of all 
goods in Antsiranana. Without this tuna, everything remains at high price the whole year” 
(MD 05). As seen in the previous section, local fishers consider the competition brought by 
these landings as manageable. They did not have issue in selling their fish and the 
competition was only a couple of months a year (MD 24, 26). In sum, in far northern 
Madagascar, the stevedores are an important but easily neglected part of the tuna supply 
chain. They access the resources without fishing while supplying the local market. They also 
turn industrial ‘unwanted’ tuna to an economically local ‘needed’ fish. 
In the three segments of the fishery, labour opportunities are a means by which various local 
stakeholders gain access to the tuna resource.  These labour opportunities often generate 
access for those not having their own rights-based access to the resources. In coastal 
communities where tuna fishing takes place, diverse livelihoods are created around the 
fisheries and the supply chain of tuna. Livelihoods are also created for foreign fishers who 
have access to the resources through the semi-industrial sector in the Seychelles. Finally, the 
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contribution of the industrial segment and especially the EU fleet through labour 
opportunities is not all benefits as often advertised by DWFNs. While landings of industrial 
vessels generate labour opportunities and benefits for stevedores, fishing crew members who 
are not from the fishing nations often gain fewer benefits from fishing activities.  
State authority: a strategic mechanism to maintain access to tuna 
A sixth structural mechanism that is explored by Ribot and Peluso is authority. Individuals or 
institutions with authority can dictate the implementation of rights-based mechanisms of 
access and shape the ability to benefit from resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Having access 
to actors with authority can influence the way resources are accessed including legitimisation 
(Sikor and Lund 2009). In this section, I will show how actors with a privileged link to state 
authority maintain and sustain their access to the resources compared to those with limited 
links. 
The first illustration is of DWFNs’ access to the authority of coastal states. For foreign 
industrial fishing fleets, this is key to establishing fishing access agreements with the WIO 
countries. In the three countries studied, this connection to state authority has been 
established through a long-term relationship built between host countries and DWFNs, 
mainly through bilateral cooperation and development aid (as will be developed in Chapter 
7). Through this involvement in host countries, DWFNs have created strong leverage to 
negotiate rights to tuna resources within EEZs. During discussions with officials from 
fisheries departments, one interviewee mentioned that DWFNs such as the EU use 
development aid and partnership as an element to be considered during negotiation of fishing 
access agreements (MD 78). In Madagascar, anecdotes during negotiations of fishing access 
agreements include those of prime ministers being pressured by foreign embassies during the 
negotiations to grant access to fishing grounds based on the long-term partnership of both 
parties (pers. obs). Such intervention of state institutions into fisheries negotiations shows 
how access to state authority has helped DWFNs maintain their entry to tuna fishing grounds. 
The second example is how industrial fishing firms access their own governments as well as 
coastal state authorities to ensure their sustained access to the resources and the fishery. For 
European fishing firms, producer associations play a key role in building a strong relationship 
with state authorities that provide subsidies. For example, for the case of the EU, fishing 
associations such as ORTHONGEL, OPAGAC or ANABAC are prime contacts of the state 
for subsidies or fishery policy. To illustrate, the EU delegation to the 2018 IOTC meeting 
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included a representative of each association in addition to representatives from fishing firms. 
Similarly, the Malagasy delegation included representatives from the Korean fishing fleet 
(pers. obs.). This close link of foreign fleets to their state or even coastal states (as seen for 
the case of Madagascar) shows a privileged access to state authority. Through connection to 
their home state, fishing firms make sure that they benefit from state support in the fishery 
including by gaining capital and technology. Through access to coastal states, foreign fishing 
firms ensure that management decisions at IOTC do not impede on their rights to fishing 
grounds. 
In the small-scale fishery, the state has the authority to issue permits and licences which are 
needed by small-scale fishers, especially if they want to sell or transport their products. 
Fishers who have an existing relationship with state officials will be more aware of schemes 
that the state might put in place to develop the fishery or support fishers. During the 
fieldwork, discussions with fishers, however, show a considerable distrust of the state, 
especially in Madagascar. Fishers especially made statements such as “the government is 
only there to punish small fishers” (MD 19, 59). In Mauritius and the Seychelles, fishers 
expressed that the state was “not doing enough for the local fishers” (SE 19, 26) or that it was 
“protecting the big boats” (MU 25, 35). In contrary to DWFNs and their fishing firms, small-
scale fishers have fewer interactions with the state, creating fewer opportunities for leverage 
as compared to the industrial segment. In Madagascar, it is through the intervention of NGOs 
working in fisheries, collaboration with fisheries departments and local fishers that small-
scale fishers have improved their access to state authority. In Mauritius and the Seychelles, 
fishing associations facilitate access to state authority in order help fishers benefit from 
various subsidies but also voice their demands, the latter not always welcomed by the state 
(MU 25, SE 47). To mirror the example of delegation composition, it has only been since 
2016 that local fishers have joined the state delegation of the Seychelles to the IOTC (IOTC 
2015, 2016). From what was observed in the meeting of 2018, there was no such integration 
of local fishers in the delegations of Madagascar and Mauritius. Thus, only fishers in the 
Seychelles have succeeded in taking part in regional negotiations at the IOTC.  
The leverage that the industrial sector has through DWFNs’ privileged access to state 
authorities, either in host countries or in their own states, shows the limits that small-scale 
fishing actors have in accessing tunas and the fishery, compared to the industrial actors. 
While rights-based mechanisms determine the legal arrangements available for fishing, 
access to state authority in tuna fisheries facilitate the mobilisation of these arrangements. It 
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is also a key strategy by DWFNs to maintain access to tunas and ensure that their economic 
interests are considered in management measures.   
To conclude this section on relational and structural mechanisms, I showed how benefits 
from tuna fisheries and access to tunas are strongly influenced by these mechanisms. While 
knowledge, technology and capital have a direct impact on the quantity of tuna fished and the 
economic benefit from the fisheries, market, labour opportunities and state authority shape 
the context of how benefits are distributed across the different segments of the fishery, and 
also contribute to maintaining access to the resources.  
The use of the theory of access framework highlighted that while rights-based mechanisms 
set the foundations for the possibility of access to the tunas to a variety of actors through 
various legal arrangements, structural mechanisms present a clear picture of unbalanced and 
unequal access between the involved (Figure 9). As I will develop in the next section, these 
power relations and conflict are aggravated by the materiality of the tuna resources and the 
western Indian Ocean.  
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Figure 9: Mapping of access to tuna using R+P’s classic theory of access 
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6.3. CONSIDERING MATERIALITY AND THE ROLE OF NON-HUMANS IN 
ACCESS POLITICS 
If the previous section described how the classic theory of access can be applied to tuna 
resources, I will now move to the enhanced theory of access that considers both the spatiality 
of the ocean and tuna as contributing to shaping access but also how fishing practices 
influence the materiality of the fish and the sea. Considerations of materiality are essential in 
discussions about mobile resources as their biophysical and ecological characteristics 
determine their movements. This is one of the key arguments of this chapter on access as the 
materiality of WIO tunas, including their ecologically and socially produced biophysical 
characteristics which are exacerbated by their high mobility, play an important role in the: 
who, when, and how the tuna is fished and managed.  
In the following sections, I will start with a presentation of the concepts of materiality and 
mobile resources as I use them in this thesis. I will continue with explaining how I integrate 
materiality to the framework of R+P. I will finally show two examples of how materiality in 
tuna fisheries shapes access to the tunas and how this can also influence materiality. From 
this enhancement of the classic theory, I then offer a new mapping of access to tuna resources 
infused with materiality.  
6.3.1. The concept of materiality and its influence in resource management 
The concept of ‘materiality’ refers not just to the tangible biophysical and spatial 
characteristics of a resource, but also the ways in which those aspects are constructed through 
social processes (Bakker and Bridge 2006). This reflects a ‘material turn’ in political ecology 
and other fields in social sciences (Bennett 2010; Walker 2005), which explores the active 
dynamics of non-humans and highlights the importance of biophysical ecology in socio-
environmental research. As Robbins puts it, “non-human actors play an important political 
role in explanation” (Robbins 2003: 643). This leads to a kind of hybrid socio-natural 
materiality that has an impact on access to the resources while it is also influenced by this 
same access.  
The need to study materiality has been widely explored in geographical studies especially 
those on construction of nature or society-nature (Castree 1995; Robbins 2012). Beyond 
simple attention to the matter and biophysical features, various authors have attempted to 
present how materiality intervenes in social practices or how it can be produced or co-
produced. Bakker & Bridge (2006) promoted a new research agenda in resource geographies 
where exploring materiality entailed looking beyond the binary of materiality and production 
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of nature. They encouraged the study of various contributions that materiality can bring to 
resource studies, including the different meanings attached to the tangible, the impacts of the 
biophysical in social practices or how the material creates or disrupts social practices of 
resources management (Bakker & Bridge 2006). Bakker (2012) discussed materiality as 
“shaping human perception, discursive constructions and responses to one resource” (p. 617) 
but also how the material can be produced through social, representational and symbolic 
practices (Bakker 2012; Bakker & Bridge 2006). Anderson and Wylie (2009) suggested 
looking at materiality beyond the elements (earth, water, fire, air) of the earth or the state 
(solid, liquid gas) of the object but also through the processes that can enact the properties 
and capacities of these elements. Bennet (2010) in her account of the role of things in our 
daily lives exposed the vitality and political force of things through their encounters with 
other bodies. By looking at the agency of non-human materials, she showed the ways in 
which things as they move, compose and combine, create affect and shape different 
capacities of action between humans and non-humans. The materiality of tuna I use here then 
includes both the biophysical features of the fish such as their mobility, their feeding and 
social behaviour but also their produced features through fishing practices. As for the 
materiality of the WIO, this includes the productivity and ecological characteristic of this 
western part of the Indian Ocean as well as the imagined geographical delimitations produced 
through social practices. I will argue that there are crucial factors to consider in a theory of 
access of tuna resources. 
In parallel to the concept of materiality, the thesis also engages with the agency of non-
humans in social practices as advocated by different authors. Whatmore (2002) for example, 
in her discussion of hybridity in geography drew attention to the role of space and 
relationships between human and non-humans in shaping various processes in society. She 
advocated for broadening our way of thinking of the social world by better including the non-
humans and the relations that constitute the world. Haraway through her various works 
explored our entanglement with non-humans including companion animals and various non-
living technologies. Regarding animals in particular, she described the way in which non-
humans can be active partners and engaged in processes that co-shape all the parties involved 
through historically and culturally situated encounters (Haraway 2008). Her manifesto called 
for a better way of engaging with non-humans as “a question of cosmopolitics, of learning to 
be ‘polite’ in responsible relation to always asymmetrical living and dying and nurturing and 
killing” (ibid: 42). In this thesis, I present the tuna and the WIO as actants in shaping access 
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to tuna fisheries including through their materiality. I will argue that their agency requires 
better attention in the management of access but also in ensuring their sustainability.   
Before expanding on this more theoretical argument, below I review concrete examples from 
the scientific literature of materiality in both terrestrial and marine resources. 
Mobile resources on land  
In this section I will explore the various implications of materiality of mobile animals notably 
linked to their movement. Animals such as elks, bison, deer, elephants, zebra or antelope all 
migrate in their lifespan. This movement takes different forms and patterns during which the 
population size or distribution can change (Lulka 2004; Tisdell 2015). Some species 
undertake migration in response to seasonal changes while others can undertake movements 
according to their lifecycle (Tisdell 2004). In the case of the bison for example, Lulka (2004) 
emphasised the need to consider their movement in conservation policy. He described that 
existing measures such as establishing boundaries are only reinforcing human and non-
human hierarchies, and can undermine the conservation of the species itself. Sundberg (2011) 
explored the role of wild cats in disrupting enforcement of border control in the United states. 
As the conservation of the species was argued by environmental agencies, its protection 
across borders generated challenges to border control agents trying to enforce strict 
delimitation of borders.  
Highly mobile animals through large geographic areas can be qualified as fugitive resources 
(Giordano 2003). Resources are defined as fugitive when their movement is unidirectional 
and where the initial user gains all the benefits from the resources but does not necessarily 
bear the cost of the exploitation since such costs can move with the resources (ibid). This 
fugitiveness has been discussed by various authors regarding the challenges it presents, in 
managing property rights, for example. Luek (1995) recognised the complexity of setting and 
managing property rights of fugitive resources or resources situated in a vast geographic area 
due to the variation of classification of species, land ownership patterns, and wildlife values. 
Tisdell (2004) emphasised the economic value of fugitive resources passing through private 
property compared to those in an open access setting. He argued that in a US legal setting, the 
movement of wildlife through private lands can incentivise landowners to implement 
stewardship and conservation of the species for future economic opportunities. The 
fugitiveness of wildlife has also been studied in savanna ecosystems in Africa. Child (1996) 
showed that the movement of wildlife through a large area where various local communities 
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and tourists are present required access to be shared. This sharing involved tourists paying for 
access, to the benefit of the local communities. Meguro (2011), however, indicated that 
fugitive resources in savannas can also have negative effect on local populations such as 
creating human-wildlife conflicts and making management unattractive to communities 
(Meguro 2011).  
Access to migratory species in Africa has also been discussed in relation to Transfrontier 
Conservation Areas (TFCAs). Intended to conserve migratory species such as elephants, 
these areas are subject to management by actors across the countries where the TFCA is 
established which can be challenging. While rules of access can be established in 
collaboration by various countries, the effectiveness of their implementation varies due to 
often differing governance capacity, leading to management efforts being more or less 
successful in the different parts of the TFCA (Muchpondwa and Ngaru 2010). The 
materiality of migration is also discussed by these authors as a potential factor of uneven 
distribution of benefits.  
The cases presented above emphasise the role of the mobility of animals in shaping their 
management and access. It also shows how the movement of animals as part of their 
materiality can disrupt environmental policies or engender conflicts amongst actors.    
Mobile resources at sea 
Researchers from various fields have studied how people access marine resources that are 
mobile such as tuna, salmon, marine turtles or other shared fish stocks.  
Fisheries management and marine conservation studies have shown that migratory species 
present challenges for their management, including regarding access. Management of salmon 
for example implies the conservation of both freshwater and marine habitats as well as 
regulating inland activities affecting both habitats (Semmens et al. 2011). The movement of 
fish can also bring complexity to management processes. Bear (2012), for example, discussed 
the role of bottlenose dolphin movements in the management of scallop fisheries as the 
dolphins are a protected species that feeds on the seabed where dredging for scallops is taking 
place. Management measures for a sedentary resource, here the scallops, required the 
consideration of mobile animals, here the bottlenose dolphins. He argues that the materiality 
of non-humans shapes management measures and also calls for a deeper study of the sea as 
well as its materiality, its multiple elements and actants. Bear and Eden (2008) also explored 
the complexity brought by movement of marine species in management processes such as 
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certification. They presented how the boundaries required for fisheries certification can 
become fluid as the fish moves and can naturally evade the established limits of the particular 
place to be certified. With fish moving freely, moving in and out the certifiable space can 
make their labelling difficult and requires therefore a better consideration of spatiality of the 
sea but also ecological knowledge of the fish.  
Another case is marine turtles, a species that appears on all lists of protected species. The 
question of access to the resources by local populations has been overridden by the global 
need for their conservation (Campbell 2007). Their migration across various oceans has 
required the intervention of international measures such as prohibition or restrictive use. Such 
policies can contradict local settings where consumption and use of the resources are 
culturally acceptable or part of socially established norms (Campbell 2004; Humber et al. 
2015). For Campbell, the problem with this migratory species is of “space and scale” as the 
resources move across national and international spaces while management measures are 
taken without consideration of the local scale of access. Marine turtles illustrate the key role 
of materiality and spatiality in the management and access to moving resources. Local access 
to the moving resource is controlled by international measures due to their global ecological 
importance. 
A last example comes from the implementation of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). 
Despite their attributed economic efficiency (Birkenbach et al. 2017; Newell et al. 2002), 
implementation of ITQs has been subject to various critiques. Those include the lack of 
consideration of ecosystems and the nature of fishing resources especially marine fugitive 
ones or a disregard of social equity as ITQs could be in the hands of a few large fishing 
companies (Copes 1999; Sumaila 2010). These debates on ITQ emphasise the complexity 
that the movement of the fish brings to questions of access. As they are designed to establish 
rights of a given portion of the total allowable catch of fish, they can be challenging to 
implement in multispecies fisheries such as tuna where in addition to being migratory, the 
fish also congregates with many other species. 
This exploration of the role of movement in natural resources showed the specificities of 
questions of access, property and management when resources are mobile. The above studies 
have shown that when the materiality of species, notably their movement, is not taken into 
consideration, policies and management measures are less likely to be effective and can have 
negative impacts on the resources and their users.   
  189 
6.3.2. Integrating materiality and the role of non-humans into Ribot & Peluso’s framework 
The following sections argue that the materiality of tunas and the WIO have an impact on the 
theory of access to tunas in two ways (Figure 10). First, benefits from tuna fisheries are 
highly dependent on the materiality of tuna including its productivity and presence within a 
country’s EEZ or in the high seas. Second, the biophysical attributes of tuna shape and 
influence structural access mechanisms such as knowledge and technology, which in turn 
have an impact on the quantity of tuna that can be accessed. The materiality of the sea and 
tuna is also shaped by various rights-based mechanisms of access that generate spatialisation 
of the sea. This section also presents the role of tuna and the WIO as actants in the politics of 
access to tuna. The established yet imaginary boundaries of the WIO, the current availability 
of tuna and the perceptions around their current ecological state shape various narratives of 
overfishing and equitability around the benefits from the resources. This in turn has an impact 
on the power relations that intervene between actors involved in the fishery and its 
management. 
Figure 10: R+P’s mapping of access enhanced by materiality and the role of non-
humans 
 
 
To explore this integration of materiality and the role of tunas and the WIO in the theory of 
access, I will first illustrate, through two important aspects of materiality of marine mobile 
resources – spatiality of the sea and movement of tuna, and how access to tunas and related 
benefits are influenced by the role of the WIO and tuna. I will then explore how the 
materiality of tuna can be co-produced through practices in the fishery. Finally, I will present 
the materiality-infused theory of access.  
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The role of the WIO and tuna in access control 
The sea has often been seen as an undeveloped space of trade, lawlessness and placelessness 
(Steinberg 2001). At the same time, it is also considered a specific space of enquiry ‘out of 
sight’ and yet rich in socio-cultural and political formations and perspectives (Peters 2010). 
The latter is specifically true for the WIO and its tuna fisheries. Tuna fishing takes place in 
waters that are ecologically distinct (from near coastal reefs to deep water), carved into 
particular geopolitical and economic territories, through which the different species move and 
circulate. Tuna moves within high seas, with an open access regime, and also within the 
legally defined space of EEZs between countries of the WIO region.  
The UNCLOS, through its supposed delimitation of the marine space, has territorialised the 
sea around the Indian Ocean. The establishment of EEZs, which put tuna under the property 
regime of coastal countries when they pass through their waters, turn it into fugitive resources 
(Giordano 2003) as soon as they move to another EEZ. This fugitiveness of tuna beyond 
national jurisdictions can create perverse incentives for host countries akin to those of open-
access property regimes, where profits accrue to the takers but all share the costs.  These 
incentives may influence host countries in their approach to fishing access agreements. One 
government official commented “the fish moves beyond our waters, if they are not fished in 
our waters, they will be fished elsewhere, it will be a loss for us” (MD 02). Here the 
territorialisation of the sea gives power to host countries to lease its resources, but at the same 
time, the mobility of the tuna creates incentives to accelerate exploitation while possible. The 
WIO and tuna here become actants in the creation of economic power that coastal states can 
have in tuna fisheries.  
This situation is different when the fish reaches the high seas. There are no access rules or 
property regime applicable yet, fishing vessels are then free to catch tuna without any specific 
regulation as UNCLOS requires countries to collaborate in order to establish conservation 
and management measures38. However, fishing vessels are constrained, when full, by their 
need to land and tranship at the closest ports which in the WIO are in the Seychelles, 
Madagascar, Mauritius and Kenya (MD 42, MU 30, SE 66). The strategic positions of ports 
make these countries necessary in the operation of tuna fishing. Foreign fleets, in their 
strategy of optimising their time at sea, land to ports to be able to return to fishing grounds as 
 
38 Article 117 of UNCLOS - Duty of States to adopt with respect to their national measures for the conservation 
of the living resources of the high seas: “All States have the duty to take, or to cooperate with other States in 
taking, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living 
resources of the high seas.” 
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soon as they can. The sea, as open as it may be, cannot always fulfil the needs of tuna 
exploitation, requiring fishing vessels, especially purse seiners, to come back at land.  
The mobility of tuna and the spatiality of the vast ocean are therefore a key element to the 
fishery. The imagined political boundaries of the sea are not respected by mobile tuna. As 
migratory species, some tunas travel in the WIO region at different periods of the year while 
other species can be found all year long in different countries’ waters or undertaking a 
circular journey. Yellowfin and bigeye tuna for example are found in the coastal waters of 
Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles between April and December and further offshore 
between November and March. Coastal tunas are present all year in the coastal waters of the 
countries (Fonteneau 2010, 2014; Kaplan et al. 2014). The question of spatiality of natural 
resources and its implication in terms of access has been particularly looked at by Giordano 
(2003). He presented four types of spatial frameworks: open access, private property, fugitive 
resources [where the resources move from one space to another] and migratory resources 
[where the resources can travel between two spaces]; and emphasised the need to 
differentiate management under these frameworks and consider their influence on the 
exploitation (ibid). 
Placing tuna under Giordano’s categorisation of spatial frameworks (open access, private 
property, fugitive resources and migratory resources), tuna fits a particular framework 
depending on the time and place: from the property of the state to an open access regime and 
qualifying as a fugitive resource when leaving one EEZ but also migratory if not caught and 
pursuing its movement in the region.  
The characteristics of tuna movement mean that it has no fixed spatiality, making access 
mechanisms to it highly diverse in terms of actors and content. Foreign vessels need to have 
fishing access agreements with different countries of the WIO region to catch sometimes the 
same school of tuna. Here tuna is an agent that deterritorialises established legal access 
boundaries. It forces fishing vessels to negotiate access to different host countries and gives 
power of access control to the coastal states in the EEZs, but only until the tuna moves to the 
high seas where that national power is lost. Tuna and the sea are therefore important actants 
as they mitigate tuna fishing activities and power relations in the WIO.   
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A new materiality of tuna co-produced through technology and social practices 
Tuna could be qualified as an undisciplined resource moving around different seas and one 
that can be productive one year and not the other. Yet, its materiality can also be produced by 
the practices that are associated with its fishing. To illustrate, I explore two examples: first, 
the use of Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs), and second, piracy.  
In the Indian Ocean, 30% to 50% of purse seine catches are from FADs (Dagorn et al. 2013; 
Kaplan et al. 2014). The use of FADs has been adopted as a fishing practice because fish are 
naturally attracted to floating objects. The reasons are manifold, including for protection 
against predation, for food, association or protection of eggs and larvae (Castro et al. 2002; 
Dagorn et al. 2013). FADs are used both in the industrial and in the artisanal sectors. In tuna 
fisheries they are mainly used by the purse seine industry. The use of FADs by purse seiners 
in the Indian Ocean has drastically increased. It is estimated that around 7,000 units were 
deployed in 2010 and 14,000 in 2013 (PEW 2015).  
While they increase productivity and facilitate the localization of fish, their impact on the 
ecological behaviour of the fish is debated. Some of the issues raised include the higher risks 
for some species such as skipjack to be overfished, the aggregation of more juvenile fishes 
under FADs, or the reliance of the fish on FADs for feeding and disrupting their natural 
search for food, hence their migration patterns (Davies et al. 2014, PEW 2015). Those can 
lead tuna to be attracted to poor condition areas where the FADs are located. It can also 
change their natural movement as well as impact their growth (Dagorn et al. 2013; Davies et 
al. 2014). The use of FADs as a fishing practice has therefore produced another type of 
materiality of the fish, changing its migratory behaviour but also its biophysical traits. Here, 
interactions between fishers and tuna through FADs co-produce materiality that increases the 
quantity of tuna accessed by fishers, reduces the extent of tuna agency in fishing and also 
modifies the nature of the resource.   
Another practice that had an impact on the materiality of tuna in the WIO is Somalian piracy. 
Between 2005 and 2009, piracy was rife in the northwest Indian Ocean, preventing many 
industrial vessels from undertaking fishing due to security reasons (Chassot et al. 2010). The 
IOTC reported that the tuna catch in the region during the piracy period was reduced and that 
Somalian piracy could have been one of the causes of decrease in catch and reduction of 
active vessels (e.g. IOTC 2012a: 38 and IOTC 2014: 39). Fishing effort remained reduced 
until 2011, when the security situation had improved.  
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Since 2011, as tuna vessels returned to the WIO, the production of tuna steadily increased in 
the region (IOTC 2016a). The effort also increased for all foreign industrial fleets. Between 
2010 and 2016, the number of purse seiners in the WIO region has increased by 53%, and the 
number of supply vessel that help locate the tuna increased from 7 in 2010 to 26 in 2016 (MU 
33). Anecdotal stories from the field said that the event of piracy allowed the tuna to re-
flourish in the region. This increased its availability for the years after and with that the 
number of vessels fishing in the region. Stories by different actors included statements such 
as “there is a lot of fish in the canal this year, because of the pirates, the resources could rest 
and rebound” (MD 42) or “the piracy had a major impact in reducing the numbers of boats 
coming in the WIO region” (SE 31) and “the piracy events between 2008 and 2012 almost 
closed the fishing which relieved the pressure on resources” (SK 02). This is an illustration of 
how the health of the tuna stock can then be influenced by socio-political practices such as 
piracy that took place far from national waters but had direct consequences to the tuna 
accessed in those waters. The frantic race to fish since the stop of piracy is also seen by some 
as one of the reasons why the yellowfin tuna stock collapsed in 2015 (SK 02).  
Those two examples show how fishing and other practices happening in the large Indian 
Ocean can affect the fish, its stock but also its intrinsic nature. The undisciplined tuna is 
conquered by technology through FADs and the health of its stock impacted by a socio-
political event. They illustrate how the materiality of tuna and tuna as benefits can be shaped 
by technology and social practices in the fishery.  
A mapping of access infused by materiality and the role of non-humans 
Looking back at the theory of access and the inputs of materiality as well as the role of the 
fish and the WIO, I argue that these two elements require more attention in the study of 
access to natural resources, particularly for mobile ones, migratory species, and the marine 
space. To do so, I suggest to enhance the theory of access of Ribot and Peluso by integrating 
the impacts of materiality and the role of non-humans, and highlighting their implication 
when mapping access to the resources.  This can be done at all three stages: introducing the 
implications of the biophysical aspects as well as socially constructed materiality of the 
resources to the benefits they produce, exploring co-production by considering the role of 
access mechanisms in producing materiality, and finally examining the role of fish and the 
WIO in shaping benefits and power relations (Figure 11) 
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Figure 11: A theory of access to tuna infused with materiality and the role of non-
humans 
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6.4. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
This chapter on access politics started by mobilising the classic theory of access of Ribot and 
Peluso. It then built on the framework to add materiality and the role of non-humans as 
components that influence different parts of the theory. In this conclusion section, I will 
highlight the winners and losers in the politics of access to tuna resources including by 
exploring structural settings that produce potential patterns. I will end this section with my 
reflection on the use of the theory of access and materiality to study tuna fisheries.  
6.4.1. Patterns of situated winners and losers  
After mapping access to tuna resources, I will now develop a bit further the power relations 
elements and discuss the impact of those relations on who benefits or not in the tuna fisheries. 
To do so, I will undertake a common task in political ecology, which is exploring potential 
patterns of winning and losing. Robbins (2012) mentions that political ecology stories “track 
winners and losers” (p. 87) and in this process “it is essential to understand the degree to 
which such outcomes are non-incidental, persistent, and repetitive: a structure of outcomes 
that produces losers at the expense of winners” (p. 87). In tuna fisheries, tracking patterns of 
winning and losing requires paying attention to access mechanisms that produce uneven 
benefits as well as the elements such as geographical scale that produce more situated 
outcomes (Figure 12).  
Structural winners and losers 
From the mapping of access above, we can highlight that three mechanisms produce 
structural losers and winners: knowledge, technology and capital. These three ultimately lead 
to a substantial difference in tuna catch between the foreign industrial segment and the 
national tuna fisheries.  
In terms of knowledge, while local fishers – from small-scale to semi-industrial – have many 
years of experience to locate the fish and various means to access the fishery, those are 
limited compared to the knowledge produced by the industrial sector where research 
institutes and advanced technology are available. Local fishers are then losing catches due to 
this structural differentiation. In terms of technology, the same persistent pattern of lack of 
availability to technology in the segment makes small-scale, and especially artisanal and 
semi-industrial fishers – as they fish further offshore – lose in the game of gaining tuna. 
While it can be argued that the distinction between the segments naturally produces different 
catches, what can be noticed is that coastal states have been engaged in the development of 
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their fisheries at the same time as allowing DWFNs into their waters. However, national 
technology investment, as well as national research institutes, lag far behind. The case of the 
Seychelles needs to be mentioned where some artisanal fishers have managed to move 
towards a semi-industrial exploitation and where the Seychelles Fishing Authority produces 
more detailed knowledge through reports and statistical bulletin on tuna fishing compared to 
its two neighbours. While DWFNs argue to have provided fisheries development to the 
coastal countries, it has not entirely produced an improved tuna fishery. The development of 
a national fishery in the three islands has been limited to non-existent. Despite some 
advancements in the fisheries in Mauritius and the Seychelles, weaker countries like 
Madagascar have failed to improve their national fisheries through fisheries development aid. 
This questions the discourse of DWFNs of bringing support to developing countries through 
access agreements. As for capital, the industrial sector has sustained access to capital through 
their own funds or through access to government funding. Local actors have much less access 
to capital, despite recent efforts of governments of the WIO like in the Seychelles and 
Mauritius. 
Situated and contextualised winners and losers 
The geographical space of the tuna exploitation in the WIO also produces injustices.  These 
are, however, situated and contextualised. They therefore need to be understood with a 
consideration of the socio-political context. They also need to be placed in the context of the 
benefits that are generated through the fishery.  
In the EEZ, relations of powers between foreign boats, local fishers and coastal state 
governments and the tuna are variable and localised. As foreign boats are required to have 
fishing access agreements to access the resources, they have to negotiate this access with 
coastal state governments, giving coastal states power over the management of tuna fishing 
and provides them the ability to determine conditions under which fishing by foreign boats 
takes place. The countries’ capacity to negotiate and the outcome of such negotiation are, 
however, different depending on the socio-economic context of the country. The Seychelles, 
for example, as a more developed nation with the most productive fishing ground and a key 
port for purse seiners can, to some extent, has a substantial leverage and higher capacity to 
negotiate conditions of access with DWFNs. Madagascar on the contrary relies rather heavily 
on DWFNs for aid and national budget (MD 78; pers. obs.) which can give the country less 
leverage in negotiations for access. The country can still be considered to be winning if one 
takes into account the value added of industrial tuna fishing combined with development aid. 
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For the case of the EU in Madagascar for example, the value-added from the EU tuna fishery 
in the country is estimated at about 4 million Euros a year (Caillart et al. 2018) and the 
amount of EU development aid that is provided annually is around 500 million Euros (SEAE 
2016). However, these socio-economic gains need to be weighed against the large amount of 
profit made by fishing firms and especially the sustainability of the tuna exploitation. The 
tunas, subject of the negotiations for access, are not winning, especially in the fact that they 
are widely traded resources despite the limited knowledge on their productivity and 
availability in national waters. For the case of the EU reference tonnage of catch for example, 
it cannot really reflect a ‘surplus’ of the existing stock as prescribed by Article 62 of the Law 
of the Sea, as such surplus has not been determined and as tunas are migratory and 
transnational. As such, the determination of the surplus at the national level appears 
unrealistic.  
In the territorial waters and the EEZ, the debate around competition over the resources also 
brings different arguments. While local fishers argue that industrial fleets strongly contribute 
to the reduction of fish available, industrial operators claim that industrial tuna vessels fish 
outside the 200 NM of territorial water which should not impede on local fishing activities. 
Here again, winners and losers are situated. DWFNs are not entitled to fish within territorial 
waters while local fishers are, which makes DWFNs not entitled to tuna in that marine space. 
However, for the three case studies, the competition exists between the semi-industrial fleets 
and the industrial fleet within the EEZ as they often fish in the same productive areas. 
Similarly, bycatch caught by purse seiners are often species that are caught by artisanal and 
small-scale fishers. Photos of landings of purse seiners in Madagascar and data from the 
USTA show that species such as skipjack, bigeye, kawakawa, and frigate tuna and non-tuna 
species such as barracudas and sharks are caught as bycatch by purse seiners and are also 
caught by small-scale and artisanal fisheries in Madagascar (USTA 2017, IOTC 2018d). Here 
then, local fishers can lose fish that are present in both the EEZ and the territorial waters.  
The situation in the high seas is different in terms of power relations. The distance of the high 
seas from the coastal states makes it difficult, if not impossible for local fishers of the WIO to 
fish in the high seas. The DWFNs with industrial boats are able to reach the high seas and 
catch tuna. The influence of technology and knowledge therefore put industrial vessels in a 
continuous winning position compared to coastal vessels with limited capacity. The high seas 
here engender some financial power to industrial fishing firms from the catch revenue they 
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obtain. The coastal states are currently unable to benefit from catches of the high seas nor 
revenues from the fish.  
As for overfishing, the different segments of the fishery make different arguments as to who 
is responsible for overfishing in the WIO region and more broadly the Indian Ocean. Small-
scale, artisanal and semi-industrial fishers argue that overfishing by the industrial fishing 
sector has affected local resources. On the other hand, DWFNs, especially at the Indian 
Ocean level, often argue that the catch of the small-scale and artisanal segments is not 
accurately portrayed as there is a lot of underreported catch from gears such as gillnets (BK 
05). Such claims by the industrial segment are valid to some extent. In some countries of the 
Indian Ocean that have substantial small-scale/artisanal tuna fisheries using methods such as 
gillnets, there is a limited knowledge on the catch and similarly for the small-scale fisheries’ 
catch in the three countries. However, in the case studies, small-scale fishers and artisanal 
fishers do not specifically target tuna. The Seychelles and Mauritius’s semi-industrial fleet 
composed of longliners has only recently grown in size. Madagascar has a limited number of 
longliners in its semi-industrial fleet and its artisanal fleet use hand line or trolling which lead 
to a low catch of tuna in the WIO and wider IO region. The argument of using overfishing to 
shift blame between the segments of the fishery is ultimately making tuna the main loser, as 
its stock may continue to reduce while debate continues on overfishing.  
The role of tuna here is worth mentioning. Through its movement across territorial waters, 
EEZs and the high seas, tuna (or, more precisely, the migrations of schools of different 
species) drives actors to gain or lose catches. While in the EEZs, coastal states only have a 
time-limited right to the tuna, whereas DWFN fleets can follow the fish across EEZs and to 
the high seas. In the high seas, while industrial boats have full right to exploit the resources, 
the tuna itself does not necessarily cooperate by making itself available to fish, either due to 
its migration or due to its productivity which can be high or low at different years. Here, the 
tuna and its materiality dictate where the vessels could go to follow it. The use of FAD 
technologies, however, suppresses this power by allowing vessels to increase their chances of 
catching tuna. In terms of fisheries management, adapting to this specificity of tuna is 
essential to ensure that benefits from the fisheries are maintained but also that the tuna is 
fished to a level that allows its long-term sustainability. At the country level, gathering 
knowledge about the presence of different tuna species can help fishers and fisheries’ 
departments to mobilise resources for fishing at certain periods of the year or to discuss the 
need to reduce access to the fishing during reproduction stages. At the regional Indian Ocean 
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level, fishing activities in the high seas where the fish travels could benefit from further 
surveillance to prevent illegal fishing. Another important aspect is a continued monitoring of 
the biological impacts of FADs on tuna species which could have unexpected impacts in the 
longer term.  
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Figure 12: Contextualised winners and losers within the arena of power relations 
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6.4.2. The contributions and limits of using the theory of access in tuna fisheries  
Using the theory of access of Ribot and Peluso (2003) to explore tuna fisheries in the WIO 
gave us a deeper understanding of the array of actors behind the fishery, their interactions, 
and the different power relations that form through the different mechanisms of access to the 
resources. Exposing rights-based access mechanisms showed that beyond direct revenues 
from the fishery, a range of indirect actors from intermediaries to port workers or coastal 
community members also benefit from it. Rights-based mechanisms are also a source of 
geopolitical interactions between countries that can influence development aid and 
development trajectories. My analysis of structural and relational mechanisms showed that 
beyond rights-based access mechanisms, tuna fishing is engineered by rooted knowledge, 
advanced technology and a multiplicity of social relations. These means of access generate 
power relations that are not fixed or permanent. Actors, through various mechanisms, 
depending on the socio-political contexts and interactions, have power over the tunas at 
specific temporal and spatial scales. 
The chapter also argues that materiality and the role of non-humans require more attention in 
the study of access to fluid resources such as the sea or highly mobile species, such as 
migratory species. The theory of access of Ribot and Peluso can be enhanced by making the 
role of non-humans and the influence of their materiality clearer when mapping access to the 
resources.  This could be done at all three stages:  
1. Introducing the implications of the materiality of the resources to the benefits produced. 
Here it is suggested that in the study of the benefits produced, the resource itself is looked at 
by exploring how its characteristics influence the quality and quantity of benefits that actors 
obtain. This is particularly relevant for mobile species to which the amount of benefits can 
vary according to the movement of the species. As seen in tuna with its migration and species 
diversity, those can influence the quantity of fish accessed and the potential financial gains.  
2. Exploring co-production by considering the role of access mechanisms in producing 
materiality. This process of co-production has been evident in the case of tuna fisheries where 
the characteristic of the fish has influenced access, but also how the fishing has changed the 
‘features’ of the fish. The resources and the mechanisms of its use do influence each other 
and co-produce both mechanisms and ‘new tuna’. This was also explored in other studies 
such as the one of American borders and the impact of the characteristics of the desert and 
wild animals on establishing and controlling borders (Sundberg 2011).  
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3. Examining the role of non-humans through the way their biophysical aspects as well as 
their socially constructed materiality shape power relations. As seen in tuna fisheries, power 
relations between DWFNs and host countries as well as between fishers in the different 
segments of the fishery have been engendered by the spatiality of the sea and how the 
resources move around the WIO. For mobile speices especially, power relations can shift and 
evolve with the species’ mobility giving some actors power over other actors in a specific 
time or place.  
The use of the theory of access also presented some limits in this thesis. I observed that using 
the theory of access can be difficult for a multiple-scaled study. One of the challenges lay in 
introducing the role of geopolitics in shaping access and influencing mechanisms of access. 
The theory, as originally proposed by R+P, was built on case studies where the geopolitical 
scale was less relevant, and less explicitly theorised. To use the theory requires a careful 
attention to the question of scale. While geopolitics will be addressed by the next chapter, it 
also plays an important role in access that could not be directly addressed by the theory of 
access. This was also due to the fact that tuna fisheries are a highly multi-stakeholder activity 
that strongly involve foreign firms and countries.   
Another remark considering my use of access theory is warranted.  While R+P’s list of 
structural mechanisms was not exhaustive or to be taken as exhaustive, the chapter attempted 
to explore most of them. This proved difficult at times, considering that the chapter covers 
the various segments of the fishery, three countries and a diversity of fishing actors. 
Addressing each mechanism for each country, segment and actor was not feasible. The 
chapter had to focus on the distinction between the segments of the fishery and using 
examples from the three countries when possible. This demonstrates the limit of the theory as 
more designed for a precise resource at a specific geographical location and also a resource 
from which benefits can be clearer to establish. It could have then been more beneficial to use 
the theory of access for a specific segment of the fishery in one country.     
Nevertheless, what the theory did allow me to do was to bring to light several often 
overlooked aspects of tuna fisheries, such as the people behind the fishery or the difficult 
balance of benefits. It can also help in enlarging discussions of access for similar types of 
mobile resources, being more mindful of the entanglement between human and non-human 
actors and the heterogeneity of means of access involved. 
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6.4.3. The contributions and limits of using materiality and the role of non-humans in 
studying tuna fisheries  
One of the main contributions of this Chapter on access is its consideration of materiality and 
the role of non-humans in the analysis of resource access. The enhanced theory showed that 
tuna as highly mobile and also co-produced can disrupt users’ efforts of management and 
requires concerted actions in a large geographical scale to be effective.  The materiality of the 
sea and tuna influence the management of access in the different EEZs and bring countries to 
compete for foreign revenues to get most of the benefits from these mobile tunas. On the 
other hand, it was also shown that tunas can be impacted by fishing practices that make the 
fish easier to find and catch in the current type of highly extractive type of exploitation of the 
resources in the industrial segment. By congregating under FADs, the fish makes industrial 
exploitation more effective. At the same time, these practices can have a destructive impact 
on the state of the resources.  Here the material fish is both an actant in how the fisheries are 
managed and the way it is accessed but is also heavily impacted by other actants’ fishing 
practices and management decisions. In the study of fisheries, having this double 
consideration allows a more diverse view on the role of the fish and users’ actions on the fish. 
Tuna fisheries, explored with the lens of materiality and the role of non-humans, are then co-
produced with the fish playing a non-negligible role in establishing access and management. 
The spatiality of the sea is also a key component to consider in the WIO region. As opposed 
to the South Pacific, in the WIO it is largely open to the high seas, making it more open to 
uncontrolled uses especially by the industrial sector. As explained in section 6.1., the 
application of materiality to industrial fisheries including for tuna has been explored before 
under other terms such as ‘environmental conditions of production’ (Campling and Havice 
2014). What the present chapter brings to light is that it is not merely environmental 
conditions, but access, management and materiality shaping each other. In an attempt to bring 
an improvement in policy as the ‘seed’ in political ecology, the use of materiality and the role 
of non-humans informs users that the fish and the ocean are important actants that shape their 
use. As it will be seen in Chapter 7, a strong collaboration of coastal states is needed to be 
able to face more powerful users of the tunas in the industrial segment. Similarly, the role of 
fishing practices on the state of the tunas resurfaces throughout the chapter. As seen in 
Chapter 5, the resources are declining, and as such the impacts of practices like FADs on the 
materiality of the fish require continuous advocacy in order to advance fisheries management 
and policy regarding tuna.  
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This attention and role I attribute the tuna including via materiality is not without its 
criticisms. For instance, Malm (2018) argues that attributing an active role to the non-humans 
distracts from the role of humans in the current state of affairs, at least in climate change. A 
point that could be made is that the use of materiality and non-humans here can is a 
distraction from the role of capitalist exploitation in access to resources. As argued by 
Campling (2012b), firms’ strategies and tariffs strongly determine access and management of 
the WIO tunas fisheries. The industrial exploitation of tuna in the WIO, currently the most 
substantial segment in the region in terms of catch, is the most impactful on the fish. One 
limitation of the theory of access enhanced by materiality and the role of non-humans could 
be the loss of focus on the role of drivers that are rooted in political economics such as capital 
and market in the state of resources. While those components are addressed in the classic 
theory of access, my argument was that they should be equally investigated along with 
materiality and the role of non-humans.  
A similar limit to this approach that can be raised is that the role of human actants and their 
decisions could be obscured. The focus on attributing agency to non-humans in the thesis 
could have prevented from a deeper analysis of decision-making on management at different 
levels. The thesis could have benefited from a detailed analysis of some actors’ involvement 
and decision-making at the different stages of the fisheries from fishing to management of 
access.  
In defence of this chapter, it can, however, be argued that the aim of the chapter is to produce 
this diversity of lenses to analyse the fishery as other aspects such as the political economic 
part and governance of the fishery have been largely addressed elsewhere, for example in 
Campling (2012a), Campling and Havice (2014) or in Lecomte et al. (2017).  
In conclusion to this chapter on access, I argue that using the theory of access and putting an 
emphasis on materiality and the role of non-humans has provided a view of the WIO tuna 
fisheries with a fuller spectrum. With the PE lens, the chapter shows that local and national 
stakeholders are at different times and spaces both winners and losers; the foreign industrial 
actors, steady winners; and the fish – or its sustainability in the future – a consistent loser. A 
deeper look at the role of the fish and the sea can bring more awareness of the susceptibility 
of tuna and the WIO as actants. It also helps to keep raising awareness on the impact of 
destructive practices towards natural resources. 
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CHAPTER 7. POTENTIALITIES AND CHALLENGES TO 
REGIONALISM THROUGH TUNA FISHERIES 
“Au moment de conclure ce message sur une note d’espoir et de 
satisfaction, je tiens à remercier aussi, au nom de notre organisation 
régionale, l’engagement constant de l’Union Européenne à nos côtés 
depuis 2007; un engagement d’importance, à la hauteur des intérêts 
européens dans ce secteur et dans cette partie du monde.” 
Discours de Monsieur Jean Claude de L’Estrac, Secrétaire Général de 
la Commission de l’Océan Indien. 6 Juin 2016. 
As tuna resources move between the EEZs of the countries of the WIO, fishing boats operate 
across territorial boundaries, and the management of the tuna fishery is guided at a 
supranational level, ‘regionalism’ would seem to be an important entry point. From the 
activity of fishing the highly mobile tuna to the regional management of the tuna resources, 
countries of the region have had long-term economic and socio-politic interactions. In 
addition to that, the WIO region and especially the sub-region of the three countries studied – 
the Southwest WIO – have for a while been engrained in a regional rhetoric of belonging to 
the ‘Indianoceania’, a sub-region that shares the Southwest Indian ocean, as well as common 
values and cultures. The Indianoceania identity, conveyed since 1985 by the 
intergovernmental Indian Ocean Commission, is promoted as bringing countries together to 
collaborate on various fronts. In this regional context, this chapter aims to investigate if tuna 
fisheries in the WIO have contributed to this regional cooperation and identity. To this end, 
this chapter will answer the research question: how does the tuna fishery bring countries to 
cooperate or compete and does the fishery contribute to the building of a regional identity? 
To respond to this question, I will highlight the existing initiatives of regionalism in tuna 
fisheries, which have had successes and failures over the years. To understand the challenges 
to enacting regionalism in tuna fisheries, I use geopolitical political ecology as a lens of 
analysis. The chapter will proceed as follows.  
I start with a presentation of the theoretical foundations of the chapter. I first discuss my use 
of the concept of regionalism. I then expand on the framework of geopolitical ecology, a 
theoretical lens combining regional political ecology and geopolitical economy (Bigger and 
Neimark 2017; Galt 2016; Glassman 2017). In the study of tuna fisheries of the WIO, where 
an important part of the catch is caught by DWFNs, geopolitics between coastal countries and 
DWFNs constitute a key element in the discussion of regional interactions.  
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The chapter continues with a section that illustrates how regionalism is manifested within 
tuna fisheries. It first presents the existing regional identity, which does not necessarily 
feature tuna fisheries at its centre. The section continues by dissecting the existing regional 
cooperation initiatives within which countries of the region have collaborated in tuna 
fisheries as well as the various attempts at building a regional tuna fleet. I will show that such 
regional initiatives often fail or have had relative successes.   
The third part of the chapter consists of explaining the challenges that countries of the WIO 
face to achieve regionalism through tuna fisheries. Through the lens of geopolitical ecology, I 
unveil the role of geopolitics in impeding current initiatives of regional cooperation in the 
WIO and its impact on the management of tuna fisheries. The analysis will also show that 
economic interests, lack of involvement of countries and lack of local integration of a 
regional identity are factors that hinder regionalism.  
To conclude, from the empirical data and interactions with stakeholders, I propose some 
pathways through which regional cooperation and identity could be reinforced within tuna 
fisheries. This requires interventions at different levels and especially within each segment of 
the fishery. I end the chapter by providing my reflection on the use of political ecology – 
extended to geopolitical ecology – to explore regionalism and present the contributions and 
limits of the framework.  
7.1. USING GEOPOLITICAL ECOLOGY TO EXPLORE REGIONALISM  
Political ecology is generally known as a framework that analyses natural resources access 
and management from the perspective of resource managers, often rooted at the local level 
(Robbins 2012). However, it has also evolved to explore more the impact of broader factors 
and processes beyond local scale (Simon 2016). Since the tuna fisheries of the WIO take 
place within and beyond local borders, studying regionalism and regional dynamics requires 
moving beyond locally centred analysis. To this end, I will use here a recently developed part 
of political ecology that focusses on the role of global processes and geopolitical institutions 
in environmental change and management. This geopolitical lens will help understand the 
challenges facing countries of the WIO to implement regionalism. After a description of how 
I use regionalism, the section will develop more the theoretical framework of geopolitical 
ecology.  
 
  207 
7.1.2. The concepts of region, regionalism and the making of regional identity in political 
ecology 
Before delving into the discussion of the theoretical framework used here, it is useful to 
define the concepts of region and regionalism as used in this chapter. Geographers often 
define the region as a delimitation of space within which a dominant criterion is present 
(Baud et al. 2013; Levy and Lussauld 2013). Other definitions include administrative 
delimitation within a country or places that are linked by homogeneous characteristics such 
as natural features, history and culture or by common interests and needs (Baud et al. 2013; 
Bufon 2010; Rangan and Kull 2009). Furthermore, as Simon puts it, “regions are 
performative and capable of doing work analytically, discursively and materially” (Simon 
2016: 199). Here my use of the Western Indian Ocean region refers to the space where 
countries are linked by the western part of the Indian Ocean. As discussed at the start of 
Chapter 4, the delimitation of the WIO of the region is not fixed and neither is the 
delimitation of the Indianoceania or the Southwest Indian Ocean. The former seems to cover 
the countries of the IOC and the latter, while also covering the countries of the IOC, goes 
further to East African countries until the horn of Africa and to the East until the Maldives. I 
will use both terms in the chapter as the three countries are considered in both delimitations. 
Through examples drawn from tuna fisheries, I particularly focus on this sub-region where 
geographical conditions along with cultures and especially tuna resources are shared.  
Regarding regionalism, a common definition of the term involves the idea of mutual 
dependency of countries in the same region (Hurrell 2009; Ronni 1997). This regional 
interdependency of countries is then manifested through various regional phenomena such as 
regional identity, interstate cooperation, economic regionalisation or regional cohesion 
(Hurrel 2009). To answer the research question of this chapter regarding the role of tuna 
fisheries in the WIO regionalism, my use of regionalism as a concept refers here to two 
different, though related, dynamics.  I particularly focus on regional cooperation between 
countries, while also looking at the social construction of a regional identity through 
contextualised practices and narratives (Paasi 2003; Tarte 2014). The choice of these two 
components stems from my observation during the time of the research of the way tuna 
fisheries are embedded within regional discourses and practices. For a start, tuna resources 
are depicted as the ‘shared wealth’ of the Indianoceania and the WIO (De l'Estrac 2016; 
Obura et al. 2017). More importantly, the management of the tuna resources is decided at the 
supranational level of the Indian Ocean within regional platforms such as the Indian Ocean 
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Tuna Commission (IOTC) or the Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission (SWIOFC). 
Within those platforms, countries are prompted to cooperate for the conservation of the 
resources and the management of fishing activities. It therefore appears relevant to analyse 
regionalism through these two components and show the dynamics that tuna fisheries 
generate in these regional processes. 
In the studies of tuna fisheries, regionalism has been widely discussed in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) region but has received less interest in the WIO region. Most 
tuna studies that address the regional question in the WIO are embedded within studies of 
regional dynamics and processes at the IOTC (Abolhassani 2017; Kaplan et al. 2014; Sinan 
and Bailey 2019). In contrast to the WCPO, where tuna is interlocked within EEZs, the 
Western Indian Ocean and especially its southern part is adjacent to a large high sea area. The 
tuna resources largely migrate between EEZs and the high seas. In this geographical setting, 
regionalism in the WIO through tuna fisheries can be difficult to establish and might have 
been the reason for the fewer number of studies looking at this regional phenomenon. The 
regional experience of the WCPO is, however, still worth mentioning. Countries of the 
Pacific region have succeeded to create regional management platforms to manage their 
fishery or to cooperate together in access negotiations (Tarte 2014). Countries of the Pacific 
region have also gathered together by environmental interest - the sustainability of tuna 
resources and currently the issue of sea-level rise and climate change, as well as political 
concerns - regaining sovereign rights over the resources and managing outsiders with an anti-
colonialism vision (Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1989; Schurman 1998). A regional identity has 
emerged from the need of countries to reappropriate and control their resources after the 
decolonisation process (Cicin-Sain 1989; Tarte 2014). Finally, studies have also investigated 
the role of local populations in this regionalism and presented the differentiated involvement 
of local populations (Alexander 1997). In the West and Central Pacific Ocean, Pacific Island 
Countries (PICs) have also managed to effectively cooperate as a group in their Vessel Day 
Scheme (VDS) negotiations with DWFNs (Fry and Tarte 2015; Havice 2013). This has 
allowed PICs to negotiate fishing access agreements with DWFNs as a group of countries. As 
the tuna targeted by purse seiners – skipjack and juvenile yellowfin – are present with EEZs 
of these countries, DWFNs have to cooperate with at least one PIC and comply with the VDS 
to be economically profitable. This diversity of the manifestations of regionalism in the 
WCPO shows that tuna fisheries can be a catalyst for regionalism in the right geographic and 
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socio-political setting. It is therefore of interest to investigate how the tuna fisheries in the 
WIO can foster or impede regionalism. 
7.2.3. Contributing to a geopolitical ecology of tuna fisheries  
As discussions of regionalism are transnational and also involve foreign fishers, governments 
operating in an international geopolitical sphere, and regional institutions, it appears relevant 
to use a theoretical framework that addresses the question of regions and also brings in 
broader geopolitical and economical elements of analysis. In this section I will look at 
regionalism and more precisely regional cooperation and identity by building a framework of 
geopolitical ecology, which takes insights from regional political ecology and geopolitical 
economy.  
Regional Political Ecology (RPE) has been interested in the idea of the region through a 
range of conceptual lenses. Originally established to integrate the local use of resources with 
broader structural processes and environmental conditions (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987), it 
has evolved to include discussions of how scalar dynamics politicise environmental problems 
at the regional level (Rangan and Kull 2009) and investigations of the discursive construction 
of regions and regional classifications (Galt 2016; Simon 2016). Recent debates in regional 
political ecology have highlighted the relevance of considering regional approaches either 
within a country or at a meso-scale level (McKinnon and Hiner 2016). Some interesting 
questions raised in these discussions include “the possibilities and constraints created by the 
regional biophysical environment” for agriculture and food systems and the role of 
stakeholders such as households, communities and the state in shaping productive conditions 
(Galt 2016). RPE therefore allows researchers to explore how the characteristics of the region 
shape processes, here regional cooperation and identity building through tuna fisheries.  
To address questions of geopolitics, developing a “geopolitical ecology” of tuna fisheries 
appears important. Various definitions could be made based on its two parts components – 
geopolitics and political ecology. Bigger and Neimark (2017) use geopolitical ecology as a 
conceptual framework to combine strengths from both fields and “gain a deeper 
understanding of the role of large geopolitical institutions […] in environmental change.” 
(ibid:14). In line with the regional political ecology definition of considering broader political 
economy processes, they put geopolitics alongside with political economy and aim to “find 
synergies between political ecologists' careful attention to multi-scale environmental politics 
and the discursive-material co-constitution of global institutional geopolitics” (ibid:14). The 
understanding of geopolitics here is one of “struggles for political dominance” as well as 
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“attempts to make, organise, dominate and control particular spaces, most notably now the 
spaces of the global neoliberal economy” (Dalby 2013: 38). This framework appears 
especially pertinent in examining the role of entities like the EU or countries like Japan that 
are central geopolitical actors in the Indianoceania while also having their fleets fishing in the 
region. It also allows an investigation of the potentialities of regionalism through tuna 
fisheries, in the current socio-political context of the region. 
Another component I integrated to the geopolitical ecology of tuna fisheries is ‘geopolitical 
economy’, a concept that focusses on “the intertwining of the geopolitical and the socio-
spatial” and calls attention to “the socio-spatial variegation and complexity of political 
economic processes, not simply emphasis on the importance of the global scale” (Glassman 
2017: 408). Within this framework, Glassman suggests giving more attention to three 
aspects: the flexibility of socio-spatial relations through the “deep intertwining of 
geographical political economy and geopolitics”, the recognition of states as “institutional 
ensembles rather than allegedly unified actors ruling over unified blocks of territory”, and the 
flexibility of “concrete state practices” (ibid: 412). For the case of tuna fisheries, Havice and 
Campling have highlighted the role of power relations at the nexus of state and market. They 
also showed how the current fisheries crisis has been driven by the continued central role of 
the state in harnessing continued expansionary and volume-driven extractivist logics (Havice 
and Campling 2017). Therefore, this added component to the theoretical framework for this 
chapter allows a better consideration to the States’ practices in the SWIO tuna fisheries and 
their role in the current management of the resources. It also considers the role of spatial 
configuration in shaping the geopolitics and political economy of tuna fisheries.  
7.2. PAST AND CURRENT REGIONALISM THROUGH TUNA FISHERIES IN 
THE SWIO  
To analyse the extent to which there is regionalism in tuna fisheries, I will start by describing 
the current regional identity of ‘Indianoceania’ that is promoted within the region. I will then 
continue by highlighting examples of past and present regional cooperation that have 
involved tuna fisheries. These examples will illustrate how countries have collaborated – or 
not – through tuna fisheries, namely in two attempts to set up a regional fleet and recently a 
regional association of local fishers. I will also discuss two cases that, despite being seen as 
regional cooperation successes, are strongly tainted by external influences.  
7.2.1. The ‘Indianoceania’ identity and the Indian Ocean Commission   
For the three islands studied, discussions of regional identity go in hand with looking at the 
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Indian Ocean Commission, which is the main vehicle of such identity. The sociocultural 
foundation for an ‘indianoceanic’ regional identity is often depicted by the IOC as leading to 
regional cooperation on different fronts. When it comes to tuna fisheries, however, existing 
regional initiatives have mainly involved technical collaborations. 
The Indian Ocean is typified as “a space of trade” (Steinberg, 2001). It has experienced 
exchanges of goods, people, animals and plants over thousands of years (Beaujard 2005; 
Boivin et al. 2013; Fuma 2013). The Southwest part of the Indian Ocean is a discrete – and 
somewhat more marginal – region in these historical networks of exchange around the rim of 
the ocean (Beaujard 2005, Moorthy and Jamal 2010). The Seychelles and the Mascarene 
islands are thought to be uninhabited before European colonialism. Commonalities between 
the countries of the region include their insular characteristic, their strong colonial history 
and the different waves of settlements from Africa, south and southeast Asia (Hoarau 2013; 
IOC 2013b). They have been called the ‘Latin Quarter’ of the Indian Ocean, due to the 
French presence, at one time or another, in all of the territories concerned. There are also sub-
regional commonalities within some of the islands. Mauritius, Reunion, Rodrigues and the 
Seychelles have an established creole culture that links its people through some roots of 
languages, cuisine, music and dance, that is not seen in Comoros or Madagascar (IOC 2013). 
Similarly, the region has different levels of settlements. While all the islands have seen the 
arrivals of Afro-Malagasy slaves then Indian workers, a much higher proportion of Indians 
are present in Mauritius, Reunion and the Seychelles compared to Madagascar and Comoros 
(Sellström 2015).  
As a result of these commonalities, it might be expected that an “indianoceanic” space be 
cultivated amongst people in the region. This is based on shared history, identity, cultural 
heritage, and development aspirations amongst the islands of Comoros, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Mayotte, Reunion, Rodrigues, and the Seychelles. The “indianoceanic” identity is 
promoted by the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) in various forms. They include events such 
as regional the “Prix Indianoceanie”, an annual call for literary works in the region (IOC 
website39), through reports that promote a shared heritage in the Indianoceania (IOC 2013b; 
Jauze 2016), or through the branding of the IOC in its website and various publications 
gathering the islands of the region under the Indianoceania (see for example illustration 17).  
 
39 https://www.commissionoceanindien.org/portfolio-items/prix-indianoceanie-2019/. Accessed January 08th, 
2020.  
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Illustration 17: Promotion of the ‘Indianoceania’ by the IOC on its facebook page 
 
In addition to this regional identity promotion, the IOC has also been a catalyst of regional 
cooperation. Regarding tuna fisheries in particular, the IOC has been the source of several 
technical collaborations under its promotion of a regional “smart economic growth”. Three of 
them can be presented here: SMARTFISH, “des thons et des hommes” and the Regional 
Fisheries Monitoring Program (PRSP, or Programme Régional De Surveillance Des Pêches). 
The SMARTFISH program, while led by the IOC and its members, covered 20 countries 
throughout Eastern and Southern Africa – Indian Ocean region (ESA-IO) and aimed at 
improving capacities for the sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources. It included two 
phases 2011-2014 then 2015-2018. While the program had a variety of projects relating to 
fisheries in general, it also included projects that were specifically linked to tuna fisheries 
(Table 25).   
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Table 25: Sample of tuna-related projects under the SMARTFISH program of the IOC  
Project Objective 
Collaboration with the IOTC  Providing IOC member countries training to comply with the Port 
State Measure Agreement and IOTC conservation measures 
Regional action plan on SWIO coastal 
tuna fisheries   
Increase entrepreneurship amongst coastal tuna fishers through 
modernisation of technics, marketing strategies, management of 
governance and innovative funding  
Regional Plan for Fisheries Surveillance 
in SouthWest Indian Ocean  
Establish a common regional strategy for surveillance operations, 
pooling of means, information, and know hows 
Regional scientific observer program  Training scientific observers from the SWIO region to collect 
scientific and catch data on tuna and tuna-like species on tuna 
vessels 
Bycatch awareness program  Raising awareness amongst fishing fleets regarding bycatch in tuna 
fisheries and management measures 
Source: IOC 2011, 2013a, 2015a, 2016c, 2018b 
Second, the documentary series “Des thons et des Hommes”, funded by the EU and 
commissioned by the IOC in 2015, included a series of short documentaries (20mins) about 
tuna fishing in the three islands, Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles. While the 
documentaries attempted to discuss both coastal and offshore fishing, their outcome was 
mainly focussed on the economic impacts of the European industrial tuna fishing in the 
SWIO region. Through interviews of fishing authorities, processing companies, IOTC staff 
members, scientific experts and local fishers, the documentaries presented the importance of 
industrial tuna fishing for the three islands and discussed the existing management measures 
of tuna resources in the region (IOC 2015b).  
Third, the regional monitoring and surveillance program or PRSP is one of the most 
successful projects of the IOC. The program started in 2007 and is mainly funded by the EU. 
It encompasses a system of satellite data sharing as well as a regional surveillance in the 
waters of countries members of the IOC. Each country member has patrolling agents from 
their respective countries as well as patrolling vessels and boats that are jointly used for 
surveillance in the WIO region (IOC 2015d). In the past ten years, the program has been 
considered as having drastically diminished illegal fishing in the region through “45 regional 
patrols, 930 hours of air surveillance and more than 70 offences recorded” (IOC 2016d). 
As it can be seen in these tuna-related projects, the IOC has been instrumental in prompting 
technical collaboration between the three islands. It has prompted the creation of a network of 
scientific observers and fishing inspectors. It has also attempted to harmonise the 
management of tuna fisheries in the SWIO region by helping countries comply with the 
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IOTC measures or by establishing regional strategies of monitoring or an action plan for the 
coastal tuna fisheries. These collaborations have brought not only governments to cooperate 
in the adoption of policy, including for tuna fisheries, but also, it has brought technicians and 
representatives of fisheries departments in different divisions to work together on various 
projects. Here, regionalism, through regional cooperation, is materialised through highly 
technical involvements of both government and fisheries department’s representatives.  
7.2.2. Attempts to establish a regional industrial tuna fleet  
Despite the existence of technical collaboration between the three countries, an area where 
regionalism has been a hard sell was the establishment of a regional industrial fleet. The story 
of two regional projects in the 1980s and 1990s will be presented here as illustration. They 
demonstrate that in WIO tuna fisheries there has been historically a lack of regional interest, 
strong national interests that have surpassed a regional spirit, and initiatives that have been 
reliant on donors with limited interests on the viability of projects.  
Tuna fisheries represents an important economic opportunity for the WIO. For that reason, 
countries of the region have aspired to have national fleets as well as a regional fleet that 
targets tuna and would be operated jointly by the countries. The first option being high in 
cost, Mauritius and the Seychelles have managed to maintain an industrial fleet only through 
flagging of EU and Asian vessels. Also, so far, only the Seychelles has managed to steadily 
develop its semi-industrial sector. Mauritius has flagged semi-industrial vessels and 
Madagascar has a handful of semi-industrial national boats that do not only catch tuna but 
also other pelagic and demersal species (GoMa 2017, GoMU 2017).  The second option, of 
establishing a regional fleet, has been attempted a few times since the 1980s.  
One attempt at establishing a regional tuna fishery was an IOC project, the regional tuna 
project “Projet thonier regional” under the management of a regional entity called the 
“Association thonière”. The association was established in 1987 by the IOC with the aim of 
operating an industrial fleet in the region, from the collaboration of the five islands 
(Comoros, France (Reunion island), Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles). The project 
was initiated in 1990, with funding from the European Economic Community. It started with 
a first phase that lasted two years with diverse objectives including the operation of a regional 
industrial vessel, establishment of FADs, data collection, tagging and observers (Association 
Thonière 1990). The five island countries were each in charge of a part of the operation. 
Madagascar was in charge of coordination of the association and FAD management, 
Mauritius was in charge of environmental and data analysis, the Seychelles were to operate 
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the tuna vessel and Comoros in charge of FAD management and training (Illustration 18). In 
its second phase, the project removed its focus on the establishment of a regional tuna 
operation and broadened its scope to the development of all segments of the fishery 
(artisanal, semi-industrial, industrial). The industrial segment was focussed on improving 
effectiveness of existing port infrastructures and the coordination of tuna operators. The 
second phase also included an emphasis on research regarding monitoring of population 
dynamics and tuna environment. It also included a focus on training: the management of 
FADs and fishing techniques for the small-scale fishery, the training in longline technique in 
Mauritius and the Seychelles and a training of technical crew members embarked on 
European industrial vessels (IOC 1995). After an investment of around 11 million Euros from 
the European Economic Community (EEC) and 1,5 million Euros from the IOC members, 
the project lasted about five years and ended in 1995. The closing of the project was due to 
lack of funding, difficulties in operating the industrial vessel and lack of interest from 
countries, notably with the Seychelles pulling out of the project at the end of the first phase 
(IOC 1995). During the 2017 fieldwork, one government representative that took part in the 
project was interviewed about the project and explained: 
“I was part of the Association thonière. The project stopped because there was no 
funding left. Also, the trials we did were not conclusive on the tuna vessel, we did 
not catch many tuna, just a few numbers. Then, the project wanted to develop 
national fleets, it was a failure because national actors were not motivated nor 
interested in the end. It stayed too scientific for stakeholders. This country is a 
‘trial country’, all we do is trials. In the end the sea is not for the poor countries” 
(MD 55) 
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Illustration 18: Role of each IOC member under the regional tuna project 
 
Source: Synthesis report of the regional tuna project Phase I. Archive of the Malagasy Ministry of 
fisheries in Antananarivo 
Another attempt was through the creation of the Western Indian Ocean Tuna Organisation 
(WIOTO) that was initiated by the Seychelles in 1991 and included other IO countries such 
as Comoros, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, the Seychelles, 
Sri Lanka and Tanzania.  The WIOTO wanted to mirror the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries 
Agency (FFA) and have a regional control of access to the tuna grounds (Campling 2012a; 
POSEIDON 2014). The aims of the WIOTO were to increase revenue from tuna resources 
and improve cooperation between countries on policies, surveillance and mutual access. 
However, the organisation did not last due to lack of interests from a majority of the members 
and due to geopolitical pressure from France in undermining the potentiality of the 
organisation at the international level (Campling 2012a).           
These two attempts to establish a regional tuna fleet failed due to various factors, including 
technical difficulties, lack of financial and other means, and geopolitics. The interviewee 
cited above also mentioned that at a time of the trials at sea, the tuna catch was quite low 
(MD 55). It can, however, be highlighted that there is one common driver that prevented the 
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advancement of these initiatives: the variable implication and limited interest by regional 
countries. As early as the 1990s, it was apparent that countries, while interested by the idea of 
a regional tuna exploitation, were not fully engaged towards its implementation. They were, 
however, highly involved in the development of their own port infrastructures and tuna 
canneries. Another point to notice here is the involvement of the EU in the attempt to 
establish a regional tuna fishing while its fleet was also entering the SWIO region to fish at 
the same time. It already showed the important geopolitical role the EU was playing in the 
region for tuna fisheries. It was helping the countries to develop their fisheries, even though 
with limited success due to the time and funding limits of these activities. One could also 
argue that the EU in the end had no real interest in developing a regional fishery for the 
coastal states. The end of the project removed competition from a regional industrial tuna 
fishing and contributed to protecting EU interests as their fleets were starting operations in 
the SWIO. The two examples expose the weak and recurrent short-lived regional cooperation 
that takes place through tuna fisheries. 
7.2.3. Involving small-scale fishers in regional tuna fisheries management  
Only recently, have regional initiatives appeared to involve local tuna fishers. Small-scale 
tuna fishing has long been absent in the regional agendas of the WIO, and so have its small-
scale tuna fishers. As illustrated in the previous section, since the arrival of industrial fishing 
in the early 1980s, the focus of countries and the IOC have been on the development of 
industrial fleets. In the past ten years, with the increased importance given to small-scale 
fisheries at the global level, activities of small-scale fishers have received more interest and 
led to international initiatives such as the creation of the confederation of professional 
organisations in the artisanal maritime and continental fisheries of Africa (CAOPA) in 2010 
or the publication of the FAO Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale 
Fisheries in 2015 (FAO 2015). In this context, regional initiatives have usually been led by 
external actors such as NGOs or intergovernmental entities. As will illustrate the case of the 
FPAOI below, this regional cooperation of fishers, while an important step for the integration 
local perspectives in the regional fisheries management, is also fragile from its dependency 
on external actors.  
The IOC, under its SMARTFISH program, mainly funded by the EU, supported in 2015 the 
development of a federation of professional associations of small-scale fishers of the Indian 
Ocean (FPAOI for ‘Fédération des Pêcheurs Artisans de l’Océan Indien’). By 2017, the 
FPAOI included 18 professional organisations and associations representing artisanal fishers 
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in the five member countries (FPAOI 2017). The aim of the federation, according to a press 
release, is “to allow an efficient and informed participation of fishers to decision-making 
processes regarding the management of fisheries in the Southwest Indian Ocean” (IOC 
2015c). While the activities of the Federation are aimed at fisheries in general, it is also 
involved in activities linked to tuna fisheries in particular.  
Two examples of activities can be mentioned here. First was a workshop in 2018 entitled 
“The Coastal Tuna Fisheries Retreat” where the Federation brought its members together 
with other fishers and tuna stakeholders of the SWIO region to discuss the modernisation of 
the coastal tuna fishery (IOC 2018a). From the workshop and based on those themes, 
participants to the workshop adopted the 1st regional action plan for coastal tuna fisheries in 
the SWIO region (IOC 2018b). The plan was described by one of the members of the FPAOI 
as “in line with the aspiration of the FPAOI to make the tuna fisher a business man” and to 
bring a harmonised vision in the way coastal tuna fisheries are developed in the WIO region 
(ibid). The second example is the involvement of the FPAOI at the IOTC. Since its admission 
as an observer at the IOTC in 2016 and led mainly by Keith André, the president of the 
federation and a tuna fisher in the Seychelles, members of the FPAOI have also undertaken 
advocacy at the IOTC for better tuna management. Issuing statements to the members of the 
commission and advocating for the importance of tuna fisheries to small-scale fishers by 
publicly intervening during plenary debates, the FPAOI has brought more voices of the 
small-scale fishery to the IOTC. When interviewed about this involvement at IOTC, one 
member of the FPAOI declared:  
“the presence of small-scale fishers at the IOTC has helped the adoption of 
more management measures since 2016, we have expressed the high stake that 
the fisheries represent for us, for our livelihoods and for food security” (SE 
47).  
In 2017, the FPAOI strongly advocated for the reduction of the number of FADs to be used 
in IO as well as the reduction of supply vessels and fishing capacity in general (FPAOI 
2017). At the 2018 commission meeting, a member of the FPAOI spoke at the plenary to 
criticise the historical catch approach of DWFNs in discussions of allocations, alleging that it 
impeded the management efforts of coastal states (pers. obs.).  
These activities of the FPAOI effectively bring fishers’ representatives together and involves 
them in policy-making. Since its creation in 2015, and mainly through the leadership of 
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members in the Seychelles, coastal tuna fishers have increased their presence in the broader 
Indian Ocean tuna fisheries’ scene. This presence has led to more local perspectives being 
heard at the broader regional level of the Indian Ocean fisheries management. While only on 
paper so far, the establishment of an action plan for coastal tuna fisheries represents an 
important step for small-scale fishers in gaining more interests and funding for tuna-related 
activities.  
Three important points, however, need to be highlighted here. First is that the principal 
source of funding for FPAOI activities as of 2018 is the EU through the IOC. The ability of 
FPAOI members, the fishers, to undertake activities is dependent on this funding. This may 
be problematic. The EU is the same actor that fiercely negotiates within the IOTC to adopt 
measures that are less beneficial to the local fishers of the region (Sinan 2018) or that 
increases its fishing opportunities in countries’ EEZs at a questionable price (Standing 2016). 
This indirect dependency on an actor with sometimes conflicting interests represents a 
paradox for the Federation’s viability in the longer term. Funding from the EU on these types 
of projects is typically for limited periods of around five years. If funding for the FPAOI 
follows this pattern, in 2020 the federation will face an issue of funding its activities.  
A second point is the representativeness of tuna fishers within the federation. Since so far 
most of the activities have been attending workshops and meetings, one question that can be 
raised is the actual voice of the federation. Regarding tuna especially, out of the three 
countries studied, the Seychelles has the most organized fishing association with local leaders 
carrying fervent claims against industrial tuna fishing in the national waters. In Mauritius, 
there are also local leaders that voice their concern against industrial fishing. A national 
federation of fishers does exist but is less vocal than the one of the Seychelles. Concerns 
regarding tuna resources are mostly emitted by individual fishers rather than by the federation 
(pers. obs.). In Madagascar, such leadership is marginal. Since the inception of the FPAOI, 
the Malagasy representative at the FPAOI has been the representative of a fishing association 
(called Association Tazara) in the east of the country, whose fishers are not focussed on tuna 
but rather on deep-sea fish (pers. obs.). From the fieldwork done in Madagascar in three 
different regions, tuna fishers are not aware of activities undertaken by the Malagasy 
representative at the FPAOI. Amongst the more than one hundred fishers interviewed, the 
FPAOI was only mentioned by the Association Tazara.  One question could therefore be the 
extent to which representativeness of tuna fishers within initiatives such as the FPAOI is 
ensured. This is especially relevant to maintain the long-term involvement of fishers in topics 
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and events that are discussed within the FPAOI. This issue of representativeness also 
represents a challenge for the IOC itself. As events are in English or in French and often 
discuss technical subjects in specialised terms, finding fishers speaking either of these 
languages and accustomed to technical discussions can be challenging. This probably 
explains the situation from the Malagasy part where meetings are attended more by an 
educated intermediary in the fishery rather than a tuna fisher with a lower level of 
understanding of regional and international management. It also explains the strong 
involvement and leadership coming from the Seychelles.  One significant missing link in the 
work of the IOC could therefore be ensuring that representatives to the FPAOI spread the 
knowledge and information gained at events to the broader number of tuna fishers in their 
countries.  
A third point that can be noticed in its fourth year of existence is the focus on policy that the 
FPAOI has chosen for its activity relating to tuna fisheries. While ensuring more voices from 
small-scale fishers is key to the management of the resources, interests of fishers are often 
difficult to sustain in the longer term without tangible activities that can increase their 
revenues or improve their fishing activities directly. This point can be supported by evidence 
from another initiative, the SWIOTUNA platform established by the WWF with other NGOs 
in the region in 2011. The platform gathers civil society organisations, private sector and 
fishers working on tuna in the SWIO region. The platform has as objectives to promote 
dialogue and promote collaboration towards sustainable management of the resources (WWF 
2017). It has resulted so far in yearly meetings discussing management and small initiatives 
that do not directly relate to local tuna fishing. It has then been difficult for fishers within the 
region to see the value of the platform in the region and get involved nationally (pers. obs). 
As explained by an interviewee, in charge of the SWIOTUNA project: 
“For the case of Madagascar, there is a great potential [in local tuna fishing] 
but it does not seem to be a priority for fishers, it seems that there are more 
important issues for them. Dealing with tuna requires work at high levels, at 
the policy level. It seems difficult to integrate that within the communities. In 
principle, they are not against the initiative”. (SK 01) 
As of 2019, the SWIOTUNA platform is in its 8th year of existence but has not been involved 
yet in the IOTC nor represented within other regional projects of the IOC or SWIOFC (pers. 
obs.). The existence of this parallel platform to the activities of the IOC also shows how 
dispersed activities are within the region, with the IOTC, the IOC and multiple NGOs having 
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each their own activities. Lack of coordination and especially limited activities around direct 
fishing activities have made initiatives in the region difficult to sustain.  
Here we can see that the FPAOI represents an important opportunity in building and 
reinforcing a regional identity amongst tuna fishers, through connecting small-scale fishers 
and building a regional voice in policy making. However, the current dependency of the 
Federation upon external funding, the challenges of increasing its reach to the dispersed tuna 
fishers of the region and its tuna policy-oriented focus could jeopardise its success. Without 
independent mechanisms to sustain itself and more direct activities linked to the fishing 
activities of the fishers, the future of the FPAOI could be uncertain. 
7.2.4. Success stories with grey areas  
Two regional initiatives need to be highlighted as they directly impact tuna fisheries. These 
are the regional surveillance and monitoring program and the reciprocal fishing agreement 
between Mauritius and the Seychelles. They can be seen as tangible examples of successful 
regionalism. While their success is in particular promoted by government officials, this 
section will argue that, despite the fact that they have brought countries to cooperate directly 
in tuna fisheries, this cooperation is reliant on support from geopolitical actors who also have 
a strong interest in the success of these initiatives.  
An EU-dependent regional surveillance monitoring 
The regional fisheries monitoring program (PRSP, or ‘Programme Régional De Surveillance 
Des Pêches’) is one of the flagship projects of the IOC. When asked about the program, 
officials from the department of monitoring and surveillance in the three islands 
acknowledged the improvement that the program has brought to the fight against Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in the waters of the IOC countries. One 
interviewee in Madagascar commented that “since PRSP, there is much less IUU fishing in 
our seas” (MD 37). Similar statements were made by officials in the two other countries. In 
2016, the EU committed another €1,5 million to support the program (IOC 2016d). At the 
governmental level, commitment of countries has also been very high. In 2017, a new 
declaration was made to confirm the interest of countries in pursuing the program and the 
fight against IUU (IOC 2017). As an interviewee from a monitoring centre expressed 
regarding governmental involvement: 
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“As soon as there is a common interest there is cohesion in the region. The protection 
of resources, for example, or the fight against IUU fishing represents a common 
interest. When it comes to revenues, it is another story.” (MD 37)  
The PRSP is then considered key to the sustainability of the Indianoceania fisheries and 
especially tuna. This importance of the program to the region is also highlighted in press 
releases of the IOC where representatives emphasise that: 
“the conservation and sustainable management of our fisheries resources is paramount 
to our economies. It is only by pooling our resources and means together [through 
PRSP for example] that our countries will be able to consolidate the fishing industry 
and protect the resource against pillage.” (IOC 2016d) 
or  
“the PRSP is the story of the evident willingness of countries to cooperate. The results 
of work since 2007 from this mechanism of combatting illegal fishing go far beyond 
what any country can do on its own” (IOC 2017)  
The PRSP program is therefore an example where regionalism is present through regional 
collaboration at government levels. Officials are committed to the program in their public 
discourse and at the people level where inspectors from the different countries of the region 
work together to undertake the patrolling. For tuna fisheries, monitoring and surveillance is 
key to fostering the revenue that the countries can get. The PRSP is therefore a good 
illustration where the common interest of fight against IUU and willingness to retain the 
value of tuna through good monitoring bring countries together at different levels.  
Two limitations need to be recognised here. The first one relates to the geographical reach of 
the program. The EEZ of Tromelin island, a contested territory between France, Madagascar 
and Mauritius is not covered the PRSP program and neither is the EEZ of Mayotte, the 
French territory that is also contested by Comoros (Illustration 19). This raises the question 
of the full efficiency of the program where some areas are not to be patrolled despite being in 
the middle of the IOC countries. As a migratory species, tuna travels around the different 
EEZs and beyond. If monitoring is not allowed in the grey areas, the loss of value from those 
areas in the region can be questioned.  
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Illustration 19: Coverage of the PRSP program 
 
In yellow: area covered; grey zones are French or contested territories. Source: IOC 2011 
A second point worth exploring is the involvement of the EU in the funding of the program 
and by extension its funding of the IOC activities. The contribution of the EU also serves its 
own interests since the French and Spanish boats dominate the regional purse seine fishery 
(Campling 2012a). The EU often describes its funding to the PRSP as an important one since 
“the programme is fully in line with the European Union's general guidelines on responsible 
and sustainable fisheries and regional cooperation” (IOC 2016d). This puts into question the 
argument that this is an example of regional interests coalescing. With its flagged vessels 
operating in the waters of the IOC members, and especially in the waters of the three 
countries studied, the funding of the PRSP largely benefit the fishing operators of the EU. 
Through the programme, the EU’s tuna catches are protected from other non-EU entities 
fishing illegally in the region. As one interviewee expressed, “countries have to be aware that 
the EU also gives us money to protect its own interest, they benefit from their own 
investment in the region” (MD 01). This contribution of the EU can also be questioned in 
terms of its use as leverage in other interactions of the EU with the coastal states such as 
fishing access agreements. Entanglements of countries with the EU are therefore multiple and 
can represent a powerful leverage that countries can find hard to negotiate against. The EU 
here becomes a catalyst of regionalism while also succeeding to protect its interests in 
ensuring access to fishing grounds for its fleet. 
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A regional reciprocity to the benefit of DWFNs 
Another successful collaboration within the SWIO region is the reciprocal Mauritius and the 
Seychelles fishing access agreements put in place since the 1990s (as seen in Chapter 6). 
While those agreements allow reciprocity in terms of fishing grounds, they cover boats that 
are foreign-owned but flagged in one or the other country. Foreign operators in the WIO 
region, mainly Spanish, French and Taiwanese, flag their boats from Mauritius or the 
Seychelles against a flagging fee. In the Seychelles for example, 13 purse seiners and 45 
longliners were put under the Seychelles flag for the year of 2015 (GoS 2016). Flagging can 
be seen as beneficial for both parties: first, it adds to the national fleet of the coastal countries 
while providing a flagging revenue. Second, it leads to foreign fleets having more vessels 
involved in the fishery beyond those under a bilateral agreement. One interviewee stated “the 
Spanish do double flagging as they prepare for the eventual measures that might stop them 
from fishing under their country’s flag” (MU 33). While these agreements do provide 
benefits to the countries involved, the involvement of DWFNs in the transaction can be 
questioned. This is highly relevant especially regarding the increase of their fishing capacity 
in the region at a time where the IOTC and its members are trying to implement measures to 
rebuild the tuna stock (IOTC 2017b). The fishing activities of those vessels also present other 
challenges, such as the difficulty of obtain accurate statistics of catch and effort, or the fact 
that they may fall under dubious tax regulations and ambiguous labour standards (Campling 
and Colás 2017). Here, the perceived successful cooperation between Mauritius and the 
Seychelles in tuna fisheries is only partly to the benefit of the two countries. Overall, below 
the surface of this cooperation lies fishing firms’ strategies to sustain access to fishing 
grounds and to ensure that economic benefits from the fisheries are fully extracted in the 
WIO region.   
In the two cases above, the closeness of the oceanic territories of the three countries 
prompted regional interventions with the aim of protecting the economic interests of coastal 
countries in fisheries. However, cooperation is paved with socio-economic and geopolitical 
obstacles. Existing successes remain dependent on external actors who ultimately benefit 
from both the collaboration and lack of regional agreement. In the current setting, 
regionalism through tuna fisheries is fuelled more by DWFNs than the countries. It has only 
been present within the short span of projects’ time and through the funding that are invested 
by external actors.  
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7.3. CHALLENGES TO REGIONALISM IN TUNA FISHERIES  
Through the above presentation of regional efforts in tuna fisheries, it is apparent that 
regionalism is often difficult to implement when it comes to tuna. Moreover, sustained 
regional initiatives are often tainted with influences from actors outside the region. This 
situation is due to the various geopolitical and socio-economic challenges that countries face 
in their management of the fisheries and conservation of the resources. To explore these 
challenges, the section will look at three scales: regional – investigating interactions between 
the countries involved in the fishery during negotiation of management measures, national –
 looking at the national economic interests that drive the lack of regionalism in the region, 
and local – looking at interactions between local users of the resources. With an approach 
combining regional political ecology and geopolitics, the aim is to explore the difficulties of 
building an identity and sustaining cooperation through tuna fisheries.  
7.3.1. Geopolitics as a persistent obstacle to regionalism 
This section will focus on interactions between countries involved in tuna fisheries in the 
Southwest IO region. Using the lens of geopolitical economy and aiming to contribute to a 
geopolitical ecology of tuna fisheries, it aims to contextualise and historicise the involvement 
of countries in tuna fisheries and the challenges of regionalism. It will do through looking at 
two interactions of countries that were observed during the fieldwork: the 8th Session of the 
Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission that took place in Antananarivo, Madagascar, 
28-31 March 2017 and the 22nd Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission that took 
place on 21–25 May 2018 in Bangkok, Thailand.  
Development aid and the WIO countries’ dependency on DWFNs   
One of the reasons that makes tuna fisheries a prime stage for geopolitics is the role of 
foreign development aid given by DWFNs to the countries of the Southwest IO and 
particularly to the three islands studied. The European Union, France, Japan, China and South 
Korea, amongst others, are major donors in those countries for development aid and fisheries 
aid. The EU is for example engaged in a national development aid program amounting to 518 
million Euros in Madagascar covering governance, infrastructure and rural development for 
the period of 2014 to 2020 (EU 2016a). On the Asian side, Japan’s development aid to 
Madagascar amounts to a yearly average of 7,5 million Euros and addresses a wide range of 
development areas such as agriculture, fisheries, health and education (JICA 2018). In 2017, 
it has contributed to the construction of various buildings including some related to fisheries 
in Madagascar and Mauritius. Most notably, Japan has invested 370 million Euros in the 
  226 
extension of the Port of Toamasina in Madagascar (Hanazaki 2017). Similarly, in 2017, 
South Korea donated more than 24 million Euros in equipment and vehicles for the risk and 
disaster centre of the Malagasy government (Présidence 2017). In Mauritius and the 
Seychelles, where the level of economic development is higher, there are also contributions 
from those DWFNs, even if it is to a lesser extent compared to Madagascar. Under the 11th 
European Development Fund for example, there was 9,9 million Euros program for Mauritius 
(EU 2016c) and a 2,2 million Euros program for the Seychelles (EU 2016b). Those 
contributions, even though they could be considered distant from the subject of tuna fisheries, 
have an impact on how coastal states interact with DWFNs and with each other. One 
interviewee in Madagascar made the statement “the money they give you, they will take it 
back in one way or another, tuna access agreement is one of them” (MD 01). As seen in the 
Pacific, for example, Japan’s development aid and diplomacy strategy were very much 
geared towards linking it to access to tuna resources by the Japanese fleet (Tarte 1995). 
Illustration 20: Inaugural sign for the extension of fisheries centre in Mauritius 
 
Photo by the author 
While there is limited research on the role of Asian development aid in access to fishing 
grounds in the IO and particularly in the Southwest WIO region, there is, however, physical 
evidence of this link. As seen in Illustration 20, it is not a trivial detail that Mauritius has a 
strong friendship with Japan. The island nation obtains donations of fisheries buildings while 
also being the most important port for Asian longliners, including the Japanese fleet.  
Fishing access agreements play a key role in the making of foreign aid. As seen in Chapter 6, 
a part of the financial contribution (labelled as sectoral support for the EU) is to be dedicated 
to the improvement of fisheries in the host countries. In the three countries studied, this 
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‘sectoral support’ has over the years contributed to the construction of different 
infrastructures such as fisheries buildings, port infrastructure or processing facilities 
(Illustration 21). It has also funded different projects within the departments of fisheries. 
Those include projects towards small-scale fisheries such as the registration of fishers or 
fishing equipment in Madagascar; the improvement of infrastructure for local ports, such as 
ice-making machines in the Seychelles, and improvement of patrolling capacity and fishing 
techniques such as fishing using anchored FADs in Mauritius (Cofrepeche 2014; 
COFREPECHE et al. 2016; EU 2014; SFA 2011, 2013). Such contributions, which have 
started since the beginning of industrial tuna fisheries in the region in the 1980s, have created 
a strong relation between the Southwest WIO countries involved in fishing access agreements 
and DWFNs. The latter have built an intricate relationship involving long-term involvement 
not only in trade but also in providing development aid. This long-standing entanglement 
between coastal countries and DWFNs is recognised by national actors, notably 
representatives of fisheries departments, especially as influencing discussions of access 
agreements (MD 78).  
Illustration 21: Newly built processing factory in the Seychelles, co-funded with the EU 
 
Photo by the author 
Such interactions can influence the position taken by governments at regional tuna meetings 
such as at SWIOFC or IOTC meetings. This could be one of the factors that has prevented 
countries, especially weak ones like Madagascar, in supporting the position of other coastal 
states in the Indian Ocean. Historically, DWFNs have been strong geopolitical allies that 
provide much more to the coastal states than neighbouring countries. National interests lean 
more towards collaboration with DWFNs than other countries of the region. France, in 
particular, as a former colonial power in the three countries, has had a strong influence in the 
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establishment of tuna fisheries in these countries, including through investment in canneries, 
fleets’ development and in building the capacity of tuna statistic units. An important 
postcolonial relation has been in place and can frame countries as historically indebted to 
France. DWFNs use their strategic and historical positions as long-term foreign aid ‘partners’ 
of coastal states to seek alignment of states like Madagascar or Mauritius to their side. The 
construction of the Indianoceania as a region is therefore, in practice, highly difficult to 
achieve through tuna fisheries, if one takes into consideration the strong involvement of 
DWFNs in the countries of the region. The situation also raises the important question of real 
economic and political interests behind development aid in the region.  
Unbalanced negotiation capacities at regional negotiations – Event ethnography at 
SWIOFC 
The second arena where evidence of geopolitics influencing the management of tuna fisheries 
was apparent was at the 8th Session of the Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission 
(SWIOFC) in March 2017. While the commission had various items on its agenda, including 
reports from its different subcommittees on stock assessments, countries collaboration 
regarding tuna fisheries or monitoring control and surveillance, one agenda item related to 
the tuna fisheries of the Southwest WIO region was particularly relevant. This was the 
attempt of the commission to adopt Minimum Terms and Conditions (MTCs) for fishing 
access agreements in the region. By 2017, this proposal had reached its 8th year of debates 
and proceedings (FAO 2017). The document was reviewed by the legal office of the FAO 
and came back with comments for the commissioners of each country to discuss. The 
countries were also asked by the secretariat of the commission to decide between a voluntary 
guideline and a binding document. However, a precision was made by the Secretariat that the 
legal office of the FAO advised that the document was not appropriately written for a binding 
document and that the commission could not be used as the forum to adopt such type of 
binding document.  
During the meeting discussion, three interest groups were identified: those that were in 
favour of a binding instrument (including Kenya, Maldives, South Africa and Tanzania) and 
openly expressed it, those that were in favour of a guideline (France – representing Reunion 
Island, Mauritius and the Seychelles) with or without explicit support, and countries without 
strong opinion (such as Madagascar or Comoros) with limited interventions during the 
debates.  Two countries were particularly opposing each other during the debates. They were 
South Africa, strongly pushing to move the process forward for a binding agreement and 
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France, asking for more precautionary approach by looking in detail in the content of the 
document and also demanding that the document come back to national legal offices before 
any decision.  
During the debates, France excelled at delaying the process of the meeting with three 
negotiation techniques. First, it reverted to previously discussed articles in the document. 
During the three times it did so, South Africa intervened and requested that the process 
moves forward by not coming back to already discussed articles. Second, it proposed to the 
members of the commission highly debatable amendments such as requiring that coordinates 
of fishing zones of coastal countries are put in the document, which launched long debates 
between the delegates. Third, it reiterated it could not be part of a binding document and 
would require the guideline to pass through its national legal office (Pers. obs.). This 
negotiation tactic of France was mainly challenged by South Africa, supported by Kenya and 
Tanzania. France was accused of delaying of the discussions despite being involved in the 
process for many years. It was also accused of defending the interests of the industry rather 
than those of its overseas territory, Reunion island. Interventions as below were expressed by 
the commissioner from South Africa, in response to France’s strategy (notes from pers. obs.): 
“We need to go back to history. We are deliberately hostaged in the process. It is 
more important that we have a text and move forward with it. African states have 
worked really hard and ‘others’ just contribute.”  
“Binding agreement seems to not be possible. We do not have an option. If not 
binding, it is losing the essence of what it was purposed for. Five years is a long 
time to develop just guidelines. A lot of concessions were already made in 
Zanzibar [site of previous meeting], and agreement on articles. We seem to go 
backward. Some of us do not care they are not necessarily affected like us. We are 
talking about our own EEZs, we negotiated a lot. When our land was taken, there 
was no negotiation but here we are. The aim of the MTC is that resources benefit 
coastal states.” 
While such strong statements prompted support from countries like Tanzania and Kenya, 
they did not receive the same support from the three islands of the Southwest IO region. 
Mauritius and the Seychelles particularly supported the French position of adopting a 
guideline rather than a binding document. In a couple of interventions, the Seychelles argued 
that the document should not be too restrictive as a guideline while Mauritius openly stated it 
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was not willing to accept a binding agreement. Madagascar during the entire debate kept 
silent despite being the host country of the meeting.  
An even more interesting discussion was when France was asked if DWFNs that were not 
from the EU fished in French waters. The question was asked by South Africa in order to see 
the real interest of France in having MTCs. France, after responding that it did in its other 
overseas’ territories also mentioned that the Seychelles and Mauritius were fishing in its 
waters. The two latter countries confirmed they had agreements with France, which closed 
the debate in favour of France. Interestingly, no commissioner raised the point that those 
agreements covered EU-owned vessels that are flagged to Mauritius and the Seychelles.  
The case of the discussion about MTCs is illustrative of the challenges that the Southwest IO 
faces. First, we can see that despite some countries trying to prompt the emotions of other 
countries of the region to appropriate the resources (as the South African delegate did), there 
is a manifest lack of unanimity between the coastal countries. The observable positioning of 
Mauritius and the Seychelles defending their involvement with DWFNs such as the EU (in 
this discussion, represented by France) show their interests in the fisheries. Their long 
economic relations with DWFNs through the fisheries prevailed against alignment with other 
coastal countries. Second, the presence of France within the commission, as a representative 
of Reunion Island, in the end jeopardises attempts of cooperation between coastal countries. 
The representative of France stated twice that “since the industry was not taken into 
consideration in the discussion, France will represent the interests of the industry” (notes 
from pers. obs.). This shows the economic stance that France has taken, despite being present 
in the commission as representing the interest of its coastal state. From informal discussions 
with coastal countries’ delegates at the meeting, this stance of France preventing cooperation 
was common in the region (MD 76).  Historically, France has also impeded regional 
negotiations by undermining the WIOTUNA initiative in the 1990s (Campling 2012a). Third, 
the strong ability of France to negotiate at the meeting was highly challenging for coastal 
countries to counter. With a team of well-trained negotiators and support from the EU, 
France had six delegates to rely on during the negotiations while most countries only had two 
and very few were intervening with strong points. This explains a strong geopolitical position 
that France can have in these types of negotiations. It also demonstrates the weak socio-
political environment of the coastal countries. Even for a strong country like the Seychelles, 
one of its delegates was newly appointed at the fisheries department and a few months after, 
was not part of the department anymore. The same for Madagascar, which was represented 
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by a delegate just freshly appointed by an incoming Minister. With such political changes, it 
is difficult to maintain stability of proceedings within fisheries departments and such 
negotiations can fall short of consistent involvement if the departments do not have an 
established strategy regarding the matter discussed.  
It has been shown in this section that economic interests, geopolitical strength of some actors 
and an unstable political environment are important factors impeding regional integration 
regarding tuna fisheries. As the SWIOFC is a regional country-related platform, the next 
section will show how in a larger platform such as the IOTC, DWFNs interact with coastal 
states and influence the management of tuna fisheries in the Indian Ocean. Within the IOTC, 
DWFNs are fully involved in discussions and not mere observers as they are within 
SWIOFC.  
The weight of historical entitlement claimed by DWFNs – Event ethnography at IOTC    
A second illustration of the challenges of regionalism regarding tuna fisheries is within the 
broader regional level at the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. As of the commission meeting 
of 2018, there was a substantial divide between the countries, members of the IOTC. On one 
side there is a group of DWFNs, including entities like the EU or countries like Japan, Korea. 
On the other side, there are the 21 coastal states of the Indian Ocean including the three 
islands studied that are gathered under the G16 group (named after Article XVI of the IOTC 
agreement40 which acknowledges the sovereign rights of coastal states over living resources 
in their EEZs) (IOTC 1993). Since 2011, one of the recurrent subjects discussed is the 
allocation of tuna catch in the Indian Ocean. Two highly distinctive proposals have emerged 
from the two sides. One proposal, from the DWFNs and led by the EU, puts the majority of 
the allocation (85%) based on historical catch in the Indian Ocean (IOTC 2018c). This would 
mean that DWFNs would be the most entitled to the pie of allocations. The other proposal, 
from the G16 and led by Maldives, attributes the catch based on more criteria (a baseline for 
all coastal states, historical catch, a supplement of allocation on the high seas and a 
supplement for small island states and developing coastal states). In contrast to the EU 
proposal, the G16 proposal did not allocate proportions on these criteria (IOTC 2018b).  
 
40 Article XVI. COASTAL STATES’ RIGHTS: This Agreement shall not prejudice the exercise of sovereign rights of 
a coastal state in accordance with the international law of the sea for the purposes of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the living resources, including the highly migratory species, within a zone of up to 
200 nautical miles under its jurisdiction. 
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The G16 proposal is not sponsored by all the 21 states part of the G16 group. 
Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles have three very different positions 
regarding the G16 proposal: the Seychelles, along with South Africa, are strong 
co-sponsors of the proposal. The delegation of the Seychelles for example 
requested the Commission to make progress on the allocation issue, whereas 
DWFNs wanted a more cautionary approach of looking at the proposals in more 
details through simulations (IOTC 2018b, pers. obs.). As early as when all the 
proposals were just presented to the commission, at the start of the meeting, 
DWFNs expressed their concern over the allocation proposal by the G16 with 
statements such as: “What about the simulations? If we do not see the exact 
effects of the proposals, we cannot discuss this” (Intervention by Japan’s 
commissioner). 
“We share the dissent of Japan and are surprised why this is even on the table as a 
proposal because the issues are too complex and there are no simulations. We are 
happy to have a work programme. There is scope to have a roadmap in order to 
have two finalised proposals next year. The preconditions were the simulations” 
(Intervention by the EU’s commissioner).   
“We are also surprised, why is the proposal on the table?” (Intervention by 
China’s commissioner). 
To respond to the DWFNs, the co-sponsors within the G16 member repeatedly made counter-
arguments.  For instance: 
“We have not made progress in the past 8 years, it has not been substantive. We 
acknowledge the need for simulation and have started those simulations. It is 
critical to make progress and agree on the principles […] Maldives depend on the 
fish, the Seychelles and Mauritius depend on canneries, Bangladesh does not have 
anything yet, and Kenya would like to develop its industry more. We cannot make 
it simple. This has been a request of coastal states for 8 years. It will make access 
reasonable” (Intervention by Maldives’s commissioner). 
“We need to make progress it has taken too long. We need to agree on the 
principles of allocation first” (Intervention by the Seychelles’s commissioner) 
“We are surprised why distant fishing nations are not even willing to discuss the 
proposal because all proposals are to be proposed and improved within the 
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commission. […] We are not against simulation but we need to decide about the 
principles” (Intervention by South Africa’s commissioner) 
Madagascar and Mauritius were not co-sponsors despite being part of the G16 group. 
Mauritius, during the meeting, used the IOTC fora to make several sovereignty claims over 
the Chagos Archipelago against the United Kingdom. It did not want to get involved into any 
proposal that included the UK and repeatedly requested to the commission that the UK’s seat 
at the IOTC should be revoked. On the proposal of allocation, Mauritius stated that it “could 
not agree with the proposal due to the potential right of the UK and the issue of Chagos” 
(Intervention by Mauritius’s commissioner). During that 2018 meeting I attended, 
Madagascar kept silent through most of the meeting. One of its delegates intervened once 
towards the end of the commission meeting to ask for a collaborative approach and 
recognising the rights of the coastal states (pers. obs.). When asked about this position, the 
Malagasy commissioner at the meeting declared “we have been instructed to see how things 
unfold first, we support the G16 but it is a very sensitive issue for us” (BK 06). During 
informal interactions with the Malagasy commissioner, the latter mentioned that Madagascar 
and Mauritius both received a letter from the EU ambassador in the Southwest IO region 
questioning their position at the IOTC. The letter was asking the countries to align with the 
position of the EU as their long-term partner (pers. obs). At the 2019 IOTC meeting, 
Madagascar switched its position and decided to co-sponsor the G16 proposal. This position 
of Madagascar could have been linked to its change of government after the 2018 meeting. 
Malagasy representatives at IOTC expressed within the G16 that the Malagasy government 
wanted to show it has sovereignty over the resources and the G16 proposal helped achieve 
this goal (pers. comm. with SE 38).   
This interaction at the international stage on tuna shows that the ‘Indianoceania’ concept is 
absent. Following Havice’s concept of a ‘more than territorial’ way of reclaiming state power 
(Havice 2018), we can see here a similar illustration of coastal countries that are using tuna 
discussions to defend territorial sovereignty. This is apparent for the case of Mauritius. For 
the Seychelles, its turn towards defending the interests of coastal states under the G16 has 
been recent since the change of head of delegation to the commission. While the Seychelles 
had for long the reputation of aligning with DWFNs (as seen in the SWIOFC forum), its 
change at the IOTC has mainly been through change of leadership. The case of Madagascar 
is more challenging and yet to some extent understandable. As a country highly dependent on 
foreign aid and as having a cannery dependent on EU supply, it cannot openly counter the 
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position of DWFNs (as do economically strong countries like the Seychelles or South 
Africa). On the other hand, under the leadership of Maldives and now the Seychelles, the 
G16 members are increasingly feeling empowered and entitled to assert more sovereignty 
over the resources in the region. Weaker countries like Comoros or Madagascar are starting 
to make discreet interventions in support of the G16 but treading carefully to not undermine 
their relationship with DWFNs. As expressed by one observer during the meeting “it is the 
first time so many G16 members have intervened in the discussion, it is usually a matter of 
DWFNs and a few G16 members” (BK 02). As argued by Glassman (2018), under a strong 
geopolitical setting, states are not unified and their practices strongly depend on their 
economic and political interests. Mauritius and Madagascar especially show flexible state 
practises to try to navigate their interests with both DWFNs and the G16.  
Another point that could be raised here is the role of NGOs in facilitating regionalism 
between the coastal countries at IOTC. This is particularly relevant for the International Pole 
and Line Foundation (IPNLF), the NGO that currently supports the activities and meetings of 
the G16 along with assisting the group in defending its position41. The IPNLF has long been 
supportive of the Maldives for the certification of their skipjack tuna fisheries, one of the first 
small-scale fisheries to be certified by the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). With the 
MSC certification, the Maldives have driven a number of conservation measures within the 
IOTC as part of their certification requirements, such as harvest control rules (IOTC 2016b). 
The IPNLF has also funded diverse activities of the G16. This involved funding coastal 
countries’ delegates, funding the meetings themselves, and also providing support on writing 
proposals to the IOTC (SE 39; pers. obs.). This support has helped the G16 evolve and fully 
participate in the challenging discussions at the IOTC. As recognised by one the of the 
NGO’s staff members,  
“Five years ago, you would sit at a scientific meeting and the only people who 
would talk would be the EU’s industry scientists. They set the narratives but 
chances are people do not have much idea about they are talking about. So, he 
puts the discourses up but no one understands and that is how it worked. Now I 
think there is some empowerment, people have more confidence.” (SE 39).  
This strong involvement of a non-state actor in the discussions of the IOTC introduces 
another element within the geopolitical dynamics between the G16 members and the DWFNs 
for tuna fisheries management in the IO. It brings another type of political pressure upon 
 
41 At the 2018 IOTC meeting, I was embedded with this NGO as a volunteer translator from English to French 
for Francophone delegates, during the internal meetings of the G16.  
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coastal states, one encouraging them to align to the G16’s position, based on various types of 
support, including modest yet significant help to improve delegates’ ability to attend G16 
meetings. The current momentum of the coastal states is then fuelled by the IPNLF’s support 
to the work of the G16. The latter could become reliant on such assistance. To respond to this 
“backstage” support to the G16 members, the EU for example has tried to further develop its 
partnership with countries of the IO and particularly those of the IOC region. This was, for 
example, materialised by a new project funded by the EU to promote dialogue between the 
EU and the IOC countries in fisheries governance (BK 05). 
We can see here a counter initiative from the EU to align IOC countries more to its interests. 
The countries of the Southwest IO can be exposed to problematic geopolitical situations. 
They have to balance not only their national socio-economic interests but also have to 
manage their geopolitical allies as well as new alliances with NGOs. State practises of the 
Southwest WIO countries are therefore heterogenous and constantly evolving for tuna 
fisheries management. This, ultimately, makes regionalism an unpredictable and long-term 
challenging enterprise.      
7.3.2. Competition for landings as an economic factor against regionalism 
An important component of the relationship between the three coastal states in the Southwest 
IO is the competition that tuna brings in. The three countries all have landing ports, canneries 
and fishing grounds (Kaplan et al., 2014; POSEIDON, 2014). The three canneries were 
originally built in collaboration with foreign private companies. The Seychelles saw its first 
cannery built in 1987 in collaboration with French and Spanish companies (Marsac et al. 
2014), Madagascar in 1990 in collaboration and funding from French companies (Gilbert and 
Rabenomanana 1996) and Mauritius in 1970 with funding from Japanese companies 
(Campling, 2012a). While this infrastructure all brought economic development to the 
countries, they were not built with a regional vision that required coordination between the 
three canneries.  
Fishing operators have an open choice on where they land, and they usually make their 
decision based upon questions of cost, efficiency, and quality. This puts the cannery in 
Madagascar at the bottom of the competition. In a country with a difficult socio-economical 
context and where corruption is rated high and governance indexes relatively low 
(Razafindrakoto et al. 2017), inefficiency is a considerable obstacle. Over the years, fishing 
operators have only chosen to land in Madagascar as a last resort. While Madagascar saw 
around 30 vessels landing in the 1990s every tuna season, in the tuna season of 2018, only 6 
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vessels landed in the port of Antsiranana (MD 36). In the recent years, only Spanish vessels 
came to Antsiranana to tranship or land to the cannery. European interviewees that were 
landing in Madagascar made statements such as “we only go to Madagascar because we fish 
in the Canal [Mozambique Channel], it is faster to land here than in the Seychelles when we 
want to go back fishing in the Canal” (MD 45) or “it is very inefficient here, the stevedores 
take too long to unload the fish and there is theft all the time” (MD 43). Operators prefer to 
land or tranship in the Seychelles and Mauritius where the service is considered more 
efficient and where investments have been made over the years towards this efficiency 
(Lagier et al. 2005; Marsac et al. 2014).   
As explained by Campling (2012b), industrial tuna exploitation in the WIO has been driven 
by a continuous need for satisfying demand and capitalist logics of extraction. Governments 
seeking to sustain the economic benefits from the fishery are favourable to access agreements 
and try to improve their port infrastructure to encourage the landing of tuna in country. 
Moreover, as seen in Chapter 6, the geographical position of the three countries puts the 
Seychelles as central to the tuna exploitation, with both ports, processing facilities and 
productive fishing grounds. This requires Madagascar and Mauritius to provide more services 
to be attractive to fishing vessels. Mauritius has done so by facilitating procedures of landing 
and exporting through the establishment of the Seafood Hub. Madagascar has, however, 
struggled to maintain a competitive position in the region. 
7.3.3. The absence of a regional identity at the local level  
Tuna is considered one of the shared resources of the ‘Indianoceania’ countries. In a press 
release in 2016 on regional monitoring, the IOC emphasised the importance of tuna fisheries 
in the region, not only as a key provider of revenue and jobs but also to ensure food security 
for coastal population of the region (De l'Estrac 2016). Yet, a discussion with local 
stakeholders on regional identity through tuna shows a different picture.  
Interviews with fishers in the three countries studied showed a lack of connection through 
tuna fisheries. Amongst the local fishers interviewed, only a handful had knowledge of 
interactions in tuna fisheries: two fishers in Madagascar knew there were other Malagasies 
working in the Seychelles at canneries, one in Mauritius knew some Seychellois are also 
fishing tuna in the waters of Mauritius and two fishers in the Seychelles had contacts with 
Malagasy and Mauritian fishers. Very few also knew about the potential in the different 
countries in terms of tangible collaboration in terms of tuna fisheries. One interviewee in the 
Seychelles explained he was sourcing his bait from China and did not think bait such as squid 
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could be sourced in the two neighbouring islands (SE 61). The same situation applies with 
crews of semi-industrial boats in the Seychelles of which the majority are Sri Lankans. When 
asked about working with other fishers from the region, 20 fishers in the Seychelles could 
only mention Sri Lankans. While the latter have built the skills in longline fishing for decades 
(Hewamanage 2010; Pajot 1978), regional initiatives have not actively tried to link tuna 
fishers of the region. They could, for example, benefit from each other’s strengths such as 
man power in Madagascar, bait in Mauritius and Madagascar and local fishing vessels in the 
Seychelles.   
Another aspect of tuna fishery that brings local actors to be involved in the fisheries is 
through the work in the canneries, more specifically Malagasy workers that go to work in 
Mauritius and the Seychelles. Those working relations can be opportunities to bring locals 
together as working on a shared resource. However, the reality depicts a common picture of 
work migration for higher wages without local integration (Craig 2015; de Haas 2010). 
Malagasy tuna workers in the Seychelles feel marginalised as they are only considered as 
cheap labour. One Malagasy worker who has been based in the Seychelles for three years 
made comments such as “they do not really like us here, they think we are only poor and low-
level workers for the cannery” (SE 65). As a Malagasy myself, I personally experienced these 
biases during several interviews of local stakeholders in the Seychelles. Interviewees would 
first ask if I was working for the cannery and could not apprehend that I was a researcher 
from an overseas university (pers. obs.).  
While migrant workers recognise the improved social and economic conditions, they 
experienced in the Seychelles compared to Madagascar, the tuna workers do not feel 
integrated nor part an ‘Indianoceania’ community. Here, the geographical proximity of 
‘Indianoceania’ countries has allowed the practice of work migration. However, everyday 
practice of the workers shows the lack of appropriation of such identity.  
7.4. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION  
To conclude this chapter on regionalism, I argue that there is a fragile regionalism through 
tuna fisheries in the Indianoceania region. While it is present through various initiatives, it is 
either dependent on external actors or often impeded by geopolitical interventions, especially 
by DWFNs. Furthermore, in the writing of this section, two comments come to mind. The 
first one was from a peer review of my paper published based on part of this chapter. The 
reviewer asked, “Why would one expect resource extraction (tuna in this case) to bind 
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nations together? Wood extraction in South Asia hasn’t bound those nations together; 
soybean production in Africa hasn’t brought those nations together” (Anonymous reviewer, 
JIOR paper). The second was a tweet in response to the paper from a fisheries practitioner in 
the WIO region. The tweet stated “[…] Glad to see the FPAOI mentioned as a catalyst for a 
regional vision for fisheries (not just tuna - fishermen knew from the beginning it is a cause 
of disunity)” (Tweet of March 15th 2019, Yann Yvergniaux). Those two comments seem to 
make this regional chapter difficult to defend. However, I suggest here that despite these 
realities, the WIO is rich in human and socio-economic interactions that could be used as a 
basis for reflection towards an improved regional cooperation and identity. Improving 
regional cooperation and strengthening a regional identity through the fishery requires strong 
will from countries – which does exist intermittently – and sustained exchanges between the 
people of the WIO, fisheries managers to fishers to other local and national actors. 
7.4.1. Pathways towards making tuna fisheries a catalyst of regionalism 
Improving regionalism through tuna fisheries can be beneficial to the WIO region for two 
reasons. First, tuna as a shared resource of the region could benefit from a more harmonised 
management. While national interests need to be taken into consideration, another strong 
common interest needs to be built and that is the sustainability of different segments of tuna 
fisheries in the long term. Second, as seen in previous sections, DWFNs have a strong 
influence on countries’ management decisions. Coastal countries can reinforce their position 
as a group against DWFN by pursuing current efforts of regional cooperation in the fishery. 
In the current context of strong dependency on DWFNs, reinforcing regionalism amongst 
coastal countries will provide geopolitical strength to the countries like in the South Pacific 
and will be key in determining the future of tuna fisheries management. To this end, three 
suggestions are made here at the local, country and DWFN levels.  
Increasing learning exchanges between the WIO people in tuna fisheries 
Based on my different interactions with various stakeholders in the Southwest IO tuna 
fisheries as well as observations of activities related to tuna fishing in the region, three 
pathways emerged which could be explored to foster regionalism amongst the people of the 
region.  
First is within the FPAOI. A key step for the federation is to overcome its reliance on the EU 
for funding. As in various projects of the IOC, time limits inherent to funding have been one 
of the main causes of fading tuna-related initiatives. To ensure its long-term viability, the 
  239 
federation needs to find other venues of funding for the next ten years, providing the time to 
generate its own income. Financial sustainability, as a key factor for both members buy-in 
and also long-term viability (Bennett 2017; Ebel et al. 2018) will determine the future of the 
federation. International donors such as the World Bank and other similar funders that have 
previously invested in the region on similar work have often only provided short to medium-
term funding. Generating income will require a strategic approach towards improving 
economic exchanges between its members and gaining profits from this involvement. As the 
federation gathers fishing associations within the IO, it presents an occasion to explore trade 
opportunities including export and import between the countries of the region. Despite being 
a challenging endeavour between its members, especially in the capacity needs for such 
enterprise, generating more tangible value might incentivise fishers in being more involved in 
the federation and the latter could sustain its activities. Here, the involvement of each coastal 
state could also contribute to this development. As countries want to develop their national 
fisheries, assisting the development of trade between the countries has the potential to set a 
basis for better cooperation along with national development.  
A second step would be to increase the policy outreach of the federation. As it stands, the 
federation has a couple of leaders who attend the IOTC meetings. During my two years of 
fieldwork, local tuna fishers interviewed were not aware of the policy work that 
representatives of the FPAOI were doing to defend their interests. The federation also has the 
potential to increase awareness amongst tuna fishers in the region regarding the state of the 
resources, conflicts with DWFNs and opportunities within the region. I argue here that tuna 
could effectively represent an opportunity for fishers to build a regional identity, based on 
tuna advocacy. This would require a rigorous outreach of activities undertaken by 
representatives of the federation at the regional, IOTC level for example, to their respective 
national levels. In the Seychelles and Mauritius, this outreach is currently done through the 
press which has provided a forum for fishers to express issues related to fisheries (see for 
example Illustration 21). This kind of outreach is, however, limited in Madagascar. The 
FPAOI representative in Madagascar, based in the east of country, has limited means, 
including translation challenges, to do this outreach in other parts of the country.  
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Illustration 22: News report in the Seychelles after the 2017 IOTC commission meeting 
 
Source: Facebook feed of the newspaper Today in the Seychelles 
There is a tangible opportunity here for countries like Madagascar to learn from the fishers of 
the Seychelles to better voice their interests and concerns in tuna fisheries. This information 
and learning exchanges also represent an important potential for Malagasy fishers who could 
see their views and perspectives better integrated in national management decisions.  
Moreover, the FPAOI could foster the creation of national associations of fishers in coastal 
countries to assist fishers in building a strong national voice. Finally, the FPAOI also needs to 
be presented to fishers as an opportunity be involved in decision-making on tuna fisheries at 
different levels. Such representation is key to promote the interests of small-scale fishers in 
the adoption of management measures or policy at the national and Indian Ocean levels.    
A second venue to link the tuna people in the Southwest IO is through the tuna canneries. 
The depiction of tuna workers, as seen in section 7.3.3, is currently one of key contribution to 
economies in terms of the number of employment provided by the canneries. There is, 
however, very limited information available regarding other added values of the migration of 
tuna workers to their home country and families or to the socio-economic benefits they might 
bring to host countries. This is particularly relevant for cannery workers from Madagascar to 
Mauritius and the Seychelles, or those of other WIO nationals working in canneries. The 
types of information that are not known include for example, to what level do tuna workers 
sustain their family in their home countries? Or how much do they contribute to the national 
economies of their host countries beyond employment? Public knowledge about these figures 
could contribute to an improved consideration of cannery workers beyond their ‘low-skilled 
workers’ reputation. In the Seychelles particularly, the integration of Malagasy workers 
would require involvement of the two governments, Madagascar and the Seychelles, as well 
as entities such as the IOC to undertake an appropriate evaluation and outreach regarding the 
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extended value of cannery workers’ migration. Sharing this knowledge amongst the people of 
the three islands has the prospect to increase a better understanding between cannery workers 
but especially amongst the public. Addressing the current lack of integration of tuna workers 
can be a venue for an appropriation of a regional ‘working on tuna’ identity. Ultimately, the 
production of cans which contributes to the economies of the islands is dependent on the 
labour of the WIO nationals. The value of this WIO labour, not only economic in terms of 
jobs, is underestimated and under documented.   
The third pathway that could be explored is between the tuna consumers of the region. While 
the economic value of tuna is widely recognised and advertised in the region, its contribution 
to food security, despite being widely acknowledged, is not fully known (Obura et al. 2017). 
Differently to countries like the Maldives where diets are mainly based on tuna, the three 
islands have different consumption traditions. Madagascar having a large surface of inland 
territory, only a distinct part of the population relies heavily on fish as protein. Furthermore, 
preference for tuna is not the same all over the country. While tuna is highly appreciated in 
the north of the country, the coastal population would prefer other fish in the east and 
southeast. This is the same in Mauritius and the Seychelles: even if tuna is widely consumed, 
it is not the preferred fish to consume and considered more as an export product. Moreover, 
while fresh tuna is consumed by hotel clients, tuna cans are considered expensive by locals. 
These perceptions on tuna could also contribute to the limited engagement that people of the 
Southwest IO region show towards tuna. If compared to Maldives, the population of the 
region has an entirely different attachment to tuna, beyond its economic value.   
Building a regional identity through tuna could then be done by improving this attachment to 
the tuna amongst the people of the Southwest IO through tuna conservation and/or 
consumption. Western countries have internalised a view of tuna as an affordable source of 
protein with high nutritional value, a view contributing to the large demand of tuna. In the 
WIO, the contribution of tuna to the diets of local population has been unexplored beyond 
general statements in policy documents that tuna contributes to food security.  To this end, 
more investment is needed towards documenting the local value of tuna, in nutrition but also 
in the culture, rather than limiting it to its economic one. Showing the dietary benefits of tuna 
and its contribution to food security for the people of the region can bring another element to 
the value of tuna for the region on top of revenues and job opportunities. Projects, such as 
those of the IOC, could focus more on such endeavour. By establishing an improved 
appropriation of tuna, consumers in the WIO might find more interests in defending an 
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improved use of the resources. This could contribute to reinforce the existing regional 
identity, putting tunas as both a shared resource but especially a shared source of food. 
Developing more regional links within the segments of the fishery 
If these are the pathways to link people of the region through tuna work, exploring more 
opportunities of collaboration within the different segments of the fishery could also be a 
venue to reinforce regionalism. The current situation of tuna fisheries will not really 
contribute to regional identity, beyond a few EU-funded projects. An ‘Indianoceania’ vision 
and ultimately a regional tuna fishery is only possible if interests of all parties are considered 
and individual socio-economic contexts are taken into consideration. This difficult enterprise 
requires a differentiated approach looking at the needs of each country that could be fulfilled 
by collaboration with the others.  
Within the small-scale and semi-industrial tuna fisheries, fishers in the three islands, could, 
for example, fulfil each other’s needs by sourcing bait from each other or exchanging skills 
and fishers. Semi-industrial fishers in the Seychelles interviewed mentioned the need for bait 
– mackerel pike and squid bought locally or imported, and the lack of fishers as pressing 
issues. Madagascar has an important fishing ground within which bait could be harvested. 
Here, the Seychelles could look more to Madagascar where these baits are caught throughout 
the west coast and improve economic exchanges between fishers. Similarly, Madagascar is 
witnessing an increase in the number of coastal fishers due to the high rate of unemployment 
in cities and the highlands (MRHP 2015). This growing number of fishers can increase 
pressure on the local stock of fishing resources. The Seychelles could therefore bring 
Malagasy as labour fishers onto its semi-industrial vessels or even on small-scale vessels also 
facing a shortage of fishers. This could be a concrete collaboration of fishers that would also 
socially help both countries. Seafood is already traded between Madagascar and Mauritius, 
but at a very low rate (Randrianarifidy 2016). This type of trade, however, requires strong 
interventions between the governments. The FPAOI could also support such initiative since 
the federation has the potential to connect the different associations of fishers and their 
members in the different countries of the region. Exchange of skills from the more developed 
islands could also benefit fishers in Madagascar might that be for improvement of quality 
through processing and transport or through exchanges of fishing skills between fishers. 
Leadership from the Seychelles is also key to bring to the other islands of the region and 
especially in Madagascar. While there is an apparent strong movement towards marine 
conservation in Madagascar (Gardner et al. 2018; Harris 2011), fishing associations including 
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for those working on tuna have a very limited lifespan. Local fishers are less involved in 
policy advocacy before the state regarding tuna fisheries, as is seen in the Seychelles and to 
smaller extent in Mauritius. Current initiatives of fishers are mostly channelled through 
marine conservation efforts (Gardner et al. 2018; Gardner et al. 2017; Rocliffe et al. 2014). 
The efforts of the Seychelles’ fishers in being heard and in being able to join the Seychellois’ 
government delegation at IOTC represents an important step in the voice given to fishers. 
Without a strong voice from local fishers, improving the currently underdeveloped local tuna 
fisheries in Madagascar is unlikely to be considered a priority by the state. Considering the 
socio-political context in Madagascar, different from the two neighbouring islands, the 
development of the local tuna fisheries also requires a strong protection of the rights of local 
fishers as the main beneficiary of such development. As seen in the case of the Seychelles, 
the development of the semi-industrial sector has involved foreign investors. In Madagascar, 
the local tuna fishery could be an easy target for elites that would concentrate capital and 
benefits. Learning from the experience of the Seychelles can therefore be valuable in this 
process of development.  
This development of a locally owned semi-industrial fleet in the Seychelles represents an 
important experience and lesson learnt to be shared with the other countries. However, the 
specific socio-economical context of the two neighbouring islands needs to be at the forefront 
of any attempt of replication. More specifically, Mauritius, as it started to do in 2017, could 
more easily replicate the loan system that the Seychelles has established to increase its 
national fleet. In Madagascar, such system could be difficult to put in place considering 
challenging investment and business environment in the country. The shortage of fishers in 
the Seychelles also requires attention. Considering the number of fishers in Mauritius and the 
limited involvement of locals in fisheries, Mauritius could face a similar issue while 
developing its national fleet. On the other hand, while Madagascar could collaborate with the 
Seychelles regarding its potential supply of a labour force, the involvement of Malagasy 
fishers outside the country requires capacity building so that fishers are able to undertake 
such fishing. This represents another tangible opportunity to bring local fishers of the 
Southwest IO region together. The IOC and its members could play an important role in these 
developments. While the FPAOI can be a catalyst and intermediary between fishers and the 
IOC, the strong involvement of governments and the IOC is required to develop these 
pathways of collaboration.  
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In the industrial segment, currently dominated by DWFNs, two avenues can be explored. 
First is through an improved collaboration amongst the countries of the WIO in harmonising 
management of distant water fishing in the WIO. Considering the economic importance of 
tuna fisheries in national revenues, countries of the region have an interest in continuing 
granting access to foreign industrial fleets. However, that also requires them to sustain the 
tuna resources in the WIO. As already occurs in regional monitoring efforts, countries of the 
region could also benefit from helping each other in data management or in sharing 
experiences regarding the implementation of IOTC management measures. Despite the 
difference in geographical setting, lessons could also be learnt from the Pacific islands and 
their regional management. An improved regional management of fisheries could help 
replenish the tuna stocks but also increase the strength of the region in managing industrial 
fishing. Second is regarding the management of bycatch retained on-board from purse seiners 
represents an opportunity for the three islands to collaborate. At the IOTC and SWIOFC 
level, more advocacy is currently undertaken to require the landing of this bycatch at local 
ports. The use of bycatch in country in a coordinated manner can ensure that the three islands 
take full advantage of the bycatch landed. The Seychelles has started to develop more its 
bycatch market and have processing facilities, from which the two other islands could learn. 
This is particularly relevant for the case of Madagascar where bycatch is either sold by 
stevedores or by intermediaries who have access to the high-ranked crew on the tuna vessels. 
An improved access system to bycatch by having a locally owned and run processing facility 
could decrease monopoly in the port of Antsiranana. Learning from the other islands will 
help raise awareness regarding the challenges in the different islands and help the 
governments and the IOC to focus their actions regarding the management of bycatch.  
Untangling the intricate relation with DWFNs  
The most challenging venue to foster regionalism consists of addressing the intricate 
relationship with DWFNs. A first action is to encourage improved transparency on the role of 
foreign aid in tuna access. DWFNs and coastal countries are entangled in relations that 
include foreign aid, economic access, trade, and geopolitics. The lack of explicit mention of 
access to natural resources, and tuna in particular, in foreign aid policy puts coastal states in 
an intrinsically weak position when they are negotiating access to the marine resources. 
Transparency regarding the link between development aid and access to the fish is greatly 
needed. This will allow coastal states to act with full knowledge when either accepting 
development aid or signing access agreements. It will also force DWFNs to be more open 
  245 
about their interests in country when it comes to development aid. At the moment, there is no 
official explicit link between the two whereas the link is then verbally raised by DWFNs 
when negotiating access (MD 10).  
Second, the involvement of DWFNs in fisheries development in the region requires better 
attention by the coastal states. It also needs to be recognised that DWFNs are non-
homogeneous entities. The EU is a good illustration with its contradictions highly visible in 
tuna fisheries in the Indian Ocean. Its ‘foreign aid’ arm is funding key projects to improve 
regional identity, collaboration and capacity building while its ‘commercial’ arm, eagerly 
opposes the same countries it is helping, either at the IOTC or in access negotiations. This 
demands caution from countries of the Southwest IO and the IOC when receiving funding for 
regional projects. A rigorous reflection is needed to investigate the real interests of donors 
involved in tuna fisheries. As for the Asian intervention in the region, the limited knowledge 
on the subject needs to be addressed. Very little is known on negotiations of access to tuna by 
Asian countries in the region and even less on the link between Asian foreign aid and access 
to tuna in the countries studied. Increased transparency on this issue will only benefit the 
region and improve the current leverage that coastal countries are building in the Indian 
Ocean. 
Third, it is necessary to decolonise interactions between coastal countries and DWFNs during 
regional negotiations including within the IOTC and SWIOFC. The historical and colonial 
past of coastal countries, including the three countries studied, requires a change of paradigm 
from DWFNs especially those of the EU. The EU speaks of ‘sustainable partnerships’ in 
setting up access agreements; but this rhetoric should also be applied in negotiation practises 
– especially at the IOTC such as in its proposal of catch allocation. As DWFNs have long 
claimed to have supported the capacity and development of coastal countries, they need to 
recognise that coastal countries now want more endorsement of their sovereignty on the 
resources. Since highly migratory resources require cooperation for their conservation and 
utilisation, this cooperation as it currently stands, seriously lacks equity amongst parties 
involved. The initiatives of coastal states, including within the G16, need to continue to 
ensure that equity and fairness are established between the actors involved in the Southwest 
IO and IO tuna fisheries. For the case of the ‘Indianoceania’ region especially, an agreement 
over a stronger common interest in tuna fisheries will be key for the future of the resources 
and for the development of the region. 
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7.4.2. Reflecting on the study of regionalism through actors’ practices and geopolitics  
Inspired by political ecology’s tradition of combining analysis of discourses and empirical 
practices and of exploring power dynamics, this chapter has been able to bring three types of 
insights in the study of regionalism. The first input is regarding the making of a regional 
identity through tuna fisheries. I investigated both narratives of ‘Indianoceania’ and practices 
of different actors at various scales in tuna fisheries. Tuna is portrayed as a common resource 
of the region. However, practices through fishing, within canneries and during regional 
management discussions show that existing initiatives have not built a regional identity 
beyond a few unsuccessful attempts of regional fishing and policy-related initiatives.  
Second, tuna fisheries were a prime arena to explore the link between local use, global socio-
economic processes and power dynamics. Through a geopolitical ecology and economy lens, 
I was able to go beyond exploring local and national rationalities and unveil the role of 
DWFNs in contributing to the challenging implementation of regionalism in the Southwest 
IO. This explicit investigation of the role of broader scale actors and geopolitics in the 
making of regionalism showed how and why countries of the region adopt certain stances at 
the regional Indian Ocean level. Decisions by governments of coastal countries can be 
strongly influenced by geopolitically strong actors.  
Finally, a look at the interactions of the three countries studied at international meetings as 
well as a consideration of their socio-economics and history showed that the countries of the 
Southwest IO have as many differences as they do commonalities. Resource extraction in 
itself, especially within a capitalist logic as seen in tuna fisheries, is a very challenging forum 
for fostering collaboration between actors. An improved regional approach with a 
coordinated management within joint EEZs and building a more shared identity might be 
useful to break the current dependency relations with DWFNs. From the views and practices 
seen in the field, it can be said that opportunities of collaboration are diverse. They, however, 
require both strong state interventions and sustained involvement of regional entities such as 
the FPAOI or the IOC. Other regional initiatives in the WIO that have received support at the 
local and governmental levels include learning exchanges in marine sciences and 
conservation, as well as in managing coastal fisheries like octopus. As less contentious 
compared to tuna fisheries, these avenues present opportunities for collaboration at various 
levels and could also be used to discuss the needs in tuna fisheries of the region. In addition, 
addressing issues related to the high seas remains an important component in the existing 
barriers against a regional tuna fishery. The limited capacity of the IOTC members in 
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managing the high sea makes regional efforts in EEZs of restricted reach. Tuna vessels and 
especially DWFNs are largely out of sight and reach in their activities in the high seas. 
Ongoing international negotiations for a new international treaty for the high seas could 
represent a venue to provide some answers to this issue (Gjerde et al. 2018; ICTSD 2018).  
This chapter on regionalism has highlighted the importance of both local socio-economic 
contexts, geopolitical interactions and their influences in advancing or not regional initiatives.  
An examination of state practises was necessary to understand existing challenges in 
regionalism from a state point of view. This includes exploring the role of states in shaping 
policy at the regional level and their interactions with DWFNs. The chapter has also 
uncovered how capitalist exploitation of the resources involving geopolitical actors 
influences regional management and use of the resources. The chapter suggests that the 
building of stronger links between countries and their people through tuna fisheries is 
essential if an Indianoceania is to truly exist and for the region to defend a sustainable tuna 
fishery.  
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CHAPTER 8. CONTRIBUTING TO AN IMPROVED KNOWLEDGE OF 
THE WIO TUNA FISHERIES 
I would like to finish this monograph with some concluding thoughts on how the thesis could 
serve the prosperity of the WIO including for the countries and their people but also for the 
tunas in the region. Having titled the thesis a political ecology study of tuna fisheries, I will 
also share some thoughts on the contribution of this study to the field of political ecology.     
8.1. MEETING THE MULTI-SCALAR NEEDS OF THE WIO COUNTRIES  
For the island countries of the WIO and especially the three case studies, tuna fisheries have 
an important place, might that be for the national economies, local livelihoods or food 
security. However, knowledge on the real extent of those three contributions is still limited in 
the region especially when it comes to a comprehensive look at the three segments of the 
fisheries. Despite the various investments made by countries to develop the fishery and the 
contribution of DWFNs in building capacity of countries regarding catch monitoring for 
example, there has been limited investment in building scientific capacity to assess the 
impacts of tuna fisheries both on the WIO marine ecosystems and on the livelihoods of 
coastal communities. This thesis has attempted to fill this gap and provide a clearer picture 
regarding the politics and the people behind the three segments of the fishery as well as their 
impacts on the tuna resources.   
8.1.1. Lessons learnt from exploring overfishing narratives, access politics and regionalism  
My analysis of narratives surrounding the state of tuna resources in the WIO highlighted that 
while the existence of overfishing is acknowledged by different actors, perspectives and 
knowledge on the state of the resources are produced differently. The strong perspective of 
local fishers regarding the presence of overfishing is mainly based on their long-standing 
experience. It needs to be considered as a warning sign for both fisheries departments but 
also entities such as the IOC regarding the future of the resources. The presence of a common 
narrative despite the current limited interactions of fishers in the three countries is a powerful 
story. While regional initiatives such as the FPAOI have allowed the voice of local fishers to 
be better heard at the IOTC level, it is still currently a very first step towards an increased 
consideration of local fishers in management decision-making at the regional level. The 
chapter on overfishing narratives also showed that at the national and regional level, 
governments have variable discourses. National reports produced by fisheries departments do 
not mention overfishing of resources; yet at the IOTC level, representatives from the same 
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governments have assessed the state of tuna resources, mainly yellowfin, as subject to 
overfishing. Despite sustained high level of catch and scientific advice to reduce effort since 
2011, this status of overfishing was only confirmed in 2015 and the following years. This 
delay in confirming the status of overfished tuna shows that countries, at the national level, 
are depicting the state of tuna resources in ways that sustain exploitation. At the regional 
level, as parties to the IOTC, countries delayed the adoption of management measures by 
hiding behind the bureaucratic science of the IOTC and conflictual negotiations. Similarly, 
industrial actors, while acknowledging the status of the yellowfin stock as overfished, claim 
that management measures are unjustly affecting the tuna industry as other segments, 
especially data deficient ones, could have contributed to the collapse of the resources. To 
ensure that tuna resources re-flourish in the region, parties to the IOTC need to refocus on 
their mandate to conserve the tuna resources and adopt the precautionary principle in both 
stock assessments and in their management decisions.  
The investigation of the politics of access to tuna resources in the three countries of the 
region has highlighted a diversity of livelihood stories but also intricate accounts of local and 
national interests confronted with capitalist industrial exploitations. For the three countries, 
tuna brings stories of local livelihoods where tuna fishers, boat owners and intermediaries 
have established modalities of interactions along the value chain. This manuscript has 
attempted to discuss these stories and expand on how different actors access the resources 
and benefit from them. Small-scale tuna fisheries in the sites studied have generated relations 
of labour and market access that are well recognised within their fishing communities. In 
Madagascar, despite a limited investment into small-scale fisheries by the state, with a 
consequence of limited technology to access the resources, local tuna fisheries have with 
their available means created a variety of livelihoods. In both Mauritius and the Seychelles, 
the advancement of the small-scale fishery and improved access to the resources, especially 
for the semi-industrial sector, are largely attributed to the investment of the state, that are 
often linked to revenues obtained through fishing access agreements’ revenues. The 
livelihoods created around local tuna fisheries are key to the well-being of community 
members but also to the local economies of these tuna villages and towns. The analysis also 
demonstrated that while countries try to sustain economic revenue by allowing industrial 
fishing by DWFNs within their EEZs, the impact of the fishery on the resources and coastal 
livelihood are not weighed in the balance of national interests.  Through the continued access 
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granted to DWFNs, coastal countries are putting at risk the livelihoods of their coastal 
communities and the long-term sustainability of tuna populations in the region.  
My exploration of regionalism has confirmed existing geopolitical theories regarding 
conflictual natural resources such as tuna. Exploitation of resources that are high-valued 
commodities is shaped by geopolitical interactions with DWFNs and the prioritisation of 
national interests above those of the resources. Because of these, tuna fisheries provide a very 
limited sense of regionalism. As local people working on tuna have limited contact and ports 
are in competition, a better regional integration through tuna fisheries remains challenging. 
However, there are various opportunities in which the region can advance a regional identity 
and regional cooperation through tuna. They need to take place at different levels, from 
fishing activities to policy and management decision makings. They require the countries of 
the region to assess the real benefits they gain from cooperating with DWFNs compared to 
the need for the long-term conservation of tuna. The thesis has also shown that the 
mainstream narrative of ‘Indianoceania’ hardly finds its place in tuna fisheries. This identity, 
however, represent an opportunity to improve the WIO’s public attachment to the resources. 
While in countries like Maldives tuna is considered a full part of daily life, in the case study 
islands such an association with tuna only exists to a limited extent. Tuna is considered as 
mostly only tuna for the canneries. An improved anchoring of a regional identity linked to 
tuna fisheries could help entities such as the IOC or the FPAOI to coordinate regional 
management measures of the resources and an increased engagement with tuna issues at 
different levels including at governmental level but also at local levels such as amongst the 
public, fishers and within the canneries. 
8.1.2. Improved knowledge on Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles’ tuna fisheries 
As seen in Chapter 4, tuna fisheries in the three countries studied are a rich field of enquiry. 
Here, I will come back to each country and present what the thesis has contributed to 
knowledge on tuna fisheries.  
For Madagascar, regarding the tuna fisheries, I showed that the question of competition over 
the resources, while less pressing due to the limited number of semi-industrial vessels, still 
exists considering that available data shows that some species caught by small-scale/artisanal 
fishers are also caught by industrial vessels as bycatch. The thesis also showed that local 
fishers in Madagascar do not mainly attribute the overfishing of resources to industrial tuna 
vessels (different to the two neighbour countries). Local fishers attribute the cause of reduced 
resources to climate change, environmental degradation and the increase of fishers’ numbers. 
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The thesis also highlighted that despite its limited tuna fisheries, there is a vast array of social 
relations and job opportunities behind every segment of the fishery. Many actors indirectly 
access tuna and are key to local economies, from the intermediaries in Ste Luce to women 
boat owners in Mahajanga and Ramena and the stevedores in Antsiranana. I also showed that 
managing industrial fishing in Madagascar is the trickiest. It is not surprising that industrial 
fishing is criticised, for the case of Madagascar, as its contribution is only known through the 
foreign revenues it provides to the state. The critique of industrial fishing by NGOs and 
academics in Madagascar has to be tempered with the consideration of its role in supplying 
the cannery (the main job provider in Antsiranana), and in the job opportunities and revenues 
for stevedores, crew members working on vessels, and Malagasy immigrants working in 
canneries of the WIO region. For the role of Madagascar in tuna fisheries regionalism, I 
showed that the country has to the extent of its possibilities always adhered to regional 
projects from the 1980s to the current G16 discussion at the IOTC. Its difficult position, 
being reliant on development aid, influences its capacity to align with other stronger coastal 
countries or adhere more to regional programs supported by DWFNs. Political stability also 
impedes on its efforts and its management decisions. The Importance given to the 
development of national tuna fisheries or to regional initiatives can vary according to 
leadership in the country. Despite a very active country in regional management, one has to 
always consider decision-making regarding tuna fisheries in the socio-economic and political 
context of that specific moment.  
For Mauritius, while tuna fisheries are not at the centre of its economy, they represent an 
important contributor to the socio-economic development of the country including through 
the Prince Tuna cannery (the country’s the largest employer), through the different activities 
at the port, and also through the livelihoods they provide to local fishers. The thesis 
highlighted that Mauritius, despite a lower tuna productivity in its EEZ, has managed to gain 
an important place in the WIO tuna exploitation. First, in terms of access politics, Mauritius 
has improved its access to tuna resources by two rights-based mechanisms: flagging of 
vessels and the reciprocity agreements with Seychelles. The former has allowed the increase 
of vessels in its national fleet and the latter has allowed access to fishing grounds beyond the 
EEZ. Second, its enabling business environment has generated various interests by local 
entrepreneurs in the processing of tuna as well as the retention of companies such as Prince 
Tuna and IBL. While these largely contribute to the national economy they also benefit 
DWFNs, operating the flagged vessels, and Asian ones using the port for transhipment. At 
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the local level, the thesis also showed that similar to Madagascar, tuna fishing provides 
important economic opportunities to other members of the local community such as women 
who play an important role in the supply chain of local tuna. Moreover, the development of 
the semi-industrial sector and upgrading of the artisanal vessels represents a welcomed 
opportunity for local fishers. The state might, however, face increasing resistance from local 
fishers due to potential conflicts in fishing grounds with the industrial segment, as seen in 
Seychelles. Regarding overfishing, fishers in Mauritius have, like in the Seychelles, a strong 
view regarding the involvement of industrial vessels in the state of tuna resources, their view 
is, however, complemented by putting the state as partly responsible to the reduction of 
resources by granting licences. Like in Madagascar, the contribution on the local fishing 
activities of the industrial segment especially through fishing access agreements is not felt by 
local fishers despite existing projects of fisheries development funded by such agreements. In 
terms of regionalism, the thesis presented the special case of Mauritius at the IOTC level 
where its non-alignment with other countries is mainly geopolitical and linked to sovereignty 
claims. While Mauritius is one of the key countries of the IOC – hosting its headquarters, 
when it comes to tuna fisheries, the country is faced with the challenges of balancing 
geopolitical interests and regionalism.  
For Seychelles, the thesis showed that the central role of the Seychelles in the WIO tuna 
fisheries stems from a combination of productive fishing grounds, enabling administrative 
services, a favourable socio-economic and political context and also high levels of investment 
from the private sector including from foreign fishing firms. In terms of access politics, the 
Seychelles have optimised their access to tuna resources by both developing a national semi-
industrial fleet, flagging foreign vessels and concluding fishing access agreements. While 
they are key to the prominent role of the Seychelles in the region, they have also created a 
conflict between the different segments of the fishery especially as the semi-industrial fleet 
grows. The competition over the resources is apparent especially as the semi-industrial fleet 
and to some extent some artisanal vessels fish in the same areas as industrial vessels within 
the EEZ. Structural mechanisms of access such as technology, knowledge and capital 
exacerbate the divide, with local fishers feeling outplayed by the industrial sector in the 
fishery. This has led to fishers building a strong voice in the country and in the region for a 
reduced industrial fishing. Fishers involved in tuna fisheries and other fisheries have 
consequently built a compelling narrative of overfishing being caused by the industrial 
segment, without mentioning the increase of the semi-industrial fleet. The thesis showed that 
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local fishers in the Seychelles, through a combined public advocacy, support from 
international media and a global favourable environment for small-scale fishers, have taken 
the lead in the region including through the FPAOI. This has led to more access to the state 
including being able to join the Seychelles’s delegation at the IOTC. This leadership 
constitutes an important lesson learnt for the other countries of the region. In terms of 
regionalism, the Seychelles are also presented with a dilemma, while it is considering the 
interests of its local fleets, its economy is also highly dependent on the industrial segment 
especially landings from purse seiners. While the change of position of the Seychelles from a 
long-term ally of DWFNs to more alignment with coastal countries is fairly recent, the 
country has a difficult balance of interests that it has to weigh during regional discussions.          
An important question for the three countries studied is “do tuna fisheries actually bring 
benefits to the countries?”. While the thesis has attempted to provide a picture of winners and 
losers in the fishery, there is still missing information to respond to the question including the 
real value of tuna as contributing to food security and livelihood of hidden actors. More 
detailed research is needed to fully examine these contributions. The same also applies to less 
seen actors such as stevedores and fishing crew members who come from beyond the WIO 
region. Their contribution to their own national economies as well as the livelihoods linked to 
their activities require more attention. Through such future investigation, the value of local 
fishing and involvement of local actors could be better considered by countries and provide 
more arguments to debate for or against the perpetuation of foreign industrial exploitation as 
currently undertaken in the WIO.  
For the three countries of the WIO to continue to benefit from tuna fisheries and improve 
such benefits, three action points are needed: expand knowledge on the impact of tuna 
fisheries on local livelihoods, improve the attention and support given to local fisheries and 
investigate the impact of the different segments of the fishery on the resources. It may require 
a change of paradigm in the sector and consider the need to degrow. Echoing the degrowth 
movement calling for a more just society and positive socio-ecological changes, I argue for a 
fairer distribution of benefits. Tuna fisheries are a key ocean-related activity that requires a 
fairer balance of benefits received, especially to the local actors and coastal communities.  
8.2. ‘SPEAKING’ TUNA  
Here I will share my concluding thoughts regarding the conservation of tuna and the 
management of the fisheries. As seen on land, managing stationary natural resources within 
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clearly established legal boundaries can pose various challenges. Managing tuna resources 
that move within fluid boundaries of the WIO can then be even more challenging. As this 
thesis has shown, the materiality of the tuna and the WIO bring both opportunities and 
challenges. While the movement of this valuable species through EEZs brings some forms of 
national development to the countries, it also generates competition between host countries 
and especially challenges in management. Three points need to be raised here regarding the 
management and conservation of tuna in its current state in the WIO.  
The first key point relates to the industrial segment of the fishery. The current exploitation of 
tuna resources in the WIO through highly industrialised purse seiners and longliners is one of 
the biggest challenges that the countries of the WIO encounter. First, as behind the industrial 
fleets are strong capitalist companies and powerful DWFNs, the countries of the WIO are put 
in a difficult position of managing access to the resources by companies that bring revenues, 
jobs and tuna to the canneries. Under this setting, putting the conservation of tuna resources 
on government agendas is difficult. Perceived national interests, linked to the economics of 
the industrial fishery rather than the impact of the fishery in the longer term, override the 
need to sustain the resources. Second, the impact of tuna fisheries and especially the 
industrial segment is still largely unknown. Current knowledge on the state of tuna resources 
are produced only at the Indian Ocean level. From the IOTC’s stock assessment in 2018, at 
least three fish species are more likely to be overfished in the Indian Ocean: yellowfin tuna, 
longtail tuna and narrow-barred Spanish mackerel. The last two are species that are also 
caught by coastal fisheries and are key to coastal communities. Knowledge on the 
interactions between industrial fishing and those coastal resources is limited to local stories of 
overfishing by the industrial fleet. This limited knowledge also applies to the case of bycatch 
species caught in the nets of purse seiners, such as sharks, marine turtles, and albatross, 
which are substantially affected by industrial exploitation and only assessed at the IOTC 
level. Addressing this knowledge gap at the WIO level can help countries understand the 
broader impact of industrial fishing on the marine resources and the ecosystem, as well as 
provide arguments to weigh the impacts of the current industrial exploitation in the WIO. 
 A second reflection is around the materiality of tuna and the WIO within which it moves. 
Through discussions with fishers and presence in the field, it was noticed that tuna has a fluid 
ontology, especially in Madagascar. What is considered tuna or not can be strongly debated 
in Madagascar, and this especially due to the diversity of local dialects that qualifies one fish 
as tuna or not, in one region compared to another. This then brings questions of which tuna is 
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overfished at the national level while tuna is differently defined in different parts of the 
country. Efforts of conserving tuna become challenging for the state. To succeed in any effort 
of improving knowledge on tuna resources, an active capacity building is required for the 
fishers and statisticians of the fisheries department regarding the various species. In Mauritius 
and the Seychelles, due to a more tuna-oriented semi-industrial fishery, this confusion over 
tuna is less pronounced. There is a fairly clear divide between coastal tunas sold on local 
markets and industrial tunas exported directly or used at the canneries. As seen in Chapter 5, 
however, the discourse of the reduction of tuna resources at the local level is for 
undifferentiated “tuna” in the three countries and especially in Mauritius and the Seychelles. 
This distinction between the various species of tuna being blurred when questions of 
overfishing are discussed at the local level can portray local claims as too general and 
difficult to address at the national and even regional level. A second point is the fluidity of 
the WIO itself and how it shapes the fisheries. While the WIO has historically been portrayed 
as a space of trade, through the development of tuna fisheries since the 1980s, it has also 
evolved to a space of strong geopolitical negotiations, territoriality and especially diverse 
livelihoods. 
The third aspect I would like to bring is the idea of ‘speaking tuna’. In an article by Bill 
Adams entitled ‘speaking lion’, he promotes the need for nature conservation to reach out to 
other fields and approaches to succeed. His vision is that “conservation success could be 
improved by effective interdisciplinarity, openness to new and contrasting ideas, and a 
commitment to transparency to encourage dialogue about alternative management actions.” 
(Adams 2016: 868). I contend here that the management of tuna could benefit from a similar 
change of paradigm. Too often associated with fisheries management, surrounded by stock 
assessments, probabilities and economic models of cost effectiveness, an improved 
management of the fishery requires a better consideration of other approaches and contrasting 
ideas. This is particularly needed considering the current situation of overfished species like 
yellowfin.  
For a start, management of tuna fisheries at the regional IOTC level urgently requires inputs 
on solving geopolitical conundrums. While the issue of politically powerful actors (DWFNs), 
dominating within RFMOs is way too common, the IOTC is currently strongly affected by 
such issues. As long as geopolitical interests are not addressed and kept as the elephants in 
the room, important management measures will keep being delayed, to the detriment of the 
future of the tunas.  
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At the national level, coastal states need a better consideration of contrasting ideas, including 
those of local fishers, often less heard due to the louder voice brought in by revenues and 
benefits from fishing access agreements. Coastal states need to refocus on the long-term 
future of local livelihoods in tuna and the long-term sustainability of marine resources. This 
will require difficult trade-offs that might impact the present economic interests of the state 
and its geopolitical partners.  
Finally, improving the current management of tuna fisheries also requires integrating 
alternative views and ways of resource exploitation. As part of building an argument for 
degrowth in tuna fisheries, one aspect of such an approach that could be brought to tuna 
fisheries is the concept of care. Care as seen in degrowth includes the idea of ‘giving care’ 
which implies a commitment and work to satisfy a need of care in a direct relationship 
(D’Alisa et al. 2015: 64). The suggestion here is to consider the idea of giving care and bring 
actors to commit to take actions towards the needs of tunas – here their long-term 
sustainability through conservation and management. One of the challenges in enacting such 
an approach is the ‘out of sight’ character that the fish may present to the policy-makers. 
Implementing the idea of care calls to establish a direct relationship with the fish. This 
relationship, while present in local offices of fisheries departments, on fishing boats or in 
canneries, is often inexistent at the table of negotiations. To establish care, these interactions 
with the resources need to be made familiar to policy-makers, especially before they sit and 
negotiate access or management measures. This is particularly relevant for coastal countries 
that are put to negotiate with highly trained negotiators of DWFNs. By bringing alternative 
views and approaches into solving the tuna conundrum, countries of the WIO have the 
opportunity to free themselves from the structural weight of geopolitics and capitalist ways of 
exploiting the fish.  
8.3. ENRICHING THE FIELD OF ‘MARINE’ POLITICAL ECOLOGY BY 
STUDYING TUNA FISHERIES  
As seen in Chapter 3, studies of tuna fisheries have been rather prolific within other 
disciplines and in other oceans. With this thesis, I have then attempted to develop the field of 
‘marine’ political ecology with the study of tunas and the western Indian Ocean. The thesis 
demonstrated how tuna fisheries in the WIO present the case of unsustainable blue growth, 
perpetuating ecological degradation through industrial fishing and marginalisation of local 
actors. It also provided an interesting case of multiscalar interactions of actors and showing 
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the challenging politics of resources management at different scales. It finally emphasised the 
need for more attention to the non-humans when it comes to analysing activities at sea.  
8.3.1. Discussion of blue degrowth 
Given the current enthusiasm about the blue economy and blue growth, the study of tuna 
fisheries serves as a reality check for ocean-based activities undertaken under a capitalist type 
of exploitation. As presented in this thesis, the usual winners and losers will be generated if 
other initiatives involving marine resources follow the example of tuna extraction. Other blue 
economy activities will face even greater challenges in developing countries that are mainly 
dependent on foreign actors for exploitation and with limited knowledge production 
regarding the state of various marine species and ecosystems. As seen in tuna fisheries and as 
it currently stands, coastal countries will not get the benefits promised under the blue 
economy. In a capitalist-oriented system, the same dominant actors – firms and geopolitically 
strong countries – will be the ones profiting from the activities under the blue economy. In 
line with current calls for a more ‘just’ blue economy especially for small-scale fisheries 
(Bennett 2018), the study has also brought in more local voices that are currently less heard 
in the blue growth dialogue. In tuna fisheries, these local views are often overridden by the 
hegemonic narratives of sustainability that are currently pushed by national governments and 
industrial actors. Contributing to ‘the seed’ effort of political ecology, the study of tuna 
fisheries in the WIO has shown the difficult if not impossible way to achieve sustainability in 
the existing capitalist way of using the tuna and the sea. Coastal countries need to adopt 
robust actions for the improvement of the state of tuna resources. Those will require difficult 
trade-offs. Nationally, there is a strong need to refocus the fishery towards local fishing 
communities that are the most dependent on the fish. The question of pursuing industrial 
fishing or not can only be addressed by systemic change at the global level, where the socio-
ecological impacts of the exploitation are fully revealed and prompt the adoption of less 
growth-oriented exploitation. In tuna fisheries and other blue economy activities, there will 
be no win-win solution to sustain the marine resources. Solutions will demand putting the 
fish, the sea and their custodians first, at a potential loss for some economic and political 
actors. In other words, tuna fisheries need a blue degrowth, that will question claimed 
sustainability, focus more on the custodians of the resources and a positive socio-ecological 
change in the use of marine resources. While achieving these will represent a real challenge 
for coastal countries, a strong argument is needed to motivate countries. This could be built 
based on three foundations: the opportunity to further defend sovereignty of coastal countries 
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over tunas in the region; the need to sustain the fish for the long-term benefits of the region 
and its people; and the opportunity to lead by example at the global level by implementing an 
inclusive and more just blue economy agenda. 
8.3.2. An empirical contribution to discussions of spatial scale  
Political ecology studies of natural resources have often been accused of being limited to 
local analyses or on the contrary accused of treating scale too loosely moving from the local 
to the global (Neumann 2015; Rangan and Kull 2009). The use of a political ecology lens to 
study tuna fisheries has required a careful consideration of scale. Due to the movement of the 
resources and the strong influence of the external actors, the study of tuna fisheries required 
to work at local/national scales in countries and regional scales at the WIO and Indian Ocean 
level. I have given less attention to the global scale as other scholars have addressed 
questions of markets, firm strategies and state of the resources. The study has therefore tried 
to address the above-mentioned critique and to carefully take into consideration the 
relationships between actors and the impact of natural resource use across scales. First, at the 
local level, the thesis has tried to ‘humanise’ the tuna fisheries by telling stories of local and 
regional fishing, fishers, intermediaries, stevedores or cannery workers. At the national and 
regional levels, the study showed the limited visibility of local stories from the three islands 
studied in management discussions and the shifting positions of coastal state actors when it 
comes to adopting management measures at the IOTC. This disconnection between scales is 
not uncommon in a high value resource such as tuna. As presented in Chapter 7, the study 
also contributes to expanding the field of geopolitical ecology. Through this angle, the study 
of mobile and cross-border resources such as tuna adds an empirical element to the field and 
opens it up to the study of similar resources that are dependent on geopolitical interactions for 
their use and management. For the field of political ecology, the study of highly mobile 
species such as tuna complies with the idea of Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) of analysing 
local resource use in the context of broader factors. The specific focus at the regional level 
was key as that is where state practises are the most diverse and have a strong impact on the 
management of tuna fisheries in both coastal waters, EEZs and the high seas. 
8.3.3. Reiterating the importance of non-humans 
The role of non-humans in political ecology has been widely recognised, as seen in Chapter 
6. While there has been criticism regarding giving more place to the non-humans in social 
practices and about the emergence of ideas around new materialism and post-humanism (as 
seen in Malm 2019), this thesis contends that mobile tuna fish and the sea in general play a 
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non-negligible role in shaping their use and management. The thesis has offered a 
contribution on two fronts. Empirically, it presents how the materiality of tuna and the WIO 
shapes questions of access, geopolitics and perception on resource use. With the increase of 
interests in marine issues within political ecology, the study of tuna provides a 
comprehensive example of the role of non-humans and their impact on social practices at 
different scales. Theoretically, studying tuna fisheries has also brought reflection on the idea 
of co-producing materiality as the tunas are also impacted by fishing practices and political 
decisions taken about their management. In line with discussions about new materialism, I 
argue that tuna, its fishers and managers co-exist and influence each other’s being and 
practices. While fishers strongly depend on the availability of the fish to gain benefit from the 
fishery, the tuna’s availability and productivity are also influenced by the fishers’ practices 
and more generally by the political management measures taken – or not – to sustain the 
fisheries. Tuna are both ‘cooperative’, for instance by aggregating under FADs to the point of 
its overfishing but also ‘undisciplined’, refusing to comply with human-established 
boundaries or prediction of productivity. For an out of sight resource that a handful of its 
consumers would have seen alive, tuna generates multiple interests and conflicts amongst an 
array of actors and across borders.  
8.4. FUTURE RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES  
Tuna fisheries present a double conundrum for research. On the one hand, it appears like it 
has been extensively researched including in the Indian Ocean (for example the work of Liam 
Campling – political economy, Frederic Le Manach – access agreements, Alain de Fonteneau 
– biology of tuna, Laurent Dagorn – biology of tuna and FADs, Marie Le Comte – 
governance and sustainability, this thesis – political ecology). On the other hand, there are 
questions that remain unanswered mainly due to the large extent of tuna fisheries in the 
Indian Ocean and even in the WIO and also due to the multiplicity of actors and sites that 
need to be considered for the fishery. The following questions emerge from the thesis.  
First, knowledge on the ecological impact of tuna fisheries in the region is still limited. As it 
stands, only the main commercial species are being properly assessed, with knowledge on 
other neritic tuna and bycatch species still lacking. The thesis has provided perspectives on 
the ecological status of tuna species in the WIO, based on IOTC assessments and local 
perceptions. A step further that would be needed is a deeper ecological history of the tuna 
resources in the region. The challenge in this future research agenda lies in the availability of 
environmental data regarding the tuna species and their associated species in the WIO region. 
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At this current time, lack of data and uncertainty rule the science of IOTC assessments and 
contribute to the perpetuation of tuna exploitation at a pace that might not sustain the 
resources in the long-term. While there is scientific capacity available in the region, there has 
been limited interest in focussing on tuna fisheries. This represents an opportunity for the 
scientific community of the WIO to expand knowledge on the subject but also for the 
countries to be provided with more scientific evidence for better decision-making.   
Second, more localised explorations of coastal tuna fisheries including their catches, the 
socio-economic impacts of their fishing and their nutritional needs met through tuna fisheries, 
are strongly needed especially in the three countries studied. The local tuna catches are 
largely underestimated. Other socio-economic and political aspects also require attention, 
including micro-politics in those fisheries and social impacts. The thesis has only provided a 
glimpse of a larger story that needs to be told from each tuna village. At the current time, 
provision of jobs and food security are the main arguments to protect the marine resources for 
local communities, without being fully apprehended. The broader social impacts of the 
fisheries or the politics involved are less known. Local tuna fisheries will highly benefit from 
a more anthropological and ethnographic approach that would provide detailed stories 
regarding the local communities and the tunas they fish. Another approach that could also 
expand this would be a decolonial, environmental justice or feminist lens from which the 
structural implications of countries’ colonial past, class and gender on local practices in 
coastal communities could be highlighted. This could provide a rich knowledge and further 
highlight various forms of injustice.  
Third, the question of national compliance to IOTC resolutions is an important issue, 
understudied at the regional level. It has received limited attention, included from this thesis. 
Other researchers are currently exploring the IOTC and its proceedings (for example, Sinan 
and Bailey (2019) or the performance of RFMOs overall (for example Aranda et al. (2012); 
Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly (2010)). What has been missing in the literature and especially in the 
WIO is an analysis of the implementation of management measures at country levels. While 
the IOTC has a compliance committee that monitors how member parties implement 
resolutions, those are limited to reports presenting what countries have been compliant to or 
not and what measures countries are taking to be compliant. An analysis of the politics and 
the socio-economic challenges that countries face to implement management measures is 
needed. It could provide more guidance to parties on how to adopt measures that are 
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achievable or invest in means and options needed to improve compliance of countries, 
especially the poorest ones such as Madagascar.  
Finally, something that could also be explored is the link between tuna fisheries and more 
global policies, for example the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). There are 
increasing studies of how various uses of natural resources contribute or not to the SDGs (see 
for example Waldron et al. (2017) for agroforestry, Mugagga and Nabaasa (2016) for water 
resources, or Cooke et al. (2016) for inland fisheries). It can be interesting to investigate how 
tuna fisheries contribute or not to achieving specific SDGs including SDG 14 that refers to 
the management of life below water or SDG 2 that refers to food security. This could involve 
doing research on one site or one country and provide an assessment of the impacts of tuna 
fisheries in their situated contexts. Such exploration could help policy makers in their 
decision-making on tuna fisheries at different levels, since the SDGs are now well integrated 
in various political discourses (FAO 2018b; Halvorsen and Higgins 2020).  
As a last thought, it needs to be acknowledged that tuna fisheries have provided a rich and 
vast array of study and analyses for researchers. Despite current advancement in the different 
disciplines, many questions remain unanswered and might contribute to the continuous 
exploitation of the resources that currently causes their depletion. This thesis has attempted to 
provide an idea of the across-scale socio-political interactions that take place in the WIO 
which requires more attention to better understand and improve the management of the 
fishery.   
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. List of interviews 
Interview 
code 
Category of interviewee 
Affiliation  
(or village for fishers) 
Interview date 
Type of 
interaction 
BK 01 Government official EU DG Mare May, 2018 Open discussion 
BK 02 Policy Officer IPNLF May, 2018 Open discussion 
BK 03 Semi-industrial boat owner Victoria May, 2018 
Semi-structured 
interview 
BK 04 
South Korean industry 
representative 
Dae Young Fisheries May, 2018 Open discussion 
BK 05 
Spanish industry 
representative 
OPAGAC May, 2018 
Semi-structured 
interview 
BK 06 Government official 
Malagasy Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries 
May, 2018 Open discussion 
MD 01 Government official 
Malagasy Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries 
February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 02 Government official 
Malagasy Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries 
February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 03 Malagasy crew member French purse seiner February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 04 Government official 
Malagasy Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries 
February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 05 Government official USTA February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 06 Fish shop owner Poissonnerie Joreda February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 07 Small-scale fisher Antsiranana February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 08 Sport fishing operator Antsiranana February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 09 Small-scale fisher Antsiranana February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 10 Government official USTA February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 11 Government official CSP February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 12 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 13 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 14 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 15 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 16 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 17 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 18 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 19 Government official Ramena district February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 20 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 21 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
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MD 22 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 23 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 24 
Boat owner and small-
scale fisher 
Ramena February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 25 Boat owner  Ramena February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 26 
Boat owner and small-
scale fisher 
Ramena February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 27 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 28 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 29 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 30 Former small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 31 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 32 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 33 Former small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 34 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 35 Small-scale fisher Ramena February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 36 Surveyor USTA February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 37 Government official CSP February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 39 Staff member 
AZIMUT NGO (in 
Antsiranana) 
February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 40 
Tuna snack seller at 
market 
Antsiranana February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 41 Staff member 
Conservation International 
(in Antsiranana) 
February, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 42 Senegalese crew member Spanish purse seiner February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 43 Senegalese crew member Spanish purse seiner February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 44 Spanish captain Spanish purse seiner February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 45 Spanish captain Spanish purse seiner February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 46 Senegalese crew member Spanish purse seiner February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 47 Spanish crew member Spanish purse seiner February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 48 Surveyor USTA February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 49 Staff member PFOI February, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 50 Government official 
Malagasy Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries 
March, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 51 
Intermediary and boat 
owner 
Mahajanga March, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 52 
Intermediary and boat 
owner 
Mahajanga March, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 53 
Intermediary and boat 
owner 
Mahajanga March, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 54 Small-scale fisher Antsahabingo March, 2017 Open discussion 
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MD 55 Government official 
Malagasy Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries 
March, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 56 Sport Fisher Mahajanga March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 57 Small-scale fisher Amborovy March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 58 Small-scale fisher Amborovy March, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 59 Small-scale fisher Amborovy March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 60 Small-scale fisher Amborovy March, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 61 Small-scale fisher Amborovy March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 62 Small-scale fisher Amborovy March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 63 
Intermediary and fisher's 
spouse 
Amborovy March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 64 Small-scale fisher Amborovy March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 65 Small-scale fisher Amborovy March, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 66 
Intermediary and fisher's 
spouse 
Amborovy March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 67 Small-scale fisher Antsahabingo March, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 68 Small-scale fisher Antsahabingo March, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 69 Staff member DELC NGO March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 70 Staff member REFRIGEPECHE EST March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 71 Government official 
Malagasy Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries 
March, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 72 Government official CSP March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 73 Government official CSP March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 74 Government official CSP March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 75 Government official CSP March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 76 Government official 
Malagasy Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries 
March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 77 Government official CSP March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 78 On-board observer CSP March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 79 Former on-board observer CSP March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 80 NGO staff MIHARI network March, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 81 NGO staff MIHARI network March, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 82 NGO staff Blue Ventures March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 83 NGO staff Blue Ventures March, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 84 Staff member PFOI March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 85 Senegalese crew member 
Txori Tori (Spanish purse 
seiner) 
March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 86 Senegalese crew member 
Txori Tori (Spanish purse 
seiner) 
March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 87 Senegalese crew member 
Txori Tori (Spanish purse 
seiner) 
March, 2017 Open discussion 
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MD 88 Fish shop owner Poissonnerie Toky March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 89 NGO staff WWF March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 90 Government official 
Malagasy Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries 
March, 2017 Open discussion 
MD 91 Intermediary Toamasina October, 2018 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 92 Small-scale fisher Toamasina October, 2018 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 93 Small-scale fisher Toamasina October, 2018 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 94 Small-scale fisher Toamasina October, 2018 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 95 Small-scale fisher Toamasina October, 2018 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 96 Small-scale fisher Toamasina October, 2018 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 97 Intermediary Toamasina October, 2018 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 98 Small-scale fisher Ste Luce 
November, 
2018 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 99 
Intermediary and boat 
owner 
Ste Luce 
November, 
2018 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 100 
Intermediary and boat 
owner 
Ste Luce 
November, 
2018 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 101 Government official 
Malagasy Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries 
November, 
2018 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MD 102 Small-scale fisher Ste Luce 
November, 
2018 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 01 Small-scale fisher Grand Baie April, 2017 Open discussion 
MU 02 Former small-scale fisher Rose Hill April, 2017 Open discussion 
MU 03 Government official Albion Fisheries Centre April, 2017 Open discussion 
MU 04 Small-scale fisher Trou aux Biches April, 2017 Open discussion 
MU 05 Small-scale fisher Tamarin April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 06 Small-scale fisher Tamarin April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 07 Small-scale fisher Rivière Noire April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 08 
Intermediary and boat 
owner 
Flic en Flac April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 09 Intermediary Rivière Noire April, 2017 Open discussion 
MU 10 Small-scale fisher Tamarin April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 11 Small-scale fisher Tamarin April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 12 Small-scale fisher Tamarin April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 13 Small-scale fisher Rivière Noire April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 14 Sport fisher operator Rivière Noire April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 15 Small-scale fisher Rivière Noire April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 16 Intermediary and fisher's Tombeau Bay April, 2017 Semi-structured 
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spouse interview 
MU 17 Small-scale fisher Tombeau Bay April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 18 Small-scale fisher Le Morne April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 19 
Intermediary and fisher's 
spouse 
Bain des Dame April, 2017 Open discussion 
MU 20 Small-scale fisher Bain des Dame April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 21 Government official Albion Fisheries Centre April, 2017 Open discussion 
MU 22 Government official Mauritius Port Authority April, 2017 Open discussion 
MU 23 Government official FiTEC April, 2017 Open discussion 
MU 24 Small-scale fisher Tombeau Bay April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 25 Small-scale fisher Bain des Dame April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 26 Staff member Mer des Mascareignes April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 27 Government official FiTEC May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 28 Staff member IOC May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 29 Staff member Princes Tuna May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 30 Government official Seafood Hub April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 31 Sport fishing operator JPH Charters April, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 32 Small-scale fisher Tamarin May, 2017 Open discussion 
MU 33 
Processing company 
representative 
IBL Seafood May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 34 Government official 
Mauritian Ministry of Blue 
Economy, Marine 
Resources, Fisheries and 
Shipping 
May, 2017 Open discussion 
MU 35 Small-scale fisher Pointes au Sable May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 36 Small-scale fisher Tamarin May, 2017 Open discussion 
MU 37 Small-scale fisher Trou aux Biches May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 38 Small-scale fisher Trou aux Biches May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 39 Small-scale fisher Trou aux Biches May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
MU 40 Small-scale fisher Trou aux Biches May, 2017 Open discussion 
MU 41 Small-scale fisher Pointe aux sable May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 01 Advisor SFA May, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 02 Government official Seychelles Port Authority May, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 03 Small-scale fisher Victoria May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 04 Small-scale fisher Victoria May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 05 Small-scale fisher Victoria May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
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SE 06 Small-scale fisher Victoria May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 07 Small-scale fisher Providence May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 08 Small-scale fisher Beau-Vallon May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 09 Small-scale fisher Bel Ombre May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 10 Small-scale fisher Bel Ombre May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 11 Small-scale fisher Bel Ombre May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 12 Government official 
Seychelles Ministry of 
Agriculture and fisheries 
May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 13 Semi-industrial fisher Victoria May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 14 Semi-industrial fisher Victoria May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 15 Semi-industrial boat owner Providence May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 16 
Processing company 
representative 
Sear Harvester May, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 17 Government official SFA May, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 18 Semi-industrial fisher Victoria May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 19 Staff member Nature Seychelles May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 20 Semi-industrial fisher Victoria May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 21 Semi-industrial boat owner Victoria May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 22 Sri-Lankan crew member Victoria May, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 23 Semi-industrial boat owner Providence May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 24 Small-scale fisher Anse à la Mouche May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 25 Small-scale fisher Anse à la Mouche May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 26 Small-scale fisher Anse à la Mouche May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 27 
Sri-Lankan crew member 
manager 
Victoria May, 2017 open discussion 
SE 28 Small-scale fisher Victoria May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 29 Member 
Seychelles Fishing Boat 
Owners Association 
May, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 30 Government official SFA May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 31 Government official SFA May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 32 Small-scale fisher Victoria May, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 33 NGO staff 
Island Conservation 
Seychelles 
May, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 34 Small-scale fisher Victoria June, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 35 Semi-industrial boat owner Victoria June, 2017 Semi-structured 
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interview 
SE 36 Staff member Green Island Foundation June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 37 Former small-scale fisher Victoria June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 38 Staff member IPNLF June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 39 Staff member IPNLF June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 40 Government official 
Ministry of Finance, Trade 
Investment and Economic 
Planning 
June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 41 Semi-industrial fisher Victoria June, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 42 Semi-industrial fisher Victoria June, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 43 Small-scale boat owner Victoria June, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 44 Quality Manager Fresh Seafood Ltd June, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 45 Semi-industrial boat owner Providence June, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 46 Semi-industrial boat owner Providence June, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 47 Member 
Seychelles Fishing Boat 
Owners Association 
June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 48 Member 
Seychelles Fishing Boat 
Owners Association 
June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 49 Small-scale boat owner Victoria June, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 50 Sri-Lankan crew member Victoria June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 51 French captain 
SAPMER (French purse 
seiner) 
June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 52 French researcher IRD June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 53 Surveyor SFA June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 54 Sport fishing operator Victoria June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 55 Semi-industrial boat owner Victoria June, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 56 French researcher IDDRI June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 57 Surveyor SFA June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 58 Small-scale fisher Victoria June, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 59 Semi-industrial boat owner Victoria June, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 60 Government official SFA June, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 61 Semi-industrial boat owner Victoria June, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 62 French Researcher IRD June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 63 Ivorian crew member French purse seiner June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 63 Staff member Indian Ocean Tuna Ltd June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 65 Staff member Indian Ocean Tuna Ltd June, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SE 66 Spanish Captain Spanish purse seiner June, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
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SE 67 Malagasy crew member Spanish purse seiner June, 2017 Open discussion 
SE 68 French Researcher IRD June, 2017 Open discussion 
SK 01 Staff member WWF Madagascar March, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SK 02 NGO staff WWF WIO June, 2017 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SK 03 
Spanish industry 
representative 
OPAGAC April, 2018 
Semi-structured 
interview 
SK 04 
French industry 
representative  
SAPMER May, 2018 Open discussion 
SK 05 
French industry 
representative  
ORTHONGEL May, 2018 Open discussion 
SK 06 
French government 
representative 
French Ministry of 
Agriculture and  Food 
May, 2018 Open discussion 
SK 07 Staff member Greenpeace March, 2017 Open discussion 
SK 08 French Researcher IRD May, 2018 Open discussion 
SK 09 
French industry 
representative  
Previously worked for 
SAPMER 
May, 2018 Open discussion 
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Appendix 2. Guiding questions during interviews 
FOR FISHERS (also adapted for intermediaries and representatives of processing companies) 
0 Nom, prénom (et âge)  
1 Statut : Êtes-vous pêcheurs à plein temps ou mi-temps (pêcheur saisonnier/récréatif) ?  
Statut : Est-ce que vous pêchez le thon ?  
2 Espèces : Quelles espèces de thon pêchez-vous ?  
3 Saison : Quelle est la saison du thon ?  
4 Effort : Pêchez-vous tous les jours toute l’année ? Tous les jours en saison du thon ?  
Capture : Combien de kg de thon pêchez-vous environ par jour/semaine en saison?   
 Capture : Combien de kg de thon pêchez-vous environ par jour/semaine hors saison?  
5 Localisation : Où se trouve le thon et à quelle distance devez-vous aller le pêcher?   
6 Technologie: Quelle technique de pêche utilisez-vous  (ligne, palangre, traine, senne, 
poteau et ligne, filets maillants, autres?) 
 
7 Capital: Comment avez-vous financé votre bateau et le matériel ? (propriété, prêt, 
subvention, autre?) 
 
8 Travail: Combien de personnes participent à la pêche ? (famille, membres d'équipage, 
membres d'équipage nationaux et locaux) 
 
9 Travail: Comment les personnes impliquées sont-elles embauchées et comment sont-
elles payées ? 
 
11 Négociation d'autres relations sociales: Avez-vous besoin de négocier votre accès à la 
pêcherie (et avec qui) ? 
 
12 Accès légal: Avez-vous besoin de permis/licences pour pêcher ? (venant du ministère ? 
de la ville ?) 
 
13 Autorité: y-a-t-il une autorité particulière qui fait des règles sur la pêche thonière et qui 
pose des conditions pour accéder à la pêche ? 
 
14 Identité sociale: Faut-il appartenir à une coopérative ou un groupe pour pêcher le thon ?  
15 Marchés: Comment utilisez-vous votre capture ? (subsistance ? marché?)    
16 Marchés: Pour le poisson vendu, qui sont les clients finaux ?    
17 Marchés: Quel est le circuit du poisson avant d’arriver au marché final ?  
Y a-t-il des collecteurs ? Vente direct ? 
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18 Négociation d'autres relations sociales: avez-vous besoin de contacter ou payer 
quelqu’un pour faciliter la vente de votre poisson ? 
 
19 Revenus : Combien coute le kg du thon au débarquement ?  
20 Revenus : Combien peut-on gagner avec la pêche par semaine/mois?   
21 Revenus : Quel pourcentage du revenu hebdomadaire/mensuel représente le thon quand 
c’est la saison ? 
 
22 Revenus : La pêche au thon est-elle importante pour les locaux ? Pourquoi ?  
23 Accès illicite: Pensez-vous qu’il y a des pêcheurs illégaux? Comment sait-on qu'ils sont 
illégaux ? 
 
24 Etat des Res : Pensez-vous qu’il y a plus ou moins de thon dans les eaux nationales ?  
Pourquoi ? 
 
25 Etat des Res : Combien de kg pêchiez-vous il y a 10 ans 20ans ? d’autres pêcheurs le 
disent-ils?  
 
26 Etat des Res : Quelles sont les causes de la situation actuelle ?  
27 Etat des Res : Quelles seraient les solutions au problème? Quelles actions existent ?  
28 Perspective : Qu’est-ce que vous pensez de l’avenir de la pêche et plus particulièrement 
la pêche au thon ? 
 
29 Région : Connaissez-vous des pêcheurs de la région WIO ?   
30 Région : Travaillez-vous avec des pêcheurs de la région dans le domaine du thon ?  
 
FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
0 Name and position  
 Fisheries socio-economics 
1 How are the different fishing operators managed within the country?  
2 What is the historical and socio-economic context of fishery?  
3 When are the fish present during the year?  
4 How do the movement of the fish influence the management of actors?   
 Access 
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5 What are the access rights  and legal documents required to undertake tuna fishing?   
6 Is there some fishing that is not officially reported to the government/authorities   
7 What gears and technology are used (longline, purse seine, pole and line, gillnets, 
VMS, other?) 
 
8 How is the fishery funded in general (own property, loan, subsidy, other?)  
9 Where do the fish go (subsistence, who do you sell it to as final market clients/others?, 
what journey does it take to arrive in the end market) 
 
10 Does association with a group (specific community, country - national/foreign/EU) 
facilitate  access to the fishery? 
 
11 Who has the authority to allow access to tuna resources at different levels   
 State of the resources 
12 What do you think of the state of tuna resources?   
13 How do build the national catch/state of resources?   
14 Why do you think there is/there is no overfishing?  
15 Do you need to promote your position? If so how?  
 Regional fisheries 
16 What are your interests/what is at stake in the access to the resources?   
17 Could you perceive tuna fishery as providing a regional identity because of its 
movement within the region? 
 
18 Would you have an interest in a regional fishery?  
19 What would be the drivers and/or obstacles to a regional fishery  
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FOR NGO STAFF MEMBERS AND OTHER ACTORS 
0 Name and position   
1 What is the historical and socio-economic context of fishery?   
2 When and how is the fish present during the year?   
3 Where does the fish go ?   
4 What do you think of the state of tuna resources?    
5 How do you build your knowledge on this subject?   
6 Do you think there is/there is no overfishing? Why?   
7 How do you need to promote your positions?    
8 
Could you perceive tuna fishery as providing a regional identity because of its 
movement within the region?   
9 Would you have an interest in a regional fishery?   
10 What would be the drivers and/or obstacles to a regional fishery   
 
  
  295 
Appendix 3: Sample of codes and main trends derived from the Atlas ti. analysis 
Chapters Sample of main codes Major trends 
State of tuna 
resources 
- StateOfRes_less 
- StateOfRes_less_narr 
- StateOfRes_SameOrMore 
StateOfRes_Unknown  
- Less resources 
- Narratives about reduced resources 
- Same or more resources 
- We cannot know 
Access politics - Access2Cap_StateHelp 
- Access2Cap_BoatOwn 
- Access2Know_Exp 
- Access2Lab_Patron 
- Access2Market_LocMar 
- Access2Market_viaInt 
- Access2Tech_Handline 
- Access2Tech_FAD 
- LegalAccess_RoleOfPo 
- EconoBenef_Price 
- MatOfFish_Species 
- MatOfFish_Interaction 
- Importance of state subsidies 
- Individual investment in boats 
- Fishing experience to build knowledge 
- Role of patronage in labour 
- Importance of local markets 
- Role of intermediaries 
- Use of handline in local fishing 
- Use of FAD in various segments 
- Role of policy in legal access 
- Price of tuna sold locally 
- Role of species diversity 
- Interaction between segments as fish 
moves 
Regionalism - RegColl_geopolitics 
- RegColl_betwCountries 
- RegColl_betwFishers 
- Regionalism is linked to geopolitics 
- Regional collaboration between 
countries 
- Regionalism between fishers 
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Appendix 4: Description of gears catching tuna in the WIO 
Gear 
Type 
Gear description Illustration 
Segment of the 
fishery 
Gillnet A wall of netting that hangs in 
the water column, typically made 
of monofilament or 
multifilament nylon 
 
Small-scale or semi-
industrial  
Handline Handlines may be used with or 
without a pole or rod. For fishing 
in deep waters the lines are 
usually operated using reels. The 
gear includes the jigging lines, 
operated by hand  
 
 
Small-scale  
Longline A mainline and snoods with 
baited (occasionally unbaited) 
hooks at regular intervals and 
which is set, in general, on or 
near the bottom  
 
Semi-industrial or 
industrial 
Pole and 
Line 
A hooked line attached to a pole. 
Fishing rods/poles are made of 
wood (including bamboo, also 
constructed of split cane) and 
increasingly of fiberglass 
 
Small-scale or semi-
industrial  
Purse 
seine 
Long wall of netting framed with 
floatline and leadline (usually, of 
equal or longer length than the 
former) and having purse rings 
hanging from the lower edge of 
the gear, through which runs a 
purse line made from steel wire 
or rope which allow the pursing 
of the net 
 
Industrial 
Trolling A line with natural or artificial 
baited hooks and is trailed by a 
vessel near the surface or at a 
certain depth. Several lines are 
often towed at the same time, by 
using outriggers to keep the lines 
away from the wake of the 
vessel. The line are hauled by 
hand or with small winches. 
 
Small-scale or semi-
industrial  
Source: Compilation from FAO 2020 and Gillet 2011 
